MEHROTRA, J.: This is judgment-debtor's appeal. The res­pondent decree-holder got a decree for ejectment of the appellant. There are two main grounds on which the execution is objected to by the present appellant. It is firstly urged by him that after the decree had been obtained, there was a com­promise between the decree-holder and the judg­ment-debtor under which the decree-holder had undertaken not to eject the judgment-debtor for five years and the judgment-debtor was to pay up the rent. In pursuance of the aforesaid agreement, the judgment-debtor had been regularly paying rent. This compromise is set up as a defence to the ejectment of the appellant in execution of the decree. Five years have not so far expired. The court below came to the conclusion that even if the compromise is accepted to have been arrived at between the parties, it cannot be taken notice of in the execution proceedings as it has not been certified under O. 21 R. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are two arguments urged by the counsel for the appellant in this connection. It is firstly urged by him that the compromise is not an adjustment or the discharge of the decree and therefore it was not necessary to get it certified and secondly it is urged by him that on the facts and materials the compromise as alleged by him has been established inasmuch as the judgment-deb­tor paid arrears of rent for the past period. There is no substance in either of these two contentions. So far as the contention of the exis­tence of a compromise is concerned, that is a finding which cannot be challenged in second ap­peal; but even assuming that the finding is in favour of the judgment-debtor, we see no reason to differ from the opinion of the court below that this compromise could not be given effect to in the execution proceeding, unless it has been certi­fied. If it is not an adjustment of the decree, it was an agreement between the parties not to exe­cute the decree itself and if there was any breach on the part of the decree-holder of this agreement, the judgment-debtor may have his remedy, if any, by means of a suit; but if he intends to put it as a defence to the execution of the decree it can only be done on the basis 'hat there was a temporary sus­pension of the execution of the decree for five years and the decree stood satisfied for five years. This was only an adjustment of the decree and unless it was certified, it could not be taken notice of by the executing court. (2) The next contention is that the judgment-debtor is entitled to the protection of S. 5 of the Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 (Assam Act 12 of 1955). Relying upon cer­tain observations made in the case of Harsukh Sarawgi. v. Mashulal Khemani AIR 1957 Assam 22, the court below has held that it is not open to judgment-debtor to get benefit of S. 5 in execu­tion proceedings. Apart from those observations we are inclined to agree with the court below on the interpretation of S. 5 of the Act itself. Sec­tion 5 of the Act provides as follows: "5. v. Mashulal Khemani AIR 1957 Assam 22, the court below has held that it is not open to judgment-debtor to get benefit of S. 5 in execu­tion proceedings. Apart from those observations we are inclined to agree with the court below on the interpretation of S. 5 of the Act itself. Sec­tion 5 of the Act provides as follows: "5. Protection from eviction - (1) Notwith­standing anything in any contract or in any law for the time being in force,- (a) where under the terms of a contract entered into between a landlord and his tenant whether before or after the commence­ment of this Act, a tenant is entitled to build, and has in pursuance of such terms actually built with­in the period of five years from the date of such contract, a permanent structure on the land of the tenancy for residential or business purposes, or where a tenant not being so entitled to build, has actually built any structure on the land of the tenancy for any of the purposes aforesaid with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landlord, the ten­ant shall not be ejected by the landlord from the tenancy except on the ground of non-payment of rent; (b) where a tenant has effected improve­ments on the land of the tenancy under the terms whereof he is not entitled to effect such improve­ments, the tenant shall not be ejected by the land­lord from the land of the tenancy unless com­pensation for reasonable improvements has been paid to the tenant. (2) No tenant shall be ejected by his landlord from the land of the 'tenancy except in execution of a decree for ejectment passed by a competent civil court. (3) No decree for ejectment passed on the ground of non-payment of rent shall be executed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree and if the tenant pays into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree the entire amoun1 payable under the decree within the aforesaid period, the Court shall record the decree as satis­fied." Clause (I) of S. 5 of the Act lays down that n» tenant shall be ejected except on the ground of non-payment of rent; but when cl. (1) is read along with cl. (2) it will be clear that cl. (1) plaices an inhibition on courts to pass decree for ejectment in suits. (1) is read along with cl. (2) it will be clear that cl. (1) plaices an inhibition on courts to pass decree for ejectment in suits. When a decree has already been obtained, then the tenant is not protected from ejectment un­der cl. (1) in execution of the decree. Clause (2) clearly lays down that no tenant shall be ejected by his landlord from the land of the tenancy ex­cept in execution of a decree for ejectment passed by a competent civil court. In cases where the decree has already been obtained through a com­petent court, the tenant can be ejected in execution of the decree and it is not open to the tenant to get benefit of cl. (1) of S. 5. It was very strenuously contended by the counsel for the appellant that the language of cl. (1) is very general and it applies to all kinds of tenants. The legislature has made no distinction between the tenants against whom a decree has already been obtained and the tenants against whom no decree has been obtained and if the legis­lature intended to make such a distinction, it would have used clearer words. Reliance has been, placed on the case. of K. C. Mukherjee v. Mt. Ramratan Kuer, AIR 1936 PC 49. It is true that this court has also held that S. 5 of the Act is retrospective but when cl. (1) is read along with cl. (2), it is clear that the legislature intends to save the application of cl. (1) to the tenants ag­ainst whom decrees have already been obtained. If any other interpretation is given to cl. (1) of S. 5, cl. (2) of the section becomes redundant. In the Privy Council case there were no words so as to-limit the expression of S. 26(N) and (O) and save the application of those sections to the pending-suits. In that case the transferees were given a right to acquire absolute right if they deposited certain money with the Collector within certain time and the argument which advanced in that case was that this right was not given to the tenants ag­ainst whom the suits had already been filed. The Privy Council pointed out that there was nothing in the language of the section itself to imply any such restriction. The Privy Council pointed out that there was nothing in the language of the section itself to imply any such restriction. The right given to a transferee to acquire absolute right on payment of certain money was given to all tenants and no distinction was drawn between the tenants against whom the suit was pending at the date of the suit and other tenants. It was pointed out in that case by the Privy Council that if such an interpretation was put on the language of the section, then it was at the wish of the landlord only to have filed a suit be­tween the period when the Act was actually passed and the period when it became enforceable and thus put an end to the right of the transferee to acquire an absolute right. Such an interpretation could not be put. In the present case, we have given considerable thought to the argument and we think that cl. (2) of S. 5 clearly puts a limit on the applicability of cl. (1) of S. 5 and it clearly takes those tenants against whom decrees have al­ready been obtained outside the purview of the operation of S. 5(1). In this view of the matter, we see no force in this contention either. In the result, therefore, there is no force in this appeal, and it is rejected. (3) We however direct that subject to payment of all arrears of rent, the defendant can have three .months' time to vacate the land. DEKA, J. : (4) I agree with the view expressed by my .learned brother and have very little to add. The only point that I would like to clarify in this con­nection, is in response to an argument advanced by Mr. Shome on the interpretation of cl. (1) of S. 5 of the Assam Act XII of 1955. The material words occurring in that section are- "the tenant shall not be ejected by the landlord from the tenancy" .and Mr. Shome argues that this means that even in execution of a decree the landlord cannot eject the tenant except on the ground of non-payment of rent; - but in my opinion, this construction is not correct, because the same phraseology occurs in both cl. (a) and cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 5. In .cl. Shome argues that this means that even in execution of a decree the landlord cannot eject the tenant except on the ground of non-payment of rent; - but in my opinion, this construction is not correct, because the same phraseology occurs in both cl. (a) and cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 5. In .cl. (b) it is stated that "where a tenant has effected improvements on 'the land of the tenancy under the terms whereof he is not entitled to effect such improvements, the tenant shall not be ejected by the landlord from 'he •land of the tenancy unless compensation for rea­sonable improvements has been paid to the ten­ant." 'The compensation has to be ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction and it is not that the landlord can assess the compensation arbitrarily and then ask for ejectment of the tenant on payment thereof. In both the clauses above-mentioned, it is clear that the decree must be of the court itself directing ejectment and for payment of com­pensation also when the case comes under cl. (b). These functions cannot be arrogated to an executing court and therefore sub-s. (1) of S. 5 cannot in any sense have application to an execution of the de­cree cither retrospectively or prospectively. (5) The reasons given by Ram Labhaya J. in the case reported in AIR 1957 Assam 22 (ibid) are also cogent though obiter. His Lordship clearly •expressed the view as to whether one can avail of the remedies under S. 5 at the execution stage, even though that was not a point at issue and the reasons given are in the following words: "An executing Court cannot go- behind the de­cree. Nor can it re-open the matter at that stage. There is no express provision conferring power on the executing Court to entertain a plea by which liability to ejectment could be disputed on the ground of the provisions contained in S. 5 of the Act. Clause (2) of S. 5 seems also to indicate that the decree passed by a competent Civil Court remains executable. There is no express provision conferring power on the executing Court to entertain a plea by which liability to ejectment could be disputed on the ground of the provisions contained in S. 5 of the Act. Clause (2) of S. 5 seems also to indicate that the decree passed by a competent Civil Court remains executable. These observations are made merely to indicate that though the Act may apply to pending actions, it does not necessarily follow that it applies to pending executions also." It is clear on a perusal of the section itself that section 5(1) of the Act is not intended to be given effect to in execution of a decree, - no matter whenever a decree is passed. The appeal there­fore fails. Appeal dismissed.