JUDGMENT 1. 1. This is an application for writ under Article 226 of the Constitution by Mahmuddin Nisa Begum in a matter relating to her maintenance and arises under the following circumstances:- The petitioner is the widow of the late Nawabzada Abdul Hafeez Khan, who was admittedly the pre-deceased eldest son of and the heir apparent to His Highness Mohammed Ibrahim Ah Khan, Nawab of Tonk. We shall refer to this gentleman as Nawabzada for the sake of convenience. The status of the Nawabzada, therefore, 1 admittedly remained that of a Jagirdar of the former State of Tonk. The Nawabzada had married four wives including the petitioner, who was his second wife and he had no issue from her. Respondent No. 3 Mouinuddin Khan is the eldest son and heir of the Nawabzada and held the Jagir of Piplu until it was resumed sometime in the middle of 1950. The petitioner made an application for her maintenance under Section 27 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (No, VI of 1952), hereinafter called the Act. The Deputy Collector, Jagir, dismissed the petitioner's application by his order, dated the 24th of July, 1956. This application was opposed by Respondent No. 3 on a number of grounds which we consider it un-necessary to enumerate for the purposes of the present application. Thereafter the petitioner male another application to the Additional Jagir Commissioner, who recommended that the petitioner should be granted a sum of Rs. 150/- as maintenance allowance out of the compensation payable in respect of the Jagir of Piplu to Respondent No. 3, The jagir Commissioner after hearing both the parties accepted this recommendation to the extent that he provisionally fixed a sum of Rs ICO P.M. as maintenance allowance for petitioner. This order is dated the 26th of December, 1957 and is document No. 5. Respondent No. 3 then went in appeal to the Board of Revenue and by their order, dared the 19ih of March, 1958, the appeal was allowed, the order of the Jag r Commissioner was set aside and the petitioner's claim was rejected. The present application has been filed against that order. 2. The main contention of the petitioner is that the interpretation put upon Section 27 of the Act by the learned members of the Revenue Board is incorrect and should therefore, be quashed. The present application has been filed against that order. 2. The main contention of the petitioner is that the interpretation put upon Section 27 of the Act by the learned members of the Revenue Board is incorrect and should therefore, be quashed. It may be pointed out in this connection that the learned members in rejecting the petitioner's claim in this case relied on an earlier decision of theirs in a similar matter in Shri Budh Singh Mehta v. Mehta Chancha Singh 1557 R.R. D. 201. The question which arose before the Board was whether Section 27 of the Act authorises the Jagir Commissioner to entertain a claim T.r maintenance allowance by the dependant of a Jagirdar if he was not in receipt of any such allowance at the time of the resumption of Jagir. It was argued before them that the language of the section was wide enough to include persons not only actually receiving the allowance at the time of the resumption of the grant but also those who were cot receiving any, though they were, or would have been entitled to receive it under icy existing Jagir law. What the learned members said in this connection was this. "If this provision was alone on the point in the Act the argument would have been sound but there are other provisions equally potent which reveal the intention of the legislature and had to a different conclusion. The first factor to be considered by the Jagir Commissioner in this section is the amount of maintenance allowance which the claimant used to receive from the Jagirdar before the date of resumption. The appellant's contention is that this factor being assigned the topmost priority in the section makes it clear that unless the claimant satisfied this ingredient, he cannot be allowed any allowance under the Act. This argument finds full support from the provisions of rule 37 D. The headline of this rule is "inquiry in respect of persons in receipt of maintenance allowance." The scope is thus evidently restricted to those persons alone who are actually in recept of maintenance allowance. Sub rule 2 of this rule makes this intention clear beyond all possibilities of ambiguity. Sub rule 2 of this rule makes this intention clear beyond all possibilities of ambiguity. After receipt of application in Form 11 the Collector is required to ask the Jagirdar to state if he has any objection in respect of the facts mentioned in the application and in particular in respect of the continuance of the maintenance allowance. If the Jagirdar fails to file any objections, it is provided in the rule that "it shall be presumed that he has no objection to the maintenance allowance stated in the application being continued and deducted cut of the compensation and rehabilitation giant payable to him." This rule, therefore, confines itself to the inquiry in respect of persons actually receiving the allowance and provides a procedure whereby the Jagirdar ran raise objections to the continuance of the allowance and failing which the presumption against the Jagirdar would be that he has no objection to the continuance of that allowance. There is nothing in this rule or any other rule prescribing a procedure for inquiry and decision in claims from those persons who are not receiving any allowance at the time of the resumption but come forward alter the resumption to claim the same out of the compensation to be paid to the Ex-Jagirdar. The reason is not far to seek. The Act provides for the resumption of Jagirs and for that matter makes provision for the liquidation of the liabilities of the Jagirdar as existing at the time of resumption, a.g., maintenance allowances, payments to religious institutions, pension to employees and debts due from a Jagirdar. All other civil liabilities outstanding against the Jagirdar after the resumption of the grant can be determined only by competent authorities in common with other members of the general public.................we find that the rules as they stand clearly confine themselves to the consideration of those claims alone where persons are already in receipt of maintenance allowances and thereby definitely exclude from their purview those cases where no such allowances are actually being received, The provisions of Form 11 may be examined in this context. Item 5 of this form relates to the amount of maintenance drawn by the claimant at present whether it is paid monthly, six monthly or yearly. Item 6 is as below: "if no maintenance allowance is received at present, state the maintenance allowance claimed." 3. Item 5 of this form relates to the amount of maintenance drawn by the claimant at present whether it is paid monthly, six monthly or yearly. Item 6 is as below: "if no maintenance allowance is received at present, state the maintenance allowance claimed." 3. An inquiry upon this form is prescribed in R. 37-D. As pointed out above, there is nothing in R. 37-D in respect of claimants who are not receiving any allowance at present. The irresistible inference, therefore, is that the Legislature intended that such claims ought to be determined by a competent court should be treated at par with similar claims arising against persons other than Ex-Jagirdars............ The jurisdiction of the civil courts doss not stand barred in such cases by the provisions contained in the Act. We, therefore, hold that the learned Jagir Commissioner had no jurisdiction to determine the maintenance allowance of the respondent for tire reason that he was not in receipt of any allowance at the time of Resumption of the grant................" 4. The question for determination before us is whether the aforesaid interpretation of Sec 27 is correct. Section 27 reads as fellows: "(l) Any reason who, under any existing jagir law, is entitled to receive a maintenance allowance out of the income of any jagir, shall be entitled to receive, out of the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to the Jagirdar such amount for maintenance annually as the Jagir Commissioner may fix after taking into consideration, (i) the amount of maintenance allowance which that person used to receive from the jagirdar before the date of resumption; (ii) the net income of the jagirdar from the jagir at the time of fixing the raid maintenance allowance; (iii) the net amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant fay to the jagirdar, and (iv) such other matters as mar be prescribed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained m sub-Sec. (1), the Government may, in the case of a widow who is entitled to such maintenance allowance, continue to pay to her out of the Consolidated Fund of the State the whole or any part of the maintenance allowance during her life-time even after the full compensation and rehabilitation grant payable under this Act have been paid to the jagirdar". 5. The expression "existing jagir law" as defined in clause (d) of Section 2. 5. The expression "existing jagir law" as defined in clause (d) of Section 2. of the Act means any Act, Ordinance, regulation, rule, order, resolution, notification or bye-law relating to jagirs or jagirdars in force in the whole or any part of the State at the commencement of this Act and includes (i) any custom or usage, relating to such jagirs or jagirdars prevailing at the commencement of this Act in the whole or any part of the State and having the force of law, and (ii) the terms and conditions contained in any order or instrument granting or recognising the grant of a jagir. Now reading these two provisions together, we wish to point out at the very outset that the language of Section 27 is quite plain and unambiguous. Again it is well-settled that a fundamental rule for the interpretation of a statute is that what the court should do is to apply its mind to the particular provision of a statute which it is called upon to interpret and put that interpretation on it which its language plainly and naturally bears uninfluenced by any a prior considerations. We may add that where the language of a statute is obscure, or it is open to more meanings than one, then it may be necessary to resort to extraneous aids such as the state of the preexisting law and the consideration of cognate provisions and the like, but where that is not the case, we have no doubt that there can be hardly any necessity or justification for trying to seek the meaning of the provision elsewhere, except by putting the plain meaning on the words used by the Legislature itself. (See Craies on Statute Law, 1952 Edition, Pages 63-66). 6. Applying this test to the present case, we have no doubt that the language of Section 27 is plain enough. It provides for the grant to the dependants of a jagirdar of maintenance allowance from the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to the jagirdar when his jagir has been resumed. It is further provided by the section that such a person before he can be held entitled to receive such maintenance, must be entitled to receive it under any existing jagir law at the date of the resumption of the jagir. It is further provided by the section that such a person before he can be held entitled to receive such maintenance, must be entitled to receive it under any existing jagir law at the date of the resumption of the jagir. The section nowhere provides (in addition to what has been pointed out above) that the claimant should also have been in receipt of any maintenance allowance out of the income of the jagir concerned at the date of the resumption of the jagir. It is true that the section further provides for certain factors which the Jagir Commissioner while fixing the amount of the maintenance allowance claimed must keep in view, and these have been specified in the four clauses appended to the section, the first thereof being the amount of maintenance allowance which the claimant used to receive from the jagirdar before the date of resumption. It is this factor which seems to have principally weighed with the learned members of the Revenue Board in interpreting this section in the manner which commended itself to them and so to require the maintenance out of the income of the jagir under any law or custom but he should also have been in actual receipt of the same at the date of the resumption of the jagir, We should like to point out, however, that this approach to the interpretation of the section in question cannot be accepted as correct, for the main body of the section plainly requires this and no more that before a person can be entitled to receive a maintenance out of the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to a jagirdar, he must have been entitled to receive a maintenance allowance cut of the income of that jagir, and whether he is so entitled or not, again, under the plain language of the section, has got to be determined in the light of any 'existing jagir law'. The definition of 'existing jagir law'as set out above is a very wide one, and it may be that the claimant is entitled to a maintenance under any statutory law in force in the whole or any part of the State at the commencement of this Act or he may be entitled to such maintenance in accordance with any custom or usage relating to such jagirs prevailing at the commencement of the Act and which has the force of law. What we wish to point out is that so far as the plain language of this section goes, therefore, all that the claimant is required to establish is that he was entitled to receive a maintenance allowance out of the income of the jagir in question under a statute or in accordance with the custom relating to a jagir, and, once he does so, it is further provided that he shall be entitle to receive a suitable maintenance Out of the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to the jagirdar. It is true that the section itself provides that in fixing the amount of the maintenance allowance, certain matters may be taken into consideration, these matters being, (i) the amount of the maintenance allowance which that person used to receive from the jagirdar before the date of resumption; (ii) the net income of the jagirdar from the jagir at the time of fixing the maintenance allowance; (iii) the net amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to the jagirdar; and (iv) any other matters that may be prescribed. It is obvious that the matters specifically mentioned in the first three clauses of the section are illustrative and not exhaustive and, therefore, the Legislature thought fit to provide under clase (iv) that any ether matters may be taken into consideration which may be prescribed. It is obvious that the matters specifically mentioned in the first three clauses of the section are illustrative and not exhaustive and, therefore, the Legislature thought fit to provide under clase (iv) that any ether matters may be taken into consideration which may be prescribed. Why the Legislature provided under the first clause or sub Sec. (1) of Section 27 that the maintenance already received by the dependent of a jagirdar should be taken into consideration, would be obvious when we point out that there would certainly be a large number of cases where such dependants would already have been in receipt of such allowances, and in such cases it would be quite natural that the quantum thereof must be taken into consideration where such allowance is sought to be claimed from the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable from the jagir after the jagir is resumed. From this, however, it is hardly legitimate to conclude that the section provides for the grant of allowances to such persons only, and not to other persons who may be entitled according to law to receive maintenance but have rot been in receipt.thereof. It would be entirely incorrect, therefore, to read any limitation into the main body of this section because of clause (a), while such a limitation has not been provided for in the main body of the section. Having regard to the plain tenor of the section, we are unable to import into the section any such further qualification that before a person can be held entitled to receive any compensation, he must have bean in receipt thereof at the date of resumption of the jagir. For one thing, it should have been quite easy for the Legislature to have worded the section differently if that was its intention. For another, to put such an interpretation the section would be tantamount to introducing words into the section which are not there and which on well settled principles relating to the interpretation of statutes, it is certainly not our business to introduce therein. For another, to put such an interpretation the section would be tantamount to introducing words into the section which are not there and which on well settled principles relating to the interpretation of statutes, it is certainly not our business to introduce therein. If we were, therefore, to accept the interpretation adopted by the learned members of the Revenue board as the correct one, we would be compelled to read some such words into this section, to with and was in receipt thereof at the date of the resumption of jagir', before the expression shall be 'entitled to receive', but these words are net there at all, and there was nothing to prevent the Legislature from putting them into the section if that was what they had intended. With great respect, therefore, to the members of the Revenue Beard, we are unable to hold that the interpretation put by them upon this section is correct on a plain reading of the language of the section itself. 7. We are not unaware that the learned members filer somewhat fortified in the interpretation which they put on section 27 by the language of r. 37-D, made under the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagir Rules, 1954. It is true that this rule bears the heading, "Inquiry in respect of persons in receipt of maintenance allowance", and then proceeds to lay down, as down, as follows: "For the purpose of determining the persons entitled to receive the maintenance allowance and the amount to be paid to them under Section 27, the Jagir Commissioner shall, (after the resumption of a jagir), by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette and in one or more important newspapers circulating in Rajasthan, call upon persons who under any existing jagir law are entitled to receive such maintenance allowance and who are desirous of receiving it out of the compensation to be paid to the jagirdar to apply to the Collector of the district in which the headquarters of the jagir ate situated. The application shall be submitted in duplicate in Form No. 11. The application shall be submitted in duplicate in Form No. 11. If no such application is submitted within the period mentioned in the notification, it shall be presumed that the parson entitled to receive a maintenance allowance is not desirous his maintenance allowance under the Act." Sub-rule (2) tier provides that where an application in Form No. 11 has been received, the Collector shall forward a copy of the an note the jagirdar, asking him to state within a period of one month from the date of the receipt of the same if he has any objection to it. The jagirdar may then raise an objection. In such a case, he must give full reasons for the stand taken by him. If no objections ate received from the jagirdar within the specified period, it shall be presumed that he has no objection to the maintenance allowance claimed by the claimant. Sub rule (3) further provides that whether any objections have been received or not from the jagirdar under sub R. (2), the Collector shall hold such inquiry as he may deem necessary in respect of the persons entitled to receive the maintenance allowance under Section 27 and the amount to be paid to them, and shall forward his recommendation to the Jagir Commissioner, who may after such inquiry or further inquiry as he may deem necessary, fix the amount of maintenance allowance under Sec, 27 of the Act. There are some further provisions in this connection contained in sub R. (4) and (5) but we are not concerned with them for the purposes of this ease. 8. We may in this connection also refer to Form No. 11 prescribed by the rules under R. 37 D. This form relates to the application for grant of maintenance allowance from jagir income. Col. 4 of this form requires the claimant to state the nature of his relationship with the jagirdar. In Col. 5, the applicant has to state what amount of maintenance, in cash or kind, he had been Drawing before the resumption of the jagir, & whether It was monthly six monthly or yearly. Col. 6 then is worded as follows:- 'If no maintenance is received at present, state the amount of maintenance allowance claimed. We have given the material portions of R. 37-D and of Form No. 11. Col. 6 then is worded as follows:- 'If no maintenance is received at present, state the amount of maintenance allowance claimed. We have given the material portions of R. 37-D and of Form No. 11. as these seem to us to have weighed considerably with the learned members of the Revenue Board in coming to the conclusion to which they did. It seems to us that this rule lays down the general procedure in the matter of determining any maintenance allowances payable to the dependants of a jagirdar after the jagir has been resumed, & what it provides in this connection is that the Jagir Commissioner shall issue a notification both in the Stale Gazette, and in certain well known newspapers, calling upon the dependants of the jagirdar concerned whose jagir has been resumed to apply to the Collector of the district in which the headquarters of the Jagir are situated for maintenance, and thereafter the necessary subsequent steps have to be taken as already set out above. What we wish to emphasise is that even under this rule the person who have to at ply are those who are entitled to receive such maintenance under any existing jagir law a id who are of course destroys of receiving i it. A careful and critical examination of this rule will also show that it nowhere requires that the parson applying must have been in receipt of the maintenance at the date of the resumption of the Jagir. As for the heading or the marginal note of this rule, namely Inquiry in respect of persons in receipt of maintenance allowance', we have no hesitation in saying that this heading is misleading, and in any case, it cannot be so used as to control or cut down from the plain meaning of the rule, much less the section for the fulfilment of the purposes of which the rule has been framed. In the I. T. Commr. v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 134 it was held that : "... ... ... In the I. T. Commr. v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 134 it was held that : "... ... ... marginal notes in an Indian statute as in an Act of Parliament, can not be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute..." Again in Nal nakhya v. Shyam Sunder A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 148 , it was observed that a marginal note can not be allowed to control the meaning of the body of the section if the language employed therein is clear and unambiguous and that if the language of the section was clear, then it may be that thee is an accidental slip in the marginal note rather than that the marginal note is correct and the accidental slip is in the body of the section itself. The law is, therefore, well settled in our country as in England that the marginal note of a provision of law can under no circumstances be allowed to control the meaning of the body of the provision whether it is contained in a section of the Act or a rule made under the Act. 9. As we have analysed the whole position, there is hardly any in consistency between section 27 and r 37-D because both of them plainly envisage the case of a person entitled to receive maintenance under the existing law and a discordant rote, if at all, is struck by the marginal note only. There is, therefore, no want of harmony between the main provision in the Act and the rule framed by the Government to tarry out the purpose thereof. We wish, however, to take the opportunity of pointing out that even if the rule said something differently from the provision contained in the Act, it is the latter which would prevail and not the rule. We wish, however, to take the opportunity of pointing out that even if the rule said something differently from the provision contained in the Act, it is the latter which would prevail and not the rule. Assuming, though not conceding for the purposes of argument, that the rule confines itself to an inquiry in respect of persons actually in receipt of maintenance allowance, we wish to point out that the proper method of interpretation would be to hold that the rule itself cannot control the language of the Act, and it is the language of the Act which must prevail whole the latter is plain and unambiguous, the reason being that the rules are made to subserve the purposes of the Act and not that the Act is made for the purpose of carrying out the requirements of the rules. The method, there ore, which seems to have found favour with the learned members of the Board in the interpretation of section 27 on their supposed reading of r. 37-D cannot be accepted as correct. As we have, how ever, pointed out above, there is no disharmony whatsoever between the main provision contained in s, 27 and the body of r. 37-D, and it is only the marginal note of the rule which is mi=leading and wrong, being in conflict with both the section and the rule. We have no hesitation in saying that the said marginal note is unhappily worded and is of no consequence and can not be allowed to restrict the true scope of the rule to which it is appended, much less the section itself. We are also not impressed by the argument which further seems to have found favour with the learned members of the Board that no procedure has been provided for inquiry and decision as to claims made by persons, who though entitled to receive a maintenance, may not have been in the enjoyment of the same at the time of the resumption, but choose to come forward alter the resumption to claim maintenance out of the compensation payable to the ex-jagirdar. Indeed, we fully appreciate that claimants for such maintenance may be persons,who being entitled thereto were already in receipt of it or they may be persons, who for reasons which are not inconceivable, may not have been in receipt of them for the simple reason that such an occasion did not arise before, for reasons entirely outside the control of the claimant. On a careful examination of the provisions of the rule, we are called upon to interpret, we have no doubt that the rule contemplates an inquiry into both kinds of claims and not merely one of them. It is true that where a person has been in receipt of a maintenance from before, he must mention the same and under sub-r. (2), the jagirdar has been given an opportunity to file his objection, if any, in respect of the continuance thereof and where no objection is received from the jagirdar, it shall be presumed that he has no objection to the maintenance allowance being continued and deducted out of the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to the jagirdar. This is all right so far as it goes. There is, however, sub-r. (3) which furthur provides that the Collector shall, whether any objection have been received or not from a jagirdar under sub-r. (2), hold such inquiry as he may deem necessary in respect of the persons entitled to receive the maintenance allowance under section 27 and the amount to be paid to them and shall then forward his recommendation to the Jagir Commissioner, who may after such further inquiry as he may consider necessary, fix the amount of maintenance allowance under s 27 of the Act. We wish to point out that even if sub-r. (2) does not cover the case of a person who may not be in actual receipt of maintenance allowance, the language of sub-r. (3) is wide enough to cover this class of cases and "here again, be it noted, that the Collector is called upon to hold such inquiry as he may deem necessary in respect of the persons entitled to receive the maintenance allowance under section 27 and the amount to be paid to them." The inquiry contemplated under sub-r. (3) may be both with respect to the title of the claimant to receive the maintenance in accordance with any existing law which, as already stated, is inclusive of custom having the force of law, as also with respect to the amount of the maintenance allowance payable to such a person. On a careful reading, therefore, of the entire rule, we are clearly of opinion that there is nothing in it which militates against the view, that persons who may not have been in actual receipt of a maintenance allowance may make an application for it, being granted to them under section 27 of the Act, provided that they are entitled to receive the same under any existing jagir law as defined in the Act. 10. We next propose to consider Form No. 11 prescribed under r. 37-D of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Rules, 1954. This form appears also to have been taken into consideration by the learned Members of the Revenue Board in Budh Singh's case (l) and they have also referred to Col. 6 of this form, apart from Col. 5. Col. 5 obviously relates to those cases in which maintenance allowance was drawn at the time of the resumption of a jagir-Col 6 then is in these terms: 'If no maintenance allowance is received at present, state the amount of the maintenance allowance claimed.' This requirement to our mind indicates another reason why the interpretation put by the learned Members of the Board on section 27 cannot be accepted as correct. For if section 27 is to relate only to those claimants who have been in receipt of a maintenance allowance at the date of the resumption of the Jagir and also the inquiry under r. 37-D was to be confined to such cases, there was hardly any sense in requiring a I claimant to state what amount of maintenance he wished to claim even where he I was not in receipt of any maintenance before the resumption of the jagir, or the making I of his application. We are clearly of opinion that this an additional reason for rejecting the interpretation put on section 27 by the learned members of the Board, and for upholding the interpretation which we have thought fit to put on it, as discussed I above. We hold accordingly. 11. We pause here to point out the dominating objective underlying the enactment of section 27 to our mind clearly is to make a reasonable provision for the dependants of an expropriated jagirdar in the way of their maintenance, so that they may not be left completely stranded owing to the resumption of the jagir from the income whereof they were generally speaking being maintained by the jagirdar before the resumption whereof and to which benefit they were entitled according to law or a valid custom having the force of law. Such dependants may have been receipt of separate maintenance allowances from the jagirdar or the might have been living with the jagirdar and be joint with him in mess and residence, but once the jagir was resumed, it may no longer be possible for the jagirdar to maintain them as he did while he was in enjoyment of his jagir, or there may have come into existence a member or members in the family who would be entitled to receive maintenance from the jagirdars just on the eve of the resumption of the jagir. The Legislature in its wisdom has, therefore, thought fit to provide a machinery under section 27 and the rules framed thereunder whereby a reasonable provision can be made for the maintenance of all such persons, the one important limitation being that such persons must be entitled to receive maintenance from the income of the jagir. The Legislature in its wisdom has, therefore, thought fit to provide a machinery under section 27 and the rules framed thereunder whereby a reasonable provision can be made for the maintenance of all such persons, the one important limitation being that such persons must be entitled to receive maintenance from the income of the jagir. If there are other dependants of the jagirdar who may have been receiving assistance from the jagirdar, but all the same who were not entitled to receive any maintenance from him under any law or custom, such persons would, of course, be rot entitled to the benefit of section 27. But where the dependants in any given case are of the category of persons entitled to receive a maintenance allowance from the jagirdar out of his jagir according to law or custom as the case may be, than this, in our opinion, is enough to attract the benefit of section 27 and is not further necessary that before their claim for the maintenance can be recognised and granted, they must also show as a pre-condition that they were in receipt of such maintenance at the date of the resumption of the jagir. That this is the meaning of the provision we are called upon to consider, will also be obvious if we illustrate our meaning by a simple example. Suppose a son is born to a jagirdar, whose jagir has been resumed, just a moment before the resumption of the jagir. The question is whether such a person would be entitled to the maintenance out of the jagir income. Obviously, the infant sin of the jagirdar may not have been in receipt of any maintenance from his father's jagir. If the correct interpretation of section 27 were that which the learned Members of the Revenue Board have put on it, than it seems to us that such a person would have to claim whatsoever for the grant of a maintenance after the resumption of the jagir for the simple reason that he was not in receipt of any maintenance allowance on the eve of the resumption of the jagir. We have no manner of doubt, however, that this could not be the meaning of the provision under consideration and that was why the Legislature in its wisdom laid down the simple qualification for a dependant of the jagirdar to claim maintenance out of the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to the latter namely that such dependant should be a person who was entitled to receive maintenance from the income of the jagir prior to resumption thereof under any statutory law or under any custom having the force of law. From the foregoing discussions, our conclusion is that the interpretation put by the learned Members of the Revenue Board on section 27 of the Act namely that in order to entitle a person to receive a maintenance allowance cut of the income of any jagir of the jagirdar from the compensation and rehabilitation giant payable to him, he must net only be a person entitled to receive a maintenance allowance out of the income of the jagir but he must have also been in actual receipt of such maintenance, at the date of the resumption of the jag r, is not borne out by a careful examination of the language of the section and is, therefore, incorrect, and we hold accordingly. 12. Our attention has been drawn in this connection to another decision of the Board in Hanuman Singh v. Amar Singh 1959 R.LW. (R.S.) 1958(29) R.R D. 210. The appellants in the case where the chhutbhaiyas of a thikana in the former State of Bikaner. By certain orders of His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner, the appellants had been granted a certain amount of maintenance. It however, appears tint these chhutbhaiyas were not in receipt of these allowances from the thikana at the time the parent jagir was resumed. The Jagir Commissioner rejected the appellants claim for maintenance, and reliance seems to have been placed by him among other grounds on the division of the Revenue Board in Budh Singh case. It however, appears tint these chhutbhaiyas were not in receipt of these allowances from the thikana at the time the parent jagir was resumed. The Jagir Commissioner rejected the appellants claim for maintenance, and reliance seems to have been placed by him among other grounds on the division of the Revenue Board in Budh Singh case. When the matter came in appeal before the Revenue Board, however, Budh Singh's case was distinguished with the following observations: "That case can be easily distinguished from the present one "in that case the question of maintenance was never raised or decided by any competent authority prior to the resumption of the Jagir and it was on this basis that it was held that no maintenance could be allowed under the provisions of the Act. In the present case it is clear that the appellants had been adjudged eligible to a maintenance allowance first by the Mehktna Council of the Bikaner State and subsequently by the Ruler of the Bikaner State in 1918. The fact that no payments were actually made would not detract from the value of this decision as otherwise it would amount to placing a premium on deliberate nonpayment by the Thikana In the present case it appears that non-payment was to some extent due to the non-completion of survey proceedings in the Thikana. Thus to our minds there is a clear distinction in a case where maintenance allowance has been adjudged to be paid by a competent authority but has not been actually paid and where the question of maintenance allowance was neither raised before nor decided by any competent authority prior to the resumption of the jagir. The contention raised before us is untenable." The effect of this decision, to our minds, is more or less a departure from the rule laid down in Budhsingh's case. In the earlier case, it was clearly held, as already discussed above, by the Board that before the claim of the dependant of a jagirdar for a maintenance allowance from the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to him on the resumption of his jagir can be accepted, he must have been in receipt of such allowance at the date of the resumption of the jagir. In Hanuman Singh's case where the last mentioned observations were made, the learned members distinguished the earlier case by saying that a case where a dependant was adjudged entitled to a maintenance allowance, though he was not in receipt of such allowance at the date of the resumption of the jagir stood on a different footing from a case where such a claim was neither raised nor recognised before by any competent authority prior to the resumption of the jagir. On a most careful and anxious consideration of the whole matter, however, we are unable to agree with the line of distinction adopted in Hanuman Singh's case. In our considered opinion, the simple requirement of s 27 is whether the dependant who claims maintenance was or was not entitled under a statutory law or a custom having the force of law to any maintenance from the income of the jagir prior to its resumption, and if he so was, he would be entitled to receive maintenance even after the resumption of the jagir. the amount thereof being dependent on various considerations laid down in the section itself and this position is not at all materially affected by the consideration whether his claim has been adjudged to be corrected by any competent authority before the resumption of the jagir or it has not been so adjudged, and more than whether he has been in receipt of such allowance before the resumption of the jagir or not. The material requirement is the right or title to receive such allowance from the jagir income under any ex sting law or custom as defined in the Act at the date of the resumption of the jagir. If he has such a right, section 27 recognises it. If on the other hand, he does not have such a right then he cannot claim it. This is the plain effect of section 27 as already discussed above. 13. If he has such a right, section 27 recognises it. If on the other hand, he does not have such a right then he cannot claim it. This is the plain effect of section 27 as already discussed above. 13. On the interpretation of section 27 which has commended itself to us, we may as well point out at this place that the authorities appointed under the Act appear to us to have exclusive jurisdiction to take cognizance of and adjudicate on all claims falling within the ambit of section 27 including the claims of the category we have before us in this case, by virtue of section 46 of the Act which presents a complete bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil or the Revenue Courts to deal with or decide them, in as much as it clearly lays down that (save as otherwise provided in the Act) no Civil or Revenue Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act and further that an order made by any such officer or authority shall not be called in question in any court. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision elsewhere in the Act which saves the jurisdiction of the Civil or the Revenue courts in his connection. Consequently the bar of section 46 fully applies in the present case and the Jagir Commissioner alone has the authority in law to adjudicate on such claims subject of course to an appeal to the Revenue Board under section 39 read with section 32 of the Act. We hold accordingly. 14. Lastly, it was strenuously contended before us on behalf of the contesting respondent that, even on our interpretation of section 27, the present petitioner would not be entitled to claim any maintenance from the compensation payable to the contesting respondent, because her claim for the same stood rejected by an order of His Highness the Nawab of Tonk by certain orders passed in 1928 and 1934 and, therefore, it could not possibly be revived now. Certified copies of certain orders have been brought on our record in support of this contention. Certified copies of certain orders have been brought on our record in support of this contention. We, however, find that these documents 'did not engage the attention of the learned members of the Board at 'all and no finding has been given either by them or by the Jagir Commissioner on this aspect of the case. As we look at the matter, this argument relates to the merits of the case and not to the question of jurisdiction on which ground alone the hoard rejected the petitioner's claim, and it is not our function to make any pronouncement upon this contention in the exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction and in any case at this stage and we give the contesting respondent liberty to raise this question if he so chooses, when the case goes back to the Revenue Board for a fresh decision on the merits and it will be for the Board to decide it in accordance with law. 15. In this view of the matter, we allow this application, set aside the order of the Revenue Board, dated the 19th of March, 1958, as being erroneous on a question of jurisdiction, and holding that the Jagir Commissioner had proper jurisdiction, to entertain the petitioner's claim under section 27 of the Act, we hereby send the case back to the Board for disposing of it on the merits. In all the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. *******