Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. This appeal is preferred from the order of the Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga, dated 24-3-1956, pronouncing judgment according to the award. The appellant and the respondents are members of a joint Hindu family, and there is np. dispute that both had half share each in the joint family properties. In partition suit No. 14/5 of 1945/46, a decree for partition of the joint family properties was passed and in fact the properties were divided, and both parties came in separate possession of their respective shares carved put by the final decree. It appears that this partition decree did not finally terminate the dispute between the parties and cordial relations were not restored. It is alleged that Haris Chandra Jha, father-in-law of Sitaram Jha, respondent No. 4, and Madhav Jha, father-in-law of the appellant, Sitaram Jha, were on inimical terms, and in order to feed fat their own grudge they disturbed the cordial relations, in consequence of which several criminal cases cropped up, instituted by one or the other party. Eventually, their disputes were referred to the arbitration of three persons, namely, Jatadhari Missir, Thakuri Jha and Kedarnath Missir. The arbitrators gave their written award on 26-7-1953. Later on, the award was transcribed on a stamp paper on 12-9-1953, which was duly registered on 14-9-1953. It is in accordance with this award that that decree has been passed and it is this award which is impugned. The appellant filed an application under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the award on the grounds that the arbitration agreement dated 13-5-1953, was not genuine, that his thumb-impression was obtained on blank papers under coercion and misrepresentation and these papers were subsequently converted into a document which is now called arbitration agreement, that there was no compromise before the arbitrators, that the arbitrators misconducted themselves, that the award has been improperly procured and that the award was otherwise invalid. 2. All these points were negatived by the learned Subordinate Judge. He held that the arbitration agreement was genuine and was duly executed by the parties after full comprehension of its contents. He further held that the arbitrators held tegular sittings, and after taking evidence of the parses and considering their respective cases gave the award and that they had not misconducted themselves in the proceeding. He held that the arbitration agreement was genuine and was duly executed by the parties after full comprehension of its contents. He further held that the arbitrators held tegular sittings, and after taking evidence of the parses and considering their respective cases gave the award and that they had not misconducted themselves in the proceeding. He further held that the award given by the arbitrators was not in excess of their authority. In short, he held that the award was legal, valid and binding upon the parties. 3. In support of this appeal, learned counsel for the appellant raised three contentions. In the first place, he contended that the award that was registered was not the award that was delivered on 26th July, 1953. and therefore, the entire award was invalid. It is urged that after the award was pronounced on 26th July, 1953, the arbitrators became functus officio, and they could not give any fresh award. Therefore, the award dated the 14th July, 1953, was legally invalid. It is true that the written award that was delivered on 26th July, 1953, was not actually presented for registration before the registering officer. In fact, it could not have been so presented, as it was written on a rough piece of paper. The entire award was freshly written on a stamp paper on 12th September, 1953, and that award was eventually registered on 14th September 1953. There is no difference between the written award dated 26-7-1953 and the registered award dated 14-9-1953. It was merely the original award which was re-written on the stamp paper. Both are substantially the same. It is not a case of subsequent alteration or modification of the award originally delivered, nor is it a case where a fresh decision was given. For the purposes of registration it was necessary to write out an award on a stamp paper, and it is exactly what was done in the present case. The question is whether on this ground the award can be impugned as invalid. It is manifest that what was done on 12th September 1953, was not that a separate decision was given by the arbitrators but the original award was engrossed on a stamp paper. It was merely a ministerial act, necessitated by the provisions of the Registration Act. The question is whether on this ground the award can be impugned as invalid. It is manifest that what was done on 12th September 1953, was not that a separate decision was given by the arbitrators but the original award was engrossed on a stamp paper. It was merely a ministerial act, necessitated by the provisions of the Registration Act. As laid down by their Lordships of the Bombay High Court in Parshotamdas V/s. Kekhushru Bapuji, AIR 1934 Bom 6, where an award is passed, the writing out of it on a stamp paper, which would be necessary before it could be filed in Court, is merely a ministerial act. To the same effect is the decision of a Bench of this Court in Chhati Lal V/s. Ram Charitar, AIR 1941 Pat 215. Learned Counsel particularly referred in this connection to a decision of this Court in Deep Narain V/s. Mt. Dhaneshwari, 1959 Pat LR 262: ( AIR 1960 Pat 201 ). This case is clearly distinguishable. In this case, the award had been amended and altered. In these circumstances, it was held that the arbitrators became functus officio. This is not the case here. All that was done was that the original award was engrossed on a stamp paper. This contention, in my opinion, is devoid of merit and must be overruled. 4. Next, it was contended that a compromise petition had been filed before the arbitrators and that though basing their award substantially on the compromise petition, the arbitrators departed from the terms of the compromise petition. In support of this contention reference was made to an application filed by the appellant before the arbitrators on 13th May, 1953, (exhibit B). Learned counsel referred to this application as the agreement and urged that the award materially differed from the terms of the agreement incorporated therein. The argument is wholly misconceived and contrary to facts. The document (exhibit B) is not the compromise petition. It is an application filed by the appellant himself. The compromise that was filed before the arbitrators is exhibit A and it is not the case of the appellant that there is any difference between the compromise petition (exhibit A) and the award that was made by the arbitrators. This contention, therefore, lacks factual basis, and must be rejected. 5. It is an application filed by the appellant himself. The compromise that was filed before the arbitrators is exhibit A and it is not the case of the appellant that there is any difference between the compromise petition (exhibit A) and the award that was made by the arbitrators. This contention, therefore, lacks factual basis, and must be rejected. 5. Lastly, it was contended that the award was vague and incapable of execution, inasmuch as plot No. 379 has been divided half and half between the parties, and at the same time the whole plot has been allotted to the appellant as homestead. This point was not taken in the Court below, nor has it been taken as a ground in the memorandum of appeal. This contention was raised for the first time in course of the argument, and I am afraid this cannot be allowed at this stage. At the same time, there are no materials on the record to support this contention. There is nothing to show what is the area of this plot, nor is there anything to show under what circumstances such division was made. Therefore, this argument cannot be entertained and must be overruled, 6. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs. V.Ramaswami, J. 7 I agree.