Judgment Kamla Sahai, J. 1. In this case, the petitioner prays for transfer of a criminal case pending against him in the Court of Mr. R. Upadhya a Magistrate with first class powers at Patna, 2. The petitioner has made various allegations in his application. Firstly, it has been stated that the Magistrate was a Supply Officer at Gopalganj, and the petitioners father Bhola Nath Choudhary, was the President of the Railway Mazdoor Federation, North-Eastern Railwaymens Union and All India Consumers Association. It has further been stated that the petitioners father protested with Mr. Upadhya, the learned Magistrate, on several occasions on account of irregularity, etc. In his explanation, the learned Magistrate has stated that he was Supply Officer at Gopalganj in 1945-46, but he asserts that he had never heard the name of Bholanath Choudhary until he became a bailor for his son, the petitioner in this case. Along with a supplementary affidavit, some papers have been filed to show that some resolutions were passed at some meetings against the Supply Officer at Gopalganj. In my opinion, these papers do not show that there are really any troubles between the petitioners father and Mr. Upadhya. I accept Mr. Upadhyas statement of fact, and my conclusion is that the petitioners allegation is incorrect. 3. The petitioner has made another allegation to the effect that the Editor of the "Searchlight" is on inimical terms with his father, and one of the representatives of the paper is a friend of Mr. Upadhya. Mr. Upadhya has denied that any correspondent of the "Searchlight" at Patna is his friend. I accept his denial, and hold that the petitioners allegation in this respect also is incorrect. 4. The petitioner has made various allegations as to what the learned Magistrate did against his interests in the course of the trial. I do not find that any of these allegations is borne out by the record of the case. In fact, it appears to me that most of the allegations are wildly made in order to support a prayer for transfer. It was intimated to the learned Magistrate on behalf of the petitioner on 18-9-1959 that a petition for transfer under Sec. 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be moved. A transfer petition was also shown to him; but it was immediately withdrawn. It was intimated to the learned Magistrate on behalf of the petitioner on 18-9-1959 that a petition for transfer under Sec. 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be moved. A transfer petition was also shown to him; but it was immediately withdrawn. That shows that the petitioner had no real grievance until that date, and he had also no reasonable apprehension that he would not receive fair trial at the hands of the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate heard arguments on several dates. 6-10-1959, was fixed for judgment. On that date, the petitioner was absent and his co-accused, Sultan Jafer was present. A petition was filed on that date before Mr. Upadhya on behalf of the petitioner that he was ill, and had been advised rest in bed for the day. On this ground, prayer was made for postponement of the delivery of judgment. There was no medical certificate with the petition, and, therefore, the Magistrate rightly decided to reject the petition for time. He has recorded an order on the 6th October that the petitioners father promised to produce him at 2 p.m. but, instead of producing the petitioner, he (the petitioners father) filed an application for postponement of the case, in view of the petitioners desire to file an application under Sec. 526 for transfer. An alleged prescription was attached to the petition; but it appeared to be an outdoor ticket of a hospital without any seal or date. Hence, the Magistrate did not rely upon it. He further held that that was not the stage when the case could be postponed on intimation of the desire to file an application for transfer. He, therefore, rejected the petition for time. He also issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner along with processes under Sections 87 and 88. He further directed the bailors to be called upon, to show cause why the bail bonds should not be cancelled and the amounts forfeited to the State. He fixed the next day for showing cause. 5. On the 7th October, the learned Magistrate recorded an order in which he said, among other things, that the cause shown by Shrt B.K.N. Singh. Advocate, who was one of the bailors saying that he was unable to find out the accused, was not satisfactory, and so the bail bond was cancelled, and the bail amount forfeited. 5. On the 7th October, the learned Magistrate recorded an order in which he said, among other things, that the cause shown by Shrt B.K.N. Singh. Advocate, who was one of the bailors saying that he was unable to find out the accused, was not satisfactory, and so the bail bond was cancelled, and the bail amount forfeited. He further recorded an order that, on Mr. Singhs repeated prayer, he would "reconsider this order on 19-10-1959 when he is promising to give out trace of the accused and to produce him in Court". 6. On the 19th October, the petitioners father, Bholanath Choudhary, filed an application., stating that the petitioner was ill at home at village Rasalpur, and was under the treatment of one Dr. Sharma from 4-10-1959. He also produced a certificate issued by Dr. Sharma and another certificate issued by Dr. S.K.N. Sinha on 18-10-1959, which was countersigned by the Civil Surgeon, Dr. S.K.N. Sinha simply said that the petitioner complained before Him of various ailments, and that there was a certificate from Dr. Mukteshar Rai Sharma that the petitioner had been suffering from paratyphoid. On these materials, he merely advised rest for two weeks to the petitioner. It is obvious that Dr. S.K.N. Sinha or the Civil Surgeon did not themselves find the petitioner suffering from any ailment. In fact, he could not have been ill at his home from the 4th October as stated by Dr. Sharma, because his father promised to Mr. Upadhya on the 6th October to produce him within a few hours. Mr. B.K.N. Singh also stated in his petition that the petitioner was at Patna on 6-10-1959. Mr. Sharmas certificate was, therefore, clearly unreliable. The Magistrate came to the same conclusion, and, therefore, rightly disbelieved the petitioners father Bholanath Choudharys allegations. He further said in his order dated 19-10-1959, that he had received an order from the Sessions Court, staying the proceedings until 20-10-1959. It is thus clear that he passed the order dated 19-10-1959, at a time when further proceedings in the case were stayed by a higher Court. 7. Another fact which I must state is that the petitioners father filed an application on 22-10-1959, before Mr. Upadhya, stating that the statement of fact in his order dated 6-10-1959. to the effect that the petitioners father had promised to produce the petitioner in Court at 2 P. M. was incorrect. 7. Another fact which I must state is that the petitioners father filed an application on 22-10-1959, before Mr. Upadhya, stating that the statement of fact in his order dated 6-10-1959. to the effect that the petitioners father had promised to produce the petitioner in Court at 2 P. M. was incorrect. This application came to be dealt with by the learned Magistrate in his order on the 26th October. He then said : "There is another petition filed on 24-10-1959 (this was the date on which the petition was put up before him) alleging that there is a wrong recording on the order-sheet of 6-10-1959 to the effect that the father of the accused promised to produce the boy Shushil Kumar Choudhary of 2 P. M. on the same date in Court. There is nothing incorrect in the order-sheet. The order-sheet was written and announced in the presence of the petitioner who was Bhola Choudhary father of the accused Shushil Kumar Choudhary". It seems to me to be perfectly clear that Bholanath Choudhary has made a false allegation by saying that he never promised to produce the petitioner in the learned Magistrates Court at 2 P.M. on the 6th October. 8. On hearing the arguments of the learned counsel and also on going through the record of this case, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner and his father have been making all kinds of incorrect allegations against the Magistrate. The petitioners father appears to have deliberately acted in such a way on the 6th October that the Magistrate should become irritated. He first promised to produce the petitioner at 2 P. M. and then at 2 P. M. he filed an application for postponement of the delivery of the judgment on the ground that an application for transfer was going to be moved. Further, it is quite clear that the pretext for absence of the petitioner from the Magistrates Court from the 6th October was a mere false pretext. The subsequent medical certificate of Dr. Sharma cannot be correct, as I have already said because of the promise made by the petitioners father before Mr. Upadhya on the 6th October and also because of the statement made by Mr. B.K.N. Singh in his petition. Dr. The subsequent medical certificate of Dr. Sharma cannot be correct, as I have already said because of the promise made by the petitioners father before Mr. Upadhya on the 6th October and also because of the statement made by Mr. B.K.N. Singh in his petition. Dr. S.K.N. Sinha appears to have written his certificate merely because the petitioner appeared before him on the 18th October, and made certain statements as to his complaints, and produced a certificate of Dr. Sharma. No importance can, therefore, be attached to Dr. S.K.N. Sinhas certificate. In these circumstances, it is perfectly clear that the petitioner has been absenting himself from Mr. Upadhyas Court without any valid reason. The warrant of arrest issued against him was also never executed, manifestly because the petitioner was evading arrest. 9. There is, however, one point on which it appears to me that this case should be transferred. That point is that, although the petitioner and his father deliberately irritated the learned Magistrate, he does appear to have allowed himself to get irritated. On the 6th October, he was perfectly right in directing the issue of a non-bailable warrant of arrest against die petitioner and also in directing the bailors to be called upon to show cause why the bail bonds should not be forfeited. It was not necessary for him, however, to issue processes under Sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the same date. He should have waited until the execution report of the warrant of arrest was received. The fact that he issued those processes is evidence of his irritation. In passing the order on the 19th October which was a date fixed for, amongst other things, reconsideration of his order cancelling the bail bond of Mr. B. K. N. Singh, he should have postponed the reconsideration also to another date, in view of the stay order which he had received from the Sessions Court. He did not do so, but merely said that the bail bond had already been cancelled, indicating that he would not reconsider the question of cancellation of the bail bond. This is another pointer to the fact that the learned Magistrate allowed himself to become annoyed with the petitioner. 10. He did not do so, but merely said that the bail bond had already been cancelled, indicating that he would not reconsider the question of cancellation of the bail bond. This is another pointer to the fact that the learned Magistrate allowed himself to become annoyed with the petitioner. 10. The learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State, had strongly argued that the petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of something which he himself brought about. In other words, he has argued that the petitioner was out to irritate the Magistrate, and, if the Magistrate, like any other human being showed some irritation, that cannot show that the Magistrate would tear up his judgment, which was ready on the 6th October, and would write out another judgment. I have not the slightest suspicion that the Magistrate would not act in such a manner. I am fully satisfied that Mr. Upadhya is not likely to change the judgment which he has written. The question, however, has got to be judged not from the point of view of the Court but from the point of view of the petitioner. Although the petitioner and his father did act in a manner which was calculated to irritate the Magistrate, I cannot help feeling that there may now be a reasonable apprehension in his mind that, owing to the annoyance and irritation caused to the Magistrate, he may not get justice. In these circumstances, I think that justicc will be better served by transferring the case to some other Magistrate. 11. As the petitioner has been absconding, he will remain in custody until the disposal of the case. Mr. S.N. Sahay has stated that no prayer for bail would be made on his behalf. He has further stated that no prayer on behalf of the petitioner will be made for de novo trial. The other co-accused of the petitioner has shown no interest in the matter of transfer as he has not appeared. Presumably, therefore, he does not want de novo trial. Sec.350, as it now stands after amendment, places the matter of de novo trial entirely in the discretion of the Magistrate. Unless, therefore, the Magistrate feels that further examination of any of the witnesses, whose evidence has already been recorded, is necessary in the interests of justice, he will proceed upon the evidence which is already on the record. 12. Sec.350, as it now stands after amendment, places the matter of de novo trial entirely in the discretion of the Magistrate. Unless, therefore, the Magistrate feels that further examination of any of the witnesses, whose evidence has already been recorded, is necessary in the interests of justice, he will proceed upon the evidence which is already on the record. 12. Another prayer which has been made by Mr. S.N. Sahay is that the case should be heard and disposed of expeditiously. That, in my opinion, is a very reasonable prayer. Mr. Pandey Narsingh Sahay, who appears on behalf of the State in this case before the learned Magistrate, is present in Court. He says that he will be prepared to proceed with the arguments in the case on any date fixed by the Magistrate to whom this case is transferred. 13. In the circumstances mentioned above, I allow the application, and direct that the Sessions Judge of Patna will transfer this case to any other competent Magistrate at Patna. He will pass his order as soon as he possibly can. The record of this case will be transmitted to him immediately and he will transmit it to the Magistrate to whom he transfers the case for disposal immediately after he passed the order. The learned Magistrate will try to fix a date within a fortnight from today for commencement of the arguments in this case unless he considers further evidence necessary, he will fix a date for that purpose also within a fortnight from today. He will proceed with the evidence or arguments from day to day until the arguments are concluded. Thereafter, he will deliver his judgment at as early a date as possible.