Judgment :- 1. This may be a hard case but in my opinion the appellant is not entitled to get any relief in law. The suit properties were the subject of a mortgage under Ex. A dated 20-3-1082 and the mortgage amount was a sum of Rs. 48/-. In pursuance of an assignment regarding the equity of redemption in 1122 the plaintiff instituted the present suit in 1124 for redeeming the mortgage evidenced by Ex. A. Among the several objections raised by the appellant-defendant, one of the contentions was that he should get as and for value of improvements a sum of Rs. 500 before the redemption could be decreed. That is, according to him, though he took a mortgage of a paddy land he has converted it into a gardenland, and the landlord is getting the benefit of that conversion. A commissioner has gone into this matter and according to the commissioner's report it is seen that the value of improvements awardable to the defendant-appellant has been fixed in the sum of Rs. 176-7-10. 2. The plaintiff contended that the defendant appellant is not entitled to any value of improvements because the conversion of double crop paddyland into gardenland, however desirable and profitable it may be from the point of view of the mortgagee, absolutely changes the character of the land, so far as the mortgagor was concerned, and therefore far from being an'improvement' the defendant should be made liable for damages for having committed waste on this property. Therefore it will be seen that the plaintiff and the defendant were taking a position in extreme. 3. Learned District Munsiff without really considering the question as to whether in law the conversion of a paddyland into a gardenland can be considered to be an item of 'improvement' entitling the mortgagee to the value of improvements, proceeded on a totally different basis and held that though the defendant has set up that this improvement has been effected with the express written consent of the jenmi, still in the circumstances of this case, it must be considered that the landlord has impliedly consented to the mortgagee making this improvement. The trial court very definitely found that the case of the defendant of the express written consent by the jenmi has not been substantiated by the evidence on record. 4. The trial court very definitely found that the case of the defendant of the express written consent by the jenmi has not been substantiated by the evidence on record. 4. As regards the actual value of improvements awardable to the defendant, the trial court, after considering the commissioner's report has fixed the sum of Rs. 121-14-2 as payable to the defendant in respect of his claim for the value of improvements. In view of this, he gave directions for redemption on the plaintiff depositing the value of improvements and also the mortgage amount. 5. On appeal by the plaintiff the learned judge was not prepared to accept the contention of the defendant that conversion of a double crop wetland into a gardenland by itself without the consent of the landlord, can be considered to be an improvement entitling the defendant in law to claim the value of improvements for the same. The learned judge has held against the defendant on the question of either the express or implied consent of the plaintiff. As mentioned by me earlier even the trial court has held against the defendant regarding the express consent. The appellate court negatived also the implied consent because there was no evidence from which such an implied consent could be inferred in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, as in law, the defendant is not entitled to claim the value of improvements, he differed from the findings of the trial court and in consequence held that the 4th defendant is not at all entitled to any value of improvements. Then the plaintiff appears to have pressed his claim for getting compensation for what he calls waste. The commissioner appears to have gone into it and estimated the same at Rs. 46-6-7 for converting the gardenland into its old state of a double crop paddyland. The learned judge permitted the plaintiff to deduct this amount and directed the plaintiff to deposit the balance amount covered by the mortgage, Ex. A. It is against this decree and judgment of the learned District Judge that this second appeal is filed by the 4th defendant. 6. On behalf of the 4th defendant, Mr. Narayanan Asan, his learned counsel has contented that the view of the learned judge that the appellant is not entitled to claim the value of improvements for converting the wetland into a garden-land is not sound in law. 6. On behalf of the 4th defendant, Mr. Narayanan Asan, his learned counsel has contented that the view of the learned judge that the appellant is not entitled to claim the value of improvements for converting the wetland into a garden-land is not sound in law. The learned counsel was not able to convince me that the view of the lower courts that in the circumstances of the case, an implied consent cannot be drawn is in any way wrong. Therefore the only other two points that arise for decision in this second appeal are (1) whether the 4th defendant is entitled to claim value of improvements for converting the double crop paddy-land into a gardenland and (2) whether the award of Rs. 46-6-7 in favour of the plaintiff for re-converting the gardenland into double-crop paddy land was proper. 7. After hearing Mr. Asan, learned counsel for the appellant, and also Mr. N.K. Varkey, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent, I am satisfied that the decree of the learned judge does not require any interference at the hands of this court. not prepared to accept the contention of Mr. Asan that the conversion of double crop paddyland into a gardenland does not in any way alter the nature of the holding. 8. I am a double crop paddyland into a gardenland, however desirable it may be from the point of view of the mortgagee or the tenant, is a substantial alteration of the character of the holding and it cannot certainly be considered to be an'improvement' in any sense of the term. If such a conversion is accepted as an 'improvement' entitling a mortgagee or tenant in possession of property to claim value of improvements, in my opinion, it will be a very serious inroad into the rights of the landlord or the mortgagor concerned. The property that was put in the possession of the present appellant was admittedly a double crop paddyland and in my opinion he has no right to alter the character of the land by converting it into a gardenland without the consent of the mortgagor, express or implied. In this case the express consent set up by the appellant has been found against him by both the courts. In this case the express consent set up by the appellant has been found against him by both the courts. The question of implied consent also does not arise because the learned judge was satisfied that there were absolutely no circumstances in this case to warrant any such conclusion in favour of the defendant appellant. 9. With respect I am in full agreement with the decisions reported in Padmanabhan Bhoothanathan v. Kali Neelakandan (30 T.L.R. 47) and Kunjan v. Nethran Bhattathiripad (16 T. L. J. 95) to the effect that a tenant or a mortgagee has no power to alter the character of a holding without the express consent of the Landlord or the mortgagor. No doubt the learned judges in those decisions have gone even to the extent of holding that such a conversion can be treated as a waste. But on that point I do not propose to express any opinion in this case. Whether such a conversion will amount to a 'waste', as understood in law is a totally different matter. But the position appears to be very clear that the mortgagee or tenant in the position of the 4th defendant appellant has no power to make a substantial alteration in the character of the premises. 10. Mr. Asan, learned counsel for the appellant, relied upon the decision of the Travancore High Court reported in Mathai v. Kochu Pillai (9 TLT 1054). I do not think that decision assists Mr. Asan in his contention. The learned judges have, no doubt, held that a mortgagee is entitled to the costs incurred by him in converting a wet land into a gardenland for the purpose of planting trees thereon, when the conversion was either authorised or acquiesced in by the mortgagor and when it is beneficial to the property. It will be seen that the learned judges have after laying down the proposition added several qualifications. In the case before me none of those qualifications exists. Therefore it is of no avail to Mr. Asan. Further, it will be seen that at page 1058 the learned judges had before them a case where a mortgagor after a conversion of paddyland into a gardenland has been made by the mortgagee in possession, has referred to all these conversions in a document which he had executed later and whereby he accepted the conversion effected by the mortgagee in possession. The facts and circumstances in the decision before the learned judges in 9 T.L.T. 1054 do not exist in the present case and the principle laid down by the learned judges has no application to the facts of the present case. 11. It may also be interesting to note that even the Kerala Compensation of Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, Act 29 of 1958, when it defines the expression 'Improvements' in S.2, clause (b) of the Act emphasises that the work or product must be one which adds to the value of the holding, is suitable to it, and consistent with the purpose for which the holding is let, mortgaged or occupied. I am omitting the other portion of the definition because it is not necessary. To the same effect is the definition of the expression'Improvement' in S.3 (3) of the Malabar Compensation For Tenants Improvements Act 1/1900 as follows: "'Improvement; means any work or product of a work which adds to the value of the holding, is suitable to it and consistent with the purpose for which the holding was let, mortgaged or occupied." 12. Again S.3 [d] of Kerala Act presumes conversion of one crop into two crops land as an improvement. To a similar effect is S.4 (d) of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act 1/1900. In my opinion, the improvement, as such, in the case before me, in order to entitle a tenant or a mortgagee to get value of improvements must be one which adds to the value of double-crop wet land as such. Whereas in this case a double crop wet land was put in the possession of the appellant he and is handing back not the double crop wetland, but a gardenland, i e. he has altered the character of the holding. In fact, in the, decision cited earlier viz., Padmanabhan Bhoothanathan v. Kali Neelakandan (30 T.L.R. 47), value of improvements was claimed for converting a'garden land" into a wet land and the learned judges declined to award value of improvements on the ground that such conversion amounted to a substantial alteration in the character of the mortgaged premises. 13. In the decision cited viz., Kunjan v. Nethran Bhattathiripad (18 T.L.J. 95) a lessee converted paddy lands into a cocoanut garden and claimed it to be an'improvement'. 13. In the decision cited viz., Kunjan v. Nethran Bhattathiripad (18 T.L.J. 95) a lessee converted paddy lands into a cocoanut garden and claimed it to be an'improvement'. The learned judges rejected the claim and observed as follows at page 97: "Granting that the value of the holding is likely to be enhanced by its conversion into garden land we are not prepared to hold that it justifies the plaintiffs being burdened with its cost without the consent of the lessor, to convert, wholly or in part, the nature or character of the holding from its original purposes. If a lessee or mortgagee chooses to speculate and spend money in the hope of improving the property by altering its character without the express or implied assent of the owner he must do so at his own risk. It it were not so, a weapon would be put in the hands of the lessee or mortgagee which might be abused for increasing the difficulties in the way of the right of redemption" 14. I may also in this connection, refer to two decisions of the Madras High Court where it has been held that a tenant is disentitled to grow on an agricultural paddy wet land a mango grove or a cocoanut or arecanut garden. In Laxman v. Ramachandra Rao [I.L.R.10 Mad. 351] it has been held that a tenant has no right to convert an agricultural paddy wet land into a mango garden. Similarly, in Kunhammed v. Narayana Mussad [1889] I.L.R. 12 Mad. 320] it has been held that conversion of a wet land into a cocoanut or arecanut plantation was both unsuited to the holding and inconsistent with the purpose for which the land is demised. Similarly in Ramanathan v. Zamindar of Ramnad [I. L. R.16 Mad. 407) it was held that a ryot has no right to convert agricultural land as a site of a house built for non-agricultural purposes. No doubt, I am also aware of a later decision of the Madras High Court in Venkatayya v. Ramaswamy [1898 XX I. L. R.22 Mad. 39] where these 3 decisions of the Madras High Court referred to above, have been attempted to be distinguished. No doubt, I am also aware of a later decision of the Madras High Court in Venkatayya v. Ramaswamy [1898 XX I. L. R.22 Mad. 39] where these 3 decisions of the Madras High Court referred to above, have been attempted to be distinguished. In that particular case, the learned judges declined to accept the contention of the plaintiff-land lord that the act of a tenant in planting cocoanut trees in a very small portion of the agricultural land amounts to waste. 15. Then the only other point that requires consideration is whether the order of the learned judge directing the appellant to pay Rs. 46-6-7 for reconverting the gardenland into double crop land requires any interference. Though I feel that such a provision, in the circumstances of this case, hits the appellant very hard, because he ultimately gets only a sum of Re.1 and odd as and for the mortgage claim under Ext. A, yet no relief can be given to him in law. Once it is held that he has no right to convert a property entrusted to him as adoubble crop wet land into a gardenland, it naturally follows that he must reimburse the plaintiff for the expenses that the latter may have to incur for restoring the land to the old state. No doubt, the commissioner has called it compensation for waste and it is also decreed as such by the learned District Judge. But it is not necessary for me to call this item as a waste. I am prepared to restrict my decision and confirm this direction of the learned judge from a slightly different point of view. I am prepared to proceed on the basis that the award of Rs. 46-6-7 is really the expense that the plaintiff will have to incur for restoring the present gardenland into a double crop paddy land which he originally had and which was the land that he mortgaged in favour of the defendant. Therefore, it must really be considered to be for the expenses that will have to be incurred by the plaintiff or at least a compensation for the expenses that he will have to incur for reconversion. Therefore, on this ground this direction also does not require any interference. 16. Therefore, it must really be considered to be for the expenses that will have to be incurred by the plaintiff or at least a compensation for the expenses that he will have to incur for reconversion. Therefore, on this ground this direction also does not require any interference. 16. As it is seen that the appellant gets only Re.1 and odd as and for his mortgage claim, I do not award costs as against the appellant. Therefore, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. No leave.