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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1959 DIGILAW 146 (MP)

National Transport Company, Seoni v. State Transport authority M. P. , Gwalior

1959-05-18

K.L.PANDEY, T.C.SHRIVASTAVA

body1959
ORDER T.C. Shrivastava, J. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been filed by the National Transport Company, Seoni, against the order passed by the State Transport Authority on 6-9-1958. That is an interim order passed during the pendency of Appeal No. 133 of 1958, by which the Petitioner has been prevented from acting upon the permit granted to it to ply buses on the Raipur-Gondia route. On 24-7-1957, the Petitioner, National Transport Company, Seoni, had applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, for grant of a stage carriage permit on the Raipur-Gondia route. This route lies partly in the State of Madhya Pradesh and partly in the State of Bombay. The Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, rejected the application on the ground that under Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called the Act) it should have been filed before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, where the place of business of the Petitioner was situate. The Petitioner then filed an application on 5-9-1957 before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur. On 1-1-1958, that authority returned the application for disposal to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, on the ground that the route lay within its jurisdiction. At Raipur, the application was opposed by the Respondent No. 2, the Raipur Transport Company, Ltd., and Respondent No. 3, the Anand Transport Company, Ltd., and ultimately the Regional Authority, Raipur, again sent it back to the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, for disposal. It was then heard by the Regional Transport. Authority, Jabalpur, on 25-4-1958 and a permit was granted to the Petitioner. It was sent to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, which countersigned it after hearing Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and other objectors. In the meantime, Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed an appeal before the State Transport Authority challenging the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, and prayed that the operation of the permit might be stayed during the pendency of the appeal. The Petitioner opposed the prayer for stay on the ground that the appeal was not competent as the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had not formally filed objections before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur. The State Transport Authority held that the appeal was prima facie tenable and ordered stay of the operation of the permit in favour of the Petitioner during the pendency of the appeal. 2 and 3 had not formally filed objections before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur. The State Transport Authority held that the appeal was prima facie tenable and ordered stay of the operation of the permit in favour of the Petitioner during the pendency of the appeal. It is against this order that this petition has been filed. On behalf of the Petitioner, Shri A. P. Sen contends that as Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had not filed formal objections under Section 64 of the Act, they were not entitled to file an appeal against the grant of the permit, and, therefore, the appellate authority had no power to grant stay. He further contends that the appellate authority should have decided the question about the tenability of the appeal before considering the question of stay. On behalf of Respondent No. 2, Shri Y. S. Dharmadhikari has pointed out that the application was not properly published when it was taken up for consideration by the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, on 25-4-1958. Even then, he had filed a formal objection to the grant of the permit on 21-4-1958 before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, but it refused to hear him on the ground that only those objections could be heard which were filed before 1-1-1958. Accordingly, the objection of the Public Transport Company alone was considered and it was observed that the objections raised by Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 would be considered at the time of the countersignature by the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur. In the alternative, he points out that when the application was sent to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, the Respondents had. filed the necessary objections and the application was not disposed of by the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, but was sent back to the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, along with the objections, and, therefore, the Respondents are entitled to file an appeal under Section 64(f) of the Act. From the orders of the two Regional Transport Authorities, which have been filed by the Petitioner, it appears to us that the application which was filed before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, and was sent for disposal to the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur, and again sent back to the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, was not disposed of by the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur. Therefore, the proceedings from the time when it was filed before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, to the time when it was disposed of ultimately by it are continuous proceedings. It may be observed that when the proceedings were restarted at Jabalpur, there was no fresh publication of the application, which means that the proceedings were treated as continuous. We do not understand what the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, meant by saying that the status quo ante was restored, and made it a ground for refusing to consider the objections raised by Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Annexure IV, filed by the Petitioner, is a copy of the agenda of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, fixed for 25-4-1958, and in that agenda in column 4 we find the names of the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 shown as objectors, which shows that till that time it was thought that they were entitled to object to the grant of the permit. At any rate, Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had filed a copy of their objections again before the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, on 21-4-1958, and, therefore, they could be considered as persons aggrieved and accordingly as objectors they were entitled to appeal under Section 64(f) of the Act. Further, the contention of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 that when the Regional Transport Authority, Jabalpur, took up the application for grant of permit on 25-4-1958, there was no publication as required by the Act can be raised at the time of the appeal to explain why they could not file the objections in time. On these considerations, it appears to us that the appellate authority was correct in hotting(sic) that prima facie the appeal was tenable and it had, therefore, the power to grant the interim stay. Shri A.P. Sen for the Petitioner relies upon Section 134 of the Act for his contention that the appellate authority has no power to grant stay of the operation of a permit during the pendency of the appeal. All that is provided in that section is that mere filing of an appeal does not by itself operate as a stay of the order passed by the original authority. All that is provided in that section is that mere filing of an appeal does not by itself operate as a stay of the order passed by the original authority. The last clause in the section is "unless the prescribed appellate authority or revisional authority otherwise directs" and it clearly implies that the appellate authority has power to stay the operation of the original order. We do not agree that the power to order stay during the pendency of the appeal can be exercised only after finally deciding whether the appeal is tenable. This is really a question which has to be decided on merits after hearing both the parties and this is likely to take some time. There may be cases where interim relief is urgently needed and delay may cause loss to the Appellant. In such cases, the appellate authority can exercise the power to grant interim stay, if it is satisfied that prima facie the appeal is tenable. We do not, therefore, think that the appellate authority committed any error in granting interim stay without finally deciding the question of the tenability of the appeal. The Petitioner has prayed for a writ of prohibition forbidding the appellate authority from proceeding with the appeal. In our view, the-question whether the appeal is tenable is entirely a matter for the appellate authority to decide. This view finds support in Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General A.I.R. 1052 S.C. 319 as would be clear from the following observation of their Lordships in para. 14 of the judgment: Whether an appeal is competent, whether a party has 'locus standi' to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is from one or another order and whether it has been preferred in proper form and within the time prescribed, are all matters for the decision of the appellate Court so constituted. The same view was taken in Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 73. The appellate authority has not yet finally decided whether Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are entitled to file the appeal and it is not open to us to decide the question in these proceedings. What we have said above regarding the tenability of the appeal became necessary on the Petitioner's contention that the appellate authority wrongly held that the appeal was tenable even prima facie and the stay order was therefore without jurisdiction. What we have said above regarding the tenability of the appeal became necessary on the Petitioner's contention that the appellate authority wrongly held that the appeal was tenable even prima facie and the stay order was therefore without jurisdiction. We make it clear that nothing that we have said need in any way affect the judgment of the appellate authority when it finally decides the question of the tenability of the appeal. The appellate authority had jurisdiction to grant the interim stay and we cannot interfere with that order in these proceedings; nor can we grant the writ of prohibition as prayed for. The Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The petition is, therefore, rejected with costs. Hearing fee is fixed at Rs.74-00 for each of the three Respondents. The outstanding amount of the security shall be refunded to the Petitioner.