MEHROTRA, J.: This is a miscellaneous appeal arising out of an execution proceeding. The respondent obtained a money decree on the 1st July 1950, against the present appellant The suit was for recovery of Rs. 6.140/- but on the date of hearing none of the parties appeared and the Subordinate Judge after considering the evidence on the record decreed the suit in part for a sum of Rs. 2,628/-. This decree was put into execution and the application tot execution was filed on the 7th May 1954. On the] face of it, the application was beyond three years. The contention of the decree-holder is that after the suit had been decreed for Rs. 2,628/'- an application was made on behalf of the plaintiff for restoration of the suit under Order 9, Rule 9 and Order 17, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. That application was finally dismissed for default on 31st July 1952. The starting point of limitation according to the decree-holder should be 31st July 1952-the date when the application for restoration of the suit was dismissed for default. The Subordinate Judge accepted the contention of the decree-holder and rejected the objections filed by the judgment-debtor. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. (2) Article 182 of the Limitation Act deals with the limitation for execution of decrees. Clause 1 of Column III of Article 182 of the Limitation Act gives the starting point of the limitation the date of the decree or order. Clause 3 of Column 3 of the Article reads as follows : (when there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review." The decree holder contends that there has been an application for review in this case; though it was styled as ail application under Order 9, Rule 9 still the object of the application was to get the suit restored after the decree passed on default, has been se aside. In effect therefore it was an application with a view to get the judgment of the court reviewed. Such an application falls under clause !
In effect therefore it was an application with a view to get the judgment of the court reviewed. Such an application falls under clause ! column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act In order to apply clause 3 of Column III of Article 182, two things are essential; firstly there mm be an application for a review of the judgment am secondly that there "has been a review of the judgment" by the Court. In the present case ever assuming that the application for restoration ii one for review by giving a wider meaning to the word 'review', still it cannot be said that in the circumstances of the present case, there has bee a review of the judgment. The application for restoration was itself dismissed for default and the Court never applied its mind to reconsider the earlier judgment. The decree-holder's counsel point out that if the words "has been reviewed" are given a restrictive meaning, the cases where the application for review is rejected even on merits will bi covered by clause (1) and not by cl. Ill of column of Article 182, Limitation Act. We do not think that any such result necessarily follows forming the interpretation which we propose to give to these words under Article T82 of the Act. Tin words in clause 3 are - "where there has been I review of judgment". In cases where the application for review is dismissed on merits, it may bf argued that the court has applied its mind and ha! considered the correctness of the judgment and has considered on merits the application for reverent and to that extent there has been a review of the judgment. But in cases where the application for review or for restoration is dismissed for default there has been no case for the court to apply ii mind to the judgment and thus it cannot be said that there has been a review of the judgment. 1 the case of Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd v. Gouri Shankar Sharma, reported in AIR 1950 SC 6 the following observation by their Lordships of the Supreme Court will be apposite.
1 the case of Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd v. Gouri Shankar Sharma, reported in AIR 1950 SC 6 the following observation by their Lordships of the Supreme Court will be apposite. "Even if the fact that the judgment debtor'a application under S. 36 was directed against the preliminary mortgage decree is overlooked, that application having been dismissed for default, the Court never had occasion to apply its mind to the question as to whether the decree could or should be reopened, and hence it cannot be said that 'there has been a review' of the decree". These observations clearly show that the words "where there has been a review of judgment" have been interpreted to apply to the cases where there has been an examination by the court of the judgment passed ex parte and not cases where the court never applied its mind to the judgment sought to be reviewed. Cases where the application has been dismissed for default cannot come under the words "where there has been a review of judgment". This case has been distinguished by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that in this case the only thing decided by the Supreme Court was that the appeal which also saved the limitation will be an appeal directly from the decree and not from any other subsidiary or ancillary proceedings in connection with that decree. Those observations of the Supreme Court were made dealing with the argument advanced by the counsel that clause 2 will apply to that case inasmuch as there had been an appeal against an order dismissing the application for restoration of proceedings under S. 36 of the Money Lenders Act. That argument was repelled and it was observed by the Supreme Court in that connection that the appeal contemplated under clause 2 is an appeal directly against the decree and not against any ancillary proceedings. But this case to our mind has clearly laid down that the words "where there has been a review of judgment" in clause 3 only apply to cases where an application has Been considered by the court and has been either rejected or allowed on merits and not to cases where such an application has been dismissed for default. Reliance is placed on the case of 'Firm Dedhraj Lachminara-yan v. Bhagwan Das, reported in AIR 1937 Pat 337 .
Reliance is placed on the case of 'Firm Dedhraj Lachminara-yan v. Bhagwan Das, reported in AIR 1937 Pat 337 . It is sufficient to point out that the view taken in that case has been overruled by a later Full Bench decision of that very court in the case of 'Rameshwar Prasad Sahu v. Parameshwar Prasad Sahu reported in AIR 1951 Pat 1 . The next case relied on by the counsel for the respondent is Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar, reported in AIR 1937 Mad 385 (FB). That case only lays down that the word 'appeal' in clause 2 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act is' wide enough to cover the case of revision. In the result therefore we set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and allow the appeal with costs. DEKA, J.: (3) I agree with my learned brother. I would only like to add that this case is covered fully by the observations made by Fazl Ali, J. in the Supreme Court case reported in AIR 1950 SC 6 where his Lordship observed after interpreting the words occurring in clause 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act as follows: "These words show that before a case can be brought under Art. 182, cl. 3, it must be shown firstly that the Court had undertaken to review the relevant decree or order and secondly that there has been a decision on the review". In the present case, it is clear that there has been no decision on review as my learned brother has .pointed out because of the application being dismissed for default. Therefore without any further investigation we can say that there was no scope for application of clause 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act and hold that limitation for a period of three years would not start from the date of disposal of the application for restoration of the suit made under Order 9, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code. The wordings in clause 3 of Art. 182 also would not favour the construction sought to be placed by the decree-holder. HF/H/V.B.B. Appeal allowed.