ORDER P.V. Dixit, J. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff from a decision of the First Additional District Judge, of Indore upholding the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge, First Class, Indore, dismissing the Plaintiff's suit for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant Municipal Corporation from interfering with certain structures put up by him on some land said to be belonging to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's case was that in July 1956 he had put up nine wooden structures, which are generally known as Gumties, on a piece of land situated in Indore; that the land belonged to him; that he was entitled to put up these structures without obtaining any permission of the Municipal Corporation; that the Gumties are not embedded in the ground and can be moved to any place; and that on 9th July 1956 some employees of the Defendant Corporation came to the Plaintiff's land and after preparing a Panchanama of the Gumties standing on the land informed the Plaintiff that the Corporation would take further steps against him. On these allegations, the Plaintiff averred that he apprehended that the Municipal Corporation would give him a notice to demolish and remove the structures, and prayed that the Municipal Corporation be restrained from interfering in any way with the structures and from taking any steps for the removal or demolition of the structures. The Defendant denied the Plaintiff's allegations that the wooden structures were movable. It pleaded that the Plaintiff had put up nine wooden structures close to each other the foundation of all of which was embedded in the soil; that these structures constituted 'building' within the definition of Section 3(9) of the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954; and that, therefore, the Plaintiff could not erect these structures without obtaining the prior permission of the Corporation. Both the Courts below have found that the Gumties in question fell within the definition of 'building' as given in Section 3(9) of the Municipalities Act and that the Defendant was entitled to take action against the Plaintiff under Section 112(7) of the Act. The learned Additional District Judge also held that the structures had foundations in the earth. On these findings, the Plaintiff's suit has been dismissed by the lower Courts. Mr. The learned Additional District Judge also held that the structures had foundations in the earth. On these findings, the Plaintiff's suit has been dismissed by the lower Courts. Mr. Pande, learned Counsel for the Appellant, did not dispute that if the structures put up by the Plaintiff were buildings, then his suit had been rightly dismissed. He, however, contended that the structures were not buildings. It was said that the essential feature of a 'building' as defined in Section 3(9) of the Act was that it must be fixed to the soil; and that the building must have a foundation was obvious from Section 112(1) of the Act which required a person seeking permission for the construction of a building to furnish to the Municipal Corporation a plan of the foundation of the building. Reliance was placed on Mayor, and c., of Southend-on-Sea v. Archer XIX Cox' Criminal Law Cases 660. I am unable to accede to the contention advanced by the learned Counsel. 'Building' has been defined in Section 3(9) of the Act as follows: 'Building' shall include any hut, shed or other enclosure, whether used as a human dwelling or otherwise, and shall include also walls, verandahs, fixed platforms, plinths, door-steps, and the like. It will be seen that this definition enlarges the ordinary meaning of the word 'building' by including in it any hut, shed, or other enclosure, whether used as a human dwelling or otherwise, and by also including walls, verandahs, platforms, plinths, door-steps and the like. There is nothing in the definition to indicate that a building must have a foundation. The ordinary and natural meaning of the word 'building' does not also point to the conclusion that a foundation is an essential feature of a building. The ordinary meaning of the word 'building' is a thing composed of the fabric of the building and the ground that fabric rests upon and encloses. It makes no difference whether the fabric is of brick or iron or stone or wood and whether the building is of a large size or of small size and whether it has or it has not any foundation or whether it is under or above the natural ground level. A building does not cease to be a building because it is constructed of wood and is merely laid on the soil and not laid into the soil. A building does not cease to be a building because it is constructed of wood and is merely laid on the soil and not laid into the soil. Section 112(1) no doubt says that before beginning to erect any building the person intending to build must give to the municipal council a notice thereof in writing and furnish to the council plan showing the levels, at which the foundation and lowest floor of such building are proposed to be laid. But from this it does not follow that every building must have a foundation. If the building is such that it can be constructed without any foundation, then no plan of the foundation need be furnished. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel is distinguishable on facts and on the language of Sections 12 and 13 of the Southend-on-Sea Corporation Act, 1895 which defined "new buildings" for the purposes of those bye-laws as an erection of a permanent character. In that case a wooden structure, which was used as a shelter for a large weighing machine and which had no sanitary arrangements or provision for lighting or heating and which was not fixed to the soil and had no foundations, was not regarded as an erection of a permanent character. The case nearest to the present case is Stevens v. Govtrley I.L.T. Rep. 33. In that case a wooden structure intended to be used as a shop was held to be a building within the Metropolitan Building Act, 1855. Erie C.J., said in that case, that a house constructed of wood, although it be not resting on masonry let into the ground by way of foundation, is when one considers the matter of which it is formed, within the mischief provided against by the Act. In Stevens' case, the Court came to the conclusion that the structure was a building even though it was constructed of wood and was merely laid on the soil and not laid into the soil. Learned Counsel said that the structures put up by the Plaintiff were not of a permanent character. But the definition of 'building' given in Section 3 of the Act does not say that the word 'building' shall mean any erection or construction of a permanent character. Learned Counsel said that the structures put up by the Plaintiff were not of a permanent character. But the definition of 'building' given in Section 3 of the Act does not say that the word 'building' shall mean any erection or construction of a permanent character. It is easy to see that if it is lawful to erect any one of these structures the Plaintiff has constructed, without the permission of the Municipal Corporation, then it would be equally lawful to make a whole street of them. The constructions put up by the Plaintiff are each measuring about 10 by 8 feet with height of 21/2 feet. They have wooden walls, doors and a roof of corrugated iron-sheets. They are intended to be used as shops and cannot be moved. These structures were not put up merely for a temporary purpose. In every way they are buildings within the definition of the word given in the Act and Section 112 of the Act which was made for the very purpose of making it impossible to put up buildings of this kind in the municipal area without the supervision of the proper municipal authorities. Even if it is assumed that the essential feature of a building is that it must be fixed to the soil and must have a foundation, the structures constructed by the Plaintiff would still be buildings because according to the evidence of Shri Baxi (D. W. 1) the structures in question have foundations which are embedded in the soil. There is no reason to disbelieve this statement of Shri Baxi. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the Courts below arrived at the right conclusion in holding that the wooden structures put up by the Plaintiff are buildings within the definition of the word given in the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954 and in dismissing the Plaintiff's suit accordingly. This appeal is, therefore, rejected. Appeal dismissed