JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment and damages or mesne profits. The suit has been decreed by the trial court and hence this appeal by the defendant. The defendant, which is a limited company, now in liquidation, and represented by its Liquidator, was a tenant in respect of the disputed premises No. 10, Mandeville Gardens, Ballygunj, District 24-Parganas. That tenancy was a monthly tenancy according to the English calendar and it began under the plaintiffs' predecessor Dr. Sarat Chandra Das Gupta, since deceased, and continued after his death at a rental of Rs. 429/- per month. 2. ON the allegations, inter alia, that the defendant's above tenancy has been duly determined under the law by an appropriate notice to quit, served in or about the first week of March, 1954, requiring the defendant to vacate the disputed premises on the expiry of the said month, and that the defendant had defaulted in the payment of rent for much over six months, to wit, from July 1952 to March 1954, so as to deprive itself of the protection of the Rent Control Act, 1950, by which admittedly the suit was governed, the plaintiffs brought the present suit on May 18, 1954. The suit was contested by the defendant company and its material defense, so far as the present appeal is concerned, was to the effect that it was not a defaulter, as alleged in the plaint, and was entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act. On this point, the defendant's specific case was that the rent for July 1952 having been tendered to plaintiff No. 1 Mrs. Amiya Prova Das Gupta (who, according to the defendant, was the sole landlord, at feast for purposes of the Rent Control Act, rents, since Dr. Das Gupta's death, leaving been paid and received by her up to June, 1952) and that tender having been refused by her, the said rent for July, 1952, was deposited with 1he Rent Controller duly and in accordance with law and such deposit had continued, all along ever since, month by month regularly according to the English calendar. 3. Das Gupta's death, leaving been paid and received by her up to June, 1952) and that tender having been refused by her, the said rent for July, 1952, was deposited with 1he Rent Controller duly and in accordance with law and such deposit had continued, all along ever since, month by month regularly according to the English calendar. 3. THAT there were deposits of rent with the Rent Controller may broadly be accepted, but the deposits, at least from July, 1952, to August 1953, appear to have been made in the name of M/s. Amiya Prova Das Gupta and the plaintiffs further denied that there had been any tender of the rent for July 1952 to plaintiff No. 1, or any refusal of the same, as alleged by the defendant, and, mainly, on the above two grounds, the plaintiffs contended that the above deposits were invalid in law and insufficient and incompetent to protect the defendant from the consequences of default under the relevant Rent Control Act of 1950. The plaintiffs further contended that all of them were landlords of the defendant at the relevant time and so tender, if any, to plaintiff No. 1 alone or deposit, if any, in her name alone would not be sufficient to afford the necessary protection to the defendant. 4. ALL the defenses of the defendant company were over-ruled by the learned Subordinate Judge who decreed the plaintiffs' suit, holding, inter alia, that the above deposits were invalid and insufficient in law to protect the defendant, first, because, either designedly or through gross negligence, they were made in the wrong name or under the wrong description of the landlord, namely, M/s. Amiya Prova Das Gupta, under the relative false statement in the tenant's application for deposit of rent which was calculated to prevent the landlord from withdrawing the same [vide sec. 20 (2)], and, secondly, because there was no tender or refusal of rents, as alleged by the defendant, so that the first deposit for July 1952 and necessarily, therefore, all subsequent deposits too, were invalid and incompetent under sec. 19 and, so, upon them, no relief or protection could be claimed by the defendant. 20 (2)], and, secondly, because there was no tender or refusal of rents, as alleged by the defendant, so that the first deposit for July 1952 and necessarily, therefore, all subsequent deposits too, were invalid and incompetent under sec. 19 and, so, upon them, no relief or protection could be claimed by the defendant. It is the propriety of the above findings which is challenged in this appeal on behalf of the defendants appellants, namely, the defendant Company and its Liquidator added on its liquidation pendent lite, as a defendant in the suit, and if the appellants succeed there, this appeal as it appears to us, would have, to be decreed and the plaintiffs' suit would fail, but, otherwise, this appeal must be dismissed. We, therefore, address ourselves at once to the above aspect or aspects of the matter. As to the first of the above two findings, the admitted position is that the deposits for July, 1952, to August, 1958, were made in the name and to the credit of Ms. Amiya Prova Das Gupta as landlord. This was certainly a misdescription and, if it be held to come within the phrase "any statement in the tenant's application, depositing the rent, calculated to prevent the landlord from withdrawing the same" as used in sec. 20 (2) of the Act, then the deposits would not be available to the defendant for its protection and, accordingly, benefit of the Rent Control Act would not be available to it. In our opinion, in the facts of this case, the decision ought to be against the appellants. 5. THE term 'calculated' in the section can best be interpreted as 'likely', in the context, particularly, of the words 'gross negligence' which plainly suggest and support an objective interpretation of the said term 'calculated' and exclude a subjective interpretation of the same. It is also, in our opinion, clear enough that the misdescription in the present case, namely, M/s. Amiya Prova Das Gupta, for Mrs. Amiya Prova Gupta, was likely to prevent the landlord, assuming Mrs. Amiya Prova Das Gupta was the sole landlord for purposes of the Rent Control Act, from withdrawing the relevant deposits. The point, therefore, that remains on this part of the case is whether the above misdescription was given designedly or through gross negligence. Amiya Prova Gupta, was likely to prevent the landlord, assuming Mrs. Amiya Prova Das Gupta was the sole landlord for purposes of the Rent Control Act, from withdrawing the relevant deposits. The point, therefore, that remains on this part of the case is whether the above misdescription was given designedly or through gross negligence. In the context of the circumstances, in which the first deposit, namely, for July 1952, followed by the subsequent deposits, was made, we have little hesitation in accepting the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the misdescription was deliberately and dishonestly given, particularly when, as the learned Subordinate Judge found,-and, in our opinion, correctly,-that the story of tender and refusal,-and also of mistake, as set up by the defendant, was false. The defendant attempted to prove that the above misdescription was due to a pure, honest and bona fide mistake, but this attempt did not,-and, indeed, it cannot,-succeed in the facts of this case. The first suggestion was that the mistake was of the Pleader's clerk who was examined on its behalf as D. W. No. 1, but this witness himself repudiated that suggestion and he deposed that he took the name of the landlord from the affidavit, given to him by the defendant's officer Lamba. It was then suggested that the mistake was of this officer Lamba, but the said officer was not examined and the attempted explanation for his non-examination that his whereabouts were not known is wholly unacceptable and unconvincing and. in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the non-examination of this particular officer, the learned Subordinate Judge appears to have been fully justified in rejecting the defense suggestion of mistake on the part of the said officer. There was no suggestion that it was an accidental or clerical error on the part of the typist who typed the above affidavit, and when the earlier context strongly suggests a motive for the above misdescription, namely, to put some obstacle in the way of the landlord's getting the money, the story of mistake appears to have been properly rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge. In judging the earlier context, as aforesaid, two circumstances are of prime importance, namely, (i) that the amount in question, namely, that purporting to be rent for July, 1952, had been previously sent by Money Order to a wrong address, namely. In judging the earlier context, as aforesaid, two circumstances are of prime importance, namely, (i) that the amount in question, namely, that purporting to be rent for July, 1952, had been previously sent by Money Order to a wrong address, namely. No 3, Russa Road, and it was returned by the Post Office, and the suggestion of D. W. No. 2 that that, again, was a mistake for the plaintiff's correct address No. 103 (103-A), Russa Road, has not been supported or substantiated by any reliable evidence. On the other hand, the defendant Company appears at an initial stage, to have asserted, through its Solicitor, that the said money was sent to the plaintiff's correct address, No. 103-A, Russa Road, and the truth only came out when the plaintiffs made the necessary enquiries from the Post Office; and (ii) that no attempt was made to send the money again after it had come back, as aforesaid, to the plaintiffs' correct address. This latter is also a strong circumstance against the theory of mistake, as put forward by the defendants. It is true that the defendants endeavored to assert the plea that the money had been actually tendered to plaintiff No. 1, but there is hardly any acceptable evidence in support of that plea, and the man who is said to have made the relevant tender, namely, Lamba, has not been examined and no satisfactory explanation also is forthcoming for his non-examination, as we have noted hereinbefore. From the plaintiffs' side, this suggestion of the defendants has been denied and we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge, for reasons, given by him, that the defendants' witness on the point, namely, D. W. No. 2, is a wholly unreliable witness and that the plaintiffs' above denial is true and ought to be accepted. 6. INDEED, in the circumstances of this case, and taking into consideration the relationship between the parties, as disclosed in evidence, at the relevant time, it is impossible to believe the story of tender by Lamba and we have little hesitation in rejecting the said story of the defendants. This will be relevant also on the impugned second finding of the learned Subordinate Judge and we shall refer to it in that connection too and discuss its legal effect there. This will be relevant also on the impugned second finding of the learned Subordinate Judge and we shall refer to it in that connection too and discuss its legal effect there. In the above background, the only reasonable conclusion seems to be that the misdescription of the landlord on the wrong name, given in that behalf in the disputed challans or the relative applications for deposit of rent, was the result or outcome of designed and deliberate action on the part of the tenant defendant and the relative deposits, accordingly, come within the mischief of sec. 20 (2), they having been made designedly in a manner, calculated to prevent the landlord from withdrawing the same, as contemplated in that section. The deposits, therefore, are of no avail to the defendants and, on them no relief or protection can be claimed by them and, if that be so, the plaintiffs' claim for ejectment and for mesne profits too, as decreed by the learned trial court, cannot be resisted. 7. FROM another point of view also, the same result would follow. Even if the defendants' story of mistake be true, it was, in the circumstances of this case, clearly a case of gross negligence and, as it was likely, that is, calculated, to prevent the landlord from withdrawing the particular deposit or deposits, the position would be the same under the aforesaid sec. 20 (2) of the Act and the trial court's decree would have to be affirmed on this point of view too. 8. THERE is a third angle of vision, from which the matter before us may be looked at. As we have held above, the defendant's story of tender and refusal cannot be believed. In view, therefore, of the mandatory provision of sec. 19 in that behalf, none of the deposits with the Rent Controller, including the deposits in the correct name of plaintiff No. 1, Mrs. Amiya Prova Das Gupta, would be valid deposits under that section, and, as, in our opinion, for purposes of sec. 20 also,-and, therefore, of sec. 12 of the Act too,-the deposit, in order to be valid and available, must be valid under sec. 19 also, none of the above deposits would really confer any benefit on the defendants as against the plaintiffs' claim for ejectment in the present suit. We are not inclined to accept Mr. 20 also,-and, therefore, of sec. 12 of the Act too,-the deposit, in order to be valid and available, must be valid under sec. 19 also, none of the above deposits would really confer any benefit on the defendants as against the plaintiffs' claim for ejectment in the present suit. We are not inclined to accept Mr. Gupta's contrary argument on the above point. Reading the two sections, Secs, 19 and 20, together and confining ourselves to the relevant parts thereof, it seems to us that, for a valid deposit with the Rent Controller for any of the purposes under the Act, tender and refusal, as mentioned therein, are essential prerequisites and, for a valid and relevant deposit for purposes of sec. 12, the further additional conditions as to the time of deposit etc., as mentioned in sec. 20, are necessary. Indeed, the tenant's right to deposit rent with the Rent Controller arises only on fulfillment of the conditions, laid down therein for the purpose, and he can have no such right except under those conditions and no deposit can be valid under the Act unless those conditions exist and have been fulfilled. If, therefore, all the defendant's above deposits in the present case be invalid under sec. 19 on the ground that there was not the necessary tender and refusal, they cannot be available under sec. 20 of the Act for purposes of sec. 12 also. 9. IN the present case, therefore, none of the above deposits would be so available nor would any of them be relevant for the defendants' protection. We may add further that, as pointed out by us (vide Order, dated January 21, 1957, in Civil Rule No. 3750 of 1954) at an earlier stage of the present proceedings, we are unable to accept the view that non-compliance with sec. 20 cannot invalidate the deposits for purposes of sec. 12 and the only effect of such non-compliance would be the incurring of penalties, prescribed in sec. 19 (9 ). This is all the more so here, as also was pointed out by us in the said Civil Rule, as the non-compliance in this case is not of the character, contemplated in or coming within the purview of the said sec. 19 (9 ). 19 (9 ). This is all the more so here, as also was pointed out by us in the said Civil Rule, as the non-compliance in this case is not of the character, contemplated in or coming within the purview of the said sec. 19 (9 ). We hold, therefore, that the defendants are not entitled to protection under the Rent Control Act and the suit has been rightly decreed by the trial court. In the above view, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the respondents' further contention that all the plaintiffs were landlords of the defendant Company and, therefore, the deposits in the name of plaintiff No. 1 alone would not be sufficient for the defendants' protection, even if such protection were otherwise available to them. We may, however, point out in the above connection that plaintiff No. 1 alone was accepting the earlier rents, though apparently on behalf of all the plaintiffs, and, so, she alone may be regarded as landlord, at least for purposes of deposits of rent with the Rent Controller. It is unnecessary, however, to pursue this matter further as, on the findings, already made, this appeal should fail. The appeal is accordingly, dismissed with costs. 10. IN the view, we have taken above, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the admissibility or otherwise of the additional evidence, sought to be tendered in this Court by the defendants appellants, by their applications, filed on July 2, 1958, and April 29, 1959. But we may point out that, for the reception of the said additional evidence or for the admission of the said documents as additional evidence in this Court, no sufficient cause has been shown and, moreover, none of them would be of any importance whatsoever, so far as the rights of the parties are concerned, in the view we have taken of those rights in our foregoing discussion. No further comment is, therefore, necessary on the said applications. No further comment is, therefore, necessary on the said applications. The defendants appellants are given time till the end of November next to vacate the disputed premises on condition that the said appellants put in to the credit of the decree-holders respondents in the court below within a fortnight from this date a sum of Rs, 1,000/-, and the balance, if any, outstanding on the date of their leaving the said premises, on account of rent or mesne profits, as the case may be at the rate of Rs. 429/- per month, within three weeks thereafter. In default of any of the above deposits, the decree-holders will be entitled to execute the present decree. In case, however, the deposits are duly made, as directed above, the execution of the present decree will remain stayed until the expiry of November next. For the above purpose, the defendants appellants will he at liberty to withdraw the amounts, not withdrawn by the plaintiffs respondents but lying with the Rent Controller or in the court below on the above account.