JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal, J. The Appellant has been convicted under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to one year's R.I. by the Additional Sessions Judge, Guna. According to the prosecution, Radhey Lal (P. W. 1), a goldsmith and resident of Bina Gunj went to a market (hat) in village Pechi for Selling and purchasing ornaments. While returning from that market at about 5 p.m., he was way-laid and robbed by two persons. He was riding a bicycle with a box tied to its luggage carrier. The distance between Bina Gunj and Pechi is about 4 miles. He had travelled almost half the distance when the two persons, with lathis in their hands, surrounded him. Both of them gave him lathi blows, untied the box and took it away. Because of the injuries Radhey Lal could not proceed further. After about half an hour Madholal (P. W. 10) happened to pass that way. He gave a lift to Radheylal in a cart to Bina Gunj. The same day, first information report was lodged at police station Chachoda at 8 p.m. The names of the robbers were not mentioned in the F.I.R. because according to Radheylal they were unknown persons. Badam Singh, Hajarilal and Laxman were first tried, but they were all acquitted. The Appellant was arrested on September 20, 1957 that is almost after 2 years of the occurrence, which took place on October 1, 1955. As against the Appellant it was urged by the prosecution that he had given some coins valued at about Rs.25 to one Ibrahim and this money was out of the stolen property. This has been disbelieved by the trial Judge. Likewise, it was said that the Appellant sold some silver and silver buttons to one Chhote Lal, that too has not been relied on. This has been disbelieved by the trial Judge. Likewise, it was said that the Appellant sold some silver and silver buttons to one Chhote Lal, that too has not been relied on. The conviction of the Appellant has been based on two facts: (1) that the Appellant and Laxman (accused in the previous case) had together pledged some silver ornaments with Dhurilal (P. W. 24) and these ornaments were eventually identified by Radheylal to be his; (2) that the Appellant had taken on rent in village Narainpura a house from Amritlal (P. W. 7), and when that house was searched on May 12, 1956, among other things, Articles 1, 2, 15, 17, 19, 20, 24 and 27 were found in a box kept in that house and these ornaments also were identified by and found to be belonging to Radheylal. Shri B.K. Apte appearing for the Appellant amicus curiae has first of all invited my attention to the fact that in the First Trial No. 3 of 1957 these accused were acquitted on the ground that the ornaments were of very common use. The ornaments alleged to have been recovered in this case are also of very common use and, therefore, it could not be said that they were kept in the box of which Radheylal was robbed. Moreover, the complainant had no books of account, but he gave the names, weight and distinctive marks of as many as 32 ornaments orally. Therefore, Radheylal could not be believed. The learned Counsel has further invited my attention to the observations of the learned Sessions Judge that as accused Laxman had been acquitted in the first trial there was no other conclusion possible but that Daulla must be convicted. Without entering into these points I shall deal with the more substantial arguments advanced by Shri Apte. It is first of all urged that the evidence relating to the pledge transaction is wholly untrustworthy. In my opinion, the argument has considerable force in it. Dhurilal (P. W. 4) stated that the Appellant and one Laxman approached him to pledge certain ornaments which they were carrying. The witness entertained a doubt and wanted to be assured that the ornaments were not stolen property. In my opinion, the argument has considerable force in it. Dhurilal (P. W. 4) stated that the Appellant and one Laxman approached him to pledge certain ornaments which they were carrying. The witness entertained a doubt and wanted to be assured that the ornaments were not stolen property. His statement gives an impression that in fact it was Daulla who pledged the ornaments while Laxman, only assured him that there was nothing wrong with the ornaments, "Saman Daulla ke pas tha. Maine ye mal Lachhman ka nahin samjha tha. Laxman ki zamanat thi." He was confronted with his statement made in Criminal Case No. 178 of 1957 before the Magistrate First Class Chachoda on February 4, 1958. There he had stated that Laxman was his relation and that he had accepted pledge of the ornaments taking them to be Laxman's. "Maine sub zewar Laxman ke itminan par uska samajh kar girvi rakha tha. Laxman ne kaha tha ki tum rakh lo. Zewar mera hai. Maine rupye bhi Laxman ko hi diya tha. Zewar bhi mujhko Laxman ne hi diye tha. Uske pas se hi nikal kar diye tha." These portions were marked as A to A, B to B and C to C. Because of the above material contradictions Durilal is not worthy of credit. Ex. P-10 has been produced as evidence of the pledge transaction. This is on a loose slip of paper and there is a thumb impression over which is written: "Nishani Angutha Daula Gujar". The only evidence that the thumb impression was that of Daulla is that of Dhurilal; the thumb impression has not been proved by any other evidence. No handwriting expert was produced by the prosecution to compare that thumb impression with the other impressions on the record (e.g. below the charge, and below the order of commitment). It is clear from the statement of Dhurilal that in the present trial he calls Daulla to be the principal pledgor and Laxman as a mere guarantor; while in the first trial he had put their respective positions in the reverse order. If the first statement is accepted as correct, Daulla appears to have nothing to do with the money borrowed or ornaments pledged. He only vouchsafed that the ornaments were not stolen property. No presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act arises against a person just because of such vouchsafement. If the first statement is accepted as correct, Daulla appears to have nothing to do with the money borrowed or ornaments pledged. He only vouchsafed that the ornaments were not stolen property. No presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act arises against a person just because of such vouchsafement. The deed of pledge (Ex. P-10) purports to have been written by some Mohanlal and attested by some Dulichand and Bajrang. No one out of them was produced by the prosecution. On the solitary evidence of Dhurilal, whose credibility has emerged as very doubtful, it cannot be held that the ornaments had really been in the possession of Daulla. As regards the search of the house, it is significant that the house was searched in the absence of the accused. Nobody was present in the house. It was locked. The lock was broken open and it is said that in the search those Articles were found in the house. There is no evidence on the record to show that the lock was Daulla's. Even Amrit Lal (P. W. 7), his landlord, did not say so. In the absence of any identification relating to the lock, the argument of Shri Apte that it was quite possible for anybody else to have planted the ornaments in the house and then put that lock there is not without force. In my opinion the accused can legitimately claim the benefit of the doubt. The search was conducted by a constable Tulsi Ram (P. W. 20), who stated that he opened the lock with his shoe. If the lock could be opened in this way, one is set thinking if to call it a 'lock' would not be misnomer. It cannot be just assumed that the constable used a shoe made of steel so as to serve as a hammer. The learned trial Judge asks: who would pledge the ornaments and why? In my opinion, that is not the correct approach in a criminal case. What has really to be seen is whether the prosecution has conclusively proved that the ornaments were in the possession of the accused and that there were no circumstances which could accord with the contrary veiw or which could create a reasonable doubt in a judicial mind about it. Amritlal and Murli could not identify the ornaments. What has really to be seen is whether the prosecution has conclusively proved that the ornaments were in the possession of the accused and that there were no circumstances which could accord with the contrary veiw or which could create a reasonable doubt in a judicial mind about it. Amritlal and Murli could not identify the ornaments. In order to raise a presumption under Section 114, illustration (a) of the Evidence Act, it must have first been proved that the stolen property was in the exclusive possession of the accused. It was not enough that some stolen property was found in the house which the accused had taken on rent and in which he was not continuously residing. I find that in the charge the residence of the accused has been mentioned as village Kankanheru, while Amritlal's house is in village Narainpura. Shri Apte has taken me through the statement of the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure code in support of his contention that the accused could not be convicted with the aid of the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act because no such question was put to him. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Satchidananda Haldar and Ors. v. The State AIR 1958 Cal. 414 . In order to convict a person under Section 411, Indian Penal Code it is first necessary to prove that the property found in his possession was stolen property and next that the person concerned knew or had reason to believe that the same was stolen property. Under Illustration (a) of Section 114, Evidence Act before presumption could be drawn against the accused person he has to be asked to a account for his possession. The answer may be furnished by the accused on his own accord and if he does not do so, the trying Magistrate has to ask under the provisions of Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure code to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. In a case where the Court is to convict a person for his failure to offer an explanation for the possession of the goods, it is incumbent upon the Court to ask the accused for an explanation and only when the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation the Court is permitted to draw any presumption. In a case where the Court is to convict a person for his failure to offer an explanation for the possession of the goods, it is incumbent upon the Court to ask the accused for an explanation and only when the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation the Court is permitted to draw any presumption. Held, that in view of the fact that the circumstances in which the money was produced gave rise to some suspicion in the mind of the Court which suspicion could have been cleared only if the Court had examined accused persons properly under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure code, it was all the more necessary for the Court to ask the accused to offer an explanation as to their possession in their examination under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure code. Lastly Shri Apte contends that the identification parade which was held on October 10, 1957 could not be used against the Appellant--it was very much belated and the delay has not been explained. The accused had been arrested on September 20, 1957. It does not appear from the judgment of the trial Judge that he considered the time factor. A lapse of 20 days between the arrest and the test identification parade remains unaccounted for. The delay, in the absence of reasonable explanation, must be held to be inordinate and it takes away from this piece of evidence all its value. The learned trial Judge embodies his own impression in his judgment that the description of the robber given in the F.I.R. agreed with the Appellant. It runs thus: Ek badmash kachh khule ranga ka ausad kad ka, tagra da badan bhandi dhoti safed pahre tha, safe bandhe tha. In the first place it is too general and indefinite, there would be thousands of persons who would fit in that description. Secondly, I would call the Appellant a person of dark complexion rather than "khule se ranga ka". In any event, such controversial observations are neither here nor there. They cannot lead to any definite conclusion. The prosecution evidence as to the recovery of the stolen property having fallen to the ground the so called identification of the accused after two years of the incident cannot sustain a conviction. In any event, such controversial observations are neither here nor there. They cannot lead to any definite conclusion. The prosecution evidence as to the recovery of the stolen property having fallen to the ground the so called identification of the accused after two years of the incident cannot sustain a conviction. Shri Apte vehemently attacked the conviction under Section 394, Indian Penal Code and urged that there was no convincing evidence of the accused having committed robbery. At worst there could have been a possibility of a conviction under Section 411, Indian Penal Code if the recovery from the possession of the accused in respect of stolen property could be believed. Having regard to all the circumstances stated above, I have reached the conclusion that benefit of the doubt must go to the accused and that entitles him to an acquittal. The appeal, therefore, is allowed, the conviction and sentence are set aside and the Appellant is acquitted. He shall be set at liberty forthwith. The Appellant in this case was not represented by a counsel, Shri B.K. Apte Advocate has appeared without any remuneration. I am very thankful to him for the useful assistance he has rendered to this Court with his thorough preparation. Appeal allowed