Research › Browse › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

1959 DIGILAW 157 (KER)

Ex-officio Chitty Registrar, Meenachil v. Joseph Chacko

1959-06-25

KUMARA PILLAI

body1959
Judgment :- 1. This revision petition has been filed by defendant 4 in O. S No. 227 of 1958 of the Additional Munsiff's Court of Meenachil, the ex-officio Chitty Registrar, Meenachil, against an order of the lower court dismissing his objection that the suit was not maintainable for want of the requisite notice under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Plaintiff and defendant 2 are subscribers in the chitty of which defendant 1 is the foreman. S.17(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act, 26 of 1120, provides:- "Every foreman shall, before the first drawing of the chitty execute a bond in favour of or in trust for the other subscribers for the proper conduct of the chitty, charging property sufficient to the satisfaction of the Registrar or any officer empowered by Our Government in that behalf for the realisation of twice the chitty amount or depositing cash in any approved bank of not less than the chitty amount". The ex-officio Chitty Registrar, Meenachil, is the officer who under the rules had to be satisfied of the sufficiency of the security for the chitty conducted by defendant 1. Defendant 1 availed of the option, given to him by S.17(1) of the Chitties Act, for depositing cash in any approved bank in lieu of executing a security bond, and he deposited the necessary amount with defendant 3, a joint stock bank. 3. The plaintiff brought the suit alleging that the claims of all the subscribers to the chitty except himself and defendant 2 had been satisfied and that, as the amount deposited with defendant 3 bank was insufficient to meet the claims of himself and defendant 2, he should be given a declaration that the said amount could be drawn by himself and defendant 2 and they might be allowed to draw the amount. Since defendant 4 was the officer who had to be satisfied of the sufficiency of the security the plaintiff impleaded him also as a party to the suit. Defendant 4 raised the contention that as he was a public officer notice to him under S.80, Code of Civil Procedure was necessary and that the suit was not maintainable as such notice had not been given by the plaintiff. Defendant 4 raised the contention that as he was a public officer notice to him under S.80, Code of Civil Procedure was necessary and that the suit was not maintainable as such notice had not been given by the plaintiff. The lower court repelled this contention holding that no notice was necessary as this was not a suit brought against a public officer in respect of any act done by him in his official capacity. The revision petition is filed by defendant 4 against the order of the lower court repelling his objection. 4. Reliance was placed in the lower court as well as before me by defendant 4's counsel on two cases, namely, Secretary of State v. Amarnath (AIR 1936 Pat. 339) and Beldeo Prasad v. Sukhi Singh (A.I.R.1938 Pat. 127). In both these cases the Secretary of State was a pro-forma party, and it was contended by the plaintiffs therein that as he was only a pro-forma party notice to him under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not necessary. This contention of the plaintiffs was over-ruled in both cases; and the contention of the learned Government Pleader before me was that the reasoning in those cases must hold good in the present case also. 5. S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood at the time of the cases referred to above read: "No suit shall be instituted against the Secretary of State for India in Council, or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Secretary of State in Council, delivered to, or left in the office of, a Secretary to the local Government or the Collector of the District, and, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left". It is plain from this section that the legislature had drawn a distinction between cases against the Secretary of State and cases against public officers. It is plain from this section that the legislature had drawn a distinction between cases against the Secretary of State and cases against public officers. So far as suits against the Secretary of State were concerned, notice was made essential, whether the suit was in respect of any act purporting to be done by the Secretary of State in his official capacity or not. So far as the suits against public officers were concerned, notice was made essential only in respect of acts purporting to be done by them in their official capacity. Therefore, even if the Secretary of State was only a pro-forma party notice was essential. Exactly similar is the case under the present section so far as suits against Government are concerned. So far as suits against public officers are concerned there is no change in the section. The section as it now stands reads: "No suit shall be instituted against the Government, or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of- (a) in the case of a suit against the Central Government, except where it relates to a Railway, a Secretary to that Government; (b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it relates to a railway the General Manager of that railway; (c) in the case of a suit against a State Government, a Secretary to that Government or the Collector of the District, and, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left". Commenting upon the part of the section relating to public officers, Mulla says in his Book on the Code of Civil Procedure, 1953, Edition, at page 307: "No notice is necessary when the suit is not in respect of an act done by the public officer, although he is made a defendant, as when a Collector is made a party defendant, for the protection of the title of a minor; or when the suit is against the official trustee for the determination of the rights of the beneficiaries to trust funds in his hands". 6. The position of the ex-officio Chitty Registrar in the present case is exactly similar to that of the official trustee in the case referred to by Mulla. He is only in the position of a stake-holder. He has nothing to do in respect of the security. He can neither release the security and direct the bank to make the payment to the subscriber, nor refuse to release the same. The Bank has to make the payment when it is proved to its satisfaction that the claims in respect of the chitty have been satisfied (and in that case the bank does so on its own responsibility and at its peril) or it has to make the payment as per the orders of the court. 7. The plaintiff wants merely declaration so far as the Chitty Registrar is concerned. The suit really is against the assets of the chitty and the foreman. In an almost parallel case, Revati Mohan v. Jatindra Mohan (AIR. 1934 P.C. 96) the Privy Council has observed: "In the case of a suit against a public officer it is only where the plaintiff complains of some act purporting to have been done by him in his official capacity that notice is enjoined." In the present case not only is there no complaint by the plaintiff of any act or omission purporting to have been done by the ex-officio Chitty Registrar but that officer could not also have done or omitted to do anything at all in respect of the subject-matter of the suit. I would, therefore, hold that this is not a case in which notice under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was necessary. I, therefore, confirm the order of the lower court and dismiss the revision petition. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.