ORDER :- Matru Khan applicant has been convicted under Sec. 26 read with Sec. 5 of the Indian Forest Act and has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default 1½ months' rigorous imprisonment. The appellate court also awarded a compensation to the Forest Department and directed the applicant to pay a sum of Rs. 2500/-. 2. The counsel for the applicant has raised two contentions before me, In the first place he contended that since no notification under S. 20 of the Indian Forest Act was passed in this case the tract of land from which the trees were cut away had not been declared to be a. reserved forest. In support of this contention he also drew my attention to the fact that the acts which are made penal in respect of the reserved forests are different from the acts which are made penal in respect of those forests about which only a notification under Sec. 4 of the Indian Forest Act has been issued. It seems that the State before it can declare any area as a reserved forest had to make two notifications. The first notification is to be issued under section 4, which may be described as a proposal for declaring a particular area as a reserved forest. After this notification is issued, claims are considered and decided and finally a second notification is issued under Sec. 20 when that area is finally notified as a reserved forest. It seems that unless an area is declared a notified reserved forest, the only penal provision that exists in the Indian Forest Act is contained in the first part of Sec. 26. This penal provision is as follows : "26. (1) Any person who : (a) makes any fresh clearing prohibited by Sec. 5, or (b) sets fire to a reserved forest, or, in contravention of any rules made by the State Government in this behalf, kindles any fire, or leaves any fire burning, in such manner as to endanger such a forest; " The subsequent part of Sec. 26 deals with those acts which are prohibited in a reserved forest. This is admitted by the counsel for the State that no notification under Sec. 20 was issued in this case and only a notification under Sec. 4 was issued. This is admitted by the counsel for the State that no notification under Sec. 20 was issued in this case and only a notification under Sec. 4 was issued. I have, therefore, to see whether the conduct alleged against the applicant falls under sub-section (a) above, for obviously sub-section (b) has no relevance. 3. In deciding this question it would be better to cite Sec. 5 of the Indian Forest Act. Section 5 runs as follows : "After the issue of a notification under section 4, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government or some person in whom such light was vested when the notification was issued; and no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as may be made by the State Government in this behalf," The contention of the counsel is that even if the allegation made by the prosecution is correct and the applicant cut away some trees from a portion of this area and only stumps were left behind, it does not come under the, words making a fresh clearing and, therefore, the penal provisions of section 26 cannot be applied to the conduct of the applicant. The counsel also drew my attention to the meaning of the word 'clearing' given in the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary. According to this Dictionary, 'clearing' has the following meanings : "1. The act of making clear : 2. a tract of land cleared of wood etc. for cultivation; 3. Method by which bankers exchange cheques and drafts, and arrange the differences;" The argument before me is that unless there is evidence to prove that the act of clearing was for the purpose of cultivation it cannot be said that the cutting away of some trees was an act of clearing. I have given full consideration to the argument advanced before me, but I am unable to accept it. 4. I will now give my reasons for finding this argument to be untenable. In the first place the procedure mentioned above indicates that any tract of land cannot be immediately declared to be a reserved forest. I have given full consideration to the argument advanced before me, but I am unable to accept it. 4. I will now give my reasons for finding this argument to be untenable. In the first place the procedure mentioned above indicates that any tract of land cannot be immediately declared to be a reserved forest. A proposal has to be made first and a notification issued on that point and subsequently after an appreciable lapse of time that tract of land can be declared to be a reserved forest. The State, therefore, cannot come into possession immediately and there would always be a short or a long interval in which others come to know that the State intends to take possession of this tract. They would thus have plenty of time to defraud the State of the trees which are standing on that area. The State represents the community and, therefore, any interpretation of a law which permits an individual with criminal designs to defraud the community for his own personal gain cannot be given to the words of the statute unless the words leave no other option and this is the only meaning which can be given to those words. Where more than one interpretation is possible the interpretation which is in consonance with the spirit of the enactment or also in consonance with the welfare of the community should be preferred to that interpretation which endangers the welfare of the community. I have, therefore, to interpret the word 'clearing' used in sections 5 and 26 of the Indian Forest Act in this background. 5. Then I find that the Dictionary meaning of the word 'clearing' also does not confine the operation of its use to clearing for cultivation alone. The first meaning is the act of making clear and where a piece of land is being denuded of trees, the land is being made clear by the removal of these trees. The intention or the purpose of such clearance need not be probed, only the act is to be seen and assessed. The first meaning is the act of making clear and where a piece of land is being denuded of trees, the land is being made clear by the removal of these trees. The intention or the purpose of such clearance need not be probed, only the act is to be seen and assessed. In my opinion where the trees are removed from a piece of land, it certainly falls within the meaning of the word 'clearing' and, therefore, I would be doing no violence to the language used either in Sec. 5 or Sec. 26 of the Indian Forest Act in holding that the act of cutting away the trees was an act of clearing. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no force in this contention and the applicant was rightly convicted under Sec. 26 read with Sec. 5 of the Indian Forest Act. 6. There is, however, one part of the order passed by the appellate court which cannot be upheld. The appellate court set aside the conviction of the applicant under section 379 I. P. Code, but punished him in another manner when it altered the order passed by the trial court. The appellate court observed that "since, however, the section also contemplates the award of compensation, to the Forest Department, the appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2500/- to the State Forest Department as compensation this being the approximate value of the trees felled by the appellant as stated by the Forester Sri R. P. Saxena and there being no ground to disbelieve his evidence on the point." The words of Sec. 26 which confer this right of awarding compensation run as follows : "Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such compensation for damage done to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid." The words quoted above in my opinion do not confer any power upon the appellate court to award this compensation. The words used are 'the convicting Court'; and the appellate court is not the convicting court and it is only the trial court which in the context can be called the convicting court. The words used are 'the convicting Court'; and the appellate court is not the convicting court and it is only the trial court which in the context can be called the convicting court. But even if it is accepted that the words 'convicting court' include all those courts which uphold the conviction of an offender, the order passed by the appellate court was clearly beyond its jurisdiction. The powers of the appellate court, when hearing an appeal, are circumscribed by the provisions of Sec. 423 Cri. P. C. Section 423 Cri. P. Code has not given any power to the Sessions Judge to enhance the sentence of an offender. If the Sessions Judge feels that the sentence awarded to the offender is inadequate, he can only make a reference under Sec. 438 Cri. P. Code, but on his own he cannot enhance the sentence. That the award of this compensation amounts to a punishment and also to an enhancement or sentence cannot be doubted and has not been disputed. The appellate court, therefore, not only misread the words of Sec. 26 of the Indian Forest Act, but it also transgressed the limits imposed upon its powers by the provisions of Sec. 423 Cri. P. Code. The order relating to compensation is, therefore, clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge and cannot be upheld. 7. The question now arises that the matter having come to my notice should I now acting under my revisional powers or under my inherent powers issue notice to the applicant as to why the sentence awarded to him should not be enhanced. If the matter had come to me in a proper manner perhaps I would have enhanced the sentence, but where such an illegality has been committed by the appellate court I think it would not be in the interests of justice to cure that illegality in this manner. I therefore, do not propose to issue notice of enhancement against the applicant in this case. 8. For the reasons given above, this application of revision is dismissed, subject to the modification that the direction given by the appellate court to the applicant that he should pay a sum of Rs. 2500/- as compensation to the State Forest Department is set aside. The order staying the realization of fine is vacated. Order accordingly.