JUDGMENT P.V. Dixit, J. This appeal arises out of execution proceedings of a decree held by the Appellant Mohammad Habib against Mohammad Usuf. From the judgment appealed against, it appears that the decree was for payment of a sum of Rs.18,340,94 and for the realisation of this amount the decree-holder applied to the executing Court for the attachment and sale of certain property belonging to the judgment-debtor which had been declared to be evacuee property and which had vested in the Custodian. The executing Court held that in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, as amended by Act No. 22 of 1951, the evacuee property was not liable to be proceeded against in any manner whatsoever in execution of the decree. The learned Judge of the executing Court also held that as directed by this Court in an appeal arising out of previous proceedings for the execution of the decree, the decree-holder could only ask the Court to move the Custodian under Section 10(2)(n) of the Act for the settlement of the decree-holder's claim out of the funds of the evacuee in his possession and that for this purpose the decree-holder should deposit the requisite process-fee. It is against this order that the present appeal has been preferred. Mr. Phadnis, Learned Counsel for the Appellant, contended that the decree under execution was rot a money decree but was a decree for the specific performance of contract to sell certain property; that the decree-holder had only sought that the property of the judgment-debtor to which the decree related and which had been declared to be evacuee property should be sold to him; and that Section 17 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, as it stood before it was amended by Act No. 22 of 1951, was applicable to the case and under that provision there was no bar to the sale of the property to the decree-holder in execution of his decree for specific performance. The argument was that Act No. 22 of 1951 which substituted a new section for the original Section 17 in Act, No. 31 of 1950 was itself repealed by the Repealing and Amend-Act No. 36 of 1957 and therefore, the original Section 17 should be held to have been restored. I am unable to accept this contention. The argument was that Act No. 22 of 1951 which substituted a new section for the original Section 17 in Act, No. 31 of 1950 was itself repealed by the Repealing and Amend-Act No. 36 of 1957 and therefore, the original Section 17 should be held to have been restored. I am unable to accept this contention. It is necessary to note the nature of the amendments made by Act No. 22 of 1950. That Act added a new sub-cluse in Clause (f) of Section 2 and substituted a new section for the original Section 17 in the Act of 1950. According to the amending Act, this insertion and substitution was to be deemed always to have been inserted or substituted. In other words Sub-clause (1) (a) of Section 2(f) and the substituted Section 17 were to be read as if they had been incorporated in Act No. 31 of 1950 right from the time when Act No. 31 of 1950 was enacted and came into force. Now, one of the rules of construction is that "when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all" see Shamrao. v. District Magistrate, Thana AIR 1952 S.C. 324 ., Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition and Keshoram v. Nando Lal AIR 1927 P.C. 97. Having fulfilled its purpose, Act No. 22 of 1951 thus remained of no value and any further retention of the same would have been purposeless only leading to confusion. It was for this reason that it was repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act No. 36 of 1957. It is noteworthy that Section 4 of Act No. 36 of 1957 itself provides that "the repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any other enactment in which the repealed enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to". It was for this reason that it was repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act No. 36 of 1957. It is noteworthy that Section 4 of Act No. 36 of 1957 itself provides that "the repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any other enactment in which the repealed enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to". It is clear from this provision that if, as I think, by Act No. 22 of 1951 the new Section 17 was incorporated in Act No. 31 of 1950 and was deemed always to have been in that Act, then notwithstanding the repeal of Act No. 22 of 1951 by Act No. 36 of 1957, the substituted Section 17 still continues to be a part of Act No. 31 of 1950 and the old Section 17 is not revived. It is, however, not necessary to elaborate the matter further as Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, gives a complete answer to the contention advanced by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant. That section lays down: Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. According to this provision, the repeal of Act No. 22 of 1951 shall not affect the continuance of any insertion or substitution made by that Act and in operation at the time of the" repeal of that Act, unless a different intention appears. The insertion and substitution made by Act No. 22 of 1951 were in operation when that Act was repealed in 1957 by Act No. 36 of 1957. Unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act, the insertion and substitution made in the original Act would continue to have operation. A different intention does not appear in the Repealing and Amending Act of 1957. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, Section 4 of the Repealing Act itself says that the repeal by the Act of any enactment shall not affect any Act in which the repealed enactment has been incorporated. A different intention does not appear in the Repealing and Amending Act of 1957. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, Section 4 of the Repealing Act itself says that the repeal by the Act of any enactment shall not affect any Act in which the repealed enactment has been incorporated. I do not, therefore, think that there is any force in the submission made by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the effect of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1957 is to revive the old Section 17 of Act No. 31 of 1950 and, therefore, the decree-holder is entitled to have his decree for specific performance executed under the old Section 17. If then the matter is governed by the substituted Section 17, the judgment-debtor's property, which has been declared to be evacuee property, is not liable to be proceeded against in any manner whatsoever in execution of any decree, whether the decree is a money decree or is one for the specific performance of a contract to sell the property. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the executing Court is right and this appeal must be and is rejected. Appeal dismissed