Judgment :- 1. The defeated first defendant is the appellant before me. The suit was for recovery of a sum of Rs. 400/-on the basis of a karar entered into between the defendant and the plaintiff on 24-2-1952. 2. According to the plaintiff, the defendant owed some amount to one Chacko Iyyo, a cousin of the plaintiff, having borrowed the sum in or about 19-1-1952. This Chacko Iyyo appears to have pressed the first defendant for payment, and according to the plaintiff, he came to the rescue of the first defendant at his request and discharged his liability by paying Chacko Iyyo. It is this amount that is sought to be recovered by the plaintiff in these proceedings. 3. The defence set up was one of absolute denial of the transaction with either Chacko Iyyo or the later transaction with the plaintiff. 4. Both sides rested their case on oral evidence. The trial court accepted the contentions of the defendant and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, whereas on appeal by the plaintiff, the learned additional District Judge of Kottayam reversed the finding of the trial court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. It is against this decree and judgment of the learned Additional District Judge that this appeal comes before me. 5. In the appeal before me, Mr. Parameswara Panicker learned counsel for the appellant, very strenuously contended that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact based upon appreciation of oral evidence recorded by the trial court in favour of his client. The learned counsel also contended that, even otherwise, the reasoning of the lower appellate court is not correct. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Vadakkel, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, has supported the reasoning of the judgment of the lower appellate court and has also drawn my attention to the faulty reasons, according to him, contained in the judgment of the learned District Munsiff. 7. I must also state at this stage, that before Mr. Parameswara Panicker started arguing the second appeal, there was a preliminary objection on the side of the plaintiff, that this being a suit of a small cause nature of the value of less than Rs. 500/-, S.108 of the C. P. C. is a bar to the filing of the Second Appeal, and to this contention Mr. Parameswara Panicker had really no answer. 500/-, S.108 of the C. P. C. is a bar to the filing of the Second Appeal, and to this contention Mr. Parameswara Panicker had really no answer. No doubt, it would have been perfectly open to me to have rejected this appeal as not maintainable, accepting the preliminary objections. But the appeal having been on the file of this court for over 3 years, I permitted Mr. Parameswara Panicker to argue this appeal as a C. R. P. under S.115 C. P. C. under which naturally, the powers of this court are very much restricted. Therefore, I make it clear that this matter has been heard and disposed of by me as a matter under S.115 C. P. C. 8. The learned counsel's contention, namely, that the decree of a trial court being based purely on appreciation of the oral evidence, an appellate court is not right in interfering with the finding recorded by the trial court, no doubt, on the face of it, is ordinarily correct. In fact there is the authority of the Supreme Court to the effect that a finding of fact, upon an appreciation of oral evidence, recorded by a court which had the opportunity of examining the demeanour of the witness, cannot be ordinarily interfered with by an appellate court. But it must also be remembered that the Supreme Court also says that it is not an absolute rule but only a rule of prudence to be pursued by the courts. That means, it is not as if that an appellate court is absolutely powerless to interfere with such a finding of fact, if it finds that the court which recorded the finding, has not really adverted to the material evidence in this case, or has disbelieved the witnesses on flimsy grounds which cannot be sustained in law. 9. Even here, it is clear from Para.4 of the judgment of the learned District Judge, that he was well aware of this principle and it is in the light of that principle that he has considered the appeal before him. 10. Though Mr. Parameswara Panicker attempted to point out mistakes in the judgment of the lower appellate court, he has not been able to ultimately satisfy me that there are any mistakes in this judgment which is under appeal. 10. Though Mr. Parameswara Panicker attempted to point out mistakes in the judgment of the lower appellate court, he has not been able to ultimately satisfy me that there are any mistakes in this judgment which is under appeal. In fact, I have persued the judgment of the trial court and I feel that the learned judge was perfectly right in reversing that judgment. 11. The grounds on which some of the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff have been rejected by the learned District Munsiff, are absolutely flimsy, in my opinion. I will give only one or two instances to show that judgment cannot be allowed to stand. 12. In discussing the evidence of the plaintiff as Pw.1, regarding the transaction of 24-2-1952, the learned District Munsiff starts by saying that he swears that on 24-2-1952, he paid Rs. 400/- to Chacko Iyyo. Then he also notes that he plaintiff swears that besides defendants, two other persons, namely, Pachu Pillai and Chanda Pillai were also present. The learned District Munsiff then says that the plaintiff is not prepared to take an oath. Further he says that this Pachu Pillai is not examined. The fact that a party is not prepared to take an oath is not by itself a ground for disbelieving his evidence. The second reason given by that court is that Pachu Pillai is not examined. That Pachu Pillai is Pw. 2 in this case. Therefore both the reasons given by the trial court for not acting on the evidence of Pw.1 cannot be sustained and therefore, the learned judge was perfectly within his rights in reversing the judgment of the trial court based upon such surmises. 13. One other instance also may be mentioned, namely, the learned District Munsiff says that Pw. 2 speaks to the fact that first defendant borrowed Rs .400/- from the plaintiff, and further observes that it is not the case of the plaintiff. I fail to understand this reasoning of the trial court. It is the case of the plaintiff that the first defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 400/- for payment to Chacko Iyyo. If that is not the case of the plaintiff, I fail to understand what else is the basis on which the present action has been filed. I fail to understand this reasoning of the trial court. It is the case of the plaintiff that the first defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 400/- for payment to Chacko Iyyo. If that is not the case of the plaintiff, I fail to understand what else is the basis on which the present action has been filed. As pointed out by the learned District Judge, absolutely no suggestion of ill-will or enmity towards the defendant has been suggested to these witnesses to speak false case as against them. These are all circumstances which have missed the attention of the trial court to appreciate the oral evidence placed before it. 14. In view of these circumstances, the appellate court has considered the evidence and come to a conclusion that the decree and judgment of the trial court cannot be sustained. 15. There is no merit in the Second Appeal which is dismissed with costs. There will be no question of refund of the court fees paid in the Second appeal, even though this is heard as a C.R.P.