ORDER V.R. Nevaskar, J. Accused Shravanlal son of Udayajit of Mandsaur, who was employed as a constable No. 113 in the D.R.P. Lines, Mandsaur was found guilty under Section 27 of the Madhya Bharat Polico Act by the Additional District Magistrate, who sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 51 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days. The trial held by him was summary. On a petition for revision preferred by the accused the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mandsaur, submitted a report under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure code to this Court for setting aside his conviction and the sentence imposed upon him. The accused was charged with and found guilty of having remained absent from duty without obtaining requisite permission from his superior officer. It is said that on 28-1-1957 he left the D.R.P. Lines premises and was out of station till 5-2-1957, when he rejoined his duties. The accused denied the charge and asserted that he was not absent from the lines either on 28-1-1957 when line officer Shamsunder checked the lines or on subsequent days till 5-2-1957 and asserted that he was throughout present in the lines during this period. According to him a false report had been registered against him maliciously as he had complained against the line officer Shri Sham-sunder and Head Constable Sunderlal for their conduct in unduly effecting search of his Almirah and had sought sanction to prosecute them. The Additional District Magistrate who held the trial relied upon the statements of line officer Shamsundar, Head Constable Sunderlal and the reports contained in the Rojanamcha regarding his absence from duty from 28-1-1957 till 5-2-1957. He considered the evidence of Dr. Trivedi regarding his having treated the accused for a boil to be not material, as according to him the crucial question was whether the accused had absented himself from duty during the material period or not. The learned Magistrate discarded the statements of the defence witnesses Virendrasingh, Ramsingh and Shrikrishna as according to him all that was suggested in their statement was that he was present in the lines. His mere presence in the line would not according to the learned Magistrate, mean that he was not absent from duty during the material period. The records produced from the police diary and registers were considered more important in this respect. His mere presence in the line would not according to the learned Magistrate, mean that he was not absent from duty during the material period. The records produced from the police diary and registers were considered more important in this respect. He discountenanced the suggestion that a false case was put forward maliciously against the accused at the instigation of the line officer Shamsundar. He therefore found the accused guilty and sentenced him as stated above. The contentions raised on behalf of the accused both before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and before this Court are: Firstly that the trial ought to be considered as bad as in a case of this description it was more appropriate to hold a regular trial. Secondly that the learned Additional District Magistrate did not comply with the provisions of Section 265(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure code as the judgment appears to have been typed and must have been done so at his dictation. Besides these two contentions three more contentions were put forward before me. Thirdly that the sanction is bad as it mentions 'with' instead of without. Fourthly that the defence evidence was not given due weight, and Lastly that the accused is not a police officer. Grounds Nos. 1 and 2 which were pressed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge seem to have appealed to him and he has reported the matter to this Court on that account. Contention No. 3 can be disposed of at once. The sanction was quite in order but for a typing error. Instead of putting down 'without' in the following part of the sanction 'for remaining absent from duty from 28-1-1957 to 5-2-1957 with obtaining leave or permission of his superior police officer'. The word 'with' was typed obviously, it was a typing error and anybody who would read the sanction would assume it to be so. For a typing error of this description where the entire context and the act indicates otherwise the sanction cannot be held to be bad. The learned Counsel at the close of his argument stated that he would not seriously press it. The contention is obviously without any force. Contention No. 5 is also without any substance. Although the word police officer is not defined in the Madhya Bharat Police Act the term 'police' has been defined. The learned Counsel at the close of his argument stated that he would not seriously press it. The contention is obviously without any force. Contention No. 5 is also without any substance. Although the word police officer is not defined in the Madhya Bharat Police Act the term 'police' has been defined. Section 2(d) of the Act provides: 'Police' means and includes all persons enrolled under this Act or a person enrolled in the Police under any law in force or otherwise in any part of Madhya Bharat before this Act comes into force. Section 7 of the Act lays down: No police officer shall be at liberty to withdraw himself from the duties of his office, unless expressly allowed to do so by the District Superintendent or by some other officer authorised to grant such permission, or, without the leave of the District Superintendent to resign his office, unless he shall have given to his superior officer notice in writing for a period of not less than two months, of his intention to resign. Section 27 provides for a penalty inter alia for wilful breach or neglect of duty in withdrawing from duties of his office without permission etc. The word 'officer' has no other meaning in the context than the holder of a public or civil office. The accused in this case is a 'constable' and is employed as such. It cannot therefore be said that he is not a police officer. The contention raised by the learned Counsel before me is that it had not been proved that he is holder of a certificate as indicated in Section 6. This contention is hardly tenable. In the first place the accused who was admittedly a constable bearing No. 113 never put forward the contention that he is not a member of the police force or is not a police officer. He does not say that he was neither the holder of a certificate under Section 6 of the Act nor was he enrolled under any law in force or otherwise in any part of Madhya Bharat before the date coming into force of the Madhya Bharat Police Act which is 16-9-1950. The very fact that he bears No. 113 indicates that he must have been enrolled either under the Act or before the Act came into force. This contention therefore is also without any force. The very fact that he bears No. 113 indicates that he must have been enrolled either under the Act or before the Act came into force. This contention therefore is also without any force. I shall next proceed to consider contentions Nos. 1 and 2 which had appealed to the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The trial of the accused in this case was summary. It is not disputed that the Magistrate had jurisdiction and power to hold a summary trial in this case but it is contended that the power vesting in the Magistrate to try the case summarily was discretionary and the discretion has not been exercised properly in this case. The reason suggested is that the effect of a finding of guilty in such a case is serious. The accused will not only have to suffer the sentence imposed upon him but may be exposed to further risk of loss of his service as a result of his conviction. Reliance in this connection is placed upon the decisions reported in Emperor v. Bashir AIR 1929 All. 267, Bradley v. Emperor AIR 1932 Lah. 188 and Sachidanand v. State AIR 1956 All. 212 . Section 260(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure code no doubt confers discretionary power upon certain class of Magistrates to try certain kinds of cases mentioned therein summarily. It is also true that the discretionary power thus conferred upon a Magistrate has got to be exercised with care and it should only be resorted to in simpler cases and when the consequences of such a trial may not go beyond imposition of punishment allowed by law for the same. Where however, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case it appears that the offence is of a more serious nature than might ordinarily be assumed to be by reason of the complicated nature of it or that it would involve more serious consequences than what might follow due to imposition of a lawful sentence it would not be desirable to resort to such a power. But these considerations are nothing different from the general consideration that the trial should be such as to be fair to the accused from all points of view and ought not to cause prejudice to him and the question whether in a particular case the accused has been prejudiced due to the trial of the case in a summary manner, even though it might be strictly legal would depend upon circumstance of a particular case. In a case reported in Sohonsing v. Emperor 9 IC 831, it was held that summary procedure though legal is most inappropriate in cases in which Government servants no matter what their rank, are concerned as accused persons. This decision was approved of and followed by Shadi Lal C.J. in Robert John Bradley AIR 1932 Lah. 188. In the latter case peculiar facts were that there was reason for the accused in that case to feel that his case would not be tried summarily as he had initially been summoned by a Magistrate with second class powers. Later however the case was placed by the Additional District Magistrate on his own file without informing the accused that he intended to try the case summarily. The accused was a public servant. The effect of the conviction of the accused might have resulted in casting blemish upon his character as a public servant and might also have brought about disciplinary action. Under those circumstances it was held that the accused had been prejudiced by the summary trial. The trial was accordingly quashed and a direction was given to try the case as an ordinary complaint. In a case reported in Emperor v. Bashir AIR 1929 All. 267 Boys and Sen JJ. held that the consequences following upon conviction of what is in itself a trivial offence may be so grave as to render a summary trial unsuitable. That was of course a case where the accused, having previous conviction to his credit was tried for an offence under Section 411, Indian Penal Code summarily. The order of conviction in that case was set aside on merits. These cases as well as the case of a Head Constable accused of intimidation reported in Subramanya Aiyar v. Queen ILR 6 Mad. 396 were followed in a recent case of the Allahabad High Court reported in Sachidanand v. State 1956 All. 212. The order of conviction in that case was set aside on merits. These cases as well as the case of a Head Constable accused of intimidation reported in Subramanya Aiyar v. Queen ILR 6 Mad. 396 were followed in a recent case of the Allahabad High Court reported in Sachidanand v. State 1956 All. 212. The proposition, that Government servants who are accused of offences triable summarily ought not to be tried under summary procedure, so broadly stated in Sohansingh v. Emperor 9 IC 831, and reiterated in Bradley v. Emperor AIR 1932 Lah. 188, was not assented to by Ramlal J., in a case reported in M.A. Khan v. Emperor AIR 1939 Lah. 467. The learned Judge in that case observed that the cases could easily be imagined of Government servants in which summary procedure would be more appropriate than an ordinary protracted trial and it is in each case a question of fact whether one or the other mode of trial permissible by law should be resorted to. In In re Mahzmmad Sultan AIR 1955 Mad. 92 , Balakrishna Ayyar J. also was not prepared to accept the broad proposition laid that in the case of Government servants summary trial is not appropriate. He held that it would depend upon circumstances of each case whether it is so or not. In a recent case of Assam High Court reported in Kanak Chandra v. Supdt. of Police AIR 1955 Assa 240, Sarjoo Prasad C.J. and Ram Labhaya J. held that it would not be desirable to lay down any hard and fast rule that all cases of Government servants in respect of offences triable summarily should be tried in an ordinary manner. It was pointed out by them that the law leaves the discretion with the Magistrate and that discretion must not be fettered in any way. The Magistrate should be free to exercise that discretion according to the circumstances of each case. It was found by them in that case that the trial, though characterised as summary was fairly elaborate. It was pointed out by them that the law leaves the discretion with the Magistrate and that discretion must not be fettered in any way. The Magistrate should be free to exercise that discretion according to the circumstances of each case. It was found by them in that case that the trial, though characterised as summary was fairly elaborate. It therefore appears from these cases that the better view is that no hard and fast rule can be laid down that in all cases of public servants charged with offences tried summarily the trial should not be summary and it is in each case a question to be determined on the circumstances of the case bearing in mind the likely consequences of a conviction. The Magistrate should exercise his discretion reasonably bearing in mind the entire circumstances of the case and where the trial is held in a summary manner the question which the superior Court need consider is whether such a trial has caused prejudice to the accused. With this principle in view if we examine the present case it appears that the trial though characterised as summary in form was sufficiently elaborate. The statements of the witnesses were recorded and the entire depositions including elaborate cross-examination were made a part of the record. The documents consisting of records kept in a public office in the regular course of business were produced and proved after the accused had full opportunity of examining and challenging them. It is in these circumstances difficult to hold that the accused had been prejudiced by the summary character of the trial. The case was simple. The allegation was that the accused had absented himself from his duty during a certain period. The Magistrate cannot be said to have used his discretion to try the case summarily improperly. Although it is difficult to anticipate the possible departmental action for my part I am not impressed by the argument of the learned Counsel for the accused that the consequences of imposition of a fine in this case would be that he would be dismissed from service. I expect that the authorities concerned would keep in mind the principle that the punishment should be in proportion to the gravity of the default. I expect that the authorities concerned would keep in mind the principle that the punishment should be in proportion to the gravity of the default. As regards the second contention that the judgment ought to have been written by the Magistrate in his own hand, it may be said that in the first place the counsel for the accused is not in a position to say whether the judgment was typed by a clerk at the dictation of the presiding officer or not. In the second place it appears now to be well settled after the decision of the Privy Council in Koltaya v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67, that where the trial is conducted substantially in a manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct the irregularity can be cured under Section 537 and nonetheless so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always be the case, a breach of one or more of the very comprehensive provisions of the Code. The trial in such cases is valid in spite of the irregularity. The material question in such cases is whether the accused has been prejudiced as a result of the irregularity. At one time it was thought that if the provision, breach whereof is committed, is expressed in a language suggesting its mandatory character the trial should necessarily be held to be illegal. But the Supreme Court in their judgment in William Slaney's case AIR 1956 SC 116 has made it clear that: The distinction that was once sought to be drawn between an express prohibition and an equally express provision positively stated strikes us as unreal. The real question is not whether a matter is expressed positively or is stated in negative terms but whether disregard of a particular provision amounts to 'substantial' denial of a trial as contemplated by the Code and understood by the comprehensive expression "natural justice". It will be observed that disregard of an express prohibition was regarded as curable in Zahiruddin v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 75 (H), so the question whether a particular provision is stated in positive or in negative terms is not the true criterion. It will be observed that disregard of an express prohibition was regarded as curable in Zahiruddin v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 75 (H), so the question whether a particular provision is stated in positive or in negative terms is not the true criterion. The Supreme Court summarised their view on the subject in the aforesaid decision as follows: The Code (Code of Criminal Procedure code) is a Code of procedure and like all procedural laws, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. The object of the Code is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along certain well established and well understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice. If he does, if he is tried by a competent Court, if he is told and clearly understands the nature of the offence for which he is being tried, if the case against him is fully and fairly explained to him and he is afforded a full and fair opportunity of defending, himself, then, provided there is 'substantial' compliance with the outward forms of the law, mere mistakes in procedure, mere inconsequential errors and omissions in the trial are regarded as venal by the Code and the trial is not vitiated unless the accused can show substantial prejudice. That, broadly speaking, is the basic principle on which the Code is based. The real question therefore is whether the accused can be said to have been prejudiced by reason the judgment being typed instead of its being written by the Magistrate in his own hand. Mr. Mathur for the accused was unable to say that the irregularity had caused any prejudice. I therefore hold there is no force in the second contention as well. As regards the merits of the case I do not think that the concurrent view of the two Courts below is erroneous. They have relied upon oral testimony of police officers Shamsundar, Sundarsingh and others as also upon the records in the police office kept regularly in the course of business. The defence evidence consisting of the testimony of Dr. Trivedi, Virendrasingh, Ramsingh and others was also taken into account. On a judicial appreciation of that evidence the accused was found to be guilty. Before the appellate Court the learned Counsel for the accused pressed only contentions Nos. The defence evidence consisting of the testimony of Dr. Trivedi, Virendrasingh, Ramsingh and others was also taken into account. On a judicial appreciation of that evidence the accused was found to be guilty. Before the appellate Court the learned Counsel for the accused pressed only contentions Nos. 1 and 2. I therefore see no reason to interfere with the order of conviction on the ground that the finding as to the absence of the accused during the material period from his duty, was erroneous. The result is that the recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not accepted and conviction of the accused as well as sentence imposed upon him are confirmed. Petition allowed