Bhandari, J.—This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India praying that a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction or order be issued against Respondent No. 1, the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur, after quashing his order dated the 7th of January, 1958, directing him to decide the application made by the petitioners under sec. 33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) in accordance with law. 2. The petitioners own and manage several manufacturing factories, one of which is the Lakheri Cement Works at Lakheri in the State of Rajasthan. Shri Hariprasad Respondent No. 2. was a workman employed in the petitioners works at Lakheri as C Grade Electrician in the Electrical Department. On the 29th of June, 1957, Respondent No. 2 was served with a charge-sheet for the various act of misconducts alleged to have been committed by him during the period from the 11th of May, 1957 to the 27th of June, 1957. He was suspended on the 29th June, 1957. It is stated in the writ petition that a full-fledge enquiry was held against him on the 3rd of July, and 17th of July, 1957, and as result of such enquiry Respondent No. 2 was found guilty of the charges levelled against him. By the order dated the 18th of July, 1957, Respondent No. 2 was dismissed with effect from the 29th of June, 1957. Respondent No. 2 was further asked to collect his dues from the Companys Cash Office on or after the 20th of July, 1957. An application dated 29th July, 1957, under sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act was also despatched to Respondent No. 1 on 19th August, 1957, and it was received by the Tribunal on the 26th of August 1957. On this application, notice was given by Respondent No. 1 to Respondent No. 2, who submitted a written reply. It appears that certain preliminary objection, which we need not mention, as they are not material for the purpose of this writ petition, were taken on behalf of Respondent No 2. During the course of proceeding Respondent No. 1 suo-moto raised two points regarding the non-maintainability of the application. It appears that certain preliminary objection, which we need not mention, as they are not material for the purpose of this writ petition, were taken on behalf of Respondent No 2. During the course of proceeding Respondent No. 1 suo-moto raised two points regarding the non-maintainability of the application. The first point was that Respondent No. 2 was not paid wages for one month prior to or simultaneously with the order of dismissal and the second was that the application under sec.33(2)(b) was not made to the Tribunal prior to or simultaneously with the order of dismissal. By his order dated the 7th of Jan., 1958, which is challenged by the writ petition, Respondent No. 1 over-ruled the other contentions raised by respondent No. 2 but held that the petitioner had committed breaches of the provisions of sec. 33(2)(b) inasmuch as the wages for one month were not paid and so also the application required to be made under the proviso to that sub-section was not made prior to or simultaneously with the order of dismissal. He expressed the view that it was extremely doubtful that order under sec. 33(2)(b) could be passed so as to operate retrospectively from the date of suspension of Respondent No. 2. He further held that the application for approval was not made within a reasonable time. On the point of the payment of one months wages, the petitioners had submitted an affidavit on behalf of the Company that in pursuance of the dismissal order a voucher for the dues of Respondent No. 2 including one months wages payable under sec. 33(2; of the Act was possible material for arriving at a finding on the good faith or otherwise of the employers in an appropriate case. But the dismissal of the application by the Tribunal for approval of the action taken by the employers without any investigation and a finding thereon as to whether the order of dismissal was prima facie justified or not and whether it had been arrived at after a fair enquiry into the conduct of the employee concerned is, a patent error in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal and is sufficient to attract the Certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. (Paras 7 &8) prepared on the 20th of July, 1957, but he failed to collect it. (Paras 7 &8) prepared on the 20th of July, 1957, but he failed to collect it. According to the voucher prepared out of the wages amounting to Rs. 84-40, a sum of Rs. 79-42 were deducted on various grounds, leaving the sum of Rs. 4-98 as payable. Respondent No. 1 was of the opinion that the workman had no opportunity to contest the validity of these deduc-tions,and that there was no sufficient compliance of the proviso regarding the advance payment of one months wages. The Tribunal refused to treat these breaches on the part of the petitioners as merely technical and the application was dismissed summarily. 3. In this writ petition it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Respondent No. 1 failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him in dismissing the application for approval submitted by the petitioners summarily. On the point of wages it is submitted that one manths wages must be deemed to have been paid by the petitioners to Respondent No. 2 as required by proviso of sec 33(2) inasmuch as Respondent No. 2 was asked by the dismissal order to collect his dues on the 20th of July, 1957, and the petitioners had prepared a voucher for the payment of wages after making such deductions as they were entitled to do under the law and kept it ready for payment to Respondent No. 2 on that date but since he did not come to collect the amount of the voucher, it was credited to the unpaid wages account on the 31st July, 1957, and the said sum is still lying to his credit in the unpaid register. The petitioners have also justified the various deductions made by them. On the questions of delay in making the application, it is submitted that the application which was filed before the Tribunal was signed and verified on the 29th of July and thereafter time was taken in preparing the translations of the various documents to be submitted with the application. Simultaneously the petitioners were taking advice from their Head office which was at Bombay. It is urged that the petitioner had furnished sufficient reason for the time taken in filing the application before the Tribunal. Simultaneously the petitioners were taking advice from their Head office which was at Bombay. It is urged that the petitioner had furnished sufficient reason for the time taken in filing the application before the Tribunal. Lastly, it is also contended that the Tribunal could not have dismissed the application for approval of the action taken by them against Respondent No. 2 without going into its merits. 4. Notice of the writ application was given to the respondents but no reply has been submitted by any of the respondents. Shri Brij Sunder Sharma, however, appeared on behalf of Respondent No. 2 and has opposed the writ application mainly on the ground that the order of the Tribunal was not illegal and was just and proper and could not be challenged before us by way of the writ petition. 5. The main question that arises for determination in this writ application relates to the interpretation of sub-sec. (2) and (5) of sec. 33 of the Act, sec. 33 inter alia lays down the circumstances and conditions under which an employer may dismiss or discharge a workman during the pendency of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute. If the workman concerned in such dispute is sought to be dismissed or discharged for any misconduct connected with the dispute, he cannot do so "save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending." If the workman falls within the category of protected workman, the employer is not authorised to dismiss him whether the cause of dismissal is connected with the dispute or not "save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending." The provisions find place in sub-sec. (1) and (3) respectively. Then there is sub-sec. (2) which inter alia provides for the cases of dismissal or discharge of a workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute and it is this sub-sec. which I have to consider in this case. (1) and (3) respectively. Then there is sub-sec. (2) which inter alia provides for the cases of dismissal or discharge of a workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute and it is this sub-sec. which I have to consider in this case. It runs, as follows:— 33(2) — "During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute— (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge, or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman : Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer". 6. It will pretable to look to the history of sec. 33 of the Act as I shall have occasion to refer to it in the course of this judgment. As the section originally stood in 1947 it provided that no employer could,during the pendency of any conciliation proceeding, dismiss any workman except for misconduct not connected with the dispute. Then, there was an amendment of the section by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal Act) (No. 48 of 1950). The amendment provided that no employer could dismiss any workman, save with the express permission in writing of the authority concerned whether the misconduct related to any matter concerned with the dispute or not. Then there was a further amendment of the section by Act No. 36 of 1956 and sec. 33 as it stands now was substituted for the old section. The change thus brought out removed the restraint put on the employer in the matter of discharge or dismissal of any workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute without previous express permission in writing of the authority before which the dispute was pending. The phraseology of sec. 33 as it stands now was substituted for the old section. The change thus brought out removed the restraint put on the employer in the matter of discharge or dismissal of any workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute without previous express permission in writing of the authority before which the dispute was pending. The phraseology of sec. 33(2) clearly shows that an employer can dismiss if he so likes a workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute but in doing so he must act in accordance with the standing orders applicable to the workman and must fulfil the two conditions aid down in the proviso. 7. Now let us proceed to examine the language of sec. 33 (2)(b) and the proviso. The proviso is worded in emphatic language as it is in negative form and uses the word shall. The use of the words has been paid where the wages for one month are mentioned and has been made where an application for approval is mentioned, suggests that in point of time those two acts must be performed before making the order of dismissal or discharge. At the same time, it cannot: be forgotten that the application for approval to be made to the authority concerned is for approval of the action taken by the employer. This only means that the application should be for the approval of the order of dismissal or discharge which has already been made by the employer. The action is to be taken first and the approval is to be sought thereafter Sub-sec. (5) of sec. 33 also speaks of an employer making an application under proviso to sub-sec.(2) for approval of the action taken by him. Thus, it can hardly be disputed that in the natural sequence of things the order for dismissal or discharge as the case may be, has to be passed first and then an application for approval of that action is to be made. I may also refer to Rule 60(2) of the Rules framed under the amended Act and also to the form K given in the Schedule thereto. Rule 60(2) lays down that an employer seeking the approval of the Tribunal of any action taken by him under clause(a) or clause(b) of sec. 33 shall present an application to the authority concerned. I may also refer to Rule 60(2) of the Rules framed under the amended Act and also to the form K given in the Schedule thereto. Rule 60(2) lays down that an employer seeking the approval of the Tribunal of any action taken by him under clause(a) or clause(b) of sec. 33 shall present an application to the authority concerned. Form K however, shows that it must be mentioned in the application that the workman/workmen discharged or dismissed has/have been paid the wages for one month. 8. It may also be pointed out that under sec. 31 of the Act, any employer who contravenes the provisions of sec. 33 is liable to be punished with imprisonment or with fine. This shows contravention of the aforesaid provisions is made punishable. 9. There is also sec. 33-A to which I shall refer in some detail hereinafter, which says that the employee may make a complaint to the appropriate authority given in that section of the contravention of the provisions of sec. 33. 10. Under the general law of contract, an employer has a right to discharge or dismiss the employee in accordance with the terms of the contract for any misconduct. This right is curtailed in sec. 33. For the first time restriction was imposed on the right of employer, where the misconduct was not connected with the dispute, by Act No. 48 of 1950, which amended sec. 33. It was provided that there could be dismissal or discharge of the workman even for misconduct not connected with the pending dispute, save with express permission in writing of the authority concerned. Looking 10 the stringency of that provision, it was thought necessary to amend it and it was so amended in the present form by Act No. 36 of 1956. Looking 10 the stringency of that provision, it was thought necessary to amend it and it was so amended in the present form by Act No. 36 of 1956. With reference to this amendment it is said in the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill by which amending Act No. 36 of 1956 came into being that:— "It is proposed to alter the existing provisions so as to provide that, where, during the pendency of proceedings an employer finds it necessary to proceed against any workman in regard to any matter unconnected with the dispute, he may do so in accordance with the Standing Order applicable to the workman, but where the action taken involved discharge or dismissal, he will have to pay the workman one months wages and simultaneously file an application before the authority, before which the proceeding is pending for its approval of the action taken." As has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh vs. Sudra Devi (1), the Statement of Objects and Reasons may be referred to "for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil which he sought to remedy". The change in law brought about by amending Act removed the restraint to some extent put on the employe-in the matter of discharge and dismissal of any workman for any misconduct not connected with the pending dispute. Instead of obtaining express permission in writing of the authority concerned before ordering the discharge or dismissal, he can now discharge or dismiss, if he so chooses, a workman but in doing so he must act in accordance with the standing orders applicable to the workman and must fulfil the conditions laid down in the proviso. The right of the employer under the general law of the land now stands restricted to that extent only, but still it is in derogation of the general law. It is proviso which lays down the conditions or restraints on the right of the employer to discharge or dismiss for any misconduct. The proviso must be strictly construed. The right of the employer under the general law of the land now stands restricted to that extent only, but still it is in derogation of the general law. It is proviso which lays down the conditions or restraints on the right of the employer to discharge or dismiss for any misconduct. The proviso must be strictly construed. "In fact, it may be set down, as a general rule, that a statute in derogation of the common law shall be strictly construed." (Statutory Const, by Crawford 1940 Edn. p. 423) 11. Another consideration which leads to the same conclusion is that the change brought about in sec. 33 by Act No. 36 of 1956 was remedial in its nature, that is, to relax the restrictions imposed on an employer in the matter of discharge or dismissal in a matter not connected with the pending dispute. It has been observed in Rai Ram Taran Banerjee Bahadur vs. Mrs. D. J. Hill (2) that— "The words of remedial statute must be construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the persons intended to be relieved." 12. Yet another consideration is that office of a proviso is not to repeal the main section to which it is attached. 13. The aforesaid considerations point out that the sub-sec. (2)(b) should be construed in a manner that the right of employer to dismiss and discharge should not be affected beyond a legitimate limit. 14 This takes us to the consideration of proviso. I have already pointed out that there is an apparent conflict in the language of the proviso itself. This conflict has to be resolved. Before embarking on the task I may point out that the proviso is in such an emphatic language that the conditions laid down in it must be fulfilled by the employer if this can be done without altogether taking away his right of discharge or dismissal of a workman guilty of misconduct. This conflict has to be resolved. Before embarking on the task I may point out that the proviso is in such an emphatic language that the conditions laid down in it must be fulfilled by the employer if this can be done without altogether taking away his right of discharge or dismissal of a workman guilty of misconduct. It has been stated in Crawford in the treatise already referred at Page 523 that — "Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, or, as it has been aptly stated, there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not", and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act." If the command is to do an act in particular manner and in no other then it can be done in that manner and no other. The proviso lays down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless certain conditions are fulfilled by the employer. These conditions must be fulfilled, if they are capable of being fulfilled, before the employer dismisses or discharges the workman. 15. The Act is framed to protect the workman. It cannot be said that the framers of law considered the fulfilment of these two conditions by employer as subsidiary. The payment of one months wages before the workman is discharged or dismissed was considered necessary in order to ensure that the workman may not be entirely helpless from the monetary point of view at the time of his discharge or dismissal. It may be sure of compensation to be given to the workman by the employer. The duty of making an application to the authority concerned is also cast upon the employer so that the authority may be apprised of what the employer has done during the pendency of a dispute before him. The purpose of the settlement of the dispute pending before him may not be frustrated by unwanted or indiscreet action of the employer. Lest such application may not be filed by the workman, who is sometimes ignorant of the law, the duty is cast on the employer. Both conditions laid down have set purpose behind them and it cannot be said that they are redundant or subsidiary. Lest such application may not be filed by the workman, who is sometimes ignorant of the law, the duty is cast on the employer. Both conditions laid down have set purpose behind them and it cannot be said that they are redundant or subsidiary. Having regard to the opening words of the proviso, they must be performed in the manner and at the time laid down by the proviso if this can be done without defeating the main clause 33 (2)(b). 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the very language of the proviso is such that the conditions cannot be performed before the order of discharge or dismissal and therefore the main section should over-ride the proviso so far as the time factor is concerned. 17. It was also urged that in the matter of payment of one months wages the workman may avoid to take the wages if the condition of the payment of such wages before discharge or dismissal is insisted upon. The employer will then be at the mercy of the workman and can never dismiss him. This illustration, it is contended, will show that the proviso cannot always be obeyed and the main section is reduced to nullity. 18. It is true that a court of law should lean in adopting an interpretation which would avoid injustice and absurdity. In this connection, I may quote with advantage following passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10 Edn. p 208— "On the general principle of avoiding injustice and absurdity, any construction would, if possible, be reacted (unless the policy and object of the Act required it) which enabled a person to defeat or impair the obligation of his contract by his own act, or otherwise to profit by his own wrong. "A man may not take advantage of his own wrong; he may not plead, in his own interest, a self-created necessity." Thus, an Act which authorised justices, in certain circums tances, to discharge an apprentice from his indenture, "on the masters appearance" before them, would justify a discharge in his wilful absence The Act, it was observed, must have a reasonable construction, so as not to permit the master to take advantage of his own obstinacy. It would be very hard that, supposing the master was profligate and ran away, the apprentice should never be discharged." 19. It would be very hard that, supposing the master was profligate and ran away, the apprentice should never be discharged." 19. The above principle is operative under the circumstances when a person is seeking to defeat the object of a provision of law by his own act. 20. But what I am concerned here is to interpret the law irrespective of any such consideration. 21. There may be provisions of law where it may be taken from the language employed, the setting in which they are placed, the importance of one provision and the subsidiary nature of the other, and other cognate considerations that one provision overrides the other. Without repeating what I have said hereinbefore, it cannot be said that sub-sec. 33(2)(b) and the proviso present before us such considerations that one should over-ride the other, if they can be reconciled. 22. In may opinion, the proper method for a court of law in solving such difficulty, as arises in the present case, is to see whether the provision under consideration can be reconciled. This is what is known as harmonious construction. The true meaning of any part of a statute is that which best harmonises with every other part of it and a construction which will leave without effect any part of a statute must be rejected. "The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute on a view of the enacting clause saving clauses and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail," (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edn. p. 162) 23. I am of opinion that the employers right to dismiss or discharge any workman not connected with the pending dispute which had been fettered by Act No. 48 of 1950 in so far as he could not dismiss him without the express permission in writing of the authority concerned and which has been restored to some extent by sec. 33(2), should not in any way be adversely affected, except to the extent it is thought necessary to uphold protection granted to the workman on the lines laid down in the proviso which should not be in any way made less mandatory to the detriment of the workman. The aim should be to make the construction of the provisions of law under consideration harmonious. The aim should be to make the construction of the provisions of law under consideration harmonious. This object is achieved if the proviso is taken as laying down that the discharge or dismissal shall not be effective unless such workman had been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. This can be easily done by providing in the order of discharge or dismissal that it shall be operative from some future date. In the meantime the employer may fulfil the two duties case upon him, that is, he may make payment of wages for and month and may also file an application for approval. This would carry out the requirements of the main section as well as the proviso. Instead of giving the interpretation that the main section over rides the proviso or vice versa, it will be better to adopt the interpretation given above. I may also observe that it is not very common to pass an order for discharge or dismissal which may be operative at some future date. The provision of law under consideration contemplates that the only legal order of discharge or dismissal which an employer is authorised to pass, is that it shall be operative at some future time, thus affording the employer some breathing time to fulfil the requirements of the proviso. 24. Now let us proceed to examine what has happened in this case. In the present case, the order of dismissal was passed on the 18th of July, 1957 and it said that Respondent No. 2 should be deemed to be dismissed from the date of suspension, i.e., the 29th of June, 1957. I have already pointed out that such an order is not contemplated under sec. 33 (2). Perhaps such an order was passed to resist any claim of Respondent No. 2 of his wages during the period of suspension if he was so entitled to. But the petitioners should not have allowed their anxiety for meeting the claim of Respondent No. 2 to over-shadow the duties cast upon them under the provision of law. 25. Respondent No.1 has held that the petitioners had failed to pay wages within one month and had also not made the application for approval within reasonable time. But the petitioners should not have allowed their anxiety for meeting the claim of Respondent No. 2 to over-shadow the duties cast upon them under the provision of law. 25. Respondent No.1 has held that the petitioners had failed to pay wages within one month and had also not made the application for approval within reasonable time. Had I adopted the interpretation that the conditions of the proviso can be performed after the dismissal within reasonable time, from such dismissal. I would have been inclined to think that the petitioners were not guilty of any undue delay. As this point has become immaterial on the interpretation adopted by me. I refrain from entering into any elaborate discussion on the subject. I have already pointed out that the workman cannot be permitted to defeat the law by his own fault and by refusing to accept one months wages even if the employer is willing to pay him. 26. Next it is to be considered whether Respondent No. I was justified in dismissing the application for approval on the ground that there was contravention of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 33 in passing that order. This leads me to the consideration of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 33. This sub-section has cast on the authority concerned the duty to hear such application without delay. On the principles of natural justice, it is but necessary that notice of such application must go to the workman concerned. After hearing him, the Tribunal is to pass, as expeditiously as possible, such order in relation thereto as it deems fit. 27. It is urged that for the breach of the provisions of sec. 33, the aggrieved workman has the right to make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to the authority provided under sec.33-A and on such complaint that authority has to adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Act and has to submit its award to the appropriate authority and the authority before whom the application for approval is made has only to see how far the order of dismissal or discharge was justified to meet its approval. Learned counsel for the petitioners has in this connection relied on certain decisions of the Honble Supreme Court bearing on the interpretation of sec. Learned counsel for the petitioners has in this connection relied on certain decisions of the Honble Supreme Court bearing on the interpretation of sec. 33 as it stood before the amendment of 1956 and on the scope of enquiry under sec. 33-A. These decisions are no direct authorities on the interpretation of sub sec. (5) of sec. 33 which has been added later on but they do throw light on the whole ambit of sec. 33 and I think that it will be profitable to consider the effect of these decisions. 28. I may first refer to the case of M/s. Atherton West & Co, Ltd. Kanpur vs. The Suti Mill Mazdoor Union (3). That was a case in which the U.P. Government Notification dated 10.3.1948, issued by the Governor of the United Provinces, in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (b),(c),(d),(e) and (g) of sec. 3 and sec. 8 of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, came under consideration. Clause 23 of the Government notification imposed a ban on the discharge or dismissal of any workman by the employer during the pendency of an enquiry before the competent authority or of an appeal before the Industrial Court, except with the written permission of the concerned authority. It was held that the enquiry to be conducted by the authority concerned on an application for grant of permission was not an enquiry into an industrial dispute as to the non-employment of the workman who was sought to be discharged or dismissed which industrial dispute could only arise after an employer had discharged or dismissed the workman in accordance with the written permission obtained from the officer concerned. The authority concerned is to institute an enquiry and come to the conclusion whether there was a prima facie case made out for dismissal of the workman and the employer was not actuated by any improper motives or did not resort to any unfair practice or victimisation in the matter of the proposed discharge or dismissal of the workman. 29. The next case is of The Automobile Products of India Ltd. vs. Rukmaji Bala (4), In that case, the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench passed on an application made by the company under sec. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (No. 48 of 1950) at the instance of the employer company was challenged. 29. The next case is of The Automobile Products of India Ltd. vs. Rukmaji Bala (4), In that case, the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench passed on an application made by the company under sec. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (No. 48 of 1950) at the instance of the employer company was challenged. The Labour Appellate Tribunal had given the company permission to retrench certain workmen subject to certain conditions. As already mentioned, the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (No. 48 of 1950) had substituted a new section for the old section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and it had also enacted a new section as sec. 33-A. In the case before their Lordships, sec. 33 and 33-A as it stood then, were considered. Sec. 33 of the Act as it stood then made provision for obtaining permission as a condition precedent for discharging or punishing the workman and no exception was made in the case of a pending dispute. Their Lordships considered the meaning, scope and effect of sec. 33 and 33-A as it stood then. Their Lordships observed, as follows:— "When an employer contravenes the provisions of sec. 33 of the 1947 Act or of sec 22 of the 1950 Act, the workmen affected thereby obvios)y have a grievance. . That grievance is two-fold. In the first place, it is that the employer has taken a prejudicial action against them without the express permission in writing of the authority concerned and thereby deprived them of the salutary safeguard which the legislature has provided for their protection against victimisation. In the second place, and apart from the first grievance, the workman may also have a grievance on merits which may be of much more seriousness and gravity for them, namely, that in point of fact they have been un fairly dealt with in that their interest has actually been prejudicially affected by the high handed act of the employer. Those sections gave the workmen the right to move the authority by lodging complaint before it." 30. It was further observed that the authority to whom the complaint is made is to decide, (1) the fact of contravention and (2) the merits of the act or order of the employer. Their Lordships took the view that sec. Those sections gave the workmen the right to move the authority by lodging complaint before it." 30. It was further observed that the authority to whom the complaint is made is to decide, (1) the fact of contravention and (2) the merits of the act or order of the employer. Their Lordships took the view that sec. 33 imposed a ban on the right of an employer on an application for lifting the ban and all that is required of the authority exercising jurisdiction under that section is to accord or withhold permission. In this view of the matter, it was held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that it had jurisdiction to lay down terms as conditions precedent for granting permission to the company to retrench its workmen. This statement of law is reiterated by Bhagwati J. in Lakskmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Ram Sarup (5). In the recent case of Equitable Coal Ltd, vs. Algu Singh (6), the employees made an application that they had been illegally and unjustifiably dismissed during the pendency of an industrial dispute without obtaining the express permission in writting of the Appellate Tribunal,as required by sec. 22 of the Act. I The Labour Appellate Tribunal found that the dismissal was justified. Nevertheless, since the appellant has not obtained the requisite permission under sec. 22 the Labour Appellant Tribunal held that the employees were entitled to compensation. The employer went in appeal in the Supreme Court. Their Lordships referred to the earlier judgment in the Automobile Products of India Ltd. vs. Rukmaji Bala and they observed, as follows:— "In an enquiry held under sec. 23, two question fall to be considered, Is the fact of contravention by the employer of sec. 22 proved? If yes, is the order passed by the employer against the employee justified on the merits? If both these questions are answered in favour of the employee, the Appellate Tribunal would no doubt be entitled to pass an appropriate order in favour of the employee. If the first point is answered in favour of the employee, but on the second point the finding is that on the merits, the order passed by the employer against the employee is justified then the breach of sec. If the first point is answered in favour of the employee, but on the second point the finding is that on the merits, the order passed by the employer against the employee is justified then the breach of sec. 22 proved against the employer may ordinarily be regarded as a technical breach and it may not, unless there are compelling facts in favour of the employee justify any substantial order of compensation in favour of the employee. It is necessary to add that if the first issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done under sec. 23. What orders would meet the ends of justice in case of a technical breach of sec. 22 would necessarily be a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circums tances of each case." The above weighty pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court may be taken to lay down the law on the scope of enquiry on an application by the employer for permission to dismiss or discharge any workman under sub-sec. (1) and (3) of sec. 33 as it stands, at present, as also on the scope of enquiry under sec. 33.A on the complaint filed by the workman under that section. So far as it is relevant to this case the law laid down may be summed up, as follows— (1) The Tribunal before whom an application for permission by the employer is made under sub-secs. (2) and (3) of sec. 33 has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute arising between the employer and the workman but is only to consider whether the ban imposed on the employer in the matter of dismissal or discharge during the pendency of proceedings should be lifted; (2) If a prima facie case is made out by the employer, the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal has is to give such permission or to refuse it provided the employer is not acting mala fide and is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimization? (Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd vs. Ram Sarup) (3) If the permission is granted, the employer would be at liberty if he so chooses thereafter to dismiss or discharge the workman; (4) Then the workman has the right to file a complaint under sec. (Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd vs. Ram Sarup) (3) If the permission is granted, the employer would be at liberty if he so chooses thereafter to dismiss or discharge the workman; (4) Then the workman has the right to file a complaint under sec. 33-A before an appropriate Tribunal as provided therein: (5) In the enquiry under complaint, the first question that the Tribunal under sec. 33-A has to examine is whether the employer has contravened the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (3) of sec. 33; (6) If there is no contravention, the matter ends there; (7) If there is contravention, the Tribunal referred to therein is to adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to and pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Act: and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government; (8) In making that adjudication if the employees action is justified on merits, then the breach of sec. 33 may ordinarily be regarded as technical breach and unless there are compelling facts in favour of the employee, compensation for the technical breach should not be awarded. 31. Now, I have to examine, in the light of the above decisions, the scope of enquiry under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 33 on an application for approval of action taken by the employer in cases governed by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 33. 32. Sub sec. (5) says that an employee is to make an application for approval of the action taken by him, i.e. for approval of the order of dismissal or discharge and the authority concerned is to pass an order in relation to that action. The scope of enquiry is limited to the determination of the question whether misconduct alleged to have been committed by the workman is prima facie proved and is of such a nature that prima facie the employer was justified in awarding the punishment of dismissal or discharge. No doubt under sub-sec. (5), the Tribunal concerned has been given the power to pass any order as it deems fit but that order must be in relation to the application filed before Tribunal. In making that order the Tribunal may prima facie examine the seriousness of misconduct proved against the the employee and may further examine that the employer is not acting malafide or is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimization. In making that order the Tribunal may prima facie examine the seriousness of misconduct proved against the the employee and may further examine that the employer is not acting malafide or is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimization. The Tribunal would not be justified in determining the question that the conditions laid down in the proviso to sub-sec.(2) are not fulfilled by the employer. For that, the remedy of the employer is either by way of taking action under sec. 31 for the criminal prosecution of the employer or else by making a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to the appropriate authority as laid down in sec. 33-A. When such a complaint is made, the appropriate Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint in the manner laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above. It shall first determine whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of sec. 33 and if it comes to the conclusion that there was such a contravention, it may proceed to determine the dispute on merits and if it finds, that the order of the employer in dismissing or discharging the workman was not justified, it may give an award to the appropriate Government for the reinstatement of the workman. In case it finds that the employers action was justified, it may ignore technical breaches or award such relief as it thinks proper. 33. This being, in my humble opinion, the correct position in law, let us examine what has happened in this case. As already mentioned, Respondent No. 1 dismissed the application of the petitioner without examining whether they had made out any prima facie case for the dismissal of Respondent No.2 on the ground that the employer had committed breach of the conditions laid down in the proviso to sub-sec. (2). In passing that order Respondent No. 1 failed to exercise its jurisdiction in refusing to examine whether any prima facie case had been made out or not for the dismissal of Respondent No. 2 and in throwing out the application on ground which should have been the subject matter of enquiry under sec. 33-A on a complaint made by Respondent No. 2 in the prescribed manner. 33-A on a complaint made by Respondent No. 2 in the prescribed manner. It may be pointed out that no application was made by Respondent No 2 under sec.33-A in the prescribed manner and Respondent No. 1 had committed an error in going into the question whether there had been any breach of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) as laid down in the proviso to that sub section. This being the position, the order passed by Respondent No. 1 is| liable to be set aside in a writ of certiorari. 34. I, therefore, allow the writ petition and set aside the order passed by Respondent No. 1 dated the 7th of January, 1958, and direct Respondent No. 1 to decide the application made by the petitioner in the light of the principles laid down above. In view of the fact that the grounds on which Respondent No. 1 has dismissed the application of the petitioner was taken by the suo-moto, I leave the parties to bear and pay their own costs in this court. Modi, J.—The first question raised in this case is as to the correct interpretation of sec. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act as amended in 1956. My learned brother Bhan-dari J. has come to the conclusion that what this sub-section requires is that the employer should pass an order of discharge of dismissal,even where such discharge or dismissal may not be connected with any pending industrial dispute (such an order being ofcourse warranted under the standing orders of the employers) in a manner that it should pay the dismissed or discharged employee a months wages and also make an application for the approval of the action taken to the Industrial Tribunal before whom the industrial dispute may be already pending. If I understand my learned brother aright it seems that he is of the view that it is only such an order of discharge or dismissal which can legally be passed under sec. 33(2) of the Act. 2. On a careful and anxious consideration of the whole matter, I, for my part, am not prepared to go so far as hold that. 33(2) of the Act. 2. On a careful and anxious consideration of the whole matter, I, for my part, am not prepared to go so far as hold that. Cases are easily conceivable where an employer may dismiss an employee for misconduct unconnected with a pending industrial dispute and at once offer the payment of a months wages to him and further simultaneously make an application to the Tribunal of the approval of the action taken by them. I can see nothing in the language of sec. 33(2) including its proviso to make such a course of conduct on the part of the employer is illegal. On the other hand, it clearly seems to me that such an order, if passed, would be unexceptionable. I have hardly any doubt that even the proviso as it is worded requires an application for approval to be made "of the action taken by the employer" and not of the action proposed to be taken by him. In other words, the approval is clearly an Ex post facto requirement, and there is nothing in this sub-section or the proviso which makes it incumbent on the employer that he must withhold the effect of the dismissal or discharge whereof approval is sought, until an application therefore has been made, though I would entirely agree that approval of the action has to be expeditiously applied for and that if approval is refused by the competent authority, the old position would be restored, and the employee may be entitled to all the benefits to which he would have been entitled if no such order had been passed against him. I should also like to point out in this connection that it may be needlessly detrimental, nay even dangerous, for the employer to have to retain under his employment a dismissed employee after his dismissal. It is one thing to say that for such dismissal or discharge the employer has to apply without loss of time to obtain the approval of the authority before whom an industrial dispute is pending, but it would be quite another thing to say that he cannot pass an order of discharge or dismissal which could not possibly have immediate effect, under sec. 33(2) of the Act. 3. 33(2) of the Act. 3. The question may be posed as to whether on the language of this sub-section, taken with the proviso thereof as a whole, an order of dismissal (or a like order falling within the ambit of this sub-section) may be passed first, and the payment of one months wages to the employee and an application for approval to the Tribunal may be made, say on the day following, or even a few days afterwards by which ofcourse I mean a reasonable time. As I read the proviso, speaking with profound respect, it does not appear to be very happily worded. A too literal interpretation of it may lead to serious anomalies. For one thing, an application for approval of some action already taken may in the ordinary course of things be made only after that action has been taken, and yet it may be and is contended on the language of the proviso that such action cannot be ordered until an application for approval has been made in the first instance. Again, if a strictly literal interpretation is to be rigidly put on the language of the proviso, a workman may defeat the power vouchsafed to his employer in sub-sec. (2) by merely, refusing to take a months wages as required in the proviso. I wonder if that could have ever been the intention of the Legislature, when it enacted the proviso. The sole object of the Legislature in enacting this proviso is that the workman may not be left stranded for money at the time of his discharge or dismissal and so offered a months wages, and he may not be victimised while an industrial dispute is pending and for this purpose the approval of the action taken has been prescribed in cases where the dismissal or discharge is not connected with such industrial dispute. 4. I am, therefore, inclined to think that a construction should be placed on the proviso which would harmonise with the body of this section itself It further seems to me that the requirements of sec. 33(2) would be satisfied substantially if in the category of cases provided for under sec. 4. I am, therefore, inclined to think that a construction should be placed on the proviso which would harmonise with the body of this section itself It further seems to me that the requirements of sec. 33(2) would be satisfied substantially if in the category of cases provided for under sec. 33(2) an employer makes the payment of a months wages or offers it to the employee or makes an application to the Industrial Tribunal simultaneously with the action taken, or on the day following, or even within a reasonable time of the action taken where such a course may have become necessary so that the actual payment of wages of the application made for approval are not characterised by any unreasonable delay whatsoever. The present participle phrases "has been paid" or "has been made" as used in the proviso should not and need not in my judgment, be rigidly interpreted so as to import the condition that the events to which they relate must have taken place prior in point of time to the order of dismissal or discharge, for such a requirement would perhaps make the provision contained in the body of the section largely nugatory if not unworkable. I may also add that no harm can arise from such an interpretation to a workman for (apart from a prosecution under sec 31 of the Act) it is open to him under sec. 33-A to make a complaint against his employer to the Tribunal concerned for a breach of the provision of sec. 33, and on receipt of such complaint, the Tribunal shall adjudicate on the merits of the complaint as if it were an industrial dispute referred to or pending before it for enquiry and submit its award to the Government. 5. I pause to point out here that such a complaint has not been made in the present case so far, and it is the Tribunal itself which raised the preliminary points as to nonpayment of the wages and the delayed filing of the application and dismissed the application without going into the merits. If this interpretation of sec. 5. I pause to point out here that such a complaint has not been made in the present case so far, and it is the Tribunal itself which raised the preliminary points as to nonpayment of the wages and the delayed filing of the application and dismissed the application without going into the merits. If this interpretation of sec. 33(2) is correct, then the next question that arises is whether in the present case the order as to the payment of the wages after the various deductions sought to be made by the employer was a substantial compliance with the proviso and again whether the application for approval of the action taken was made after unreasonable delay or not, and what is the proper effect of the breaches in these respects, if any. In other words, whether the breaches are merely technical breaches or otherwise. A proper decision of these questions in my opinion can only be arrived at after the matter of dismissal has been examined on the merits. 6. This brings me to the second question which is as to the correct scope of the enquiry under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 33, which the Tribunal is called upon to make on an application for an order of approval. Putting it in a slightly different way, the question arises whether it was right on the part of the learned judge of the Industrial Tribunal to have thrown out the application for approval of the order dismissal filed by the petitioner on the preliminary points as he did without applying his mind to the merits of the case. No direct authority on the precise meaning of secs. 33 as amended has been placed before us in this connection. I agree however with my learned brother Bhandari J. that the decision of the Supreme Court on secs.22 and 33 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal Act No. XLVIII of 1950 or on S. 33 and 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 as amended by Act, No. XLVIII of 1950 may be looked at for guidance for an answer on this point. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court appear to have uniformly entertained the view while interpreting those sections that the proper approach for the approving authority is to decide two points: first; whether a breach of the provisions of sec. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court appear to have uniformly entertained the view while interpreting those sections that the proper approach for the approving authority is to decide two points: first; whether a breach of the provisions of sec. 22 of the Act of 1950 or sec 33 of the Act of 1947 as amended has been established and (2) if that is so, whether the order of dismissal or discharge is Prima facie justified, and that if the finding of the Tribunal on the second point is in favour of the employers, then the breach of sec. 22 or sec 33 should be generally regarded as technical. (See Atherton West & Co. Ltd., vs. Sutti Mill Mazdoor Union (1), Automobile Products of India, Ltd., vs. Ramaji Bala(2) and Equitable Co. Ltd., vs. Algu Singh (3). 7. The scheme underlying sec. 33 and 33-A of the Act of 1947 as amended in 1956 appears to me to be fundamentally the same as under secs. 22 and 23 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 or secs. 33 and 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act before the amendments of 1956. A complaint under see. 33-A may be made under the Act as amended alleging a breach of the provisions of sec. 33, whereupon the Tribunal must treat it as an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act and submit its award thereon to the Government. But in the absence of such a complaint the only substantial question for the Tribunal to decide on an application for approval under sec. 33(5). would be whether to accord the approval asked for or to refuse it. There-fore, what the Tribunal has to see is whether a fair enquiry has been held by the employer into the alleged misconduct of the employee and whether a prima facie case has been made out by The employer for the action taken or not, and where such a case is established, the permission, broadly speaking, cannot be refused. See Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd., vs. Ram Scrap. (4). See Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd., vs. Ram Scrap. (4). There is also authority for the proposition that even where the employer should have obtained previous express permission for discharging or dismissing an employee and such permission was not obtained, but the order passed was substantially just, and did not savour of bad faith or victimisation and was not otherwise bad as being in violation of the principles of natural justice, the failure to obtain such previous approval was a technical breach and the order of dismissal or discharge in such cases need not be interfered with, and any order of compensation in favour of the employee would not be justified. See Equitable Coal Ltd., vs. Algu Singh (3). Again there is authority for the proposition that in a complaint under sec. 33-A a Tribunal is not entitled to sub-stitute its own judgment for that of the management as to the measure of the punishment except for compelling reasons e.g. (1) want of bona fide or (2) victimisation (3) violation of the principles of natural justice (4) a basic error of facts (5) or a perverse of absurd finding by the management. See 1951 L. L.J. 204. 8. The net effect of the above discussion is that the Tribunal cannot lawfully dispose of an employers application for approval of an order of dismissal by throwing out such an application merely on the ground that the conditions laid down in the proviso were not fulfilled, and it must further consider the question whether the dismissal was prima facie justified or not, and where it does come to the latter conclusion, it would be its duty as a rule to grant the permission applied for, unless it further comes to the conclusion that such permission should be refused for compelling reasons, such as have been indicated above, and in that connection it may conceivably be open to the Tribunal also to consider the failure of the employer to comply with the conditions laid down in the proviso of sec. 33 (2) of the Act as possible material for arriving at a finding on the good faith or otherwise of the employers in an appropriate case. 33 (2) of the Act as possible material for arriving at a finding on the good faith or otherwise of the employers in an appropriate case. But the dismissal of the application by the Tribunal for approval of the action taken by the employers without any investigation and a finding thereon as to whether the order of dis-missal was Prima facie justified or not and whether it had been arrived at after a fair enquiry into the conduct of the employee concerned is, I agree, a patent error in the exercise, of its legitimate jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal and is sufficient to attract the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. 9."Subject to the observations made above, I agree with the final order made by my learned brother Bhandari J. that this writ application should be allowed and the case remanded to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law. By the court.—The order of the Court is that the writ application is allowed and the order of the learned Judge of the Industrial Tribunal dated the 7th January, 1958, is quashed, and the case be remanded back to him for a fresh decision in accordance with law, and the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.