ORDER K.L. Pandey, J. The applicant Dayachand, who is being prosecuted for an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, has come up in revision against an order of the special Judge, Jabalpur, dated 19 November 1958 by which his preliminary objections against the prosecution were overruled. It is not disputed that, at the material time, the applicant was the Chairman of the Municipal Board, Tikamgarh, though on 17 June 1958, when the police report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure was presented against him, he had resigned and ceased to hold that office. The material allegations are these. One Dulichand needed a licence for starting a flour mill within the limits of Tikamgarh municipality. The applicant, whose sanction as Chairman of the Municipal Board was required, wanted from Dulichand Rs.50 for giving him the licence. On 13 May 1958, Dulichand brought this fact to the notice of the Collector, who directed the Additional District Magistrate to take necessary action in the matter. The Additional District Magistrate accordingly recorded the statement of Dulichand and directed the Circle Inspector of Police to register a case and accompany him. The usual trap was thereupon arranged and Rs.50, which Dulichand paid to the applicant, was recovered from him. On the same day (13 May 1958), the Additional District Magistrate passed an order authorising the Circle Inspector to investigate the ease. Pursuant to that order, the Circle Inspector investigated the case. It was unsuccessfully urged in the lower Court that the prosecution was bad because, firstly, the case was investigated by an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police without being authorised in that behalf under Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and, secondly, the applicant was not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. In regard to the first point, it is contended that the Additional District Magistrate, who had participated in laying the trap, was incompetent to pass an order under Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption, Act, 1947. In this connection reliance is placed on the following observations of the Supreme Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 S.C. 196 . In this connection reliance is placed on the following observations of the Supreme Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 S.C. 196 . When a Magistrate is approached for granting such permission, he is expected to satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower rank to conduct the investigation. The granting of such permission is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying it. It is argued that, since the Additional District Magistrate, bad participated in laying the trap, he was hardly likely to be able to exercise a judicial discretion in the matter of authorising a police officer of subordinate rank to conduct the investigation. The policy underlying the provision appears to be that, unless there be a simple or obvious case, only a responsible police officer of the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police should investigate it. In the instant case, what the Additional District Magistrate had to consider was whether, having regard to the underlying policy and the nature of the case, a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police should or should not be permitted to investigate it. There is no suggestion that this case had any special feature requiring the attention of a police officer of superior rank. Also, only because the Additional District Magistrate had participated in laying the trap, he had not rendered himself incapable of properly exercising his discretion in the matter. On the other hand, being aware of the nature of the case, he was in a better position to decide whether a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police should properly be authorised to investigate it. It may be noted that he did not pass the order in a routine way upon an application made to him for the purpose. He passed a regular order and authorised a police officer next below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate the case. In the circumstances, the order passed by him cannot be impugned as incompetent. A similar view was taken in Mehar Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1955 Pepsu 156. He passed a regular order and authorised a police officer next below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate the case. In the circumstances, the order passed by him cannot be impugned as incompetent. A similar view was taken in Mehar Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1955 Pepsu 156. It is next urged that, in this case, the investigation commenced as soon as information was given by Dulichand and thereafter further steps were taken with the assistance of the police. It may be stated at once that in this case the applicant is being prosecuted for actually taking Rs.60 as illegal gratification. So far as this offence is concerned, the first information could be given and the investigation commenced only after illegal gratification was actually taken. It follows that the laying of the trap was no part of the investigation of this offence. It is conceded that, immediately upon recovery of Rs.50 from the applicant, the Additional District Magistrate ordered the Circle Inspector of Police to investigate the case. That being so, this case has been investigated from the start by a properly authorised police officer: Mehar Singh v. State of Pepsu AIR 1955 Pepsu 156. The applicant's counsel has cited Mubarakali v. State 1958 MPLJ 166 : AIR 1958 M.P. 157 ., but that case is distinguishable on facts. Reliance has also been placed upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in Rishbud's case AIR 1955 SC 196 . It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such re-investigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for. Here, as in the Supreme Court case, the entire investigation was conducted by a properly authorised police officer. As shown, the laying of the trap was no part of investigation of this case. The applicant's counsel also conceded that he should not be regarded as urging that the trap should be laid afresh. That being so, even this contention must fail. As shown, the laying of the trap was no part of investigation of this case. The applicant's counsel also conceded that he should not be regarded as urging that the trap should be laid afresh. That being so, even this contention must fail. The only other question for consideration is whether the Chairman of a Municipal Board constituted under the Rewa Municipalities Act, 1946, is a 'public servant' within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Clause (10) of that section reads as follows:- Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district. An officer falling within Clause (10) is a public servant within the meaning of section 21 ibid. The illustration shows that a Municipal Commissioner is a public servant. "Municipal Commissioner", which is an archaic expression, has been held to include a member of a municipal committee: Nanhe v. The Municipal Committee, Jubbulpore 25 NLR 194. and Suganchand v. Naraindas AIR 1032 Sind 177. It is true, that under Section 46 of the C.P. Municipalities Act, 1922, every member of a committee shall be deemed to be a Municipal Commissioner within the meaning of any enactment for the time being in force. The express provision made in the section does not alter the fact that, even apart from it, every such member is a public servant. As pointed out in the Sind case, the body of which he is a member is empowered to acquire land, incur expenditure and prescribe taxes to be levied for municipal purposes. In a case relating to the Vice-Chairman of a Local Board constituted under the Local Self Government Act, 1920 (IV of 1920), it was observed in Anna Champatrao Deshmukh v. King Emperor 1936 NLJ 221 as follows: It follows that those who have been given authority to discharge these functions of a local or municipal nature are public officers just as much as those entrusted with the discharge of corresponding Government duties. The Boards cannot function of themselves. The Boards cannot function of themselves. Their affairs have to be administered by others, and those who have been entrusted with the administration of these affairs as members of these Boards are unquestionably public officers. These observations apply with greater force to the Chairman of a Municipal Board under the Rewa Municipalities Act, 1946. The question may also be considered with reference to the specific provisions of the Rewa Municipalities Act, 1946. Clause (20) of Section 3 of the Act is as follows: 'Officer of the Board' means a person holding for the time being an office created or continued by or under this Act but shall not include a member of the Board or a committee as such. In view of Section 39 and other provisions of the Act, there can be no question that the Chairman of a Municipal Board holds an office created by the Act. He must, therefore, be regarded an officer of the Board within the meaning of Clause (20). Further, Section 267 of the Act provides as follows: Every officer or servant of a Board shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code as applied to the State, and in the definition of 'Legal Remuneration' in Section 161 of the Code, the word 'Government' shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to include a Board. In view of the express provisions of the, relevant Act, the applicant was a public servant so long as he was holding the office of the Chairman of the Municipal Board, Tikamgarh. The contention of the applicant to the contrary is clearly untenable. The revision fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed