JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. The petitioner is interested in the eight temples which from the subject matter of O.A. Nos. 126 to 128, 157 to 160 and 168 of 1950 filed by respondents 1 to 3 before respondent No. 4, the Deputy Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Administration Department, Kozhikode. The applications prayed for action under S.57 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. 2. The petitioner filed Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1959 before the 4th respondent, invoked the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 S. C. 308 and prayed that all further proceedings be dropped. By Ext. A dated 16-2-1959 the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the said application, and the prayer in the petition is that this Court should call for the records in O. A. 126/53 to 128/53, 157/53 to 160/53 & 168/53. pending before the 4th respondent and revise the order passed in Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1959. 3. There were certain earlier proceedings under S.54 (1) of the Madras Hindu Religions Endowments Act, 1926, which were pending when the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, came into force. Those proceedings were closed with the direction that the Department may move in the matter afresh later for a decision of this question O. A. Nos. 126 to 128, 157 to 160 and 168 of 1953 followed, and the petitioner questioned their validity, without success before the High Court of Madras in Writ Petition No. 810 of 1953. According to the Government Pleader the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 810 of 1953 should preclude the petitioner from filing a petition like the one before us. The answer offered by counsel for the petitioner is that the earlier petition was under Art.226 of the Constitution and that such a petition will not preclude an application lake the present one which is under Art.227 of the Constitution. In the light of the conclusion we have reached that this petition should fail, we consider it unnecessary to decide the question. 4. In the light of the conclusion we have reached that this petition should fail, we consider it unnecessary to decide the question. 4. The relevant portion of S.57 of the Madras; Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, reads as follows: Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to inquire into and decide the following disputes and matters:- [a] whether an institution is a religious institution: S. 6l of the Act deals with appeals to the Commissioner and S.62 with suits, and appeals therefrom. 5. The validity of S.57 is not disputed. It is also conceded that the Deputy Commissioner is competent to act under the Section either on his own volition or on the motion of a member or members of the public. The contention is that the Original Applications mentioned in Para.1 above were filed by Inspectors of the Deputy Commissioners own department, that as a result there is every chance of a bias in favour of the applications, and that an inquiry by the Deputy Commissioner in such circumstances should not be permitted. 6. In 1958 KLT 969 : 1958 KLJ 720 -a case in which the petitioner was the appellant - the competency of the Inspectors of the Department to move the Deputy Commissioner for action under S.57 of the Act came up for consideration. This Court said: Our attention has not been invited to any provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, limiting the person or persons who could initiate the enquiry under S.57 (a) There does not therefore seem to be any objection to the inclusion of the Inspectors, within the category. and: In our opinion the fact that the departmental subordinate is one of the parties to a quasi judicial proceeding before his official superior does not necessarily involve a hazard. The second of the two propositions alone is disputed before us. 7. There is no doubt that the first and most fundamental principle of natural justice is that a man may not be a judge in his own cause and that disqualifying interest is by no means confined to a pecuniary interest. Halsbury deals with bias by interest as follows: It is an elementary principle, that [in the absence of statutory authority or consensual agreement] no man can be a Judge in his own cause. Halsbury deals with bias by interest as follows: It is an elementary principle, that [in the absence of statutory authority or consensual agreement] no man can be a Judge in his own cause. Therefore where persons who have a direct interest in the subject matter of an inquiry before an inferior tribunal take part in adjudicating upon it, the tribunal is improperly constituted and is without jurisdiction, and the court will grant an order of prohibition to restrain it from adjudicating, or an order of certiorari to quash a determination arrived at by it. Any pecuniary interest however small, in the matter in dispute disqualifies a person from acting as Judge unless the disability is removed by statute. Where the interest of the person adjudicating is not pecuniary, the order will not be granted unless it is shown that his interest is substantial and of such character that it will give rise to a real likelihood of bias, or that his decision was actually biassed. A mere suspicion, or even a reasonable suspicion, of bias will not of itself suffice. [3rd Edition, Vol. II, page 67]. 8. In (1954) 2 All England Law Reports, 850, Slade, J., posed the question for determination as follows: What interest in a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding does the law regard as sufficient to incapacitate a person from adjudicating on it or assisting in adjudicating on the ground of bias or appearance of bias? and answered: It is, of course, clear that any direct pecuniary or proprietory interest in the subject matter of a proceeding, however small, operates as an automatic disqualification In such a case the law assumes bias. What interest short of that will suffice? In the present case, it is claimed that a reasonable suspicion of bias is enough. It is true that there are dicta and passages to be found in judgments which lend some colour to this claim, but the authorities as a whole are almost overwhelming in support of the requirement that, to use the well known words of Blackburn, J., in L. R.1 Q B. 233 a real likelihood of bias must be proved to exist before proceedings will be vitiated on the ground that a person who has taken part or assisted in adjudicating them was in law incapacitated by interest from doing so. 9. 9. The suspicion test derived considerable support from the following passage in the well known judgment of Lord Hewart, C. J., in (1924) 1 KB 259: But while that is so, a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Lord Hewarts dictum - it was invoked in this case also - was dealt with as follows by Slade, J The frequency with which allegations of bias have come before the courts in recent times seems to indicate that the reminder of Lord Hewart, C. J., in (1924) 1 K. B. 259 that it is 'of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done' is being urged as a warrant for quashing convictions or invalidating orders on quite unsubstantial grounds and, indeed, in some cases, on the flimsiest pretexts of bias. While indorsing and fully maintaining the integrity of the principle reasserted by Lord Hewart, C. J., this court feels that the continued citation of it in cases to which it is not applicable may lead to the erroneous impression that it is more important that justice should appear to be done than that it should in fact be done. 10. There is no doubt that the legislature, if it so decides, can dispense with all or any of the hall-marks of natural justice and make a person a judge in his own cause. Coke, in his Institutes suggested that a statute which violated the principles of natural justice could be held to be of no effect, but as pointed out by Keeton in Current Legal Problems, 1955, page 30 such a doctrine was obsolete even in his day. 11. Hobart, C.J., is reported to have said that even an Act of Parliament made against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own case, is void in itself. Brooms comment is: Although it is contrary to the general rule to make a person judge in his own cause the legislature can, and no doubt in a proper case would, depart from that general rule, and an intention to do so being clearly expressed, the Courts give effect to their enactment. [Legal Maxims, 10th Edition, Page 72]. Brooms comment is: Although it is contrary to the general rule to make a person judge in his own cause the legislature can, and no doubt in a proper case would, depart from that general rule, and an intention to do so being clearly expressed, the Courts give effect to their enactment. [Legal Maxims, 10th Edition, Page 72]. Of course, as pointed out in (1954) A.C. 216, if there is any ambiguity in the statute, the Court will lean against a construction which makes a man a judge in his own cause. 12. S.84 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, was in the following terms: [1] If any dispute arises as to whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in this Act or whether a temple is an excepted temple, such dispute shall be decided by the Board. (2) Any person affected by a decision under sub-section [1] may, within one year apply to the court to modify or set aside such decision; but, subject to the result of such application, the order of the board shall be final It was contended, in AIR 1929 Madras 25, that the Board was not competent to give a decision under S.84 [1] as it had prejudged the issue by asserting the public character of the temple in a written statement filed by the Board. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., dealt with the contention as follows: S. 84 presupposes that the endowments Board on the one side should affirm that the temple is a public temple and the Dharmakartha on the other that it is a private temple. It is only then that a dispute will arise under S.84 and for some reason or other which the legislature thought sufficient, it enacted S.84 which says that the question as to the public or private nature of a temple shall be decided by the Board, and it gives the party affected by the decision to apply to a civil court and to get the order of the Board set aside. If the Board had before any suit was filed against it said that in its opinion the plaint temple is a public temple and called on the plaintiff to contribute and the plaintiff denied it, it cannot be disputed that the Board which had asserted that it is a public temple would be the tribunal to decide the question. If the Board had before any suit was filed against it said that in its opinion the plaint temple is a public temple and called on the plaintiff to contribute and the plaintiff denied it, it cannot be disputed that the Board which had asserted that it is a public temple would be the tribunal to decide the question. I think it makes no difference if that statement should be made by the Board in its written statement in a suit filed against it questioning its jurisdiction, and: Reference has been made to (1926) A. C. 586 and [1927] 2 K. B. 475 as authority for holding that where a body having judicial or quasi judicial powers has decided against a party, that body would not be qualified to act in its judicial or quasi judicial capacity in deciding any questions affecting the opposite party. That may have been a very good ground for opposing the passing of S.84 in the Legislative Council. But I do not think in the face of S.84, I can hold that the mere fact that the Board has in the exercise of its preliminary jurisdiction given to it by S.84 asserted that the temple is a public temple, would take away its right to act under S.84. Otherwise S.84 would be a dead letter as in every case the Board has to call on the trustee of the temple to submit to its jurisdiction on the footing that the temple is a public temple and it can be said that it has made up its mind. 13. The case cited in support of the petitioners contention and most strongly relied on by his counsel is AIR 1959 S. C. 308. The first of the three deviations from the fundamentals of judicial procedure alleged in that case related to bias by interest. The Supreme Court dealt with the matter as follows: In the present case, the officer who received the objections of the parties and heard them personally or through their representatives, was the Secretary of the Transport Department. Under the Madras Government Business Rules and Secretariat Instructions made by the Governor under Art.166 of the Constitution, the Secretary of a department is its head. One of the parties to the dispute before the State Government was the Transport Department functioning as a statutory authority under the Act. Under the Madras Government Business Rules and Secretariat Instructions made by the Governor under Art.166 of the Constitution, the Secretary of a department is its head. One of the parties to the dispute before the State Government was the Transport Department functioning as a statutory authority under the Act. The head of that department received the objections, heard the parties, recorded the entire proceedings and presumably discussed the matter with the Chief Minister before the latter approved the scheme. Though the formal orders were made by the Chief Minister in effect and substance, the enquiry was conducted and personal hearing was given by one of the parties to the dispute itself. It is one of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure that the person or persons who are entrusted with the duty of hearing a case judicially should be those who have no personal bias in the matter. 14. The positions of the Secretary of the Transport department who heard the objectors in AIR 1959 S. C. 308 and that of the Deputy Commissioner under S.57 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, are entirely different. Sub-Section [2] of S.68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, under which the hearing was given only says that the State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objection or his representatives and the representatives of the State Transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme. It does not specify any particular officer as is done in S.57 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951. In other words, there is no statutory mandate to the Secretary of the Transport Department under S.68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as there is to the Deputy Commissioner under S.57 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. 15. A clear legislative provision will certainly prevail as against any cannon of natural justice. Such a provision is embodied in S.57. This is apparent not merely from the wording of that section but also from the absence of any alternative arrangements for inquiry and decision in case it is held that the Deputy Commissioner is not competent to act in a given case. 16. Such a provision is embodied in S.57. This is apparent not merely from the wording of that section but also from the absence of any alternative arrangements for inquiry and decision in case it is held that the Deputy Commissioner is not competent to act in a given case. 16. We also find it difficult to hold that the Deputy Commissioner has an interest in the subject matter of the inquiry substantial enough to raise an inference of bias by interest. The functions of the department under the Act are supervisory in character and the annual contribution under S.76 is no more than a payment for the services rendered by the Government and their officers to the institution concerned. 17. If the Deputy Commissioner is not precluded by bias from acting under S.57 on his own volition as conceded by counsel for the petitioner, it is also difficult to understand how the position is altered when he acts not on his own volition but on an application filed by an officer of his department. 18. In the light of what is sated above, the petition has to be dismissed, and we do so with costs, advocates fee Rs. 100/- for all the respondents together.