Judgment :- This Writ Petition coming on for hearing upon persuing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof the order of the High Court, dated 20-1-1959 and made herein and the Counter and Reply affidavits filed herein and the records relating to proceedings pursuant to the respondents Summon Cl/223/58 dated 10-1-1959 and comprised in the return of the said respondent herein to the writ made by the High Court, and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. T. Ramaprasada Rao for M/s. John and Row Advocates for the petitioner and of Mr. R. G. Rajan for Government Pleader for the Respondent the Court made the following order :- 2.In July, 1957, 75 packages of electric bulbs arrived in Madras harbour by s. s. Nachisan Maru. In the bills of entry relating to these packages, the bulbs were said to be decoration bulbs of 6.5 volts. Twelve different importers, of whom the petitioner was one, presented bills of entry relating to these goods. The clearing agent of the petitioner claimed 20 out of the 75 packages that had arrived. Some of the cases were examined and the Customs Authorities made some enquiries. These, according to the counter affidavit "revealed that the bulbs imported as decorative bulbs were actually cycle dynamo bulb and that, therefore, they were not covered by a valid licence. In this view, the Department issued a notice on 25-7-1957 to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause why action should not be taken against him and the goods confiscated under S. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. In the explanation which he submitted on 22-8-1957, the petitioner took the stand that the bulbs in question were not cycle dynamo bulbs but were only decoration bulbs and therefore covered by the licence which he held. Thereafter some of the bulbs were sent by the Department to the College of Engineering, Guindy, for expert opinion. In paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit, it is asserted that their report was "that the bulbs were not different from cycle dynamo bulbs". Now the report which was sent by the College of Engineering, Guindy, does not say this in so many terms. It was, however, explained on behalf of the Department that such was the necessary inference from the particulars furnished in the report sent by the College of Engineering, Guindy. Now the report which was sent by the College of Engineering, Guindy, does not say this in so many terms. It was, however, explained on behalf of the Department that such was the necessary inference from the particulars furnished in the report sent by the College of Engineering, Guindy. 3.About this time, the Department began to have further doubts and suspicions and so, the contents of all the 75 packages were examined. It was then found that 55 packages contained torch bulbs of 2.4 volts which required an entirely different licence. It has already been mentioned that in the bills of entry, these goods have been described as decoration bulbs of 6.5 volts. As it was found that they were torch bulbs of 2.4 volts the Department considered that there had been a mis-declaration of the goods within the meaning of S. 167(37) of the Sea Customs Act. In consequence, a second notice, dated 3-2-1958 was issued to the petitioner requiring him to show cause why action should not be taken against him under S. 167(8), S. 167(37) and S. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act. In his reply dated 10-2-1958 the petitioner disclaimed factual knowledge of the contents of packages and repudiated responsibility therefor. There was also the plea that the goods had been mixed up. Notices were sent to the eleven other importers to whom the 75 packages related. None of them came forward to identify his packages. The Department thereupon issued a summons to the petitioner under S. 171-A of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioner replied objecting to give evidence before the Assistant Collector, Customs, on various grounds. On 7-3-1958, the petitioner was warned that his refusal to comply with the summons was punishable under S. 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The appeal preferred by the petitioner to the Collector of Customs and the revision petition which he filed before the Central Government were both dismissed. On 10-1-1959, afresh summons under S. 171-A was served on the petitioner directing him to appear and give evidence on 22-1-1959. The petitioner has come to this Court for the issue of an appropriate writ to quash the direction that he should appear and give evidence before the Assistant Collector of Customs. 4.Certain broad questions arise out of this writ petition and I had dealt with them in the judgment I delivered this morning in W.P. Nos. The petitioner has come to this Court for the issue of an appropriate writ to quash the direction that he should appear and give evidence before the Assistant Collector of Customs. 4.Certain broad questions arise out of this writ petition and I had dealt with them in the judgment I delivered this morning in W.P. Nos. 848 and 849 of 1958. It is therefore, unnecessary to cover the same ground here again. The first question that I have to decide here now is whether the petitioner is a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. In Ex. B the second notice issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs on 3-2-1958, it was specifically stated, "You are also called upon to explain why we cannot have for a prosecution to be launched against you under Cl. 81 of S. 167 of Sea Customs Act." If this clause had stood there, it would have been possible to argue that the position of the petitioner was that of an accused person and that therefore he could not be compelled to give evidence. But in a memorandum filed in this Court, it has been explicitly stated that this portion of the notice "may be deleted and is hereby cancelled." That is tantamount to an explicit statement by the Department that there is no intention at this stage to proceed against the petitioner in a criminal court. He cannot, therefore, be said to be a person accused of an offence. 5.Mr. Ramaprasada Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner, next contended that it was not competent of the Assistant Collector to issue the summons in question. The Assistant Collector purported to act under S. 171-A. That would apply only when he is making an enquiry "in connection with the smuggling of goods". In the present case, it is impossible to say that the goods had been smuggled, because they had been lawfully brought across the customs barrier. The word 'smuggling' has not been defined in the Act, but what that means was explained by a Bench of this Court in Nathella Sampatha Chetti v. Collector of Customs, (1) 1959 II ML. In the present case, it is impossible to say that the goods had been smuggled, because they had been lawfully brought across the customs barrier. The word 'smuggling' has not been defined in the Act, but what that means was explained by a Bench of this Court in Nathella Sampatha Chetti v. Collector of Customs, (1) 1959 II ML. J. 35 at page 39, it was explained : "In the absence of any statutory definition of the expression 'smuggled', it will have to be given its normal dictionary meaning, which in relation to goods, is 'imported or exported illegally'. Evasion of payment of customs duties prescribed by appropriate legislation is but one type of illegality. Such evasion could be either by bringing the goods into the country otherwise than through the customs barrier on payment of customs duty or by getting the goods through the customs barrier otherwise than on a true declaration of the nature of the goods." * 6.It will be appreciated that according to the contentions of the Customs Department, the goods in question were brought into the country by describing them as decoration bulbs of 6.5 volts, whereas actually they consisted of different kinds of bulbs, different as regards use and different also as regards voltage. Now, bringing in of any goods by giving a wrong description of them would amount to smuggling. So, I am unable to accept the objection that the enquiry which the Assistant Collector intends to conduct is outside the scope of S. 171-A. 7.It was next argued that it is not specifically alleged anywhere that the goods had been smuggled and that in the absence of such an allegation, no summons could possibly be issued. I can find no foundation for this argument in S. 171-A. The purpose of that section is to empower the customs officers to summon persons and examine them in relation to any goods which they reasonably believe to have been smuggled. Mr. Ramaprasada Rao suggested that such a view would enable the customs officers to use their power in a mala fide manner. The answer to this is that we ordinarily presume that officers entrusted with certain powers would exercise them in a proper and legitimate way. In cases where they are abused, the persons affected thereby have always relief in law. Ramaprasada Rao suggested that such a view would enable the customs officers to use their power in a mala fide manner. The answer to this is that we ordinarily presume that officers entrusted with certain powers would exercise them in a proper and legitimate way. In cases where they are abused, the persons affected thereby have always relief in law. I am not prepared to say at this stage that when he issued the summons in this case, which the petitioner seeks to quash, the Assistant Collector of Customs was in any way abusing the process of the law. 8.Mr. Ramaprasada Rao next said that if when the packages were opened and examined in detail they were found to have contained torch bulbs of .4 volts, appropriate entries must have been made in the bills of entry, but that this was not done The question I have to decide now is whether the claim of the petitioner that he is not bound to appear and give evidence before the customs authorities should be allowed or not. The complaint that the true particulars relating to the goods which were discussed at the inspection have not been entered in the bill of entry is relevant only on the question as to the manner in which that examination was conducted. It is not relevant to the question whether the petitioner should or should not attend for examination before the Assistant Collector. 9.Mr. Ramaprasada Rao next pointed out that the enclosures to Ex. B show that 26 out of the 75 packages were examined. The result was that only 49 packages remained for examination. Still it is alleged in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit that 55 packages contained torch bulbs of 2.4 volts, obviously an inconsistent statement. What the explanation for the discrepancy is I am not called upon to determine. The only question I have to determine is the question whether the Assistant Collector of Customs should or should not be prohibited from compelling the attendance of the petitioner to give evidence. Now I have found that the petitioner is not an accused person he is bound to appear and, subject to what I have said in the earlier writ petitions, W.P. Nos. 848 and 849 of 1958, is bound to give evidence. There is no justification for saying at this stage that the action of the Department is no bona fide. Now I have found that the petitioner is not an accused person he is bound to appear and, subject to what I have said in the earlier writ petitions, W.P. Nos. 848 and 849 of 1958, is bound to give evidence. There is no justification for saying at this stage that the action of the Department is no bona fide. The other contentions urged by Mr. Ramaprasada Rao have a bearing only on the question of the bona fides or otherwise of the petitioner in importing the goods and are irrelevant to the only question I have to decide.