JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - This is a decree-holder's appeal that arises out of an objection filed under Sec. 47 C.P.C. 2. It appears that Beni Prasad had four sons. Murli Dhar, Mata Prasad, Sital Prasad and Nanak Chand. Nanak Chand had, however, been adopted by a brother of Beni Prasad named Sheo Narain Lal. Murli Dhar had two sons Harish Chand and Bhagwat Prasad. Bhagwat Prasad had been adopted by Nanak Chand. Beni Prasad and Sheo Narain Lal were separate. Beni Prasad borrowed Rs. 5,000/- from the appellants and executed a mortgage bond in their favour hypothecating his ancestral property far the debt. A suit was flied to enforce the mortgage bond but the only person impleaded in it as a defendant was Beni Prasad. He contested the suit but his objections were over-ruled and a preliminary decree was passed under O. XXXIV, R. 5, C.P.C. He then died and Harish Chand, his grandson was brought on record in his place as his legal representative. During the proceedings for the preparation of a final decree Harish Chand wanted to raise the question that the mortgage on the basis of which the preliminary decree had been passed was not justified by legal necessity. But he was not allowed to raise that question and a final decree under O. XXX IV, R. 5, C. P. C. was passed against him. When the decree was put under execution Harish Chand filed an objection under Sec. 47 C. P. C. in which he contended that the mortgage was not justified by legal necessity and as the mortgaged property was his ancestral property he was not bound by the decree and the mortgagee in execution of the decree could not get the mortgaged property sold. Evidence was led by both the parties in connection with this objection. The mortgagee tried to prove legal necessity. The learned Civil judge, however, found that the evidence produced to prove legal necessity was not sufficient and legal necessity was therefore not proved. He also held that the debt had not been taken for a purpose which could be binding on the sons or grandsons of the mortgagor. It was not alleged or proved that the debt did not exist or that it had been taken for improper purpose. He also held that the debt had not been taken for a purpose which could be binding on the sons or grandsons of the mortgagor. It was not alleged or proved that the debt did not exist or that it had been taken for improper purpose. On the basis of the finding that the mortgage was not justified by legal necessity the learned Civil judge allowed the objection and declared that the mortgaged property was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree. 3. The decree-holders have now come up in appeal against the order allowing the objection under Sec. 47, C. P. C. and two contentions are pressed on their behalf. It is urged in the first place that Harish Chand, the grandson of Beni Prasad, could avoid the decree or the debt only by showing that it was tainted with immorality and as he failed to establish that fact the decree ought to have been allowed to be executed against him. The second contention is that in any case it was not open to the judgment debtor to rise objection to the decree whirl he actually raised under Sc.2 47, C.P.C . 4. So far as the lint point is concerned the matter appeal is to be concluded by a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Jagdish Prasad v. Hoshyar Singh, 26 A.L.J. 1289=1928 A.I.R. Alld. 596 In that case a joint Hindu family consisted of a father and his sons. The father had made a mortgage of the joint family property and the mortgagee after suing on the basis of the mortgage, wit non impleading the sons, had obtained a decree for sale. The sons then brought a suit challenging the validity of the mortgage. They failed to establish that the debt way tainted with any immorality aid the mortgagee failed to establish legal necessity. There was no question of any antecedent debt. It was held that the mortgagee having failed to establish legal necessity for the loan the son's suit was bound to succeed although they that ailed to prove that the debt was of an immoral character. There was no question of any antecedent debt. It was held that the mortgagee having failed to establish legal necessity for the loan the son's suit was bound to succeed although they that ailed to prove that the debt was of an immoral character. Applying the principle laid down in that case to the present case it follows t hat even though the grandson of Beni Prasad had failed to prove that the debt was tainted with immorality when the mortgagee failed to prove that there was legal necessity for the mortgage the grandsons contention that he was not bound by the mortgage was liable to be accepted. There is therefore not much force in the first contention raised. It is not contended on facts that in the present case legal necessity was actually established. 5. The second contention, however, appears to to acceptable. The decree under O. XXXIV, R. 5, C. P. C had been passed against Harish Chand himself he having been brought on record in place of the deceased judgement-debtor, it was therefore not open to Harish Chand in execution to raise any objection which necessitated the Court's going behind the decree. That is exactly what Harish Chand did. The objection he raised was that the decree was not a valid decree became the mortgage on the basis of which it had been passed was not a valid mortgage. His real contention therefore was that the decree should not have been passed. Such an objection, it is obvious, could not be raised under Sec. 47, C.P.C. 6. A similar question arose in the case of Hira Lal Sahu v. Parmeshar Rai, I.L.R. 21 Alld. 356 In that case a decree for sale had been obtained under the old Sec. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act of 1882 on the basis of a mortgage. The mortgagee then applied for an absolute order for sale under the then Sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. By the time the original mortgagor having died the application was mad against his son and legal representative. The son wanted to raise an objection that the mortgage was not justified by legal necessity and was in respect of ancestral property and as he had not been impleaded in the original suit no absolute decree could be passed. By the time the original mortgagor having died the application was mad against his son and legal representative. The son wanted to raise an objection that the mortgage was not justified by legal necessity and was in respect of ancestral property and as he had not been impleaded in the original suit no absolute decree could be passed. The application under Sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act was in the nature of an application for execution of the decree for sale and the question arose whether the objection which the son of the judgment-debtor, original mortgagor, wanted to raise could be raised in the execution proceedings. It was held that it could not be raised in those proceedings as it was a question which led to a determination of the question of the validity of the decree passed against the father. 7. The same view appears to have been tat:- en in the case of Shiva Das Singh v. Karam Chand, 1934 A.I.R. Lah. 438=I.L.R. 15 Lah 772 In that case also the son and representative of the deceased judgment-debtor wanted to raise under Sec. 47, C. P. C. an objection that the mortgaged debt was not justified by legal necessity and was tainted with immorality. It was held that he could not raise the objection because it really amounted to disputing the validity of the decree itself and the objection did not raise a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 8. The Madras High Court was of a similar opinion in Lakhmadu v. Ramudu, I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 123=1939 A.I.R. Mad. 867 9. It therefore appears to me that if the judgment-debtor wanted to assail the validity of the mortgage on the ground of want of legal necessity the proper course for him to follow was to file a regular suit. He could not raise objection under Sec. 47, C. P. C. because he could not expect the executing- Court to go behind the decree end question its validity. 10. The objection raised by the judgment-debtor was therefore not maintainable under See. 47, C. P. C. and could not on that account succeed. 11. The appeal must therefore be allowed. He could not raise objection under Sec. 47, C. P. C. because he could not expect the executing- Court to go behind the decree end question its validity. 10. The objection raised by the judgment-debtor was therefore not maintainable under See. 47, C. P. C. and could not on that account succeed. 11. The appeal must therefore be allowed. In view, however, of the fact that the respondent has not appeared in this Court to contest the appeal and on the question of legal necessity the finding of the Civil judge was against the decree-holders, I think the parties must be left to bear their own costs. The appeal is consequently allowed. The order allowing the objection under section 47 C. P. C. is set aside and the objection is dismissed. The parties will however, bear their on costs of both the Courts.