This is an appeal against an order of the Sessions Judge, Lower Assam Districts, dated 15-3-57, convicting the appellant under S. 436, I. P. Code, and sentencing him to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge with the aid of a jury, and although in his charge to the jury the Sessions Judge indicated that he was not prepared to accept the evidence against the appellant and that the case was not established against him, yet he did not think it desirable to differ with the verdict of the jury and refer the case to this Court. He, therefore, agreed with the verdict of the jury and convicted the ap­pellant. (2) The prosecution case is that on 5-1-54, the appellant committed mischief by setting fire to a certain room which belonged to the complainant Rupram Das but was in the use of the accused for the purpose of his homeopathic pharmacy. The appellant had taken the room on rent from the com^ plaint. The room formed part of a two-roomed house owned by the complainant; the western room was in the occupation of the appellant while the eastern room was rented out to one Haripada Gope. Haripada and his brother, Hiralal, used to run a tea stall in the said room. In the same compound, 1he complainant used to live in a separate house. In the said compound, at a corner, there was a plot at the junction of Boloram Jhukan Road and the Assam Trunk Road. The residential house of the complainant faces towards Boloram Phukan Road, while the rented house faces towards the Assam Trunk Road. The room had been taken by the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. The appellant is a refugee from East Pakistan and had taken some loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Administration. The complainant's case was that as the appellant was in arrears of rent, he demand­ed the rents from the appellant on the evening of 4-1-54, whereupon there was some altercation, and' at about 2. A. M. that very night, while the com­plainant was asleep in his own house, his tenant, Haripada Cope, roused him from sleep and told him that the accused's pharmacy was on fire. The complainant came out and found that flames were coming out and spreading over the whole building. A. M. that very night, while the com­plainant was asleep in his own house, his tenant, Haripada Cope, roused him from sleep and told him that the accused's pharmacy was on fire. The complainant came out and found that flames were coming out and spreading over the whole building. Many people of the neighbour­hood, assembled there, including one Bisweswar Sarma (P. W. 5). The chowkidar of the Ford Com­pany was called, and the fire was extinguished. One rickshaw-puller called Janki Singh then broke open the door of the pharmacy and it was found that there was no furniture in the room. Next day, at about 10 A. M., first information report was lodged by the complainant at the thana. That a fire broke out on the date in question in the pharmacy of the appellant, is not disputed. The contention of the prosecution was that due to the fact that the appellant had been in arrears of rent and there had been an altercation the evening before between the appellant and the complainant, 'he appellant removed all the furniture, and with a view to injure the property of the complainant, he set fire to his own pharmacy. It was also suggested by the prosecution that the appellant had taken Rs. 5500/- on loan from the Rehabilitation Department, one of the conditions whereof being that his stock-in-trade should be in­sured against fire; and the appellant had, there­fore, got his pharmacy insured accordingly. As the appellant had no business, there was no likeli­hood of his being able to pay up the Government loan unless he could get money from the Insurance Company. He, therefore, purposely set fire lo the pharmacy to get money from the Insurance Company. The prosecution rests entirely on cir­cumstantial evidence. There is no eye-witness to the occurrence, as is natural in such cases. The prosecution has produced one Subodh Chandra Sharma (P. W. 10) who stated that at about 11 P.M. while he was returning from the Music Conference, he saw a truck loaded with two almirahs in front of the appellant's pharmacy, and also two persons carrying a table from the pharmacy to the truck. The prosecution has produced one Subodh Chandra Sharma (P. W. 10) who stated that at about 11 P.M. while he was returning from the Music Conference, he saw a truck loaded with two almirahs in front of the appellant's pharmacy, and also two persons carrying a table from the pharmacy to the truck. The other evidence relied upon by the prosecution is that of Upendra Nath Sarma (P. W. 7) who stated that at about 1 A. M. in the night, he along with one Bandhuram Kalita, hap­pened to pass by that way and saw smoke coming out of the pharmacy. The appellant was 'hen seen locking the door of his pharmacy. Soon after the appellant left the place on a bicycle. The Judge in his charge has pointed out to the jury the circumstances which belie the complainants statement that there was any altercation in the previous evening. The inmates of the ad­joining room, Haripada Gope and his brother Hira-lal, did not see any altercation, as alleged. As regards the statement of Subodh Sarma (P. W. 10), '.he Sessions Judge in his charge pointed out to the jury the circumstances which went to belie his testimony. The pharmacy of the appellant did not fall directly in the way of the witness when he happened to be going back from the Music Confer­ence to his home, and has been pointed out by the Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury, it was unlikely that in a wintry night, the witness, with­out any reason, would take the longer route to reach his home, and not the direct and the shorter route. Upendranath Sarma (P. W. 7) states that he saw the appellant in the night at about 1 A. M. locking the door of the pharmacy. He also states that he was returning home from the Music Con­ference, and reaching the crossing where the pre­sent Machkhowa station of the Assam State Trans­port is situate, he first turned to the left and there­after again turning to the right, took the Assam Trunk Road. According to his own statement, without proceeding through the Assam Trunk Road, he could have proceeded direct and reached his house after crossing the railway line. He, how­ever, states that this would have been a longer route and that there was another route to his house by a lane which runs by the side of the Ford Com­pany. According to his own statement, without proceeding through the Assam Trunk Road, he could have proceeded direct and reached his house after crossing the railway line. He, how­ever, states that this would have been a longer route and that there was another route to his house by a lane which runs by the side of the Ford Com­pany. The Judge pointed out to the jury that the shortest route for the witness would have been to cross the railway line and reach direct his house, and that it was not likely for him to have taken the route which he stated he had taken and thus saw the accused locking the door of the pharmacy. Both Upendra Sarma (P. W. 7) and Subodh Sarma (P. W. 10) are chance witnesses. The suggestion of the defence was that both these witnesses were procured by one Kalicharan Moherer who it a pleader's clerk. At has been pointed out by the Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury, this sug­gestion it borne out by the fact that the investi­gating officer (P. W. 11) admitted that Kalicharan took a good deal of interest In the case and was advising the complainant. The investigating officer has further admitted that he examined prosecution witnesses Bandhuram, Upendra Sarma and Subodh Sarma at the houte of Ktlicharan on 6-1-54, and that on 7-1-54, he found some other witnesses ready at the house of Kali­charan has not been examined by the prosecution, and none of the witnesses - Subodh and Upendra tarma - reported about this incident to anybody else. In the opinion of the Sessions Judge, there­fore, the case was not established against the appellant. It, however, correct that even though the Sessions Judge may not have been inclined to hold the accused guilty, and in the charge to the , jury he indicated that the accused was entitled to acquittal in his opinion, still he could accept the verdict of the jury and need not have referred the case to the High Court. Under S. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jury and further thinks it necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court, he may refer the case to this Court. Under S. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jury and further thinks it necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court, he may refer the case to this Court. The fact that he disagrees with the verdict of the jury, is, by itself, not sufficient for referring the case to this Court unless he further finds that it it necessary for the ends of justice to do so. He may, therefore, have accepted the verdict of the jury, although he him­self was not inclined to agree with the jury and convict the appellant. It is, therefore, neces­sary to see whether there was any misdirec­tion to the jury, or the trial was otherwise vitiated, in order to enable this Court to interfere on ap­peal. (3) It is contended by the counsel for the ap­pellant that the trial in this case was illegal. Dur­ing the course of the trial, an application was made by the counsel for the defence complaining against the misconduct of one of the jurors, Sri Hang-shadhar Das. In the application, it was stated that the said juror demanded money for himself and for persuading his other colleague jurors, number­ing four, and threatened that if the money was not paid, the appellant should expect an adverse ver­dict against him. On that application, the juror concerned was examined in the chamber by the Sessions Judge in the presence of the Public Prosecutor and the de­fence advocate. The juror admitted that he had met Mr. Banerjee the counsel for the defence and had talked to him. After making that enquiry, the Sessions Judge found against the juror and, by his order dated 15-3-57, discharged the juror Hang-shadhar Das and directed that the case should proceed with the remaining jurors. It was urged by the counsel for the appellant that the Sessions Judge had inherent jurisdiction to discharge the juror on finding that he had committed miscon­duct. After the juror had been discharged on the ground of misconduct, the trial could not proceed with the remaining jurors. The jury should have been discharged and a fresh jury elected. The trial was thus vitiated. There appears to be consider­able force in this contention. After the juror had been discharged on the ground of misconduct, the trial could not proceed with the remaining jurors. The jury should have been discharged and a fresh jury elected. The trial was thus vitiated. There appears to be consider­able force in this contention. It is not necessary to refer to a large number of authorities wherein it has been held that the Court had inherent juris­diction to discharge a juror on the finding that j he has committed misconduct. Reliance has been placed by the counsel for the State on S. 282(1), Cr. P. Code, which runs as follows: "282. (1). If, in the course of a trial by jury at any time before the return of the verdict, - (a) any juror, for any sufficient cause, is pre­vented from attending the trial on any day, or (b) if any juror absents himself and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, or (c) if it appears that any juror is unable to understand the language in which the evidence is given, or, when such evidence is interpreted, the language in which it is interpreted, the Court, in any case falling under cl. (a), may, either adjourn the trial or discharge the juror, and in any case falling under cl. (b) or cl. (c), shall discharge the juror; and in any case where any purer is so discharged, the jury shall be deemed to be reconstituted with the remaining jurors as if the jury had consisted of such persons only from the commencement of the trial, and the trial shall proceed before the jury so reconstituted; and not­withstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Code, such trial shall not be invalid by read on only of the fact that the number of persons originally constituting the jury has been reduced.'' It is contended that cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 282 is attracted in the present case, and as the juror was prevented from attending the trial on account of being discharged, the jury should be deemed to have been reconstituted with the remaining .jurors as if the jury had consisted of such persona only from the commencement of the trial, and the trial should proceed before the jury so reconstitut­ed. In my opinion, S. 282(1) does not apply to the present-case. In my opinion, S. 282(1) does not apply to the present-case. Clause (a) of sub-s. (1) only ap­plies to the cases where a juror continues as a juror and is unable to attend the trial on the date of trial. It does not apply to a case where the juror has been discharged on account of miscon­duct. All the three clauses of sub-s. (I) of S. 282, Cr. P. Code, contemplate cases where the juror is either unable to attend or he is unable to under­stand the proceedings; but do not contemplate a case of discharge of a juror on account of mis­conduct. It is also clear from a perusal of S. 282 that in cases where the juror is absent or unable to understand the proceedings, the jury will be deemed to be reconstituted for the purposes of the trial, with the remaining jurors. This also indi­cates that but for the special circumstances enu­merated in S. 282(1), in all other cases where the juror is discharged, the jury stands discharged, and 1 a fresh jury is to be elected.. In my opinion, therefore, the trial was illegal in the present case inasmuch as after the discharge of the juror on ac­count of misconduct, a fresh jury was not elected. The question, however, to be considered is: whether in these circumstances, the case should be sent back for retrial, or I should myself look into the evidence and dispose of the matter. Ordinarily, when a trial is held to be illegal, the proper course would be to send back the case for retrial. In the present case, from the trend of the charge to the jury, it is clear that Sessions Judge was no' inclined to agree with the verdict of the jury, and I have myself examined the evidence and the cir­cumstances pointed out by the Judge and, in my opinion, the case against the appellant, on the evi­dence on record, is very doubtful. Under the present law, the retrial will be, with­out the aid of a jury, by the Judge alone. In this view of the matter also, no useful purpose will be served by sending the case back for retrial. Under the present law, the retrial will be, with­out the aid of a jury, by the Judge alone. In this view of the matter also, no useful purpose will be served by sending the case back for retrial. It should also be pointed out that the accused was once discharged by the Magistrate and, on revision, the case was directed to be committed to the Court of Session, with the result that the accused has been sufficiently harassed in the matter. Hav­ing regard to all these circumstances, I do not think it to be a fit case for retrial. I accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant and the sentences passed against him. Appeal allowed