ORDER K. Sankaran, C.J. 1. The Second defendant has filed this petition seeking a revision of the lower Court's order extending the time for depositing in court the amount specified in the decree. The point urged on behalf of the second defendant is that the court had no jurisdiction for thus extending the time. It is also contended that S.148 or 151 C. P. C. cannot apply to a case like the present one. 2. It is obvious that a court can invoke the aid of S. 148 C. P. C. for extending the time fixed for doing a certain thing only so long as the court is continuing to have control of the suit. The court will cease to have such control of a suit as soon as final decree in the strict sense of the terms is passed in the case. Thereafter the extension of time fixed by the final decree can be had only in an appeal, review or revision against the decree. 3. The position taken up by the second defendant in this case is that the decree passed in this case on 6-3-1958 is a final decree. That decree stated that the Plaintiff will be entitled to recover the property on payment of Rs. 1388.38 as the value of improvements due to the second defendant. This deposit had to be made on or before 6-7-1958. No deposit was made within that time. Plaintiff subsequently applied on 9-8-'58 for extension of the time for making the deposit. The court extended the time up to 30-9-1958. Plaintiff appears to have deposited the amount within that time. 4. On behalf of the 2nd defendant, it is contended that the decree passed in the case was a final decree. The decree does not expressly state so. There is also no provision as to what would happen in case of default in making the deposit within the prescribed time. The real nature of the decree has to be decided in the light of these facts and circumstances. In ILR 43 Madras 357 and other cases, decrees similar to the decree in the present case have been construed to be preliminary decrees in redemption suits. The real nature of the decree has to be decided in the light of these facts and circumstances. In ILR 43 Madras 357 and other cases, decrees similar to the decree in the present case have been construed to be preliminary decrees in redemption suits. It cannot be construed to be a final decree because no finality of the suit for redemption and recovery of the property is indicated by the decree by providing for the dismissal of the suit as a consequence of the default in depositing the redemption price within the time fixed. It follows therefore that the decree can be construed only as a preliminary decree, the court retains its jurisdiction and control over the suit. S.148 C. P. C. is attracted to such a case. It has therefore to be held that the lower court was acting rightly in the exercise of its jurisdiction under that section in allowing plaintiff's application and extending the time for the deposit of the redemption price. The order to that effect passed by the lower court does not call for any interference in revision. This petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.