Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution by R.K.V. Motors and Timbers (Private) Ltd., a motor transport company, for the issue of a writ of certiorari, quashing the order Ext. B, dated the 31st January 1959, passed by the first respondent, who is the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Trivandrum, granting a temporary stage carriage permit to the second respondent, the Director of State Transport, Kerala State, for the route Trivandrum (Cantonment)-Neyyattinkara via Kattakada. This route, among others was served by the petitioner, for about six or seven years in the past, by providing motor transport under a stage carriage permit held by it. The Jaya Service (Private) Ltd., Neyyattinkara, or shortly the Jaya Service, is another motor transport company, who had been similarly serving the same route, under a stage carriage permit held by it, till a few months before the date of this petition when it ceased to do so. On the 21st January 1959, the petitioner made an application to the first respondent, for the issue to it of a temporary permit for an additional bus to operate the same route, on the ground, that the Jaya Service had defaulted in service; this was rejected on the same day, by the order, copy of which is Ext. A. On the 30th January 1959, the second respondent applied to the 1st respondent, for the issue to the department of a temporary permit for one of its buses, on the ground, that there was public need of departmental transport service to operate on the same route. By Ext. B, the order sought to be quashed, a temporary permit was granted to the 2nd respondent to operate a service on the route, for a period of four months from the 1st February 1959, in substitution of the service operated by the Jaya Service The petitioner's chief contention is that the grant of a temporary permit to the 2nd respondent, was not warranted by the terms of S.62 of the M. V. Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act and was therefore wanting in jurisdiction. 2. The learned Government Pleader, who appeared for both respondents has placed in my hands, the papers in the office of the 1st respondent, relating to the issue of the permits. 2. The learned Government Pleader, who appeared for both respondents has placed in my hands, the papers in the office of the 1st respondent, relating to the issue of the permits. He has raised a two-fold objection to the issue of a writ under Art.226 of the Constitution as prayed for; firstly, that if Ext. B was illegal the petitioner had its remedy under S.64 A of the Act, by way of revision to the State Transport Authority, and secondly, that by applying on the 21st January 1959 for the issue of a temporary permit, the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority represented by the 1st respondent, and that it cannot now be heard to contend against it, and impeach Ext. B, as lacking in jurisdiction. Two reported cases decided by this court which were mentioned by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in which temporary permits issued by the Regional Transport Authority were quashed, are Balagangadharan v. R.T. Board; 1957 K.L. T. 1259 and Kunju Menon v. Secretary R. T. Board, Trichur, A. I. R.1957 T. C. 255; but in these no preliminary objection to the competency of the petitioner under Art.226, was raised or determined. The first of the above objections was, however, pointedly raised in New Kerald Bus Transport v. Regional Transport Authority, Cannanore, 1959 K.L.T. 405, and upheld by T.K. Joseph, J. following two decisions of the Supreme Court, notably the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 which has laid down the limitations, to the exercise of this special jurisdiction by the Court. 3. In deciding the preliminary objection, it has to be taken, that the petitioner has a good and sustainable case on the merits. The case of State of Utter Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh has decided that though there is no rule that certiorari will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy provided the requisite grounds exist, it will lie, notwithstanding a right of appeal. But ordinarily, the Superior Court will decline to interfere, until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other remedies. But this rule is one of policy, convenience and discretion, rather than a rule of law. But ordinarily, the Superior Court will decline to interfere, until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other remedies. But this rule is one of policy, convenience and discretion, rather than a rule of law. Their Lordships observed: "If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which s contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules or procedure, and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play, the superior court may quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ or certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned." The case itself was decided on the ground of a violation of natural justice in a departmental trial, in which the officer holding the trial offered himself as a witness against the persons put on trial. 4. The earlier case decided by the Supreme Court on which Joseph J, relied, was Veerappa v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR. 1952 S. C.192 where the scope of Art.226, was defined in these terms: "Such writs as are referred to in Art.226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested. In them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made." The need for interference must therefore depend on the nature and gravity of the error committed by the inferior tribunal. Coming to the present case, if the petitioner is able to satisfy the court, that in granting the temporary permit to the 2nd respondent, 1st respondent has acted, not merely erroneously but in patent and total disregard of the provisions of the Act, or in flagrant violation thereof, there is nothing in the dicta of the Supreme Court referred to above, which debars this Court from exercising the jurisdiction under Art.226, on the ground, that the petitioner could have obtained his remedy in some other manner. 5. It is necessary to see how the first respondent granted the permit. At the hearing of this petition before me, the argument proceeded on the assumption that the permit to the Jaya Service is still in force, and that notwithstanding default committed by it in the maintaining the service, it had power to resume the service at any moment this might spell a "temporary need". But on perusing the papers, which the learned Government Pleader had furnished to me, it is seen, that the permit originally issued to the Jaya Service had been cancelled on the 21st January; and the temporary permit was expressly stated to be "to operate as substitute service" in the place of the bus previously operated by the Jaya Service. On the cancellation of the permit which had been issued to the Jaya Service, the need, which it was intended to meet, and which was non-temporary, stood revived. This, without anything more, cannot stand converted into a temporary need. The counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent, while asserting the existence of a temporary need, as supporting the grant of the permit, did not disclose what it is. The covering letter of the 2nd respondent, which accompanied his application for a temporary permit, disclosed temporary need; the need, if it was one, was expressed to be, "what was felt by the public and by the local M.L.A.", for departmental services on the route. Plainty, this was not a temporary need. It is strange, that the counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent did not disclose the material fact that the permit to the Jaya Service had been cancelled, and left this to be glanced from the papers supplied to me. Plainty, this was not a temporary need. It is strange, that the counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent did not disclose the material fact that the permit to the Jaya Service had been cancelled, and left this to be glanced from the papers supplied to me. Notwithstanding the allegation in the covering letter by the second respondent, of a non-temporary need and the revival of a need of that description, consequent on the cancellation of the permit to the Jaya Service, the 1st respondent chose to issue a temporary permit which could be done under S.62 (c) of the Act, only in the event of a temporary need. It was not alleged by the 1st respondent, nor was it contended on his behalf, that on account of the shortage of the number of buses, on the route upon the cancellation of the permit, he thought fit to issue a temporary permit, till a regular permit could be granted, after going through the procedure prescribed by S.57 of the Act, as in Jairamdas v. Regional Transport Authority and others, A.I.R., 1957 Rajasthan 162. In Kunju Menon v. Secretary R.T.A., Trichur A.I.R. 1957 T.C. 255, a temporary permit was issued to be in force for the duration of a stay order, pending an appeal against the grant of a regular pucca permit; yet this court held, it was not a valid issue. What was achieved by the 1st respondent, was to set at naught the provisions of S.62 of the Act, and to issue a temporary permit, in the teeth of an allegation of a non-temporary need, without his satisfying himself as to any particular temporary need & without being able, even now to point out, in his counter-affidavit when challenged to do so in these proceedings, what if any, the particular temporary need was. I am, therefore, of the view, that this is a case in which the 1st respondent has acted, in patent and total disregard of the provisions of the Act and in excess of his powers and therefore the first preliminary objection cannot stand. The case of New Kerala Bus Transport v. R.T.A. Cannanore decided by T. K. Joseph, J. was different, as, on the merits of the case, the order sought to be quashed, was found to be perfectly valid and supportable, by reason of an amendment introduced in the Act by the Madras State Government. 6. The case of New Kerala Bus Transport v. R.T.A. Cannanore decided by T. K. Joseph, J. was different, as, on the merits of the case, the order sought to be quashed, was found to be perfectly valid and supportable, by reason of an amendment introduced in the Act by the Madras State Government. 6. It remains to dispose of the second preliminary objection, that the petitioner, by its having made the application of the 21st January, had submitted to the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent. The case relied on in support of this, was Ponkunnam Erattupetta Motor Service v. R. T. A., Kottayam,1958 K.L.T. 1034, decided by Varadaraja Iyengar, J. on the principle, that the jurisdiction under Art.226, cannot be invoked by a party who had submitted to the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. In support of this, Varadaraja Iyengar, J. relied on Pannalal Himjrai v. Union of India, A. I. R.1957 S. C. 397 decided by the Supreme Court, & Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 Bombay 208. In the former, the petitioner-assessee by reason of several antecedent proceedings, in which he had participated, had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer at Delhi, to which the assessment case had been transferred under the provisions of S.5 (7) A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 and afterwards he sought to challenge the validity of the original transfer, on the ground, that S.5 (7) A was ultra vires. In the latter on second appeal against the decision of the State Transport Authority, in the matter of the issue of a permit under the Motor Vehicle Act, Government set aside the order, and the party aggrieved thereby invoked the jurisdiction under Art.226, contending that Government had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the decision of the State Transport Authority, Chagla C.J., held, that having omitted in appeal to object to the jurisdiction of the Govt. the writ jurisdiction under Art.226, which is a special jurisdiction, the limits and conditions of which could be set by the High Court for itself, could not be extended to him. These are not analogous to the present case. the writ jurisdiction under Art.226, which is a special jurisdiction, the limits and conditions of which could be set by the High Court for itself, could not be extended to him. These are not analogous to the present case. In the case before Varadaraja Iyengar, J. pending an appeal against the issue of a pucca permit, action was instituted for the issue of a temporary permit and rival claimants opposed one another, apparently in the proceeding and one of them who was disappointed, challenged the jurisdiction of the authority before whom he had applied, to issue the permit, by a petition under Art.226; it was held he was precluded from doing so. 7. The petitioner, here, had made his application for the issue of a temporary permit, on the 21st January, to the 1st respondent, who had every authority to issue a temporary permit, in circumstances warranted by law. Though in issuing a temporary permit it is not necessary to conform to S.57 of the Act, there are matters to be considered by the authority in granting such permit. The first respondent in his counter-affidavit has affirmed, that the petitioner's application was rejected, not because the need was not temporary, but because it suffered from a disqualification that it had not provided adequate transport facilities even on the routes for which it held permits. The petitioner's present contention is not, that under no circumstances the 1st respondent has jurisdiction to issue a temporary permit; if, therefore, in the exercise of his jurisdiction the authority disregards or violates the plain provisions of the statute I fail to see how the petitioner, whose locus standi to oppose the grant to the 2nd respondent is not open to question, can be precluded from seeking to quash the grant by a petition under Art.226, if the other conditions are fulfilled. Unlike the case in Ponkunnam-Erattupetta Motor Service v. R. T. A. Kottayam, here, at the material time, there was only one proceeding, for the issue of a permit to the 2nd respondent of which the petitioner became aware, only after the second respondent had commenced to operate a service, pursuant to the grant of a temporary permit to him. I am, therefore, of the view, that the second ground of the preliminary objection too is not sustainable. 8. I am, therefore, of the view, that the second ground of the preliminary objection too is not sustainable. 8. The reasons discussed above while dealing with the first preliminary objection, are sufficient to hold, that Ext. B order was made in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Act and cannot stand; it is hereby quashed. The petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Allowed.