JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. These petitions challenge the validity of certain schemes prepared and published under S. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and approved under S. 68 D of that Act. Those Sections read as follows: 68 C "Where any State Transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such services in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State Transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State Transport undertaking may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct. " 68 D "(1) Any person affected by the schemes published under S.68C may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the scheme in the Official Gazette, file objections thereto before the State Government. (2) The State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State Transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme. (3) The scheme as approved or modified under sub-s.(2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route: Provided that no such scheme which relates to any inter State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government." 2. A common contention raised in all these petitions is that the schemes do not contain "particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered" as required by S. 68 C and that they should be struck down on that account. A common contention raised in all these petitions is that the schemes do not contain "particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered" as required by S. 68 C and that they should be struck down on that account. We have come to the conclusion that the contention should prevail. 3. The particulars given in the notification in controversy in O. P. No. 632 of 1959 read as follows : Sl. No. Name of routes Starting place Destination Important place served Route mileage Date from which the scheme is proposed to be implemented The class of proposed to be operated (Passenger and for goods service) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 Ernakulam Thodupuzha Ernakulam Thodupuzha Puthencruz Moovattupuzha Anicaud, Vazhakulam Mudkkathanam 39.5 miles 15-02-1959 Passenger service. It is agreed that the notifications concerned in the other eight petitions also were in the same form and that no further particulars were given in any one of them. 4. According to S. 68 C, any scheme prepared under that section should contain: (a) particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered ; (b) the area or route proposed to be covered; and (c) such other particulars as may be prescribed. The submission on behalf of the petitioners is that though the particulars indicated by (b) and (c) have been given, there has been a total absence of the particulars indicated by (a). 5. S. 2 of a United Kingdom Act 1835 relating to Merchant Seamen provided as follows : , "That it shall not be lawful for any master of any Ship or vessel belonging to any subject of His Majesty of this United Kingdom trading to parts beyond the seas, or of any British registered ship of the burthen of eighty tons or upwards employed in any of the fisheries of the United Kingdom, or in trading coastwise or otherwise, to carry to sea on any voyage either from this kingdom or from any other place, any seaman or other person as one of his crew or complement (apprentices excepted), without first entering into an agreement in writing with every such seaman, specifying what monthly or other wages each such seaman is to be paid, the capacity in which he is to act, and the nature of the voyage in which the ship is intended to be employed". (Abridgment of Statutes, Vol. (Abridgment of Statutes, Vol. 11, page 19). The expression "nature of the voyage" came up for consideration in 166 English Reports 553. Dr. Lushington said : "In interpreting the Act of Parliament, the words, "nature of the voyage" must have such a national construction as to answer the main and leading purpose for which they were framed, namely, to give the mariner a fair intimation of the nature of the service in which he was about to engage himself when he signed the ship's articles. Looking at the tenor of the articles in the present case, I am of opinion that the terms which are used to give him no intimation whether he is to winter in the frozen regions of the north, or perform an easy service in the luxurious climate of Naples or Trieste. I am yet to learn that such comprehensive ambiguity is necessary for the purposes of trade; and if not necessary, I cannot believe that a just construction of this state will impose any such grievance upon the seaman. I am not disposed to narrow its interpretation in cases where the exigence or convenience of commerce call for an extended latitude of construction; but I am inclined to say that this statute does not warrant an arbitrary extension of terms not required for the interest of the owner, yet so vague and indefinite as to deprive the mariner of all the benefit intended to be conferred upon him, when the legislature ordained that some information should be conveyed to him of the extent of the obligation into which he was about to cater". 6. The "main and leading purpose" of the publication directed by S. 68 C is to give all those likely to be affected by the schemes prepared under that section the fullest details of the in-road that the State Transport undertaking proposes to make into the private sector and thus enable them to raise their objections and present their case. It must follow that any publication which does not give the number of buses that will be put on the road, their seating capacity, the fare that will be charged and the number of trips per day - like the schemes before us - does not meet the requirements of the statute and cannot be sustained. 7. What we have stated above is sufficient to allow the nine petitions before us. 7. What we have stated above is sufficient to allow the nine petitions before us. We consider it desirable, however, to deal with one other contention which was strongly urged before us on behalf of the petitioners. That contention relates to the meaning to be attributed to the words "to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise" occurring in S. 68 C of the Act. 8. According to the petitioners any scheme prepared under that section will have to be "to the exclusion, complete or partial" of the private operators and cannot be in supplementation of the services rendered by them. The submission ignores the effect of the words "or otherwise". Confronted with those words all that Mr. Shenoi who argued the point with the greatest vehemence and persistence could say was that they meant 'or others', an answer for which neither language nor context provides a foundation. There can be no doubt that the expression "or otherwise" means "in other way" and one of the other ways will certainly be by way of supplementation. 9. In 20 T. L. R. 59 Walton J., had to deal with the loss of a dog shipped under a bill of lading which exempted the ship owner from liability for damage arising in providing, despatching and navigating the vessel "or otherwise." He said: "For the purposes of my decision I will assume that the loss was caused by the negligence of the shipowners' servants in leaving the dog loose. The shipowners contend that, assuming everything against them, they are protected by the negligence clause. Against that it is said that the dog was not lost from any act, neglect, or default of the defendants' servants in 'providing, despatching and navigating the vessel', and I think that was so. But the clause goes on 'or otherwise', and I think that means 'in any other way', and that the clause does apply to the negligence of the butcher in allowing the dog to go loose and be lost." 10. "Exclusion, complete or partial" exhausts all types of exclusion and there is no question of any application of the principle of ejusdem generis. As pointed out by Sutherland : "Where the specific words embrace all the persons or objects of the class designated by the enumeration, the general words take a meaning beyond the class. "Exclusion, complete or partial" exhausts all types of exclusion and there is no question of any application of the principle of ejusdem generis. As pointed out by Sutherland : "Where the specific words embrace all the persons or objects of the class designated by the enumeration, the general words take a meaning beyond the class. To apply the rule in this instance would render the general words meaningless for the reason that there is nothing ejusdem generis to fall within their purview. Its application, consequently, would contravene the more important rule of construction that all words are to be given effect. In order to prevent their rejection as surplusage, the general words take an unrestricted meaning on the ground that the legislature, by the addition of general words to an exhaustive enumeration, must have intended that they have meaning outside the class." (Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn. Vol. 2, paragraph 4913). 11. In the light of what is stated above, the schemes impugned in the nine petitions before us have to be quashed and we order accordingly, though in the circumstances of the case without any direction as to costs. 12. We have dealt with only two of the contentions raised before us. In view of the conclusion we have reached it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions and they have not been considered in this judgment. 13. We make it clear that nothing in this judgment will in any way preclude further action in accordance with the law. If any guidance is needed as to what exactly should be done, such guidance is available in the notifications published under S. 68 C in the neighbouring State of Madras, as for example, the scheme published in respect of certain routes in the Kanyakumari and Tirunelveli Districts on page 6 of the Hindu dated 12-6-1959.