JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - This appeal has been filed by one Pandit Behari Lal who had advanced certain sums of money to Lokendra Singh the respondent in this appeal. Lokendra Singh is dead and his heirs have been brought on record. Lokendra Singh had brought an application under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act for the liquidation of his debts and in the proceedings under the said Act the debt owing to Pandit Behari Lal was shown as due. 2. The history of the debt transaction as follows- 3. On the 14th of December, 1925 Lokendra Singh borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,500/- from Beharilal and executed a promissory note. Then on the 13th of August, 1926 Lokendra Singh borrowed a further sum of Rs. 1,000/- from Behari Lal and executed a second promissory note for Rs. 1,000/-. Both these promissory notes were renewed on the 22nd of December, 1930 each for a sum of Rs. 1,800/-. Each of these two sums appears to have been made up of the prior debt plus the outstanding interest thereon. 4. The two renewed promissory notes were put in suit and a decree was passed in suit no. 33 of 1932. The principal amount covered by the two promissory notes in suit plus interest was decreed in the said suit. Then an application was made under the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (Act No. XXVII of 1934) by Lokendra Singh judgment debtor, for reduction of the decretal amount. The civil Judge allowed the application and reduced the interest payable by Lokendra Singh. Then a revision was filed, being no. 209 of 1936, in this Court and it was partially successful. The interest, according to the orders of this Court, was calculated on Rs. 3,600/- being the principal amount of the two renewed promissory notes of 1930. It was this decreed debt which was shown in the Encumbered Estates proceedings and it is in respect of the reopening of this debt in the Encumbered Estates proceedings that this First appeal has been filed. 5. The learned Special Judge, in dealing with this decreed debt has, for the purpose of calculating the interest due thereunder, taken the original principal amounts under the first two promissory notes dated the 14th of December, 1925 and the 13th of August, 1926 as the principal amounts and has allowed interest on a sum of Rs. 5. The learned Special Judge, in dealing with this decreed debt has, for the purpose of calculating the interest due thereunder, taken the original principal amounts under the first two promissory notes dated the 14th of December, 1925 and the 13th of August, 1926 as the principal amounts and has allowed interest on a sum of Rs. 2,500/- only instead of on Rs. 3,600/-, being the principal amount of the two renewed promissory notes of 1930. In so far as that part of the thus determined interest on this sum of Rs. 2,500/- was concerned which exceeded the principal sum of Rs. 2,500/- itself, the learned Special Judge applied the rule of Damdupat as authorised under the Encumbered Estates Act and reduced the interest to the figure of Rs. 2,500/-. 6. Dissatisfied with the order of the learned Special Judge, the creditor Pandit Behari Lal has preferred this appeal. The appeal, in the first instance, came up before a learned single Judge of this Court, who has referred it to a Division Bench, and the contention advanced was that interest should have been calculated not on the basis of the original sums advanced under the promissory notes executed in 1925 and 1926 but on the basis of the decree obtained on the basis of the two renewed promissory notes of 1930 each for Rs. 1,800/- i.e. that the interest should have been calculated on the total amount of the principal decreed i.e. Rs. 3,600/-. 7. The question for our determination, therefore, is whether because of the provisions of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act which we shall quote hereinafter, the principal amount of the decree no. 33 of 1932 into which the two promissory notes of 1930 then stood merged is to be treated as the principal sum for calculating interest under the above named Act, or whether the principal sum should be the sum originally loaned and evidenced by the promissory notes of 1925 and 1926 i.e. a total sum of Rs. 2,500/-. 8. It is now necessary to reproduce Secs. 2,500/-. 8. It is now necessary to reproduce Secs. 14 and 15 of the Encumbered Estates Act as they then stood in 1944:- Sec. "14 (1) - The Special Judge shall, by an order in writing fix a date for inquiring into (the claims) made in pursuance of the notice published in accordance with (Sec. 9) and give notice of such date (to all the claimants) and the person who made the application under Sec. 4. (2) The Special Judge shall examine each claim and after hearing such parties as desired to be heard and considering the evidence, if any produced by them shall determine the amount, if any, due from the landlord to the claimant on the date of the application under Sec. 4. (3) All evidence recorded in any suit or proceeding which is stayed under sub-Sec. (1) of (Sec. 7) may be taken by the Special Judge as evidence recorded before himself. (4) In examining each claim the Special Judge shall have and exercise all the powers of the court in which a suit for the recovery of the money due would lie and shall decide the question in issue on the same principles as those on which such court would decide them, subject to the following provisions, namely- (a) the amount of interest held to be due on the date of the application shall not exceed that portion of the principal which may still be found to be due on the date of the application: (b) the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, will be applicable to proceedings under this Act: (c) the provisions of the United Provinces Agriculturist's Relief Act, 1934, shall not be applicable to proceedings under this Act. (5) For the purpose of ascertaining the principal under Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (4) the Special Judge, shall treat as principal any accumulated interest which has been converted into principal at any statement or settlement of account or by any contract made in the course of the transaction (on or before December 31, 1916). Explanation - Interest which on or before December 31, 1916 became part of the principal under the express terms of original contract shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be principal. (6) For the purpose of ascertaining the principal under Cl. Explanation - Interest which on or before December 31, 1916 became part of the principal under the express terms of original contract shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be principal. (6) For the purpose of ascertaining the principal under Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (4) the Special Judge shall not treat as principal any accummulated interest which has been converted into principal at any statement or settlement of accounts or by any contract made in the course of the transactions after December 31, 1916. (7) If the Special Judge finds that any amount is due to the claimant he shall pass a simple money decree for such amount, together with any costs which he may allow in respect of proceedings in his court and of proceedings in any Civil court stayed under the provisions of this Act, together with pendente lite and future interest at a rate not greater than the rate specified in Sec. 27, and if he finds that no amount is due he may pass a decree for costs in favour of the landlord. Such decree shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction but no decree against the landlord shall be executable within the United Provinces except under the provisions of this Act:- (Provided that no pendente lite interest shall be allowed in the case of any debt where the creditor was in possession of any portion of the debtor's property in lieu of interest payable on such debt)." Sec. 15. "In determining the amount due on the basis of a loan which has been the subject of a decree the Special Judge shall accept the findings of the Court which passed the decree except in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Sec. 14 : Provided that the Special Judge shall not determine any claim under a decree, until any appeal or revision filed against such decree has been finally decided or the period allowed for appeal has expired, and in all such cases the finding of the Special Judge shall be based on the final decree." 9. Before we proceed to examine those two sections for the purpose of determining the question raised, it is necessary to point out that under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act when a landlord applicant applies to be made subject to the Act, the debts both decreed and un-decreed have to be shown in the Schedule of debts payable by him and these debts have to be examined by the special Judge. 10. Now Sec. 14 of the Act lays down how each claim is to be examined. 11. The word 'claim' is used because the debt which is to be examined is due to a creditor and the amount is claimable by him. 12. If the debt is an un-decreed debt, then it falls for examination entirely under Sec. 14. The claim (for debt) is examined under the provisions of that section and in accordance therewith a simple money decree is passed for such amount as is found due and payable. Such a decree is to be deemed to be a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction. In respect of the landlord applicant's decreed debt a fresh decree has also to be passed under the provisions of Sec. 14, sub-Sec. (7) , but in determining the amount due on the basis of a loan, which has been the subject of a decree, the Special Judge is, however required by Sec. 15 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act to accept the findings of the court which passed the decree except in so far as they are inconsistent with the pro-visions of Sec. 14. 13. The contention raised by learned counsel before us was that as there is a decree passed in this case, the principal amount adjudged to the decree holder under the decree has been settled by an act of court, and, therefore, does not amount to any settlement of accounts made by the parties within the meaning of Sec. 14 (5) and (6) of the Act. The contention, therefore, was that where there is a decreed amount, the provisions of Sec. 14 (4) (a) cannot be attracted and, therefore, there is no question of reopening the decree under Sec. 15 because it cannot be said to be inconsistent with Sec. 14 of the Act. 14. We have examined the contention. The contention, therefore, was that where there is a decreed amount, the provisions of Sec. 14 (4) (a) cannot be attracted and, therefore, there is no question of reopening the decree under Sec. 15 because it cannot be said to be inconsistent with Sec. 14 of the Act. 14. We have examined the contention. The true approach to the problem, to our mind, is that the Court is required under Sec. 15 to see what decree it would have passed under Sec. 14 if the debt were not a decreed debt and if it finds that the decree it would have passed is inconsistent with the existing decree, then the existing decree must be ripped open and the amount redetermined in the light of the requirement of Sec. 14 of the Act. 15. Once this is done, the position in this case will be that the renewal of the two promissory notes will be considered to involve a settlement of accounts between the parties. 16. Under Sec. 14, sub-Sec. (6) for the purpose of ascertaining the principal under Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (4) the Special Judge is required not to treat as principal any accumulated interest which has been converted into principal at any statement or settlement of accounts or by any contract made its the carse of the transactions after December 31, 1916. It may be pointed out that under Sec. 14, sub-Sec. (4) (a), the amount of interest held to be due on the date of the application made by the land lord debtor has not to exceed that portion of the principal which may still be found to be due on the date of the application. In other words, the rule of Damdupat is made applicable. In other words, the rule of Damdupat is made applicable. The debt in question here is one which came into existence after 1916 and as the decree was passed in 1932 on the basis of the renewed promissory notes of 1930, the consideration of which promissory notes was made up of accumulated interests plus the principal amounts of the earlier promissory notes the decree is clearly liable in our view to be ripped open, and for the purpose of ascertaining what is the maximum interest which would be payable in respect of the renewed promissory notes, one would have to ignore the settlement of accounts made in 1930 and to consider the original advances of 1925 and 1926 as the principal amount of loan i.e. in such a case, the loan would be Rs. 2,500/- and not Rs. 3,600/-. We have carefully examined the argument of learned counsel to the contrary and we are of the view that the decree of 1932 can be examined because of Sec. 15 of the Encumbered Estates Act in order to ascertain whether that decree is or is not inconsistent with the provisions of Sec. 14 of the said Act and that the new decree, which must be passed in substitution of the decree of 1932, must conform to the requirements of Sec. 14. It is incorrect to say that Sec. 15 does not involve the ripping open of the decree in this case because the decree passed was given on the basis that Rs. 3,600/- was the principal amount so that this finding has to be accepted, and that the settlement of accounts which fixed Rs. 3,600/- as the principal amount has merged in the decree and so cannot be questioned. The case reported as Agha Syed Ayub Ali Shah v. Kali Charan, 1941 A.L.J. 607=AIR 1941 Allahabad 400 has been cited in support, but the case must be taken to have been disapproved in Chaudhari Rukun Uddin v. Lachmi Narain, 1945 A.L.J. 444=AIR 1945 Allahabad 113 at p. 115 We will refer to this last mentioned case again later. The case reported as Agha Syed Ayub Ali Shah v. Kali Charan, 1941 A.L.J. 607=AIR 1941 Allahabad 400 has been cited in support, but the case must be taken to have been disapproved in Chaudhari Rukun Uddin v. Lachmi Narain, 1945 A.L.J. 444=AIR 1945 Allahabad 113 at p. 115 We will refer to this last mentioned case again later. The Special Judge is enjoined by Sec. 15 to determine the amount due on the basis of a loan which has been the subject of a decree in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 14 and any inconsistencies existing between the provisions of Sec. 14 and the decree, as it stands, have got to be removed. No doubt, the Special Judge has to accept the findings of the court which passed the decree but these findings have to be accepted only to the extent that they are not in,consistent with the provisions of Sec. 14. The provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act clearly show that a decree, which has already been passed, is not considered to be sacrosanct. It is liable to be examined under Sec. 15 and there are other provisions, for example those contained in Sec. 9, which deal with the cases of joint Hindu family debts where the liability under a decree has also to be re-determined so far as the applicant landlord is concerned. Decrees which are to be examined under Sec. 15 have no force of their own and fresh decrees are passed by the Special Judge and it is these fresh decrees granted under Sec. 14, sub-Sec. (7) which are sent to Collectors for execution in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There is no provision in Sec. 15 of the Act or in any other section for sending the original decrees to the Collectors. The mere fact that there is a decreed debt does not involve that the decreed debt cannot be examined in order to show that it is consistent or inconsistent with Sec. 14. 17. We may now refer to certain cases on the point that decreed debts are liable to be reopened so as to, be made consistent with the provisions of Sec. 14. 18. In Firm Sahimal Manohar Das v. Mst. 17. We may now refer to certain cases on the point that decreed debts are liable to be reopened so as to, be made consistent with the provisions of Sec. 14. 18. In Firm Sahimal Manohar Das v. Mst. Ihtifatunnisa Begam, 1941 A.L.J. 366=AIR 1941 Allahabad 293 it was pointed out that the decreed rate of interest could be cut down by the Special Judge under Sec. 15 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act and it was pointed out that the decree which was being subjected to Sec. 15 ceased to exist as such and that the claim had to be adjudicated not on the basis of the decree but on the basis of the loan advanced. 19. In Mt. Pancham Koer v. Ranbir Prasad, 1948 A.L.J. 306=AIR 1948 Allahabad 336 there was a decree against the landlord applicant which had been amended under Sec. 30 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. It was held that the Special Judge while passing a decree under Sec. 14 on its basis was not entitled to take into consideration the amendment made into the decree. 20. In Chaudhari Rukun Uddin v. Lachmi Narain, 1945 A.L.J. 444=AIR 1945 Allahabad 113 at p. 115 the Full Bench pointed out that it was the duty of the Special Judge where he finds a decree, to accept it, as far as he can consistently with Sec. 14, but to any extent that he cannot do so, he must himself apply the provisions of Sec. 14 in variation of it. That was a case in which there had been a declaration under Sec. 33 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. After assuming that such a declaration was a decree, the Full Bench held that the Special Judge, must, under Sec. 15, accept the findings of the Court which passed the decree except in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Sec. 14. 21. To hold that a decreed debt could not be ripped open and brought in conformity with the requirements of Sec. 14, which is the section which gives part of the relief which the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act aims at giving to the landlord debtors, would in our view have the effect partially of nullifying the intention of the framers of the Act and the object which this Act is intended to subserve and to overlook the express language of Secs. 14 and 15. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the Special Judge was entitled to bring the decree into conformity with section 14 of the Act. So far as Sec. 14 is concerned, it is apparent from a reading of the section that accumulated interest, which has been made a part of the principal at a settlement of accounts, has to be ignored for the purpose of finding out the principal with a view to ascertaining the maximum amount of interest that can be allowable. In other words, for the purpose of the application of the rule of Damdupat, Sec. 14 enjoins that with the exception of settlement of accounts made before December 31, 1916, one must ignore the addition of accumulated interest to the original principal and ascertain the original principal. 22. It must however be pointed out clearly by us that the ascertainment of the original principal is only for one purpose and that of calculating the interest only. In Krishan Murari Pandey v. Drugbijai Singh, A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 275 it was pointed out that the provisions of sub-Secs. (5) and (6) of S. 14 of the Encumbered Estates Act operate solely to limit the amount of interest which may be allowed under sub-Sec. (4), that the construction to be placed on the word 'principal' for other purposes in examining and determining the claims under Sec. 14 being unaffected thereby. It was further pointed out that there is nothing to prevent the parties from treating accumulated interest as principal for other purposes and that Sec. 14 (6) does not abrogate a contract between the parties by which interest accumulating after 31st December, 1916 is converted, into principal, for all purposes. It abrogates the contract only for the purpose of ascertaining the principal under Sec. 14 (4) (a) that is for finding out the maximum interest which a creditor can get from the date of the last settlement of the date of the suit. 23. It will thus be clear that the scope of Sec. 14 of the Encumbered Estates Act is not of so wide a character that it involves the ignoring of the accumulated interest which has been added to the principal loan at a settlement of accounts for purposes other than the calculation of interest as aforesaid. 24. 23. It will thus be clear that the scope of Sec. 14 of the Encumbered Estates Act is not of so wide a character that it involves the ignoring of the accumulated interest which has been added to the principal loan at a settlement of accounts for purposes other than the calculation of interest as aforesaid. 24. It was contended before us that if the interpretation given in Krishna Murari Pandey's cases was accepted this would amount to cutting down the relief which the landlord applicant debtors were intended to receive under the Encumbered Estates Act. It was contended that in a case where there had been a settlement just prior to the filing of the application, then the relief which the landlord applicant would get would be a very small relief for it would be a relief in respect of interest accruing between the period of settlement and the filing of the application. That is so; but the section read as a whole makes it perfectly clear that the section does not aim at reducing the principal amount which has been arrived at a settlement of accounts but that the object is merely to find out the maximum amount of interest which can be granted to the applicant as between the date of the settlement of accounts and the date of the filing of the application (suit). 25. It will appear, therefore, from what we have said hereinbefore that the decree of 1932 was liable to be examined for the purpose of finding out what was the maximum interest that could be awarded on the two renewed promissory notes of 1930, the amounts whereof would be considered to be the principal amount because there was a settlement of accounts in 1930. Interest would, therefore, have to be calculated in this case on the sum of Rs. 3,600/- which comes to more than Rs. 2,500/-, the original principal, but the interest to be allowed cannot exceed the sum of Rs. 2,500/- which, as already stated, is the original principal owing to the rule of Damdupat under Sec. 14 (4) (a) of the Act. The decree of the court below will, therefore, have to be varied in the light of the above conclusions arrived at by us. 26. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, vary the decree of the court below and direct that for the sum of Rs. The decree of the court below will, therefore, have to be varied in the light of the above conclusions arrived at by us. 26. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, vary the decree of the court below and direct that for the sum of Rs. 5,688|6|3 standing in the decree, a sum of Rs. 6,4201|3|6 shall be substituted in accordance with the claim in the appeal. The rest of the decree of the court below shall stand. Costs of this Court will be paid to the appellant by tie respondents.