Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is a decree-holder who has been baulked of the delivery ordered in her favour by reason of the success of a so-called obstruction petition filed by the respondent, a stranger to the decree. 2. The petitioner's application for delivery in execution was made as long ago as 12-1-1124 (28-3-1948). It suffered many vicissitudes through which it is fortunately not necessary to pursue it for the present purpose. Suffice it to say that on 23-11-1953, the executing court made an order directing delivery on 4-1-1954, and notice that the property would be delivered on that date was issued to the respondent Devaswom Board (which had, at an earlier stage, made an unsuccessful attempt to intervene on the strength of a purchase from a prior obstructor) in compliance with R.289 of the rules in the Travancore Civil Courts Guide, the rules of practice then in force. On receiving notice the respondent Board came forward with the present "obstruction petition" on 21-12-1953. The petition was numbered as C.M.P. 19270 on the file of the Additional Munsiff, Trivandrum (the executing court) and on 11-11-1957, that court passed an order upholding the so-called obstruction of the respondent on the ground that the respondent was in possession of the property on his own account and disallowing delivery to the decree-holder. It is this order that is assailed in revision. 3. Now, from the facts stated, it is apparent that the respondent's so-called obstruction petition was really no obstruction but was an anticipatory objection to delivery by a person who was a stranger to the decree. It is settled law that such a petition does not lie and that before delivery has been actually effected a stranger to a decree can approach the court for an adjudication regarding his right to possession only when, as a result of resistance or obstruction offered by him, the decree-holder applies under 0.21-rule 97, C. P. C. for the removal of the obstruction. When delivery has been actually effected he can come forward under 0.21 R.100 complaining of the dispossession and seeking restoration. Until delivery is actually effected his safeguard lies in resistance or obstruction( and he cannot come to court objecting to the delivery before it is even attempted. When delivery has been actually effected he can come forward under 0.21 R.100 complaining of the dispossession and seeking restoration. Until delivery is actually effected his safeguard lies in resistance or obstruction( and he cannot come to court objecting to the delivery before it is even attempted. This is the view taken by all the High Courts in India, and the practice formerly obtaining in the Travancore jurisdiction of entertaining what were termed "ante delivery petitions" was discountenanced by a Division Bench of the T-C. High Court in George v. Varkey (1952-K. L. T. 660) which decision was reaffirmed by a Full Bench of the same court in Padmanabhan v. Narayanan (1955-K. L. T. 413). 4. It follows that the respondent's "obstruction petition" does not lie in law and that the order passed thereon by the learned munsiff was without jurisdiction and must therefore be set aside. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent Board that the notice issued to it under R.289 of the Civil Courts Guide was an invitation to it to appear before the court to state its objections can hardly bear examination. The mere fact that notice was issued to a party cannot invest him with a right which he does not otherwise possess, and the object of R.289 is obviously to ensure that the person in possession of the property receive due notice of his proposed dispossession and that the delivery does not take him by surprise or happen without his knowledge. 5. It is said that the objection to the maintainability of the obstruction petition was not taken in the court below and that court has decided the question on the merits. It is true that the lower court has not in its order considered any such objection but the objection being one of jurisdiction does not depend for its validity on its being taken in the court of first instance. In fact even the consent or acquiescence of the parties cannot invest a court with power to entertain a petition that does not lie in law. However that might be, in fact I find from the records that the one objection taken by the present petitioner in the lower court (as also here) is that the respondent's obstruction petition is an ante delivery petition and does not therefore lie. However that might be, in fact I find from the records that the one objection taken by the present petitioner in the lower court (as also here) is that the respondent's obstruction petition is an ante delivery petition and does not therefore lie. I might mention that a similar petition filed by the respondent Board on 17-6-1950 in respect of a prior order for delivery on 19-6-1950 was dismissed by the executing court on 12-10-1953 on this very ground namely, that the petition being an ante delivery petition was not maintainable. 6. I allow the petition and dismiss the obstruction petition of the respondent with costs both here and in the court below. Allowed.