Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to revise an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge at Parur under S.436 Crl. P. C., setting aside an order passed by the First Class Magistrate at Alwaye, discharging the six accused, who are the revision-petitioners, under S.253 (1) Crl. P. C., in respect of an offence under S.499 I. P. C., said to have been committed by them. The facts so far as they are necessary for the present purpose, may be briefly stated. A petition Ext. P4 was preferred by one Cheerakattil Vaidyan to the Manjapra Panchayat, of which the first accused was the President and the other accused were the members, imputing criminal acts, as having been perpetrated by the complainant's brother, his wife and children. Upon this, the Panchayat passed resolution Ext. P2 on the 8th January, 1955, condemning the complainant's brother and the members of his family describing them as "Pullathans". A copy of this resolution was communicated by the first accused acting as the President of Panchayat, with covering letters, Exts. P5 and P6, to the various authorities concerned with law and order in the State, including the Chief Minister and the District Magistrate at Trichur. Specific reference was made to the complainant also in Exts. P5 and P6, although there was no such reference in Ext. P2. On the 16th January, 1955, a meeting was said to have been arranged under the auspices of the Panchayat, at which accused 2 and 5 were two of the speakers. The complainant's case was, that Ext. P2 and the speeches made by accused 2 and 5 were defamatory, and he therefore instituted the complaint, which has led to these proceedings. 2. The trial Magistrate recorded the evidence for the complainant, and generally examined the accused, and discharged them on the findings, that Ext. P2 contained nothing defamatory concerning the complainant, that the contents of the speeches delivered had not been proved, and that in any event, the alleged defamatory statements were covered by exceptions 8 and 9 to S.499 I. P. C. In revision, the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not record specific findings, in view of the further enquiry which he was directing the Magistrate to make; at the same time, he indicated his view, that the findings as recorded were open to attack. He also thought, that the action of the Magistrate in not proceeding to frame a charge against the accused was not justifiable. 3. The scope of interference in revision with an order of discharge under S.436 Crl. P. C. is very limited. I shall advert only to a few of the cases to which my attention was invited by the learned counsel for the revision-petitioners. It was held by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Cheriath Devasia v. Skaria Chacko I.L.R. 1950 T.C. 643 that a revisional Court may interfere with an order of discharge, if it is patently foolish or perverse or perfunctory. As held in Sheo Prasad Ramdas v. Emperor A. I. R.1938 Nagpur 394 a revision is competent when the order of discharge is manifestly unreasonable or foolish or prima facie incorrect or perverse. If the Magistrate has not applied his mind to the case, the revisional court can interfere, Durga Das Radhakrishnan v. Emperor, A. I. R.1934 Bombay 48. These are the main principles on which a revisional court may exercise its jurisdiction. It has to be examined, how far the learned judge had kept these principles in view in directing a further enquiry. 4. The learned judge seemed to think, that the trial Magistrate committed a mistake in coming to the conclusion that Ex. P-2 contained nothing defamatory of the complainant, and that, he was really defamed without his name being mentioned. The finding of the trial Magistrate on the effect of Ext. P-2 cannot be said to be perverse or prima facie incorrect; but Exts. P-5 and P-6 had adopted the resolution as applicable to the complainant. The trial Magistrate did not hold, that Ext. P-2 was not per se defamatory. But accused 2 to 6 were not directly connected with Exts. P-5 and P-6. It was pointed out, that the resolution was communicated pursuant to a direction in Ext. P-2. Obviously, Exts. P-5 and P-6 went beyond the scope of Ext. P-2 in referring to the complainant specifically. The prosecution has not proved the connection of accused 2 to 6, with Exts. P-5 and P-6. 5. The trial Magistrate had reached the conclusion, on grounds which could not be assailed in revision before the learned judge, that the contents of the speeches made by accused 2 and 5 were not proved. This is a finding of fact. The prosecution has not proved the connection of accused 2 to 6, with Exts. P-5 and P-6. 5. The trial Magistrate had reached the conclusion, on grounds which could not be assailed in revision before the learned judge, that the contents of the speeches made by accused 2 and 5 were not proved. This is a finding of fact. The learned judge's reliance on a newspaper report was not warranted. Ext. P 29, the shorthand summary of the proceedings of the meeting, did not advance the case of the complainant in this respect. The learned judge was therefore in error in interfering with the order of the Magistrate on this ground. 6. The trial Magistrate had not considered the relevant or material points in determining whether Ext. P - 2 read with Exts. P-5 and P - 6 was protected by Exceptions 8 and 9 to S.499 I. P. C. It was necessary for him to consider, how far the conditions prescribed by these Exceptions had been fulfilled in the present case. Counsel for the complainant argued, that these Exceptions have no application whatever to the case. The trial Magistrate after narrating a few facts in Para.7, recorded his conclusion in the following terms:- "In the face of these facts I am of the view that A.1 comes under Exceptions 8 and 9 to S.499 I. P. C." I do not propose to make any definite pronouncement at this stage which might prejudice the trial court in coming to a conclusion, beyond observing that the material points bearing on the applicability of these Exceptions to the case against the first accused have not been adverted to, or considered. It therefore follows, that the first accused having been a party to Exts. P-5 and P-6, has to establish how he is protected by any of the Exceptions to S.499 I. P. C. As indicated, and as held by the trial Magistrate, accused 2 to 6 have not been proved to be connected with Exts. P-5 and P-6 in so far as they refer to the complainant specifically. 7. It was urged on behalf of the accused, that there being no further evidence for them to offer, a direction for further enquiry is not justified. This is contrary to what was held in Cheriath Devasia v. Skaria Chacko, already cited, and in Diwan Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 560. 7. It was urged on behalf of the accused, that there being no further evidence for them to offer, a direction for further enquiry is not justified. This is contrary to what was held in Cheriath Devasia v. Skaria Chacko, already cited, and in Diwan Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 560. There are indications in the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that his view was that a charge ought to have been framed against the accused. If this amounts to a direction to the Magistrate to frame a charge, it cannot be supported, as held not only in Cheriath Devasia's case, but also in Patnam Sidda Reddi v. Ambati Venkata Cirianna, A. I. R.1941 Madras 65. It is for the learned Magistrate to decide whether a charge should be framed or not. 8. The result is, that the order of discharge passed against the first accused alone is set aside, but will stand, so far as the other accused are concerned. The case will go back to the trial court for disposal in accordance with law. Allowed.