JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J. Appellant Smt. Nanhibai alias Tulsibai instituted Civil Suit No. 3-A of 1956 in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad, for possession of lands to the extent of one-half share and mesne profits for the years 1947-48 to 1949-50. The suit was dismissed. She has therefore filed this first appeal. The following genealogical tree shows the relationship between the parties: The Plaintiff (Appellant) is thus the daughter of Naraindas and the Defendants (Respondents) are the sons of Naraindas's brother Ganpatlal. Mangilal died on 4-7-1893, Ghasiram on 20-11-1897 and Naraindas on 10-12-1920. The Plaintiff's case was that Mangilal and Ghasiram both had purchased village Nasirabad for a consideration of Rs.5,000 on 26-2-1887 and they both had an equal share in it. The village was thus shown in their names in equal shares of 0-8-0 each in the settlement khewat of 1891-92 (see Exh. P-1). After the death of Mangilal in 1893, his share was mutated in the names of Naraindas and Ganpatlal, while Ghasiram continued to own his 0-8-0 share. When Ghasiram died in 1897, his share was recorded in the names of Naraindas and Ganpatlal in equal shares. Thus Naraindas and Ganpatlal each owned half and half share in that village. Between the years 1901-1903 villages Nagwada, Mahendrawadi, Kotgaon and Jamuniya were acquired by the two brothers Naraindas and Ganpatlal. The Plaintiff did not state whether Mangilal and Ghasiram formed a joint family or not. She also did not know whether Mangilal, Naraindas and Ganpatlal were joint or separate (para. 3 of the plaint). However, she alleged that as Mangilal had no ancestral property, the village Nasirabad which was purchased jointly in the names of Mangilal and Ghasiram was their common property in equal shares of 0-8-0 each. Similarly, the other villages which were purchased by Naraindas and Ganpatlal should be considered to be their common property, each owning half a share. It was also alleged that these two brothers effected a partition of their estate some time after the death of Ghasiram and before the death of Naraindas, though the Plaintiff was unable to say when that happened. She claimed that the property left by Naraindas passed to his widow Mst. Chhutiyabai, but Ganpatlal induced her to have the property recorded in the name of his son Badriprasad (Defendant No. 1) alleging that he had been adopted by Naraindas. She claimed that the property left by Naraindas passed to his widow Mst. Chhutiyabai, but Ganpatlal induced her to have the property recorded in the name of his son Badriprasad (Defendant No. 1) alleging that he had been adopted by Naraindas. Ultimately, the whole property was taken over by Ganpatlal after the death of Mst. Chhutiyabai in 1940; and when Ganpatlal died in 1941, his three sons, who are the Defendants in this case, took over the same. The Plaintiff claimed that the share of Naraindas descended on her after Mst. Chhutiyabai and the Defendants had no interest in it. She therefore filed the aforesaid suit for possession. The Defendants' case was that Mangilal was joint with his three sons Ghasiram, Naraindas and Ganpatlal and that they were doing business in the name of "Baldeo Mangilal". The consideration for the purchase of village Nasirabad was advanced by Mangilal from the funds of the shop, and Ghasiram, who was the eldest son, was nominally joined in the sale-deed on the basis of which the village came to be recorded in equal shares of 0-8-0 each in their names. The family continued joint and after Mangilal's death, his property passed by survivorship to the other two brothers. It was further alleged that the villages purchased by Naraindas and Ganpatlal were also joint family properties and after the death of Naraindas, they passed to Ganpatlal to the exclusion of Naraindas's widow. The partition alleged by the Plaintiff was denied by the Defendants. As the family continued joint and the whole property passed by survivorship to Ganpatlal, the Plaintiff's claim to the properties was denied. The trial Court found that Mangilal and Ghasiram formed a joint Hindu family with Naraindas and Ganpatlal. The pillage Nasirabad was purchased with the joint funds of the family and after the death of Mangilal it devolved on his three sons. The family continued joint and on the death of Ghasiram, his share devolved on Naraindas and Ganpatlal. The partition alleged by the Plaintiff was not found proved. The trial Court held that Naraindas and Ganpatlal acquired the other villages also as joint family property. Consequently, on the death of Naraindas the whole family estate passed to Ganpatlal, and Mst. Chhutiyabai had no interest in it. Accordingly, the claim of the Plaintiff for possession of the villages and the lands was dismissed. The trial Court held that Naraindas and Ganpatlal acquired the other villages also as joint family property. Consequently, on the death of Naraindas the whole family estate passed to Ganpatlal, and Mst. Chhutiyabai had no interest in it. Accordingly, the claim of the Plaintiff for possession of the villages and the lands was dismissed. Proceeding in chronological order, the first question is whether the village Nasirabad purchased under Exh. 2-D 4, dated 26-2-1887, for a consideration of Rs. 5,000 was acquired by Mangilal and Ghasiram as tenants-in-common, each owning one-half share in the same, or whether it was acquired as a joint family property. Shri R.S. Dabir for the Respondents conceded in arguments that Mangilal did not possess any ancestral nucleus to enable him to purchase the village and therefore the property was not ancestral in the hands of Mangilal in that sense. His contention, however, was that as Mangilal was doing business jointly with his sons and as the assets of the business were invested in the purchase of the village, it became their joint family property and the incidence of survivorship attached to it. This contention has been accepted by the trial Court. The sale-deed (Exh. 2-D-4) stands in the name of "Mangilal Ghasiram". It appears from the sale-deed that at that time there were two shops, one called "Baldeo Mangilal" and the other "Mangilal Ghasiram". The sale-deed is in favour of the shop "Mangilal Ghasiram" and it is explicitly recited therein that the consideration of Rs.5,000 was advanced from the funds of that shop. The answer to the question whether the village was the joint property of Mangilal and Ghasiram, or, whether it was held by them as tenants-in-common depends upon the question whether the shop "Mangilal Ghasiram" was the joint family shop or was a separate concern of Ghasiram alone. It appears from the mortgage-deed (Exh. 2-D-5) dated 1-8-1882, which is in favour of the shop "Baldeoji Mangilal" that it was executed at the shop of Seth "Mangilal Ghasiram". Therefore, the shop "Mangilal Ghasiram" must have come into existence some time before 1882. It was admitted in arguments before us that at the time of the sale-deed (Exh. 2-D-4) Ghasiram was about 18 years old. In 1882 he might have been about 13 years old. The shop must, therefore, have been started when he was still younger. Therefore, the shop "Mangilal Ghasiram" must have come into existence some time before 1882. It was admitted in arguments before us that at the time of the sale-deed (Exh. 2-D-4) Ghasiram was about 18 years old. In 1882 he might have been about 13 years old. The shop must, therefore, have been started when he was still younger. It is true that in trading families children of the age of 16 or 18 are associated with the business of the family; but it is highly improbable that a child under 13 years of age would contribute anything useful to the family shop, much less would he be able to run a shop of his own. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that Ghasiram was carrying on a separate business of his own. It appears to us that Mangilal started two shops at two different places and styled them differently, one in the name of his father and himself; and the other in the name of himself and his son. An important piece of evidence pointing to this conclusion is Exh. 2-D-383, which is a power of attorney executed by Mangilal appointing an agent on behalf of the shop of "Mangilal Ghasiram". This is dated 12th July 1886. This clearly shows that the shop of "Mangilal Ghasiram" was a joint family concern, and it did not belong exclusively to Ghasiram. If Ghasiram was the exclusive owner of the shop, there is no reason why Mangilal should execute a power of attorney on behalf of his shop. There is no substance in the contention that the deed was executed by Mangilal because Ghasiram was a minor at that time. There is no recital to that effect in the document. The mukhtyarnama could have a binding effect only on the assumption that Mangilal was the owner of the shop and therefore it must be held that this shop was also started by him. As we have said, the family of Mangilal does not seem to have possessed any ancestral assets when he started business. Possession of joint family property is not, however, a necessary requisite for the constitution of a joint Hindu family. Hindus get a joint family status by birth and the joint family property is only an adjunct of the joint family. The presumption therefore is that Mangilal and his sons formed a joint Hindu family. Possession of joint family property is not, however, a necessary requisite for the constitution of a joint Hindu family. Hindus get a joint family status by birth and the joint family property is only an adjunct of the joint family. The presumption therefore is that Mangilal and his sons formed a joint Hindu family. As observed in Inder Kuer v. Pirthipal Kuer AIR 1945 PC 128: The state of every Hindu family is presumed to be joint, joint in food, worship and estate; but the strength of the presumption necessarily varies in each case. It has been laid down that the presumption of union is stronger in the case of brothers than in the case of cousins,....Similarly, in Nageshar Baksh v. Ganesha AIR 1920 PC 46 it has been observed that the presumption of jointness is peculiarly strong in the case of the sons of one father. Accordingly, in the instant case, unless otherwise is proved, Mangilal must be held to have formed a joint Hindu family with his three sons. In these circumstances, association by him of his father's name in the one shop and his son's name in the other indicates that he treated the shops as joint family concerns. The assets of the shops, therefore, constituted joint family property in his hands. It has been found by the trial Court on evidence which has been elaborately discussed that the family possessed sufficient assets in the shops of "Baldeo Mangilal" and "Mangilal Ghasiram" to enable them to purchase the village Nasirabad. Shri M.R. Bobde for the Appellant contended that the value of the mortgages in favour of the shops which have been found proved did not exceed Rs.1,500 or Rs.2,000 and therefore the joint family nucleus was not sufficient for the purchase of the village. It is not necessary that the Defendants should prove that the consideration for the purchase came from the joint family assets. It is enough to show that there was joint family property from which the consideration could be paid. This has been amply proved. In fact, it has been actually proved that the consideration came directly from the assets of the shop "Mangilal Ghasiram" which, as already stated, was a joint family firm. It is enough to show that there was joint family property from which the consideration could be paid. This has been amply proved. In fact, it has been actually proved that the consideration came directly from the assets of the shop "Mangilal Ghasiram" which, as already stated, was a joint family firm. Shri M.R. Bobde then relied upon the fact that the property was recorded in 0-8-0 shares separately in the mutation registers in the names of Mangilal and Ghasiram to prove that they must have been separate in estate and that even if they were joint, they had purchased the property with the intention of keeping it in tenancy-in-common. On the question of the entries in the mutation registers, Shri M.R. Bobde relied upon Anurago Kuer v. Darshan Raut AIR 1938 PC 65. In that case, their Lordships observed that: The definition of shares may be proved inter alia by an entry in the record-of-rights showing the share of each member of the family. Such an entry will be evidence of the severance of the joint status. These observations only imply that the entry in the mutation register is only a piece of evidence on the question of joint or separate status of the family. Earlier in Nageshar Baksh v. Ganesha AIR 1920 P.C. 46 their Lordships laid down the following principles regarding the appreciation of mutation entries: The broad question of partition of rights or separation of interests is not of course dealt with in such entries, and the inference of such a transaction from each records may be weak or may be strong according to circumstances. Records of that character take their place as part of the evidence in the case. They do no more. Their importance may vary with circumstances, and it is not any part of the Law of India that they are by themselves conclusive evidence of the facts which they purport to record. It may turn out that they are in accord with the general bulk of evidence in the case; they may supply gaps in it; and they may, in short, form a not important part of the testimony as to fact which is available. We do not think that the law as laid down in that case was intended to be modified in any way by the subsequent decision. We do not think that the law as laid down in that case was intended to be modified in any way by the subsequent decision. It would thus appear that nothing conclusive follows from the entries in the mutation papers. The record is only a piece of evidence which has to be considered along with the other evidence adduced in the case to find out whether there has been a disruption of the joint Hindu family in a particular case. It is pertinent to observe, in the instant case, that the Plaintiff made no specific pleadings on the question whether Mangilal was separate from his son Ghasiram at that time. That Mangilal was separate from his son Ghasiram seems to us highly improbable in view of the fact that Ghasiram was too young to become separate from his father and to start a shop of his own. In these circumstances, the act of Mangilal in associating his son's name in the sale-deed, if not nominally, can only indicate his intention to treat the property as joint family property. Once it is held that they were joint and the consideration came from a firm, which was a joint family firm, the record of the property in the mutation registers in their names separately can only be accounted for by the fact that Mangilal had joined his son's name in the sale-deed and does not displace the presumption that the property was joint family property belonging to Mangilal and his three sons. The next question is whether the villages Nagwada, Mahendrawadi, Kotgaon and Jamuniya which were acquired between the years 1901-1903 were joint family properties of the two brothers Naraindas and Ganpatlal. Before we take up this question, it is necessary to notice one or two relevant facts. Mangilal died in 1893 and at that time the family was possessed of the village Nasirabad alone. The Plaintiff stated in the plaint that Mangilal's share was recorded in the names of Naraindas and Ganpatlal alone; but we have the copy of the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Exh. 2-D-400), dated 2-11-1893, in which it has been ordered: Mutation of names therefore in respect of the said share of 0-4-0 be effected in favour of Ghasiram, Naraindas and Ganpat, heirs and sons of the deceased, who are reported to be in possession. 2-D-400), dated 2-11-1893, in which it has been ordered: Mutation of names therefore in respect of the said share of 0-4-0 be effected in favour of Ghasiram, Naraindas and Ganpat, heirs and sons of the deceased, who are reported to be in possession. It is clear from this order that the share of Mangilal was recorded jointly in the names of his three sons. Shri M.R. Bobde, however, referred to paragraph 3 of the written statement filed by Defendant No. 1 in which he stated that the share of Mangilal was recorded in the names of Naraindas and Ganpatlal. It was contended that in view of this admission, the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Exh. 2-D-400) did not prove anything. We, however, find from paragraph 3 of the written statement, that the admission is not unqualified. All that was stated therein was that as Ghasiram's name was already on the record in the revenue papers, the names of the other two brothers were added; but it was clearly asserted in that paragraph that the patti continued to be the joint property of the three brothers. It is significant that the Plaintiff has not filed the copies of the mutation register or any village papers showing that Mangilal's share was recorded in the names of only two of his sons. Even if the 0-8-0 share held by Mangilal was his separate property, it would descend on his three sons jointly, and in that case Ghasiram's share would be 0-10-8 whereas the shares of the other two would be only 0-2-8 each. The order of the Deputy Commissioner (Exh. 2-D-400) supports the case that the family continued joint and the village Nasirabad was held jointly by the members of the family. Then, Ghasiram died in 1897. Exh. 2-D-438 is the report of the Tahsildar dated 30th June 1898 about the mutation of the village Nasirabad on Ghasiram's death. It is stated that his only heirs were Naraindas and Ganpatlal, and it was recommended that their names should be recorded in his place. This record of mutation in their names to the exclusion of Ghasiram's widow is consistent with the family being joint. The business carried on in the name of the firm "Baldeo Mangilal" was continued by the three brothers, and after the death of Ghasiram, by the remaining two. This record of mutation in their names to the exclusion of Ghasiram's widow is consistent with the family being joint. The business carried on in the name of the firm "Baldeo Mangilal" was continued by the three brothers, and after the death of Ghasiram, by the remaining two. There is nothing on record to show as to what happened to the shop known as "Mangilal Ghasiram" and it may be presumed that this shop was merged in the shop "Baldeo Mangilal". In regard to both the shops, we have indicated above that they constituted joint family concerns. However, the character of the shop "Baldeo Mangilal" after the demise of Mangilal was undoubtedly joint family business in the hands of his sons. Shri M.R. Bobde, however, relied upon the following observations in Chattanalha v. Ramchandra AIR 1955 SC 799 : Under the Hindu law, there is no presumption that a business standing in the name of any member is a joint family one even when that member the manager of the family, and it makes no difference in this respect that the manager is the father of the coparceners. We may only observe that this is not the position so far as the shop of "Baldeo Mangilal" is concerned. It was not a new business started by Naraindas and Ganpatlal. It was a business which was carried on from their father's time and was inherited by them. Under these circumstances, the presumption is that the business was joint family business in the hands of his sons. Indeed this position was not disputed before us by Shri J.P. Dwivedi, who argued the case on behalf of the Appellant at the concluding stage. In Shrinivas v. Narayan AIR 1954 SC 379 it has, no doubt, been held that the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that the property held by any member of the family is joint; but it has also been observed that where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition. In the instant case, it has been amply proved that the family was possessed of the village Nasirabad as also of the family business carried on in the name of "Baldeo Mangilal" which was possessed of extensive assets and which could easily supply the consideration for the purchase of the villages. As against this conclusion, Shri M.R. Bobde pointed out that it appeared from the account-books of "Baldeo Mangilal" that the three brothers used to withdraw money from the shop for their personal use and it is stated that they carried on independent business separately. Even if they carried on separate business, it will not be, in any way, inconsistent with the existence of the joint family property. The argument that the villages, which were purchased between the years 1901-1903, may have been purchased from the separate income of the brothers is a mere conjecture. The copies of accounts of the shop of "Baldeo Mangilal" (Exhs. 2-D-316, 2-D-317 and 2-D-318) show that the consideration for the purchase of those villages came from this firm. It is clear from these accounts that the villages were originally mortgaged with the firm several years back and after litigation they were foreclosed in favour of the firm in the years 1901-1002. These entries leave no scope for the argument that the consideration may have been separately contributed by the brothers from their own earnings. Although the sale-deeds of the villages have not been filed, the aforesaid entries in the account-books are decisive of the fact that the villages were joint family properties, when they were acquired. The next question is whether after 1903 and before the death of Naraindas in 1920 there was a partition between the two brothers. On this point, it was for the Plaintiff to show that there was a disruption of the family. It is true that for a disruption of the joint status it is not necessary that there should be a partition by metes and bounds; nor it is necessary to establish that the partition took place on any particular date. All the same, there is no evidence on record to show that there was a partition between Naraindas and Ganpatlal at any time. All the same, there is no evidence on record to show that there was a partition between Naraindas and Ganpatlal at any time. The trial Court has referred to the evidence from the account-books that the expenses for the marriages of several members of the family as also for the funeral were entered in the account of the joint family shop. Numerous transactions, as specified in paragraph 24 of the judgment of the trial Court, were entered into by the brothers jointly, which supports the conclusion that they continued joint. As against these joint transactions, there were four decrees (para. 25 of the judgment) which were obtained in the name of Ganpatlal; but as Ganpatlal was a recorded lambardar of the village and these decrees related to arrears of rent, the existence of these decrees is not inconsistent in any way with the family continuing joint. The fact that the three brothers used to withdraw money from the shop from time to time and there were separate khatas in their names in the shop account does not establish anything. There is nothing in the accounts to show that the amounts withdrawn were returned by them to the shop. Such withdrawals from a joint family concern by the brothers separately is usual in a joint family, as money for private expenses is withdrawn by the members of the family, whenever they need it. There is not much in the fact that Naraindas and Ganpatlal used to reside in separate villages for some time. It has been found by the trial Court that this was for better management of the village property, and no inference about disruption of the family can be inferred from mere separate residence. [See Kesavan v. Narayanan AIR 1953 TC 118 .] Strong reliance was placed on behalf of the Appellant on the fact that after the death of Naraindas, Ganpatlal made an application for mutating the name of his son Badridas (Defendant No. 1) on the ground that Badridas had been adopted by Naraindas and that this position was supported by Mst. Chhutiyabai, widow of Naraindas. It is contended that if Naraindas and Ganpatlal were joint, it was not at all necessary for Ganpatlal to resort to this device as, in any case, the whole property would have passed to him by survivorship. It is difficult to say why Ganpatlal took such a step. Chhutiyabai, widow of Naraindas. It is contended that if Naraindas and Ganpatlal were joint, it was not at all necessary for Ganpatlal to resort to this device as, in any case, the whole property would have passed to him by survivorship. It is difficult to say why Ganpatlal took such a step. It may be that he wanted his son Badridas to have an exclusive claim to the property and to prevent Ghasiram's widow, who was then alive, from claiming anything, or it may be for some other reason. The fact remains that this circumstance alone is not enough to raise an inference that Naraindas was separate from Ganpatlal at the time of his death. It is nobody's case that Naraindas had adopted Badridas and, as pointed out by the trial Court in paragraph 27 of its judgment, such an incident was highly improbable. Any admission by Mst. Chhutiyabai or by Ganpatlal about the adoption of Badridas is, therefore, of no consequence, as such an adoption never took place. It appears that in the year 1919 Mst. Mulibai, widow of Ghasiram, had filed a suit for maintenance. The copy of the plaint dated 24-7-1919 is on record as Exh. 2-D-354. In that suit, Mst. Mulibai had alleged that the three brothers were joint. This was an admission against her interest and supports the conclusion that the family was joint. The suit was ultimately decreed. Shri M.R. Bobde contended that the admission of Mst. Mulibai was not binding on the Plaintiff. That may be so; but the judgment and decree in that suit are admissible under Section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act as an instance in which there was assertion that the family was joint. [See Kesavan v. Narayanan AIR 1953 TC 118 .] The trial Court analysed the evidence carefully and arrived at the conclusion that the alleged partition between Naraindas and Ganpatlal was not proved. It is not necessary for us to repeat all the reasons given by the trial Court for this conclusion. We agree that the Plaintiff has not been able to substantiate her allegation that Naraindas was separate from Ganpatlal when he died. Accordingly, the property left by Naraindas which was joint family property passed by survivorship to Ganpatlal and the Plaintiff has no interest in it. The decision of the trial Court dismissing the suit is; therefore, correct. We agree that the Plaintiff has not been able to substantiate her allegation that Naraindas was separate from Ganpatlal when he died. Accordingly, the property left by Naraindas which was joint family property passed by survivorship to Ganpatlal and the Plaintiff has no interest in it. The decision of the trial Court dismissing the suit is; therefore, correct. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed