JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Kashi Nath Gupta for the issue of 'a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated July 30, 1956, of the Collector of Dehradun, respondent No. 1, directing the realisation of the amount by the arrest of the petitioner under Sec. 148 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and to restrain him by means of a suitable writ from taking proceedings against the petitioner in respect of the loan advanced to Des Raj Bhatia. 2. The petitioner had originally concealed many material facts, but after the respondents filed their counter affidavits, and the petitioner rejoinder-affidavit, there is very little controversy on the facts of the case. The questions involved are thus questions of law, whether the contract by which the petitioner guaranteed the payment of the loan due from Des Raj Bhatia was still enforceable and if the amount could be recovered from him as arrears of land revenue. 3. The facts of the case are as below:- 4. A sum of Rs. 15,000/- was advanced by the Chief Administrator, Rehabilitation Finance Administration, New Delhi, respondent No. 2 to one Sri Des Raj Bhatia under Loan Accounts No. 231 under the provisions of Sec. 13 of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act (XII of 1948) after the present petitioner and one Dr. Babu Ram Mahajan stood sureties after due execution of the letter of guarantee No. 243, dated March 4, 1949, which is Annexure A to the counter-affidavit of Manohar Lal Wadehra. The amount was so borrowed by Des Raj Bhatia for starting an industry and it was repayable in instalments. Desraj Bhatia was not able to repay the loan, according to the petitioner, on account of failure of his business. The Rehabilitation Finance Administration informed the Collector of Delhi who sent a certificate under Sec. 3 (1) of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, to the Collector of Dehradun Respondent no. 1, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 17,744|4|6 with future interest from 1-7-1952 on Rs. 15,000/- at 6% per annum from the two guarantors, namely, the petitioner and Dr. B. R. Mahajan. 5. 1, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 17,744|4|6 with future interest from 1-7-1952 on Rs. 15,000/- at 6% per annum from the two guarantors, namely, the petitioner and Dr. B. R. Mahajan. 5. The petitioner says that no citation was served upon him by the Collector of Dehradun and it was all of a sudden that on 16-7-1952 a warrant of attachment of moveable properties of the petitioner was issued to which he filed an objection on September 24, 1952. The objections were heard on 16-12-1952, but were not decided on account of a reference made to the Col-lector of Delhi. The objection which the petitioner had filed is Annexure B to the counter-affidavit of Nitya Ram, Qurk Amin. It may here be mentioned that Nitya Ram, Qurk Amin, filed the counter-affidavit on behalf of the Collector of Dehradun, respondent no. 1, while Manohar Lal Wadehra on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and 3, namely, the Chief Administrator, Rehabilitation Finance Administration, and the Union of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India. 6. The case of the respondents, on the other hand, is that citation in accordance with the law was served upon the petitioner. In the objection, Annexure B, the petitioner nowhere alleged that no citation was served upon him as required by law, even though he raised many legal objections to the recovery. In the circumstances, the version of the respondents shall have to be accepted as correct, namely, that a citation was duly served upon the petitioner before the issue of the warrant of attachment of removeable properties. 7. The afore-mentioned objection was not disposed of by the Collector, but on 14-3-1956 Sri Nitya Ram, Qurk Amin, went to the residence of the petitioner and showed him a recovery certificate dated 7-7-1952 issued by the Collector of Delhi to the Collector of Dehradun for recovery of the afore-mentioned amount. According to respondent no. 1, a letter of demand, dated July 12, 1952, was also shown to the petitioner when he gave his objection in writing which is Annexure A to the counter-affidavit of the Qurk Amin. The petitioner had not made a reference to these facts in his petition and the affidavit, but in the rejoinder-affidavit he had to admit such facts though he pleaded that no letter of demand was shown to him. The petitioner had not made a reference to these facts in his petition and the affidavit, but in the rejoinder-affidavit he had to admit such facts though he pleaded that no letter of demand was shown to him. An inference adverse to the petitioner can be drawn from his conduct. He had originally concealed facts and later on made a few false assertions. Consequently, lot purposes of the present proceeding, it shall have to be accepted that the letter of demand dated July 12, 1952, was shown to the petitioner which will amount to service of the notice of demand upon him. 8. When the petitioner failed to pay the amount due under the recovery certificate, the Qurk Amin sent a report dated 31-3-1956 to the Tahsildar, Dehradun, whereupon the Collector of Dehradun passed an order for the arrest of the petitioner. This order is dated 26-7-1956 and the Tahsildar of Dehradun issued a warrant dated 30-7-1956 for the arrest of the petitioner. The warrant could not be executed as the petitioner evaded his arrest and later on preferred an appeal No. 23 of 1956 in the Court of the Commissioner, Meerut. The appeal was dismissed under order dated 17-12-1956 where after the petitioner approached this court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 9. The petition and also the affidavit accompanying thereto are silent as to the action which the Rehabilitation Finance Administration had taken against the co-surety, Dr. B. R. Mahajan; but in the petition, legal objections with regard to the alleged adjustment with the co-surety were raised. It was to meet these legal objections that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 gave complete details in the counter-affidavit of Manohar Lal Wadehra. The petitioner has alleged that the creditor, namely, the Rehabilitation Finance Administration, has made an adjustment with the co-surety, but the actual facts which come out from the counter-affidavit and also from papers filed therewith, are that the co-surety has not been discharged, nor was any adjustment made with him. The co-surety was merely allowed to meet his liability by paying Rs. 40/- per month towards the loan. This concession was allowed on the request of Dr. B. R. Mahajan, who represented that if the total amount was immediately recovered from him, he would become bankrupt. The Collector of Pilibhit recommended that a sum of Rs. 40/- per month be recovered from Dr. 40/- per month towards the loan. This concession was allowed on the request of Dr. B. R. Mahajan, who represented that if the total amount was immediately recovered from him, he would become bankrupt. The Collector of Pilibhit recommended that a sum of Rs. 40/- per month be recovered from Dr. B. R. Mahajan and the recommendation was accepted by the Administration. The liability of Dr. B. R. Mahajan for the payment of the loan with interest still subsists. The petitioner never made a request that he may also be permitted to pay the amount of the loan with interest in instalments. In fact, he throughout challenged his liability for payment of the loan. It was for this reason that he could not be given the same concession as was afforded to Dr. B. R. Mahajan. 10. In para 9 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 3, an objection was raised to the maintainability of the present petition as far as respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were concerned. It was said that the petitioner should have sued the Rehabilitation Finance Administration, which was a corporate body under the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, 1948 (Act XII of 1948) and was capable of suing and being sued in its own name, and not the Chief Administrator thereof or the Union of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation. The suggestion made is that respondent no. 3 at least, if not both respondents Nos. 2 and 3, had been wrongly impleaded. 11. The questions of law raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner can, briefly, be summarised as below:- 1. The provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act had been repealed, and consequently no action under this enactment could be taken against the petitioner. 2. The letter of guarantee executed by the petitioner was no longer enforceable. 3. Any amount, if due from the petitioner, could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue. 4. No recovery could be made from the petitioner unless the objection which he had preferred on 24-9-1952 had been decided. 12. Under Sec. 339 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, certain provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, were amended, but it will be found that such amendments were made for restricted purposes only. 4. No recovery could be made from the petitioner unless the objection which he had preferred on 24-9-1952 had been decided. 12. Under Sec. 339 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, certain provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, were amended, but it will be found that such amendments were made for restricted purposes only. The provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act had not been amended or repealed for all purposes. The relevant portion of Sec. 339 runs as below:- "Repeals- With effect from the date of vesting in respect of any area- (c) The United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall in its application to such area be deemed to be and is here-by amended to the extent mentioned in column 3 of List II of the Schedule aforesaid." 13. In List II particulars of various sections of the Land Revenue Act so amended and the extent to which they were amended have been given; but in the present proceeding we are concerned with serial no. 23, whereby Secs. 58 to 188 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act were deleted. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has attached undue importance to list II. If this list alone is considered without reference to Sec. 339, it may be said that the above sections were deleted for all purposes; but it will be wrong to use the list without reference to the provisions of Sec. 339. The words "in its application to such area" used in Cl. (c) of Sec. 339 are of great importance and will make it clear beyond any doubt that the amendments made to the U.P. Land Revenue Act were to apply only to such area which had vested in the State under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In case the repeal or amendments made under Sec. 339 were universally applicable, that is, amendments made were to apply to every one residing or carrying on business within the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the provisions repealed under Sec. 339 had been repealed for all purposes, it would not have been necessary to add the words "in its or their application to such area" in all the three clauses of Sec. 339, and the words "in respect of any area" in the beginning of the section. If this section was applicable to all the areas and to all the persons residing within the State of Uttar Pradesh the section would have been differently worded, and it would have been indicated in plain words that with effect from the date of vesting enactments mentioned in list I of Schedule III were repealed, enactments in so far as they were inconsistent with the provisions of Chapters VIII to X were repealed and the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, was amended to the extent mentioned in Column 3 of List II of the Schedule. The legislature, on the other hand, repeated the words "in its (or their) application to such area" in all the three clauses, and used similar words, that is, "in respect of any area" in the beginning of the section. When the legislature intentionally used certain words, they must be given their proper and ordinary meaning they cannot be disregarded treating them as mere surplusage. Courts have to start with the presumption that in the enactment legislature used words with some particular object, and while interpreting the enactment all the words used should be given their proper meaning unless the Court finds it difficult to deduce the intention of the legislature without disregarding a few words or the use of such words leads to ambiguity or absurdity. 14. The word "area" has not been defined in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but it must have reference to 'estates' which vested in the State Government under Sec. 4 of the above Act. 14. The word "area" has not been defined in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but it must have reference to 'estates' which vested in the State Government under Sec. 4 of the above Act. It cannot be denied that Sec. 339 has not been properly drafted, in that the intention of the legislature has not been clearly expressed therein the use of the words any area" in the beginning of the section can be interpreted to mean that the provision contained in the section applies to all the land situate within the State, but such an interpretation will undoubtedly lead to confusion for the simple reason that if the intention of the legislature was to make the provision applicable to the whole of the State, it would not have been repeatedly laid down in clauses (a) to (c) that the repeal, repugnancy or amendments were operative only "in ita, or their application to such area." The ambiguity can be re-solved only if the area contemplated by Sec. 339 does not extend to the whole of the State, and it has reference to a class or group of land. For classifying such land one shall have naturally to look into the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the area shall be deemed to be estates which had vested in the State under Sec. 4. In other words, the provisions contained in Sec. 339 apply to only such estates as are covered by Sec. 2 of the Act and have vested in the State under Sec. 4; and as far as such land, area or estates are concerned, the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall stand amended or repealed to the extent mentioned in column 3 of List II of the Schedule. 15. The next question for consideration while laying down the scope of Sec. 339 is whether the section has its application with reference to the residence of persons concerned or to properties which they hold or which are sought to be attached or auctioned under the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act or of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. This question does not directly arise in the present proceedings and consequently can be left open for decision in a suitable case. This question does not directly arise in the present proceedings and consequently can be left open for decision in a suitable case. For the present I would merely observe that the above question is not free from difficulties and it will be desirable to amend Sec. 339 to clearly express, without any ambiguity, the intention of the legislature. 16. The petitioner is a resident of Dehradun and it can be presumed that he resides within the local limits of the Municipality of Dehradun. This Municipality exists from before July 7, 1949. from the affidavits filed by or on behalf of the parties, especially the petitioner, and the material on record, it is apparent that the petitioner owns a factory at Dehradun. He is, therefore, not only a resident of Dehradun but holds property there. Consequently as far as he is concerned, there can be no doubt as to the application of Sec. 339. In other words, in so far as the petitioner is concerned, the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, are still in force and they were not amended or repealed to the ex tent mentioned in column 3 to List II of the Schedule of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 17. In this connection, it may be observed that even if the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act as amended or repealed by Sec. 339 are applicable to the petitioner, the Collector of Dehradun could take action under the corresponding provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Sec. 281 of the Act which governs the arrest and detention in custody of a defaulter for the recovery of arrears of land revenue will not be of any help to the petitioner. It is laid down in Sec. 288 that the provisions of the Act with regard to the recovery of arrears of revenue shall apply to all arrears of revenue and sums of money recoverable as arrears of revenue due at the commencement of this Act. The present loan was taken in March, 1949 long before the commencement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and consequently the present amount could be recovered under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provided that the corresponding provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act were not applicable to the person concerned. 18. The present loan was taken in March, 1949 long before the commencement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and consequently the present amount could be recovered under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provided that the corresponding provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act were not applicable to the person concerned. 18. Sec. 281 authorises the arrest and detention of a person who had defaulted in the payment of an arrear of land revenue, which would include amounts recoverable as such. The only persons exempted from such arrest and detention are women and minors, and also persons who are not Bhumidhars or Sirdars of the holdings in respect of which arrears of land revenue are due and their liability exists on account of joint responsibility for payment of land revenue under Sec. 243. It will be found that the second clause, namely, the second proviso to Sec. 281, has a reference to holding, that is, to cultivators and not to persons residing in towns and carrying on business. The petitioner was thus not exempted from arrest and detention under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken up almost all the points which he could to have the guarantee or surety bond executed by the petitioner declared void or unenforceable. Sec. 62 of the Contract Act will not be applicable to the present case as the original contract has not been substituted by a new contract nor has it been rescined or altered. The original contract is still in existence and is enforceable. In fact, the recovery is being made on the basis of the original contract. Consequently, the original contract is one which must still be performed. 20. The law is clear that the liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract (see sec. 128). In other words, in absence of a contract to the contrary, creditor can recover loan from the surety without taking steps for making recovery from the principal debtor. The letter of guarantee executed by the petitioner is Annexure A to the counter-affidavit of Manohar Lal Wadehra. The petitioner and also Dr. 128). In other words, in absence of a contract to the contrary, creditor can recover loan from the surety without taking steps for making recovery from the principal debtor. The letter of guarantee executed by the petitioner is Annexure A to the counter-affidavit of Manohar Lal Wadehra. The petitioner and also Dr. B. R. Mahajan had agreed and undertaken to pay the amount of the loan and interest thereon if it was not repaid by the borrower, namely, Des Raj Bhatia. The liability of the two sureties was joint and several. It was also agreed upon that the failure on the part of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration to enforce any of the remedies against the borrower, or to observe and perform any of the stipulations contained in the said agreement, or any time or other indulgence being given to the borrower, or any other dealing between the Administration and the borrower, shall not have the effect of releasing the sureties from their liability under the guarantee. This clause of the guarantee will be of material importance while deciding the other objections raised by the petitioner. At present it may simply be observed that this clause authorises the Administration to recover the loan directly from the sureties, if not repaid in accordance with the agreement without first of all taking steps for recovery from the borrower namely, the principal debtor. Instead of there being any contract to the contrary, there was an agreement that the amount could be recovered from the sureties without taking steps against the principal debtor. The Administration could, therefore, take steps to recover the loan with interest from the sureties. 21. As there has been no variation in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor, there is no question of the discharge of surety under Sec. 133. Sec. 134 of the Contract Act is another provision under which a surety is discharged. It lays down that the surety is discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the principal debtor is released, or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor. The Administration has not in any way released the principal debtor, nor has it committed any act or omission, the legal consequence of which would be to discharge the principal debtor. The Administration has not in any way released the principal debtor, nor has it committed any act or omission, the legal consequence of which would be to discharge the principal debtor. What the Administration has done is to recover the amount from the sureties instead of the debtor, may be because it is not known where the debtor is. It can also be that the debtor has become bankrupt and the loan cannot be recovered from him. The act of the creditor in not taking steps for the recovery of the loan from the borrower will never amount to discharge of the principal debtor. 22. Similarly, Sec. 135 of the Contract Act is not applicable as the Administration has not made a composition with, nor has it promised to give time to or not to sue the principal debtor. 23. At this place it may be observed that in Sec. 137 it has been made clear that mere forbearance on the part of the creditor to sue the principal debtor or to enforce any other remedy against him does not, in the absence of any provision in the guarantee to the contrary, discharge the surety. In the present case, the sureties had undertaken to pay the loan only if not repaid by the borrower. This agreement was not subject to any condition, and consequently the surety shall not be deemed to have been discharged merely because the Administration has not taken any steps to recover the loan from the principal debtor or to enforce any other remedy against him. The other remedies available to the Administration were to take steps for the attachment and sale of machines etc. on which there existed a charge for payment of the loan, but it appears that no property of the borrower is available for recovery of the loan. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon Secs. 139 and 141 of the Contract Act. Sec. 139 lays down that "If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the right of the surety, or omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the eventual remedy of the surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired the surety is discharged." 25. Sec. 139 lays down that "If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the right of the surety, or omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the eventual remedy of the surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired the surety is discharged." 25. The argument put forward by the learned counsel, in brief, is that under the provisions of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, it was necessary for the Administration to properly supervise the working of the factory for which the borrower had taken the loan, and, in any case, s o have the machines attached before they could be misappropriated or done away with by the borrower. It is thus suggested that because the Administration did not take action which would have protected the rights of the surety, the surety was completely discharged. This contention is, I may say, not based on correct appreciation of the provisions of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act. Further, in the affidavit the petitioner nowhere made such an allegation. He confined himself by referring to the objections which he had raised in the appeal preferred before the commissioner of Meerut. It was thus only by implication that it was indicated that he would raise such a question of law. An affidavit must contain all the material facts, otherwise the Courts can disregard such acts, and in any case can accept whatever nay be put forward by the respondents in their counter affidavit. At this place it may, however, be observed that the omission w-as to some extent made good in paras 9 to 11 of the rejoinder affidavit dated March 12, 1959. A rejoinder affidavit is meant to meet any new point raised in the counter-affidavit, and not to make good any omission in the affidavit originally filed. If the petitioner wants to use these new assertions as his evidence, it is necessary for him to seek permission of the Court to file a supplementary affidavit so that the respondents may have an opportunity to meet the new case of the petitioner. However, to do justice in the case, I shall refer to the assertions as contained in these paragraphs. 26. However, to do justice in the case, I shall refer to the assertions as contained in these paragraphs. 26. It is mentioned in the rejoinder affidavit that by operation of the provisions of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, the entire machinery and the high power electric connection and the business connected therewith, stood charged with the amount of the said loan and interest, and it was the duty of the Finance Administration under the Act to keep a close watch thereupon, which shall be presumed to have been duly discharged; that proceedings against sureties presume default by the principal borrower and the same presumes due action and seizure of the aforesaid entire assets of the borrower and disposal thereof by the Chief Administrator, Rehabilitation Finance Administration, himself or under his orders through his subordinates; and that no reference had so far been made to the said default and the assets of the borrower and hence the same shall be legally presumed to have come to the hands of the Chief Administrator and unless it was shown that the same fell short of the dues, the entire amount of the loan shall be deemed to have been liquidated, that is, recovered from the assets of the borrower. This plea would suggest as if machines etc. of Des Raj Bhatia are still in existence. But this presumption is unjustified. In any case, the Administration namely, the creditor, has done nothing by which the properties of the principal debtor out of which the present petitioner could later on recover the amount have been affected adversely to the surety. The principle of Sec. 139 will thus not apply to such facts. For the disappearance of the machines etc. or their misappropriation by the borrower, the Administration cannot be blamed, nor can in the eye of law the surety stand discharged. 27. Loans are advanced by the Administration under Sec. 13 of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act and the mode of recovery is laid down in Sec. 15. The Administration has the power, without prejudice to any other remedy provided by law, to recover such loan or instalment thereof or interest as arrears of land revenue, or to take charge of the business or industry of the borrower on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit. Cl. The Administration has the power, without prejudice to any other remedy provided by law, to recover such loan or instalment thereof or interest as arrears of land revenue, or to take charge of the business or industry of the borrower on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit. Cl. (a) of Sec. 15 will show that the Administration has the power to recover the loan or instalments not paid as arrears of land revenue without taking steps to recover the money by attachment and sale of machine on which the Administration has a charge When the law permits the Administration not to recover the loan out of the charge properties and to directly recover the amount as arrears of land revenue, the amount can be recovered as such. The Administration will take charge of the business under clause (b) only in such cases where it would be to the advantage of the Administration. In other words, therefore, i steps are taken to recover the loan with interest as arrears of land revenue without recovering the amount by the sale of the charged properties, the Administration would be within the law. In the present case, it appears from the material on re cord that the borrower has done away with machines etc. and the properties on which the charge shall be deemed to have been created no longer exists. In such circumstances, the only step which the Administration could take for the recovery of the loan was by recovering it as arrears of lane revenue either from the borrower or from sureties. 28. Sec. 17 of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act authorises the Chief Administrator, or any other officer authorised by him in writing in that behalf, to require any borrower to furnish information or to produce books of account any other documents for inspection at suet time and place as may be specified in the order; and to inspect such books of account or documents produced and take extracts therefrom. In other words, the only power given to the Chief Administrator is to inspect the books of account or document: of the borrower. In other words, the only power given to the Chief Administrator is to inspect the books of account or document: of the borrower. Beyond this he has no power to supervise, nor can he depute any one to keep watch on the properties purchased out of the loan, or to see that the charged properties are not removed from the premises in an unauthorised manner Further, the charge, contemplated by Sec 13 of the Act is like a simple mortgage The properties remain in the charge of the borrower and are not under the control oi supervision of the Administration. Consequently, if the borrower removes the machines in an unauthorised manner, the Administration, namely, the creditor, cannot be held to have done any act which is inconsistent with the right of the surety or to have omitted to do any act which his duty to the surety required him to do. 29. Sec. 141 of the Contract Act provides that a surety is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at the time when the contract of suretyship is entered into, and, if the creditor loses, or, without the consent of the surety, parts with such security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security. In the present case, the creditor, namely, the Administration, had no security in their possession, nor had it lost the security. This section is thus inapplicable. 30. To sum up, the letter of guarantee is still effective and the petitioner is not at all discharged. 31. The term "defaulter" as defined in Sec. 2 (3) of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, includes a person who is responsible as surety for payment of any arrear or sum recoverable as arrears of land revenue. The petitioner was responsible for payment of the loan with interest as surety, and consequently for purposes of this Act, he was a defaulter, and under Sec. 3 the Collector of Delhi could issue a certificate to the Collector of Dehradun to recover the amount from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue. 32. Sec. 4 of the Revenue Recovery Act provides for an alternative remedy to the person denying liability to pay the amount being recovered by virtue of the certificate issued under Sec. 3 of the Act. 32. Sec. 4 of the Revenue Recovery Act provides for an alternative remedy to the person denying liability to pay the amount being recovered by virtue of the certificate issued under Sec. 3 of the Act. It lays down that such a person who denies his liability to pay the amount, or any part thereof, can pay the same under protest made in writing at the time of payment and thereafter can institute a suit for the repayment of the amount or the part thereof so paid. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 4 lays that such a suit has to be instituted in a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the local area in which the office of the Collector who made the certificate is situate. It is thus clear that if the person does not institute a suit but makes an objection before the Collector himself, the Collector may not take any notice of it. Apparently it was for this reason that the Collector of Delhi did not take any action when the matter was referred to him. The only remedy open to the petitioner was to pay the amount under protest and then institute a suit under Sec. 4. In other words, without the decision of the objection the Collector could take steps for the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue from the petitioner. One of the prescribed modes of recovery is by arrest and detention of the defaulter. In the circumstances the warrant of arrest issued was in accordance with the law. 33. Respondent No. 3 was beyond any doubt an unnecessary party to the proceeding. With regard to respondent no. 2, the only mistake committed was that the petitioner impleaded the Chief Administrator of the Administration, and not the Administration itself. This is a minor mistake and it will not be right to hold that the respondent No. 2 had been wrongly impleaded. 34. The petition is hereby dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 200/- which shall be shared equally by the Standing Counsel, and the counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The stay order shall stand vacated.