MEHROTRA, J. : These petitions raise common questions of law1 ' and can be disposed of by one common judgment. (2) By means of these petitions, the constitu­tionality of explanation to S. 2(12) of the Assam. Sales Tax Act, 1947 - hereinafter called the Act, has been challenged. The petitioners have been taxed in respect of their turnover for a period prior to the Constitution, though the actual assessment has been done after the coming into force of the Constitution. The point urged is that the explana­tion to S. 2 (12) of the Act was unconstitutional as the Assam Legislature had no legislative competence to enact the said explanation. This argument is based on two main reasons. Firstly that there was no sufficient territorial nexus between the sub­ject-matter of the transaction and the taxing State and secondly that the explanation has extended the meaning of the word 'sale' and empowers the sales tax authorities to tax mere agreements to sell. In this connection, it was further contended that the applicability of nexus theory to the sales tax legislation was never tested in a Court of law and it cannot be applied to sales tax legislation. The Government of India Act only authorised the State Legislature to pass legislation in respect of "tax on sale"; but that gave no power to the legislature to enlarge the meaning of the word 'sale' so as to tax transactions which are not sales. It was then con­tended that the title in the present cases to the pro­perty passed in Calcutta, the contract took place in Calcutta and the appropriation of the goods was done in Calcutta; in these circumstances, explana­tion to S. 2(12) is not attracted. It was lastly contended that at any rate after the coming into force of the Constitution, the ex­planation became void, both by virtue of the provi­sions of Arts. 286(1) (b) and 286(2) of the Constitu­tion, that being so, no tax could be assessed and re­alised from the petitioners after the coming into force of the Constitution. The matter was consi­dered by this Court in the case of Thansingh Nath­mal v. A. Majid, Supdt. of Taxes, Dhubri, reported in AIR 1956 Assam 66 and a Division Bench, of this Court repelled all the contentions of the peti­tioner. The matter was consi­dered by this Court in the case of Thansingh Nath­mal v. A. Majid, Supdt. of Taxes, Dhubri, reported in AIR 1956 Assam 66 and a Division Bench, of this Court repelled all the contentions of the peti­tioner. It is however urged that an appeal is pending against this decision in the Supreme Court and cer­tain aspects of the matter were not brought to the notice' of the Bench of this Court in the earlier case, the decision in that case should therefore be revis­ed. We do not think that anything has been point­ed out to us to; justify our taking a different view from the one taken in the earlier case. In view however, of several subsequent authorities of the Supreme Court as well as of other High Courts, we have thought it proper to examine the arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioner in detail in spite of our earlier decision to the contrary. (3) Reliance was placed on the following pas­sage in the case of State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., reported in 1953-4 STC 133' at p. 142 : ( AIR 1953 SC 252 at p. 256) in 'support of the contention that the nexus theory has not been tested in any court of law : "In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Legislature enacted sales tax for their respective Provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the basis of their sales tax legislation. Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual existence of the goods in the Pro­vince at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the goods in the Province was made an additional ground. A net of the widest range perhaps was laid in Central Provinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods were actually 'found' in the Province at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the goods in the Province was made an additional ground. A net of the widest range perhaps was laid in Central Provinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods were actually 'found' in the Province at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made. Whether, the territorial nexus1 put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each case would be sustained as sufficient was a matter of doubt not having been tested in a court of law. And such claims to tax­ing power led to multiple taxation of the same trans­action by different Provinces and accumulation of the burden falling ultimately on the consuming public." This passage was quoted with approval in the later case of the Supreme Court, Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar reported in 1955-6 STC 446 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 661 ). Although this case was overruled by the later case, still the said passage was quoted with a view to show that it correctly depicts the state of confusion prevailing in different States before the Constitution came into existence in respect of the sales tax. This passage however, to our mind, does not support the contention of the petitioners that the nexus theory was not recognized as a valid theory for the purposes of sales tax legislation. The passage, as we have already pointed out,, only depicts the pictures of sales tax legislations in different States prevailing at the date of Constitu­tion and nothing more. The passage only points out that the sufficiency of the nexus adopted by a particular State in enacting its sales tax Act has; not been tested; but the Supreme Court does not decide in this case that nexus theory does not apply to sales tax legislation. The passage only points out that the sufficiency of the nexus adopted by a particular State in enacting its sales tax Act has; not been tested; but the Supreme Court does not decide in this case that nexus theory does not apply to sales tax legislation. In the case of Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, reported in 1953-4 STC a.88 : ( AIR 1953 SC 274 ) in which the judgment was delivered on the same date, dealing with the pre-constitutional liability, it was observed as fol­lows : "The other question is that on a proper cons­truction of the relevant provisions of the Madras Sales Tax Act the High Court ought to have held that they do not authorise the imposition of sales tax in respect of a transaction of sale where pro­perty in the goods sold passes outside the Province. The first contention, appears to us to be unsustain­able. Section 100 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935......which corresponds to Article 246(3) of the Constitution runs as follows : 'Subject to the two preceding sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature has, and the Federal Legislature has not power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerat­ed in List II in the said Schedule.' The entry in, the Provincial List that is relevant for our purpose is Entry No. 48 and that speaks of 'taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements.' The entry does not suggest that a legislation imposing tax on sale of goods can be made only in respect of sales taking place within die boundaries of the Province; and all that S. 100(3) provides is that a 'aw could be passed by a Provincial Legis­lature for purposes of the Province itself. It ad­mits of no dispute that a Provincial Legislature could not pass a taxation statute which would be binding on any other part of India outside the limits of the province, but it would be quite com­petent to enact a legislation imposing taxes on tran­sactions concluded outside the Province, provided that there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus1 between such transactions and the taxing Province. This principle, which is based upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Bros, and Co. v. Commr. This principle, which is based upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Bros, and Co. v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay, (AIR 1948 PC 1118) has been held by this Court to be applicable to sales tax legislation in its recent decision in the Bombay Sales Tax Act case and its propriety is be­yond question." (4) From the reading of this case, it is abun­dantly clear that the nexus theory was accepted to be applicable to the sales-tax legislation also and the doctrine in Shaw Wallace Bros, case, (AIR 1948' PC 118) laid down by the Privy Council was accepted as fully applicable to the sales tax legislation. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the nexus theory was not applicable to sales tax legislation. The matter however has been further clarified by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. State of Bihar, re­ported in AIR 1958 SC 452 , it was held that the theory of territorial nexus should not be confined in its application only to income-tax legislation but would be equally applicable to sales tax legislation. In that case, certain provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act were held to be constitutional. Section 2(g) of the Bihar Act reads as follows: " 'Sale' means, with all its grammatical varia­tions and cognate expressions, any transfer of pro­perty in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the exe­cution of contract but does not include a mortgage hypothecation, charge or pledge. Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, the sale of any goods which are actually in Bihar at the time when in res­pect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in S. 4 of that Act is made, shall, wherever the said con­tract of sale is made, be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have been made in Bihar." The provision in the Bihar Act is similar to the pro­visions of S. 2 sub-sec. (12) of the Act. The Supreme Court further held in that case that both before and after the amendment of the Bihar Act, the definition of sale meant the transfer of property in goods and the proviso only located the sale, it did not extend the definition of sale. (12) of the Act. The Supreme Court further held in that case that both before and after the amendment of the Bihar Act, the definition of sale meant the transfer of property in goods and the proviso only located the sale, it did not extend the definition of sale. The existence of the goods in Bihar at the time of the transfer did not by itself constitute a sale, and did not by itself attract the tax. The taxable event still remained the 'sale' resulting in the transfer of ownership in the thing sold from the seller to the buyer, and no tax liability accrued until there was a concluded sale in the sense of transfer of title. It was only when the property passed and the 'sale' took place that the liability for paying sales-tax arose. There was no enlargement of the meaning of sale, but the proviso only raised a fiction on the strength of the facts mentioned therein and deemed the sale to have taken place in Bihar. Those facts did not by themselves constitute a sale but those facts were used for locating the situs of the sale in Bihar. (5) Dealing with the argument on point No. 9. formulated at p. 456 of the report as follows : ^The doctrine of nexus is not applicable to sales tax," the Supreme Court held that the doctrine was applica­ble to sales tax legislation the principle enunciated in Shaw Wallace Bros, case, (AIR 1948 PC 118) referred to above was accepted. In the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co., ( AIR 1958 SC 452 ) the fol­lowing passage from the ease of State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, ((S) AIR 1957 SC 699 ) was quoted with approval: "The doctrine of territorial nexus is well esta­blished and if there is a territorial nexus between the person sought to be charged and the State seek­ing to tax him the taxing statute may be upheld. Sufficiency of the territorial connection involves a consideration of two' elements, namely (a) the con­nection must be real and not illusory and (b) the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection. It is of no importance on the ques­tion of validity that the liability imposed is or may be altogether disproportionate to^ the territorial con­nection. Sufficiency of the territorial connection involves a consideration of two' elements, namely (a) the con­nection must be real and not illusory and (b) the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection. It is of no importance on the ques­tion of validity that the liability imposed is or may be altogether disproportionate to^ the territorial con­nection. In other words, if the connection is suffi­cient in the sense mentioned above, the extent of such connection affects merely the policy and not the validity of the legislation." To the same effect is another decision of the Su­preme Court in the case of Collector of Commer­cial Taxes, Cuttack v Bharat Sabai Grass Ltd., re­ported in 1958-9 S. T. C. 289: ( AIR 1958 SC 764 ). In this case also it was held that the definition of sale in the Orissa Sales Tax Act 1947 did not pur­port to tax a mere agreement to sell nor did the se­cond proviso thereto purport to do so. What the second proviso did was to fix the situs of the sale in Orissa when the goods were actually in Orissa at the time the contract of sale was made and this was al­together different from imposing a tax on a mere agreement to sell. The doctrine of nexus is appli­cable to sales-tax legislation. The Orissa High Court had taken a different view relying upon the case of Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. M/s. Budh Prakash Jaiprakash, reported in AIR 1954 SC 459 . That was however a case from Uttar Pradesh wherein the .State legislature had attempted to tax forward con­tracts and it was held by the High Court that it wa.4 ultra vires of the State legislature. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. In view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, there is no force in the con­tention of the petitioners' counsel that the explana­tion to S. 2 (12) of the Act is without legislative competence. The Act only taxes a completed sale, the explanation only locates the sale and does not enlarge the meaning of the word 'sale' so as to tax transactions which are mere agreements to sell and not sale. The Act only taxes a completed sale, the explanation only locates the sale and does not enlarge the meaning of the word 'sale' so as to tax transactions which are mere agreements to sell and not sale. The sale may take place outside the State of Assam, but as the goods, at the time of the agree­ment are in the State of Assam, the title to which subsequently passes to the State of West Bengal, there is sufficient territorial nexus so as to give power to the State of Assam to tax the said transac­tion. (6) Strong reliance was placed on the case of Shrirami Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue, reported in AIR 1952 Nag 378. In our opinion, this case does not support the contention of the petitioners. That the nexus theory has been accepted to be applicable, to the sales tax legislation is evident from the perusal of the following observation in this case: "We have already shown that a necessary con­nection must be established between the taxing State and the subject-matter of the tax. The sub­ject-matter of the tax here being the sale of goods, there must be some nexus between Madhya Pradesh and the sale as such. That connection must be suf­ficient or in other words, substantial. Adverting to the questions which have been formulated, it is ob­vious that where the dealer merely sends his goods to his shop in another province, there being no con­tract of sale in furtherance of which the goods are despatched, the transportation is merely for business purposes, unconnected with any sale such as is con­templated in entry No. 48. The State Government •cannot impose a transportation or export duty and therefore there can be no question of a sale tax in such circumstances. But where the goods are sent In furtherance of a contract of sale, though not en­tered into by the dealer but by the Head Office situ­ated at an extra-State point, the transaction may for the purposes of the sales tax be regarded as one in the State, on. But where the goods are sent In furtherance of a contract of sale, though not en­tered into by the dealer but by the Head Office situ­ated at an extra-State point, the transaction may for the purposes of the sales tax be regarded as one in the State, on. the strength of the explanation which as we have shown above has been validly framed." These observations go to show that the Nagpur High Court, held the explanation to1 have been validly en­acted, explanation 2 to the Madhya Pradesh Act which was in similar terms as explanation 2 (12) of the Assam Act was amended by Act XVI_ of 1949 and the amendment was held to be ultra vires as it had made drastic change in the Sale of Goods Act without obtaining the assent of the Governor General as required by the Government of India Act. Question No. 5 which was formulated as fol­lows: "Whether explanation 2 to cl. (g) to S. 2 which makes an agreement of sale taxable even though the sale may have taken place outside the province, is not ultra vires to the Provincial Legislature'' was answered in the affirmative. (7) In the present case, there is no question of want of the assent of the Governor General. Mr. Choudhury however argued that S. 107 of the Go­vernment of India Act, cl. (2) will not apply to the present case but cl. (I) will apply and therefore as­sent of the Governor General will not make the sec­tion intra vires. Clause (2) to S. 107 no doubt is attracted only where a provincial law in respect of one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list is repugnant to any provision of the earlier Federal Law or existing law and as "Tax on sales" is not in the concurrent list, cl. (2) may not apply. Even accepting this argument, "tax on sales" is (in the provincial list and therefore the Federal legis­lature was not competent to enact regarding it and even S. 107(1) will not be attracted. The Act is covered by entry No. 481 list 2 of the Government of India Act and the question of assent arises on the assumption that the Act is covered by item No. 10 of the concurrent list and thus the provisions of S. 107 (1) will be attracted. The Act is covered by entry No. 481 list 2 of the Government of India Act and the question of assent arises on the assumption that the Act is covered by item No. 10 of the concurrent list and thus the provisions of S. 107 (1) will be attracted. This Nagpur case was considered recently by a Full Bench of the same Court in the case of Mullaji Jamaluddin and Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1958 Madh Pra 220 and it was held therein that this case was an authority for the proposition that the expla­nation 2 to Section 2(g) of the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act enables the State Government to levy tax on sales in respect of goods which, were in the State at the time when the contract took place. The) existence of the goods in the State was sufficient territorial nexus to uphold the enactment and the explanation was validly enacted. In the aforesaid case, it was held by the Full Bench that the sales tax in respect of sales between 22nd October, 1949 and 25th January, 1950 (the date of the inauguration of the Constitution), where the goods were in the State at the time of contract but dispatched to U. P. could be assessed and rea­lised after the coming in force of the Consti­tution. This view is also1 in accord with our earlier Bench decision. In cases where the sale takes place after the coming in force of the Constitution, the State has no right to tax such transactions except in so far as it is permissible under the provisions of Art. 286 of the Constitution and it is not open to the sales tax officer to invoke the protection of the ex­planation. In this view of the matter, the explana­tion in the Assam Act was amended and was brought in line with the provisions of the Constitution, but there is no bar to the assessing authorities actually making the assessment and realising tax in respect of the transactions prior to the Constitution after the enforcement of the Constitution. The liability came into existence by virtue of the charging section of the Act as soon as the sale was completed and the provisions of the Constitu­tion cannot be given retrospective effect so as to wipe off the liability which has already accrued. The liability came into existence by virtue of the charging section of the Act as soon as the sale was completed and the provisions of the Constitu­tion cannot be given retrospective effect so as to wipe off the liability which has already accrued. It is not necessary to refer to a number of authorities dealing with the interpretation of the word 'void' under Art. 13(1) and (2) of the Constitution and what is the effect of the coming into force of the Consti­tution on the pre-constitution laws, it is sufficient to point out that none of the considerations placed before us by the counsel are such as to persuade us to take a different view from the one which we took in the earlier case. That the tax in respect of the pre-constitution sales could be assessed and realised after the Con­stitution has also been accepted in the1 case of Sales Tax Officer Cuttack v. B. C. Patel and Co. reported In AIR 1958 SC 643 . The point, no doubt, was not directly raised and discussed in that case, but the levy of tax in respect of post-constitution quarters was held to be without jurisdiction and as regards the pre-constitution period, it was however held to be valid and it was held that respondent was liable to pay the sales tax for the two pre-constitution quarters under S. 4 (2) of the Orissa Act. Mr. Choudhnry contended that that order was passed on the concession made by the counsel for the respondent that if the notification was held to be valid, the sales tax authorities had the right to tax the respondent in respect to the pre-constitution period. We do not think that there was any such concession made. The effect of the concession only, was that the case was not remanded to the sales tax authorities; but if the Supreme Court had been of the opinion that the tax for the pre-constitution period could not be assessed and realised after the coming in force of the Constitution there was no necessity to remand the case at all and the question of making any concession would not have arisen. This case also therefore indirectly supports the contention raised by the Advocate General on behalf of the respondent that the department had the right to rea­lise the tax in respect of the turnover of the pre-con­stitution period. This case also therefore indirectly supports the contention raised by the Advocate General on behalf of the respondent that the department had the right to rea­lise the tax in respect of the turnover of the pre-con­stitution period. (8) It is said that at no material time, there was any transaction of sale in the State of Assam, the petitioners merely purchased the goods in the State of Assam for the purpose of supply to their head office at Calcutta, and admittedly des­patched tile bales to the various mills at Calcutta, these dispatches were not in respect of prior con­tracts and sales were effected in Calcutta, the bales-were consigned in the name of one mill and actual­ly sold and delivered to another according to the instruction of the Head Office. From these facts it was lastly contended that it cannot be said that at the time when the contracts for sale took place in Calcutta, the goods were in existence in the State of Assam. It was further contended that at the time when the despatch was made, it was not ascertained against which particu­lar contract the goods were dispatched, and thus the explanation was not attracted. When the goods can be said to have been appropriated to the con­tract in accordance with the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act is a question of fact. The explanation, no doubt, provides that the sale will be deemed to' have been taken place in the State of Assam if the goods in respect of which the contract of sale takes place outside the State of Assam are in the State of Assam at the time ofthe contract. But this is essentially a question of fact which was within the competence of the sales tax authorities to investigate and decide. We have (examined the various orders passed by the sales tax authorities and which have been made annexures to these petitions and we are of the opinion that the authorities categorically found that the goods were in existence in the godowns of the petitioners at the time when the contracts were entered into and these very goods were appropriated towards the contracts. In fact, the petitioners had been taxed in respect of only those transactions which related to the goods which were in the possession and con­trol of the petitioners at the time of the contracts. In fact, the petitioners had been taxed in respect of only those transactions which related to the goods which were in the possession and con­trol of the petitioners at the time of the contracts. In para 7 of the petition in Civil Rule No. 9 of 1957, the following averment has been made : "That the aforesaid contract entered into in the form of India Jute Mills Association were for­ward contracts and in respect whereof sales were effected and completed in Calcutta with parties in Calcutta. The new firm did not have possession of the goods in respect of which contracts were made in Calcutta on the date of the contract In the form in which the goods were contracted to be sold they were never in existence in the State of Assam and had to be processed and prepared by the new firm for the purpose of fulfilling the contract. For the performance of the aforesaid contracts the goods were subsequently purchased and prepared in the form in which they were contracts to be sold with special marking etc." I para 4 of the Affidavit-in-reply it is asserted that the petitioner despatched 25,338 maunds of jute to the different mills in Calcutta against prior con­tracts during the period from 1-4-1949 to 30-9-1949. Out of the aforesaid quantity the turnover of only 5,319 maunds of jute was held taxable by the Commissioner of Taxes. From the account books produced at the time of hearing, it appeared that the petitioner despatched the aforesaid quan­tity against prior contracts and' the jute in question was in existence in Assam on the dates of the contracts. The allegations of the petitioners therefore-that the transactions taxed were not in respect of the contracts have been denied and on the findings!, arrived at by the Sales Tax authorities, we are un­able to accept that the goods were not in existence in the State of Assam at the time when the con­tracts were entered into and that the explanation is not attracted. (9) In the result, therefore, there is no force in these petitions and they are accordingly rejected with costs : SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. : (10) I agree. As the learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to challenge an earlier decision of this Court delivered by me in AIR 1956 Assam 66, I would like to add a few comments of my own. As the learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to challenge an earlier decision of this Court delivered by me in AIR 1956 Assam 66, I would like to add a few comments of my own. My learned Brother has fully discussed the matters and quoted extensively from the various decisions cited at the Bar to ex­pose the hollowness of the petitioner's contentions: my comments in the circumstances will be naturally brief. (11) The passage on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner from the decision of the Supreme Court in 1953-4 S.T.C. 133 : ( AIR 1953 SC 252 ) is no authority for the proposition that the theory of territorial rexus as a basis of taxing power had not been tested in a Court of law. The passage merely traces the historical situation prevailing at the time when a crop of taxing legislations arose in different States of the country. The decision of the Supreme Court delivered on the same day in 1953-4 S.T.C. 188: ( AIR 1953 SC 274 ), duly re­cognised the validity of the territorial nexus theory as authorising legislations of this type. It was held there that it was "quite competent to enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the Province, provided that there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing Province". In the above decision, their Lordships extended the prin­ciple of the decision of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1948 PC 118, to sales tax legislations. Sub­sequent decisions of the Supreme Court have reiterated the same principle and clarified the position-beyond any shadow of doubt; vide : AIR 1958 SC' 452, where the constitutionality of a cognate pro­vision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act was in question. It was further pointed out in this case that the said provision did not enlarge or extend the defini­tion of "sale", but merely located the situs of the sale, which meant that wherever the transfer of ownership in the goods sold may have taken place, if at the time the goods were in Bihar, the sale should be deemed to have taken place there for purposes of the taxing statute. To the same effect is the de­cision in 1958^9 S.T.C. 289 : ( AIR 1958 SC 764 ), which dealt with a similar provision of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. To the same effect is the de­cision in 1958^9 S.T.C. 289 : ( AIR 1958 SC 764 ), which dealt with a similar provision of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. These recent decisions of the Supreme Court appear to have lifted the matter above the pale of controversy. They hold in unmistakable terms that it is open to the State concerned to levy tax on sale of goods lying in the State at the time of sale, though the transaction of sale may have actually taken place outside the State. They further repell­ed the contention that in adopting the territorial nexus theory as a valid basis of legislative autho­rity, the States concerned sought to enlarge the ac­cepted concepts of "sale"; when actually they did nothing of the land, except locating the situs of sale for realisation of tax on the sale of goods lying within their territory. (12) The contention that the legislation in question is hit by S. 107(2) of the Government of India Act is clearly fallacious, because the Act is covered by Entry 48 of List 2 of the Constitution Act. The assessments in these cases all relate to a period prior to the Constitution and therefore, Article 286(2) of the Constitution is not attracted to ' the cases. Since the liability had already accrued under the charging section of the Act, there was nothing in law to prevent the taxing authorities from assessing the tax and realising the same under the relevant provisions of the said Act. No excep­tion has been taken to these provisions. I note with some satisfaction that pur view in AIR 1956 Assam 66 appears to be re-inforced by another decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 643 , where such an assessment was held valid. (13) The Rules, therefore, must be discharged with costs: hearing fee Rs. 50/- in each case. CC/V.B.B. Rules discharged.