JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. The suit out of which this Second Appeal arises was instituted by three plaintiffs, for and on behalf of the Tamil Brahmin Community of Vellangallore Desom, with the necessary sanction obtained under Order I, Rule 8, C. P. C., for a declaration that the suit property belongs to the aforesaid community and that documents relating to it brought about by the defendants are not valid, and for the recovery of possession of the property. Defendants 1 to 6 contested the suit on the ground, that the property did not belong to the community, but only to the family of defendants 1 and 2, and the documents are valid. The District Munsiff at Irinjalakuda decreed the suit, and in appeal by defendants 1 to 6, the Additional District Judge at Trichur dismissed the suit. The legal representatives of the first plaintiff and the third plaintiff have preferred this appeal. 2. The only question which arises for determination is, whether the suit property belonged to the community represented by the plaintiffs, or to the family of defendants 1 and 2. The property originally belonged to Vazhappilli Mana which assigned its rights under Ext. I dated 5th Mithunam, 1102, in favour of the first defendant. On the same day, the Mana assigned several items of properties under Ext. C in favour of the first defendant, his nephew the second defendant and Subramania Iyer, another member of their family. The plaintiffs' case is, that the suit property was being used by the members of their community for a long time as the burning ghat for cremating their dead, and that Ext. I was taken in the name of the first defendant, a leading member of the community on their behalf. The defendants' case is that a plot of 28 cents in the property on the south, was alone used as the cremation ground, by the family of defendants 1 and 2. The question is, which of these versions is true. 3. There had been several transactions in the past, between Vazhappilli Mana and the family of the first defendant, and these were settled and adjusted by the execution of the sale deed Ext. C. The differences between Ext. C and I, taken on the same day, can scarcely be ignored, and must throw considerable light on the purpose for which Ext. I was executed. As observed, Ext. C. The differences between Ext. C and I, taken on the same day, can scarcely be ignored, and must throw considerable light on the purpose for which Ext. I was executed. As observed, Ext. C was in the names of three members of the joint family, the first defendant being described as its manager, while Ext. I was in the name of the first defendant only. At the foot of Ext. I, after the schedule of property was set out, apparently for the purpose of registration, the first defendant's description was stated, as a member of the Tamil Brahmin Community, aged 60, his occupation being family management. Though Ext. I purported to be for a consideration of Rs. 50/-, it was expressly given up. It recited, that the property was being used as a cremation ground from time immemmorial. There were no operative words in Ext. A to indicate, that the transferee was to enjoy full proprietorship with the right to effect alienation and mutation of names, D. W. 4, a nephew of the first defendant, a vakil by profession and one who is certainly interested in the family, offered the explanation that, being a gift, the property was not included in Ext. C. As suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, it was safer for the first defendant to include it in Ext. C which was a sale deed brought about in settlement of prior transactions, considering that there were minor members in the transferor's family, suffice it to say, that the explanation offered by D. W. 4 is the least convincing. His evidence on many points is unacceptable. The second defendant conceded that the first defendant was a leading member of the community at the time. 4. There was no transaction with respect to this property by the family of the first defendant till the year 1118, when, on the 23rd Vrischikam of that year, a partition deed Ext. A was registered, by which the plot of 28 cents in the extreme south of the suit property was left in common, and the remainder of the property was allotted to the share of the second defendant. In describing his share in schedule C, the plot of 28 cents on the south was referred to as their cremation ground. On the 21st Medom, 1118, the second defendant executed a usufructuary mortgage, Ext. In describing his share in schedule C, the plot of 28 cents on the south was referred to as their cremation ground. On the 21st Medom, 1118, the second defendant executed a usufructuary mortgage, Ext. IX, for a portion of the suit property allotted to him, describing the southern plot as the cremation ground of the Brahmins of Thekkubhagom.. It is in evidence, that the Brahmins of that locality were comprised in two groups, called Vadakkumbhagom and Thekkumbhagom, the latter having their residence to the south of a junction called 'Nalumkoodiya Mukku', the members of the former group living on the north of the aforesaid junction. Ext. IX furnishes proof, that the plot of land was used as the cremation ground for the community, and not for the family. There was a sale deed, Ext. VIII, of the year 1120, in which the southern boundary, referring to the survey number of the suit property was described as a cremation ground. 5. It is therefore seen, that at least the southern portion of the suit property had been used as a cremation ground. Though this is not clear from Exts. I, A and VIII, Ext. IX makes it clear, that it was so used by the members of the Thekkumbhagom Brahmin Community for cremating their dead. There is nothing in Ext. I itself to suggest, that only the plot of land on the south was used. On the contrary, Ext. I made no distinction whatever between the southern plot of 28 cents and the remainder of the property. It was only by Ext. A, that this distinction came to be made. 6. It was attempted to make out, that the first plaintiff had virtually accepted Ext. A, because its draft Ext. II, and lists Exts. III and IV were drawn up by him, and he had taken part in bringing about the partition. It is seen, that the first plaintiff was a proverthicar and had taken to the profession of a document writer. In the present suit, the first plaintiff did not claim any title or set up any personal right in him or in his family, the suit being on behalf of the community. So no estoppel could be pleaded against him in his representative capacity, by reason of any individual act he might have committed. In the present suit, the first plaintiff did not claim any title or set up any personal right in him or in his family, the suit being on behalf of the community. So no estoppel could be pleaded against him in his representative capacity, by reason of any individual act he might have committed. If authority is needed for this position, it is only necessary to mention Sena Yasim Sahib v. Kadur Ekambara Iyer, 54 I. C. 497. It is also seen, that a Pulaya was allowed to occupy two huts which were erected in a portion of the property under two koolicharths, Exts. V and V(a); the rights under them were released under Ext. VI of 1118. It was urged, that if the suit property in its entirety was used as a cremation ground, the members of the community would not have permitted such occupation by Pulayas. It is not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove, that every inch of the property had been used as a cremation ground. The plaintiffs can succeed by showing, that Ext. I was taken in the name of the first defendant for and on behalf of the community. This cannot be negatived simply because, two Pulayas were permitted to occupy two huts in a portion of the property. P. W. 2, a priest in the community, deposed that there can be no objection to the occupation by Pulayas, if the portion is fenced off from the rest of the property. I do not think that the plaintiffs can be non suited on these grounds. 7. Defendants 1 and 2 and the witnesses examined by them have themselves proved, that in the past, members of the Community used the property as a ground for cremating the dead. They have not succeeded in proving by such evidence that only their relatives who died, were so cremated. Some relationships were suggested in their evidence, but were far too remote. The plaintiffs also examined witnesses to prove, that members of the Community used to cremate their dead in the suit property. At the trial, the defendants attempted an explanation, that for cremating the dead bodies of non relatives or distant relatives, the consent of the first defendant used to be taken. The plea in the written statement was, only that the dead bodies of relatives used to be cremated, and not that consent was obtained. At the trial, the defendants attempted an explanation, that for cremating the dead bodies of non relatives or distant relatives, the consent of the first defendant used to be taken. The plea in the written statement was, only that the dead bodies of relatives used to be cremated, and not that consent was obtained. The notion of a separate family cremation ground among the members of this community was unheard of, even according to defendants 1 and 2. 8. The first defendant admitted, that the suit property was obtained as a cremation ground under Ext. I itself and that previously the southern portion had been used as such, for over two hundred years. The second defendant as D.W. 2 also has admitted, that the entire suit property was obtained as a cremation ground under Ext. I. It was D. W. 3 who admitted, that Brahmins living south of the junction used to cremate their dead in the suit property. D. W. 4 deposed, that as there was no property available as cremation ground, the suit property and the surrounding properties were given over under Ext, I. D. W. 5, a priest also admitted that the Brahmins of Thekkumbhagom used to cremate their dead in the suit property. 9. It would appear, that there is another cremation ground to the north of the junction, near Narayanakulangara temple about a mile away. It was stated, that this is a poromboke land set apart by the Government for the purpose. Defendants 1 and 2 and their witnesses swore to this. This does not negative the inference which may be drawn in favour of the plaintiffs, on the above evidence. 10. The effect of the evidence discussed above may be stated thus: The suit property was being used as a cremation ground by the members of the community for a very long time. It was for this purpose and not as the family cremation ground, that Ext. 1 was taken in the name of the first defendant. The notion of a family cremation ground itself, appears to be unknown to the members of the community. There is nothing in Ext. 1 to establish, that only the southern part of the property was used for the purpose. If so, the entire property obtained under Ext. 1, must be subject to the use to which it was intended to be put. There is nothing in Ext. 1 to establish, that only the southern part of the property was used for the purpose. If so, the entire property obtained under Ext. 1, must be subject to the use to which it was intended to be put. The Brahmins of the locality used this property to cremate their dead. It may be, that after Exts. A, VIII, and IX only a part of the property was so used. This cannot affect the character of the property itself, or the scope or the nature of the original grant. Therefore I am of the opinion, that the plaintiffs must succeed in this suit. 11. The result is, that the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decree passed by the Munsiff is restored. This appeal is allowed with costs in all the courts.