JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. The facts, so far as they are necessary for the decision of this Second Appeal, fall within a narrow compass and may be briefly stated. The respondents, who are the decree holders, applied to the execution court for the delivery of possession of a property, which they had purchased in execution. By a separate proceeding which had been taken at the instance of an attaching decree holder in another suit, it was prescribed, that the respondents must deposit in the execution court 1/7th of the amount for which they purchased the property, as a condition precedent to the delivery of possession. Accordingly, the respondents' application for delivery of possession was posted on the 10th October, 1955, for the deposit of the amount ordered. No deposit having been made, the application was posted on the 15th October 1955, for disposal. The respondents then made an application for adjournment, which was granted, and the case was posted on the 22nd October, 1955, for the deposit of the amount. The application for delivery of possession was again adjourned to the 31st October, 1955. The respondents made no deposit and therefore the execution court dismissed the application. 2. On the 7th November, 1955, the respondents made an application to the execution court, the prayer in which was to restore the application for delivery of possession, on a review of the order dismissing it. The ground alleged for this purpose was, that the respondents were not intimated by their counsel as to the date fixed by the execution court for the making of the deposit. The execution court in its order dated the 16th January, 1956, held "that the allegations contained in the petition are not proved and are all false........Though no new grounds are now made out for a review of the order, as a matter of equity, I would allow this petition on terms........" The respondents were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 7/- by way of costs. 3. The judgment - debtor, who is the appellant here, preferred an appeal which was heard and disposed off by the Subordinate Judge, Kottarakara. In dismissing the appeal, he observed, that the "failure to deposit the amount in the time originally fixed by the court was........ 7/- by way of costs. 3. The judgment - debtor, who is the appellant here, preferred an appeal which was heard and disposed off by the Subordinate Judge, Kottarakara. In dismissing the appeal, he observed, that the "failure to deposit the amount in the time originally fixed by the court was........ sheer inability to raise the amount," and the grounds on which he relied were, that a fresh application for delivery of possession by the decree holders would be barred by limitation, that it was only an extension of time to make the deposit, that was in effect granted by the execution court, when it restored the application for delivery of possession, and that the equities of the case demanded such restoration. None of these grounds can be legally sustained, and the learned counsel for the respondents could not maintain them in this court. 4. The learned counsel however attempted to support the orders of the courts below, contending that, though the application for restoration employed the word "review", it must be treated as an application under S.151, C.P.C., for the restoration of the application for delivery of possession, and that the courts below having in their discretion exercised such power, this court ought not to interfere. Neither of the courts below has expressly stated that it was exercising the inherent power under S.151, C. P. C.; on the contrary, they imported some notion of equity, on the ground, that, but for the restoration, the respondents' remedy would be barred by limitation. If at all, this is a ground for declining to divest a valuable right which had accrued to the opposite party under the law of limitation, Radha Kissen Chamria v. Keshardeo Chamria, AIR 1946 Calcutta 488. S.151 is a provision which enables the court when the circumstances require "to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of court". In the present case the execution court held, that the grounds alleged for restoration were false. The Subordinate Judge in appeal thought, that the failure to make the deposit was due to the inability of the respondents to find the money; this was not what the respondents themselves had alleged. Inherent power is not intended for the condonation of laches or negligence for which there is no valid explanation. The Subordinate Judge in appeal thought, that the failure to make the deposit was due to the inability of the respondents to find the money; this was not what the respondents themselves had alleged. Inherent power is not intended for the condonation of laches or negligence for which there is no valid explanation. The view of the Subordinate Judge, that all that was granted by the execution court was an extension of time for making the deposit, is clearly erroneous, as it ignores the obvious fact, that the application for delivery of possession was restored. 5. No other point was pressed before me on behalf of the respondents. It therefore follows, that the order of the execution court restoring the application for the delivery of possession is unsustainable, and it is hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed, but I make no order as to the costs, either here or in the courts below.