JUDGMENT B. Mukherji, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a Writ of certiorari to quash an order dated the 5th of January 1957 made by the Additional Commissioner, Kanpur in a revision filed by the petitioner. There is also a prayer for the quashing of an order made by the second respondent, namely the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur: the prayer states that the order was made on the 3rd October 1955 while Annexure B which is said to be a true copy of that order shows that the order was made on the 30th November 1956. Learned counsel has been unable to tell me which of the two dates is correct. In any event the prayer made related to the quashing of the order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in respect of premises in regard to which dispute arose between the landlord petitioner and respondent no. 3, his tenant. It is necessary to state few facts in order to know precisely the points raised by this writ petition. 2. The petitioner owned a house bearing no. 85|48 at Cooperganj, Kanpur. A portion of this house was in the occupation of the third respondent as a tenant. The house was in a state of bad repair and a portion of the house needed rebuilding and the other portion needed reconditioning. The third respondent was alleged to have been a bad tenant in so far as he had been falling into arrears of rent. There was a suit for ejectment against him in 1952 and that suit was compromised sometime in December 1954. Thereafter, the landlord wanted to rebuild the entire house and bring it under his own occupation. He therefore made an application under Sec. 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act to the District Magistrate for permission to file a suit against the third respondent. The landlord relied for permission on two grounds: first that he needed the premises for his business, and secondly that the premises needed rebuilding. He therefore made an application under Sec. 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act to the District Magistrate for permission to file a suit against the third respondent. The landlord relied for permission on two grounds: first that he needed the premises for his business, and secondly that the premises needed rebuilding. Objection was made on behalf of the third respondent and his objection prevailed because the Rent Control and Eviction Officer came to the conclusion on the materials before him and on a local inspection of the property that he made, that the application of the petitioner for permission to sue the third respondent was not a bona fide application; that the petitioner's need about which he represented was not genuine, and further that the en-tire house did not require rebuilding. The petitioner's application under Sec. 3 (ii) therefore dismissed. 3. The petitioner then preferred a revision under Sec. 3 (ii) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act before the Commissioner. This revision was filed by the petitioner beyond thirty .days from the date on which the order was communicated to him. The Commissioner rejected the revision on the ground that the revision was beyond time by twelve days. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended before the Commissioner that in computing the period of limitation, that is to say, the period of thirty days, the period required for obtaining copy of the order under revision had to be excluded. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that such exclusion could not be permitted. 4. In this petition two points have been urged before me. The first is that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not a correct order and the second that the decision of the Commissioner on the question of limitation on the face of it was wrong and therefore, the Commissioner failed to exercise jurisdiction which was vested in him to revise the order. 5. In regard to the first question all I need say is that the decision which was arrived at by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was within his competence and the decision had been arrived at after giving a fair opportunity to both sides to be heard and after the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had made an inspection of the property in dispute. Therefore, in my view the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not be challenged. 6. In regard to the second contention it is necessary to pay attention to the words of Sec. 3 (ii). The sub-section is in these words : "Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants or refuses to grant the permission the party aggrieved by his order may within thirty days from the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to revise the order." The power that has been vested in the Commissioner is a power of revision. The period within which an application for exercising this revisional jurisdiction could be entertained was thirty days from the date on which the order was communicated aggrieved party. There was no indication in this sub-section nor in any of the rules framed under the Act which made it necessary or requisite to file a copy of .the order complained against. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of Ram Singh v. Panchayati Adalat, 1954 A.L.J. R. 18 for his contention that the power conferred by sub-sec. (ii) of Sec. 3 of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act was analogous to the power of appeal and therefore the provisions of Sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act applied and a party seeking revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner could claim deduction of the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order complained against. Ram Singh's case was a decision on the scope of the power Exercisable by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, a Munsif or a Sub-Divisional Officer under Sec. 85 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. The question that fell for determination in Ram Singh's case was what was the real nature of the power which was exercised under Sec. 85 by either of the officers mentioned in that section. It was held by Desai, J. that the nature of the power exercised under Sec. 85 partook of the nature of an appellate power exercised in respect of an appeal. It was pointed out in that case that the word 'appeal' has nowhere been defined by statute and therefore it is not possible to give a limited meaning to that word. It was pointed out in that case that the word 'appeal' has nowhere been defined by statute and therefore it is not possible to give a limited meaning to that word. It was further pointed out that the word 'appeal' in Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act was to be used in a wide sense and it had not the restricted meaning the word had in the Code of Civil procedure or in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in any particular statute. 7. In the case of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 165 their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that : "There is no definition of appeal in the Civil P.C., but there is no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a Subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent." 8. What is in my view of significance to note is that an application which can have the effect of an appeal has to be made to an appellate court. Their Lordships while deciding Nagendra Nath's case were considering the scope of Article 182 of the first schedule of the Indian Limitation Act. 9. Sec. 85 is headed as "Power of Superior Courts to transfer cases to Nyaya Panchayat." Under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act the court of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the Munsif or the court of an S. D. O. are in a sense superior courts. Can it be said that under the U.P. Control 9f Rent and Eviction Act the Commissioner was a superior court in relation to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, indeed, can it even be said that there is a court of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer? The Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the scheme of the Rent Control and Eviction Act exercises certain administrative and quasi judicial powers. He certainly does not act as a judicial officer or as a court. 10. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the scheme of the Rent Control and Eviction Act exercises certain administrative and quasi judicial powers. He certainly does not act as a judicial officer or as a court. 10. A comparison of the language of the two sections, Sec. 85 and Sec. 3 (2) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act makes it clear that the power exercisable by the Commissioner and the other officers mentioned in Sec. 85 are different and so is their scope. When any of the three officers mentioned in Sec. 85 has to act he has to act under the provisions of the Act empowering him to act. They therefore exercise judicial power and not the type of quasi judicial power which the Commissioner exercises while revising the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under Sec. 3 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 3 has specifically fixed the period of limitation of thirty days commencing from a particular point of time and, as I have already said, there is no indication in the Act or the rules that any other period for any other purpose could be relied upon for extending the period of thirty days mentioned in Sec. 3 (2) . 11. The word "revision" has acquired a connotation which is different from "appeal." The word "revise" according to the New English Dictionary by Murray means "the act of revising or review." According to the same dictionary "revise" also means "to look or read carefully over with a view to improving or correcting." The right to revise in the sense of correcting or improving does not necessarily mean the exercise of an appellate powers or powers which are analogous to an appeal. 12. It is well known that appeal is a creature of statute but no power of appeal is exercisable unless specific provision therefor has been made by law. In my opinion therefore it is not possible, or at any rate not correct, to say that the word "revise" in Sec. 3 (2) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act should be given a meaning which would make it coextensive with the power exercisable under appeal. In my opinion therefore it is not possible, or at any rate not correct, to say that the word "revise" in Sec. 3 (2) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act should be given a meaning which would make it coextensive with the power exercisable under appeal. There is one essential difference between the two powers, namely, the appellate power and the revisional power which need be pointed out here and that essential difference lies in the fact that in an appeal it is a party's right to have the mistake corrected while in a revision the court or any other authority that has been approached is not bound to correct a mistake even if it comes to the conclusion that there was a mistake, for the power of revision or the power to revise has in it inherent, a discretionary power. In my opinion therefore the power vested in the Commissioner under Sec. 3 (2) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act is not analogous to the power of appeal nor can it be said that the power was an appellate power and therefore the provisions of Sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act could be attracted. 13. For the reasons given above I am of the view that the Commissioner was right in holding that the application which was made to him to revise the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was beyond time. This Writ petition is therefore dismissed but since the interested respondent did not make his appearance I make no orders as to the cost of the petition.