JUDGMENT T.P. Naik, J. The Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh, along with the accused Dharam Singh (against whose acquittal the State Government has not come up in appeal), were prosecuted for offences punishable under Section 395 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar. The Additional Sessions Judge, by his judgment dated 17th February 1958, acquitted all of them. This appeal has been filed by the State Government against the acquittal of the Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh. The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows. The Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh, along with the accused Dharam Singh (who has also been acquitted), one Ajuddhi (who is absconding), Ranjit Singh and Ramdina (who are dead), went to the village Barodia Gosain at about sunset on 5th December 1956. They were armed with guns and dressed in khaki. They rounded up all the villagers who met them on the way. They made Sitaram (P. W. 2) and Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) lead the way and show them the house of Rajaram (P. W. 4), the village paid. Id front of the house of Rajaram (P. W. 4), the villagers were asked to sit, and one of the dacoits was posted to keep a watch over them. Rajaram (P. W. 4) was then called out of his house, and a sum of Rs.10,000 was demanded from him. On his expressing his inability to pay the said amount, his gold ring was taken away,from him. Two of the dacoits then took him inside the house, beat him with the butt end of a gun and threatened to burn him alive by pouring kerosene oil over his body. He was crying aloud and his cries were heard by the people sitting outside. Two of the other dacoits entered the house of Dangal Singh (P. W. 3), the mukaddam of the village, and came out with a gun as their booty. The same two dacoits then entered the house of Sitaram (P. W. 2) and brought out from it a bag and axe. While the dacoits were ransacking the houses of Dangal Singh (P. W. 3) and Sitaram (P. W. 2), two of the armed dacoits were on watch outside. After the aforesaid loot, all the decoits decamped. The same two dacoits then entered the house of Sitaram (P. W. 2) and brought out from it a bag and axe. While the dacoits were ransacking the houses of Dangal Singh (P. W. 3) and Sitaram (P. W. 2), two of the armed dacoits were on watch outside. After the aforesaid loot, all the decoits decamped. Sitaram (P. W. 2) discovered that his trunk had been broken open and the ornaments, of which he gave a list vide Ex. P-2 and which included a pair of todals, taken away. He made three reports of the three dacoities, vide Ex. p-1, p-17 and p-18, at the houses of himself, Rajaram (P. W. 4) and Dangal Singh (P. W. 3), respectively. During the investigation, the Respondent Mangal Singh made a statement to the police, vide Ex. p-7 in pursuance of which a gun (Art. E) was seized vide Ex. p-15 from karenda bushes on the bank of a nala. This Respondent was also found to have sold a pair of todals (Art. B) to Jairam (P. W. 6) along with certain other ornaments on or about 6th May 1957. Jairam (P. W. 6) had melted all the ornaments except the pair of todals which were seized from his possession, vide Ex. p-12. These pair of todals were identified by Sitaram (P W. 2) and his mother Rani Bahu (P. W. 21) as belonging to them. The Respondent Manka was apprehended on 16th June 1957 while he was going on a truck. His movements were suspicions and he had then in his possession a 12 bore gun and about ten cartridges for which he had failed to account satisfactorily. All the accused denied the commission of the offences and pleaded that they had been falsely implicated. The Respondent Mangal Singh, however, admitted having sold the pair of todals (Art. D) to Jairam (P. W. 6), but be denied that along with the pair of todals any other ornaments were sold by him to Jairam (P. W. 6). He claimed the todals as his. He examined witnesses in defence to prove the ownership of the pair of todals. The Respondent Manka did not examine any witness in his defence. He claimed the todals as his. He examined witnesses in defence to prove the ownership of the pair of todals. The Respondent Manka did not examine any witness in his defence. So far as the Respondent Manka is concerned, his complicity in the dacoities is said to be proved from his identification by the victims of the dacoities; while the complicity of the Respondent Mangal Singh is said to be proved from his identification by the victims of the dacoities coupled with the fact that a pair of todals (Art. D), which were taken away from the house of Sitaram (P. W. 2) in the dacoity committed at his house, were traced to his possession sometime after the dacoity and his explanation that they were his had been found to be fake. The Respondent Manka had been identified by Sitaram (P. W. 2), Rajaram (P. W. 4) and Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) in the Court of Session as one of the dacoits in question. This identification also finds corroboration from the fact that, these witnesses had also identified him in the test identification parade held on 17th July 1957 in Sagar jail, in which the Respondent Manka had been mixed with seventeen others which included the Respondent Mangal Singh, the accused Dharam Singh and two other suspects. Sitaram (P. W. 2) bad identified therein the Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh and one other accused Daram Singh correctly. He had not wrongly picked up any person as an accused or a suspect. Similarly, Rajaram (P. W. 4) had correctly picked up the Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh, and had not picked up any wrong person as an accused or a suspect. Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) had also identified the Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh with no wrong pick-ups. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has discarded all this evidence of identification as unreliable. He considered it very unsafe to base a conviction of the Respondents on their identification alone, without further corroboration of their presence in the dacoities from the evidence which tended to show their participation therein. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has discarded all this evidence of identification as unreliable. He considered it very unsafe to base a conviction of the Respondents on their identification alone, without further corroboration of their presence in the dacoities from the evidence which tended to show their participation therein. He found support for his conclusion in the tact: (1) that the identifying witnesses had not given any specific description of the Respondents in any report, and (2) that Sitaram (P. W. 2) one of the identifying witnesses, had admitted in his cross-examination that he had seen the Respondent-accused Manka at police station Malthone two months before the identification parade in Sager jail. We have had two criticisms to make of this approach. First, the learned Additional Sessions Judge started with an unreasonable distrust of all the identification evidence without closely scrutinising it in order to assess its true probative value; and, secondly, his dealing with the evidence was very perfunctory. For instance, there was no discussion of the evidence of Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) and Rajaram (P. W. 4) which could tell us why their evidence on the point of identification was discarded. We are mindful of the fact that eye-witnesses are fallible, and there are many cases in law reports which tell us of miscarriage of justice due to faulty recollection and identification by eye-witnesses. [See the case of Adlof Beok(sic) and the observations of Sir Benn Collins, the Master of the Rolls, in the Beok Report that-"Evidence of identity is perhaps of all classes of evidence the least to be relied upon and therefore unless supported by other facts an unsafe basis for the verdict of the jury."] This branch of proof is often times described as notoriously delicate' and the distrust of the English Court is probably based on the proved instance of miscarriage of justice through honest mistake in identification in the case of Adolf Beck. In his summing up for the jury Lord Guthrie in Oscar Slater's case said: Next we must consider the evidence of identification and its value. Not a word too much has been said on that matter by the Lord Advocate and Mr. M. Clure, It is extremely important. In his summing up for the jury Lord Guthrie in Oscar Slater's case said: Next we must consider the evidence of identification and its value. Not a word too much has been said on that matter by the Lord Advocate and Mr. M. Clure, It is extremely important. I express the point thus-it would not be safe to convict the prisoner merely on the evidence of personal impression of his identity with the man Been flying from the house, on the part of strangera to him, without reference to any marked personality or persona] peculiarities, and without corroboration derived from other kinds of evidence. My proposition involves a distinction between the identification, by personal impression, of a strange person, and the identification, by personal impression, of a familiar person. Suppose a father told you that his son, who was resident in his house, had been seen by him in Princess Street yesterday. That would be admirable evidence. But if a person who had only seen the son once in his life told you that he had seen him in Princess Street yesterday that would be evidence of slender value, unless the son bad a marked personality, or unless he bad some peculiarity about him, such as a very peculiar walk, or unless there were corroboration, such as that the man, when spoken to, answered to the name of the particular individual. The distinction may be vitally important in this case. Some of us may have doubles. We have been told that we have been in such and such a place by a competent and honest witness, who is quite sure about it, and yet we bad never been there at all. The most august case is that of his Majesty the King. The illustrated papers are fond of publishing a double of his Majesty, a person who has superficially a startling resemblance to the King, but who would never be mistaken for the King by any one about the Court. Then, again, people, differ as to the extent of a resemblance, or even whether there is any. You may have seen a strong resemblance, but one of your friends says that he can see no resemblance at all, and, when the two people are brought together, you see that there is nothing but a very general similarity. Then, again, people, differ as to the extent of a resemblance, or even whether there is any. You may have seen a strong resemblance, but one of your friends says that he can see no resemblance at all, and, when the two people are brought together, you see that there is nothing but a very general similarity. That applies to the personal impression of a stranger in reference to a stranger. (Notable British Trial Series, Trial of Oscar Slater, Fourth Edition, Edited by William Roughead, pp. 238-239). Bearing the aforesaid observations in mind, let us examine what identification evidence implies. The term 'identification' means: the proving that a person, subject or article before the Court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be. and the word 'identity' may be termed as: 'to become the same; to establish the identity of; to make to be the same; to prove the same with something described, claimed or asserted'. Identification is almost always a matter of opinion or belief (Corpus Juris., Vol. 37, p. 237). 'Identification evidence' consists of statements of witnesses to the impressions formed by them of the identity of the accused from their recollection or their recognition of him from hie general form, face, voice or any such characteristic which may have impressed themselves on their minds at the time of recognition. People differ widely in their power of observation and recollection, and consequently Courts always pay special regard to the circumstances in which the recognition took place and the time which had elapsed before their observation and recollection was put to test coupled with the circumstances under which the tests were held. People differ widely in their power of observation and recollection, and consequently Courts always pay special regard to the circumstances in which the recognition took place and the time which had elapsed before their observation and recollection was put to test coupled with the circumstances under which the tests were held. Borrowing the phraseology of Craig v. The King (1933) 49 CLR 429 at p. 446., which one of us (Naik J.) employed in Criminal Appeal No. 414 of 1958, decided on 30th July 1959, when an honest witness affirms that the accused was a person who was one of the dacoits who committed the dacoity, he is merely asserting (1) that he observed the accused; (2) that the observation became impressed upon his mind; (3) that he still retains the original impression; (4) that such impression has not been affected, altered or replaced, by any incident happening subsequently; and (5) that the resemblance between the original impression and the accused is sufficient to base a judgment, not of resemblance, but of identity. In order to test his assertions, it, therefore, becomes necessary to pay attention to the following circumstances: (a) Whether the witness was a stranger to the accused whom he was identifying or whether he was known to him from before ? How intimate was his knowledge and whether the circumstances under which he first observed him were such as to permit a lasting impression on his mind ? (b) Whether the accused had any marked personality or any special peculiarities which at the time of the witness's first observation impressed themselves upon him ? (c) Whether the length of the time which had elapsed between the date of the incident and the date when he was first asked to identify him was not such as to totally affect or considerably dim his original impression 1 (d) Whether any incident bad happened subsequently which had affected, altered or replaced his original impression ? For example, a suspect or his photograph may have been shown to a witness, before he was asked to identify him in the parade or in the Court, or he may have seen a photograph of the accused in the newspapers (where he was alleged to be the offender), which may have created a bias in his mind so that he may have persuaded himself to the belief that the suspect was the offender. (e) Whether the circumstances under which the witness was first asked to identify the accused were such that it could fairly be said that the resemblance between the original impression and the accused was sufficient to base a judgment, not of resemblance, but of identity ? The test identification must, therefore, be conducted under circumstances free from police influence, by independent persons, when the accused is mixed with a sufficient number of persons of like physical appearance so that the possibility of an honest mistake in identification is reduced to a minimum. We must, however, remember that even while paying full attention to the aforesaid circumstances, we may be led into an error by requiring too much or by being satisfied with too little. As observed in Khilawan v. Emperor A I R 1929 Oudh 430 at p. 436.: Men differ very largely in their powers of observation. One man will remember a face for a very long period though he has only seen its possessor once, and for a very short time. Other men who are unobservant may not be able to identify persons whom they had a good opportunity of identifying even a short time afterwards. The power to identify varies according to the power of observation and the observation may be bassed upon small minutiae which a witness cannot describe himself or explain. It has no necessary connexion with education or mental attainments. An illiterate villager may be and frequently is much more observant than an educated man. The physical and mental capacities of persons differ widely in their power of observation and recollection, and in the same person these powers vary at different times, according to his age, mental condition and the curcumstances under which his senses are required to form the impression, and at times of stress, the mental faculties are keyed to the highest pitch so that a person then has a more acute perception and observation than at other times. We must, therefore, consider what a man placed in the position of the witness could fairly and reasonably justly be expected to recollect, bearing in mind that the witnesses are not always honest and the police investigation not always fair. We ought not to accept as true knowledge that which is not the honest product of his unaided memory but the product of extraneous or adventitious sources. We ought not to accept as true knowledge that which is not the honest product of his unaided memory but the product of extraneous or adventitious sources. Thus, it is true that there are, no doubt, difficulties in assessing the worth of such evidence, but they by no means absolve us from subjecting such evidence to a close and careful scrutiny, in order to ascertain its probative value. Dealing with the question, Chief Justice Carter of Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Jennings 43 LRA (N.S.) 1206 at P. 1210. said: A great deal has been written and said in the past concerning the doubtful nature of testimony identifying persons. Men's faces, like their handwriting, may be so similar that the keenest observer may be baffied in seeking to discover differences. 'The witness', says Wharton, 'is asked how he knows that the prisoner at the bar is the person who fired the fatal shot, and his answer is, "I infer it from a similarity of eyes, of hair, of height, of manner, of expression, of dress". Human identity, therefore, is an inference drawn from a series of facts, some of them veiled, it, may be, by disguise and all of them more or less varied by circumstances.' Wharton, Crim. Ev. 8th Ed. Section 13. In his charge to the jury in the Tichborne Case, Lord Cockburn said: "Frequently a man is sworn to who hn(sic) been seen only for a moment. A man stops you on the road, puts a pistol to your head, and robs you of your watch or purse; a man seizes you by the throat, and while you are hi(sic) strangled his confederate rifles your pockets; a burglar invades your house by night, and you have only a repaid glance to enable you to know his features. In all these cases the opportunity of observing is so brief that mistake is possible, and yet the lives and safety of people would not be secure unless we acted on the recollection of features so acquired and so retained, and it is done every day. In our opinion, therefore, no hard and fast rule can be laid dawn that oral evidence of identification ought never to be accepted without corroboration. In our opinion, therefore, no hard and fast rule can be laid dawn that oral evidence of identification ought never to be accepted without corroboration. However, bearing in mind its inherent defects, the necessity for corroboration should be present in the mind of the Court; and, where the circumstances in the ease disclosed any necessity for it, it should be sought for. The evidence of identity must be thoroughly scrutinized, giving benefit of all doubt to the accused: but, if, after a thorough scrutiny, there appears to be nothing; on record to suspect the testimony of the identification witnesses, the Court ought not to fight shy of basing a conviction on such evidence alone, because of the bare possibility that there could be honest, though mistaken, identification. Examining the evidence we find that the dacoity was committed in the evening when it was just getting dark, but the witnesses had ample opportunity of seeing the accused. As regards the Respondent Manka, according to Sitaram (P. W. 2), he could remember the presence of this accused at the dacoity because it was he who had called him to the house of Rajaram (P. W. 4): according to Rajaram (P. W. 4), he could remember him (the Respondent Manka) because it was he who had beaten him and sprinkled kerosene oil on his person; and according to Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12), he could remember him because it was be who had taken Rajaram (P. W. 4) inside the house. Similarly, as regards the Respondent Mangal Singh, according to Sitaram (P. W. 2), he was on guard; according to Rajaram (P. W. 4), he had entered his house; and according to Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12), he had seen him going to the house of Rajaram (P. W. 4) with a gun in his band. Consequently, even though the Respondents were strangers to the witnesses, the latter had sufficient opportunity-and for a reasonably good time -to permit a lasting impression on their minds. As, at such times, under stress of circumstances, it is not unusual for a person's physical and mental faculties to be keyed to the highest pitch, the impression obtained by these witnesses would be more permanent and lasting than it otherwise would be. As, at such times, under stress of circumstances, it is not unusual for a person's physical and mental faculties to be keyed to the highest pitch, the impression obtained by these witnesses would be more permanent and lasting than it otherwise would be. The witness Sitaram (P. W. 2) did not give any description of the Respondents in his report, nor did he disclose any special peculiarities which he had marked, nor had the other witnesses, when first questioned, described any special marks for the identification of the Respondents. But, as pointed out above, an identification may be based on small minutiae which a witness cannot describe or explain. The identification parade was held in Sagar jail on 17th July 1957, i.e., about, seven months after the occurrence, which may have somewhat dimmed their original impression; but we do not think that it could have totally obliterated it. It was contended that the witness Sitaram (P. W. 2) had seen the Respondent Manka at police-station Malthone two months before the identification parade in Sagar jail, which made his test identification of this Respondent as well as his identification of him in Court quite unreliable. It appears that what is objected to is the witness's seeing this Respondent sometime (one or two months) before the test identification parade which, it may be argued, may have affected or replaced his original impression. We may at once make it clear that there was no suggestion in the cross-examination of the witness that the Respondent had been shown to him by the police in order to persuade him to falsely identify him in Court or in the test identification parade, except in the statement of the Respondent himself. We do not think that this would make his honesty suspect on that score, even if he had, at first, denied having seen him. And, then, could his bare seeing the Respondent at the police-station affect or replace his original impression ? We think not. If any thing, this identification itself would be one more circumstance corroborating the subsequent identification of the Respondent in Court. And, then, could his bare seeing the Respondent at the police-station affect or replace his original impression ? We think not. If any thing, this identification itself would be one more circumstance corroborating the subsequent identification of the Respondent in Court. The argument is not that the Respondent was not at Malthone police-station when he is alleged to have been seen by the witness which fact, if established could have shown that the witness had once made a mistake in his identification; but simply that he had in fact, seen him at Malthone police-station which fact by itself establishes nothing in favour of the Respondent unless there was proof of the fact that he had been shown to the witness by the police. We, therefore, fail to see how this admission in the cross-examination of Sitaram (P. W. 2) makes his identification evidence suspicious or unreliable. In any case, there is no similar suggestion so far as the other Respondent is concerned nor can this criticism be applicable to the other two identfication witnesses. In our opinion, there could be no reason for discarding their evidence against the Respondents on this account. The test identification parade was held in Sagar jail free from the influence of police. It was conducted by Deocharan Singh (P. W. 16), Magistrate Second Class, Sagar, and the test identification memorandum prepared by him is Ex. p-16. The suspects, who were five in number, were mixed with thirteen others. Sitaram (P. W. 2) identified, the Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh and one other suspect "Dharam Singh, while Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) and Rajaram (P. W. 4) identified the Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh. There were no wrong pick-ups, and the fact that Dharam Singh, who has been acquitted, had been identified by Sitaram (P. W. 2) as one of the dacoits, does not make his evidence completely unreliable as regards the Respondents. It is no doubt true that this witness (P. W. 2) admitted having seen the Respondent Manka a month or two prior to identifying him in Sagar jail parade; but we have held this admission to be innocuous, and even this criticism cannot be levelled against the other two witnesses Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) and Rajaram (P. W. 4). In the result, in our opinion, there was no justification for treating the" identification evidence as unsatisfactory requiring further corroboration. In the result, in our opinion, there was no justification for treating the" identification evidence as unsatisfactory requiring further corroboration. There was nothing on record to justify the rejection of the identification testimony wholesale and, in our opinion, its such rejection has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This is a case of dacoity and while we are mindful of the fact that no innocent man should suffer, we feel that no man against whom the evidence on record unmistakably establishes the guilt should escape, as their wrong acquittal jeopardises the social security which we so, dearly cherish. Even in cases where opportunity for observation was much briefer, Lord Cookburn says: In all these cases the opportunity of observing is so brief that mistake is possible, and yet the lives and safety of people would not be secure unless we acted on the recollection of features so acquired and so retained. This is also our justification for interference in an appeal with the acquittal. In the case of the Respondent Manka, in view of the fact that he is accused of dacoity, it is relevant to consider that he had been arrested with a 12 bore gun and a bag containing ten cartridges [see the evidence of Kanchhedilal (P. W. 14), Mansingh (P. W. 18), and Balwantsingh (P. W. 19), and the seizure niemorandum (Ex. p-4]. This Respondent gave no explanation for the possession of these articles. On the other hand, he denied that they had been seized from his possession. It is true that the gun seized from his possession could not be identified as one of the guns carried by the dacoits, but the fact remains that the dacoits carried guns when they went to commit dacoities at the houses of Rajaram (P. W. 4) and others in village Barodia Gosain on the night of 6th December 1956, and the Respondent was found in possession of a gun and cartridges for which he could not satisfactorily account. Similarly, as against the Respondent Mangal Singh, there is the discovery of a gun (Article E) and the todals (Article D). The gun was discovered in pursuance of a statement (Ex. Similarly, as against the Respondent Mangal Singh, there is the discovery of a gun (Article E) and the todals (Article D). The gun was discovered in pursuance of a statement (Ex. p-7) made by him in the presence of witnesses that he had hidden it outside the village by the side of bis field on the bank of a nala in Karondi bushes from where it was seized vide seizure memorandum (Ex. p-15). It is an old muzzle loader with a barrel about 2 feet long. The Respondent denied that he had made any discovery or that any gun had been seized from his possession. We have no reason to doubt the seizure of the gun at the instance of the Respondent, and the fact therefore remains that the dacoits carried guns and a gun was seized from the possession of the Respondent Mangal Singh for which he has failed to account. We do not know where the learned trial Judge got the impression that it was a dummy gun and that it was so crude that it could not have deceived any person. But even so the possession of a crude dummy gun, for which the Respondent had failed to account, would be a circumstance against him. Lastly, there is the seizure of the todals (Article D) from the possession of Jairam (P. W. 6) on 25th June 1957 vide seizure memorandum Ex. p-12. He claimed to have purchased them along with certain other ornaments, from the Respondent Mangal Singh on 6th May 1957 vide entry in his register whichwas also seized vide'Exi'(sic) p-12 . The Respondent admits the sale of the todals only but claims that the todals were his. These articles have, however, been satisfactorily identified by Sitaram (P. W. 2) and his mother Rani Bahu (P. W. 21). They had also identified these articles in a test identification vide Ex. p-13. The todals (Article D) were purchased by Sitaram (P. W. 2) a month before the dacoity from one Birje of village Malthone. Rani Bahu (P. W. 21) was also present during the purchase and, according to her, they were purchased for his (Sitaram's) aunt. Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) also identified the todals as Sitaram's. He was present at the time of their purchase by Sitaram and his mother at Malthone. Rani Bahu (P. W. 21) was also present during the purchase and, according to her, they were purchased for his (Sitaram's) aunt. Chaturbhuj (P. W. 12) also identified the todals as Sitaram's. He was present at the time of their purchase by Sitaram and his mother at Malthone. No doubt, these articles (todals) were a common article and had been with Sitaram for a short time, but even so the purchase was recent and consequently the witnesses could well carry their impression of them sufficient to identify them later on. In our opinion, there was no reason to discard their testimony simply on the ground that they had not worn them after the purchase. The learned Additional Sessions Judge relied on the evidence of Nannibai (2 D. W. 1), the wife of the Respondent Mangal Singh, who claimed to identify these articles as hers. A reading of her evidence, however, shows that she was not quite, certain if they were hers. She states: She also did not use the articles which, according to her, belonged to her mother in-law. She did not use them even after her death. In our opinion, the evidence of the prosecution is very much more positive and consequently more reliable than the halting testimony of this witness (2 D. W. 1). The learned Additional Sessions Judge was also of the opinion that if the todals were stolen articles, the Respondent should have Bold them immediately after the dacoity and not waited for about six months before selling them. In our opinion the argument is not conducive and it may well be that he postponed the sale in order to ward off any possible suspicion which may have arisen if the sale were immediately after the dacoity. It cannot also be said that the possession of these articles within six months of the dacoity could not be said to be 'recent' in order to raise the presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. In any case, their unexplained possession with the Respondent is a strong circumstance implicating him in the offence of dacoity. We are conscious of the fact that we have reviewed at large the whole evidence in an appeal against the acquittal. We feel we are justified in doing so under the circumstances of the case. In any case, their unexplained possession with the Respondent is a strong circumstance implicating him in the offence of dacoity. We are conscious of the fact that we have reviewed at large the whole evidence in an appeal against the acquittal. We feel we are justified in doing so under the circumstances of the case. We have in coming to our conclusion, given due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and borne in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of the Respondents which, if anything, had been reinforced by their acquittal in the trial Court. We are of opinion that the guilt of the Respondents Manka and Mangal Singh has been conclusively established and, as their acquittal has resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice, we would be justified in setting it aside and, in convicting them under Section 395 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code. We convict them accordingly. As for the sentence, the offence is grave and calls for a deterrent sentience. We, therefore, sentence the Respondents to rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years each.