Khemraj v. State — 1959 DIGILAW 203 (RAJ)

This is an appeal preferred under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (herein after referred to as the Act) against the order of the Dy. Collector, Chittorgarh dated 21.2.1958 whereby he rejected an application for the claim of compensation on account of resumption of muafi in Amba-ka-javasia on the ground that he had not got his name mutated in place of the last holder Tej Shanker since deceased in accordance with the Muafi Rules of the erstwhile Mewar State of Svt. 2001. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and Government Advocate in the matter and have examined the record as well. 3. The main point urged on behalf of the appellant is that his application for claim should have been treated as one under sec. 37 of the Act and should have been decided as such or if the learned Dy. Collector felt that the application was covered by the provision of Sec. 3 of the Rajasthan Jagirs Decisions and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 and the case was not regarded as having been till then decided by a competent court, the application should have been Kept pending and matter referred under sub-sec. 4 of sec. 37 of the Act to the competent court for enquiry and decision and then acted in accordance with such decision. He has also contended that the Muafi rules referred to above did not make it obligatory upon the appellant to have his name mutated in place of the last holder of the Muafi since deceased, and also out the case was not covered by those Muafi rules and consequently by the provision of the Rajasthan Jagirs Decision and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 and the matter was one which should be decided under the terms of sec. 135 and 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 in accordance with the provision of sec. 137 of that very Act as a simple mutation by the Tehsildar himself. This contention has been repelled on behalf of the learned Government Advocate on the ground that when the learned Deputy Collector passed the impugned order, the provision of sec. 37 of the Act were entirely different from what they are now, and up till 25.5.59, the passing of the Rajasthan Act No. 25 of 1959 there existed as sub-sec. This contention has been repelled on behalf of the learned Government Advocate on the ground that when the learned Deputy Collector passed the impugned order, the provision of sec. 37 of the Act were entirely different from what they are now, and up till 25.5.59, the passing of the Rajasthan Act No. 25 of 1959 there existed as sub-sec. (4) in this section and therefore there was no option before the learned Dy. Collector excepting dismissing of the claim of the appellant, his claim being not related to a title right or interest in any Jagir land arising in the course of a proceeding under the Act, but one for compensation preferred under sec. 31 of the Act consequent upon the resumption of a Jagir under sec. 21 of the Act. 4. The point for determination in this case, therefore, is whether the claim of the appellant was one under sec. 31 or under sec. 37 of the Act. Sec. 31 of the Act provides that every Jagirdar whose jagir land has been resumed under sec. 21 of the Act shall file within the time allowed in prescribed form, a statement of claim before the Jagir Commissioner. The learned counsel for the appellant has admitted that he had filed his claim in the prescribed form within the time allowed from the resumption of the Jagir (Muafi). The proceedings under this Act started on the resumption of a Jagir under sec. 21 of the Act, which provides that the Government may after the commencement of the Act by notification in the Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of any class of Jagir lands and the date so appointed finally would be the date of resumption of that Jagir. It is only after the resumption of Jagir in this manner from this date of resumption that certain consequences as described in sec. 22 of the Act follow and the Jagirdar is required to do certain acts and file a claim for compensation also. Enquiry into the transfers made by the Jagirdar and into the maintenance claim by the persons dependent upon the Jagirdar are be entitled under any existing law thereto also starts only after that. The compensation is also determined only after that and it is in connection with the finalising of this compensation that sec. 37. Enquiry into the transfers made by the Jagirdar and into the maintenance claim by the persons dependent upon the Jagirdar are be entitled under any existing law thereto also starts only after that. The compensation is also determined only after that and it is in connection with the finalising of this compensation that sec. 37. to enable the Jagir Commissioner to decide the question of title, has been embodied in the Chapter VII of the Act dealing with the grant of compensation. This would, therefore, go to make it clear beyond doubt that the proceedings contemplated by sec. 37 of the Act related only to the dispute arising regarding title, right or interest in any Jagir land resumed under the Act and not to the claim for compensation on account of resumption of jagir itself. This latter type of claim would be covered by sec. 31 of the Act and not sec. 37 of the Act. There did not, therefore, arise any question of keeping the application pending or referring the same for decision by a competent court and deciding the question of title on the basis of such a decision by the learned Dy. Collector, Jagir in the present case. For this very reason, whether as a result of subsequent amendments in sec. 37 of the Act referred to above the orders of the learned Dy. Collector, Jagir deserve any modification also did not arise. Under sec. 31 of the Act it is "Jagirdar whose jagir land has been resumed under sec. 21 who shall file a claim for compensation. A Jagirdar has been defined by sec. 2(g) of the Act as a person recognised as a jagirdar under any existing jagir law and a jagir land has been defined by sec. 2(h) thereto as any land in which or in relation to which a jagirdar has rights in respect of land revenue or any other kind of revenue and includes any land held on any of the tenures specified in the First Schedule and thus includes Muafi also." Manifestly the appellant so long as he was not so recognised as the jagirdar of the jagir resumed, he could not have any right in respect of land revenue or any other kind of revenue over this jagir. When he did not so possess any right, nor was he ever recognised as a Jagirdar thereto, he could not come forward with any claim as a jagirdar over this jagir land. The learned Dy. Collector Jagir was therefore, perfectly justified in dismissing the application of the appellant as he has done. 5. With the conclusion that we have arrived as above there does not remain any necessity of deciding, the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant whether it was mandatory for him to have the Muafi mutated in his name under rule 145 of the Muafi Rules of erstwhile Mewar State referred to above or not and whether without that he could be recognised as muafidar thereto or not and whether the proceedings as covered by sec. 3 of the Rajasthan Jagirs Decision and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 were required to be taken or not. But as this point has been raised before us we deem it necessary to examine this as well. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is based upon a misapprehension that under the provisions of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as Revenue Act), a mutation of a Muafi land could be made as that of tenancy holding and that notwithstanding there being a separate sec. 137 relating to "succession to an estate" defined by sec. 5(10) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1950 as meaning "jagir land or interest in jagir land held by a Jagirdar" it could be decided under sec. 136 as an ordinary dispute on the basis of possession. But it is certainly not so. Sec. 137 has been specially inserted in the Revenue Act for dealing with the cases of not only "succession to" but also "transfer of" the estates which as narrated above meant jagir land, and it has been ordained that such succession and transfers shall be governed and regulated by and be determined in accordance with the law usage or practice of the local area in which such an estate lies" and such law usage or practice have also been specially saved from being repealed by this very section under the provision of sec. 263 of the Revenue Act. This provision of sec. 137 has been made notwithstanding anything contained in this Revenue Act elsewhere contrary to this. 263 of the Revenue Act. This provision of sec. 137 has been made notwithstanding anything contained in this Revenue Act elsewhere contrary to this. This provision is quite emphatic that the cases of succession to or transfer of the jagir and Muafi lands shall be governed by the laws or usages or practices of the area in which such land lay. Such laws, usages etc. in this case would be found in the Muafi Rules of the first-while Mewar State Svt. 2009, and, therefore, the succession to the Muafi (Jagir) under dispute by the appellant would depend only upon his having got the same entered in his name in terms of Rule 56 thereof. The words in this rule are "Lajmi hega" which means it would be mandatory for any person claiming to be the heir of any deceased holder to apply under this rule. As to who could be such heir was described in Chapter 3 of these rules and after the enforcement of the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 any order under these rules, as they do not provide for any forum would have to be passed under of this Act. In view of this reasoning the case of the appellant clearly fell under purview of the Rajasthan Jagir Decision and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 and unless and until ho was recognised under these provisions as jagirdar of the jagir land resumed under the Act his claim for compensation was rightly rejected by the learned Dy. Collector, Jagir. There is thus therefore, no force in this appeal and it is hereby rejected.