This second appeal has been filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff whose suit for a permanent injunction was rejected by the trial court on the ground of res judicata, the first appellate court confirming the same in appeal. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record as well. The only point involved for determination in the case is as to whether the plea of res judicata can be effectively based on a consent decree or not. It is an admitted fact that a consent decree between the parties in respect of this very dispute was passed. Both the lower courts have held that the present suit is therefore barred by res judicata. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed his reliance on A.I.R. 1950 Patna 17 and 1924 Patna 758. In the former case a question arose as to whether a compromise decree dividing the amount of pension between the parties to suit was void ab initio or not regard being had to the provisions of section 12 Pension Act, 1871. Their Lordships observed that sec. 12 of the Pensions Act prevents traffic in pensions as it is opposed to public policy and hence if a compromise decree grants division of a pension between the parties it would tantamount to a traffic in the pension and will come within the mischief of sec. 23 of the Contract Act. The provisions of Sec. 4 of the Pensions Act were also examined and it was held that if a civil court could entertain a suit with regard to pensions the parties would be doing what is prohibited by law and thus the provision of law would be defeated. It was therefore, held that "It is no doubt true that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as to decree passed by invitum, but if the compromise is vitiated under the provisions of the Contract Act, that may not be binding on the parties as res judicata. It has been argued that as the previous decree was obtained by fraud or mis-representation res judicata would not govern the case. In the first place the ruling cited by the appellants counsel has no applicability to the present case. Secondly, the appellant has not yet obtained any relief from a competent civil court as regards the avoidance on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation etc. In the first place the ruling cited by the appellants counsel has no applicability to the present case. Secondly, the appellant has not yet obtained any relief from a competent civil court as regards the avoidance on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation etc. Hence he cannot be allowed to presume the existence of a fact which he is bound to establish to the satisfaction of a civil court in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 4. As regards A.I.R. 1924 Patna 758 we may point out that this decision was examined subsequently by that High Court in A.I.R. 1957 Patna 365 wherein this question was examined at length and the entire case law was subjected to a comprehensive examination. Their Lordships were pleaded to observe :— "A consent decree has to all intents and purposes the same effect as res judicata as a decree passed per invitum, and this notwithstanding the words "has been heard and finally decided" in S. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. These would give ground for argument upon one point only, that is, whether the matter in issue has literally been heard by the Court. The matter in issue has been finally decided, indeed much more finally decided by a consent decree than by a decree per invitum for against the consent decree there is no appeal. When a party has raised bis defence, and, has then consented to judgment, it is the same thing as though he had abandoned his defences and, admitted them to be untenable. Carrying that one step further, it is same thing as saying that his case has been heard, for, if a party chooses to admit that he is not in a position to sustain his defence as far as the Court is concerned that is practically the same thing as though he had adduced no evidence, and, decision had been taken against him on all those issues. A consent decree therefore between predecessors-in-interest of parties touching matters now substantially and directly in issue between them will be res judicata. Res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of the court, and, it means nothing more than that a person shall not be heard to say something twice over. Therefore, so long as a consent decree stands, it is not open to either party thereto to give the go-bye to it even if it contains clauses bad in law". 5. Res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of the court, and, it means nothing more than that a person shall not be heard to say something twice over. Therefore, so long as a consent decree stands, it is not open to either party thereto to give the go-bye to it even if it contains clauses bad in law". 5. We are, therefore, of the opinion that both the lower courts came to a correct conclusion in the case. The appeal is without any force and is hereby rejected.