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1959 DIGILAW 206 (RAJ)

Ramjilal v. Sunda

1959-10-26

R.N.HAWA, SHYAMLAL

body1959
This revision has been filed against the appellate order of the Additional Commissioner, Ajmer dated 28.5.58 upholding the original order of the Assistant Collector, Kishangarh dated 30.12.57 whereby the plaint was returned to the applicant for presentation to the competent civil court. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record as well. The applicant brought a suit in the Court of the Assistant Collector, Kishangarh, for a declaratory relief and permanent injunction and the same was decided on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties. A consent decree was passed in accordance with the terms of the compromise. Subsequently the applicant through a suit for cancellation of the consent decree on the ground that the consent was obtained through undue influence, coercion and that it was devoid of consideration. An objection was raised as to the jurisdiction of the revenue court with regard to the trial of the suit that the suit lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of a civil court and hence the plaint should be returned to the applicant. This order was upheld by the Additional Commissioner and hence this revision. 3. The learned counsel has argued before us that the trial court should have followed the principle laid down in A.I.R. 1949 All. 419. It has also been argued that sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was overlooked by the lower courts in this connection and that according to these provisions the suit was triable by a revenue court. 4. We have considered both these contentions and find that none of them is tenable. A.I.R. 1949 All. 419 was examined in a subsequent case by the same High Court reported in A.I.R. 1952 All. 922. It was observed by his Lordship that "if a decree happens to be null and void it can be ignored by all courts of law after arriving at a finding to that effect and the court do not have to exercise the power of cancelling the deed or the decree. On the other hand if the deed or the decree does not happen to be void, but is only voidable at the option of a party, then the relief for cancellation of the deed or decree can only be granted by a civil court. On the other hand if the deed or the decree does not happen to be void, but is only voidable at the option of a party, then the relief for cancellation of the deed or decree can only be granted by a civil court. Such relief cannot be granted by a revenue court whose powers are limited by the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act." In the previous case therefore since the decree was sought to be declared void, even the revenue court could have held it to be void and proceeded to grant other reliefs to the plaintiffs of that suit. In the present case before us the decree is sought to be cancelled on the ground of being voidable and unless a proper court cancels the same the revenue court could not ignore it nor can grant a relief regarding its cancellation. Thus the position is that the relief which has been sought in the present case could only be granted by a civil court, and in the absence of that relief having been granted, the revenue court could not have granted any relief to the applicant. We may also refer to A.I.R. 1953 Pepsu 151. It was observed that the fact that a particular decree was obtained by fraud from a revenue court necessarily involves a dispute of a civil nature. The fact that a revenue court bad passed that decree will not make a suit for avoidance of that decree on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud and mis-representation cognizable by the same court. Such cases are obviously governed by sec. 39 of the Specific Relief Act. Note 6, sec. 9 Chitleys C.P.C. may also be referred to in this connection wherein a similar view has been expressed. 5. As regards sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, suffice it to observe that it relates to agreement arrived at between the parties and their effect as against the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It has no relevancy to the point of jurisdiction in a suit of the present type. 6. The result is that there is do substance in this revision which is hereby rejected.