JUDGMENT P.V. Dixit, J. 1. The appellant instituted a suit in the court of the Sub-judge of Bhopal for recovery of Rs. 1160/- from the respondent alleging that on 15th January 1949, the defendant borrowed the amount from him and executed document in his favour agreeing to repay it by 21st January 1949. The plaintiff described the document as a bond. The defendant contested the plaintiff's claim on the grounds that he never borrowed any amount from the plaintiff; that the document which he had executed in the plaintiff's favour amounted to a promissory note or an acknowledgment; and that it not having been properly stamped was inadmissible in evidence. He also suggested that at the material time the plaintiff was employed in the Forest Department of the Bhopal State and he obtained the promissory note from the defendant on the representation that some pasture land would be leased out to him and that the amount claimed being thus in the nature of a bribe was not recoverable. 2. The trial court found that the defendant borrowed Rs. 1160/- from the plaintiff and executed a bond in his favour; that since the document was a bond, it was admissible in evidence on payment of requisite stamp duty and penalty by the plaintiff; and that the defendant had failed to repay the amount. The plaintiff's suit was accordingly decreed. The defendant then preferred an appeal in the court of the District Judge of Bhopal. The learned District Judge took the view that the document was a promissory note and as it did not bear any stamp at all it was inadmissible in evidence; and that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he had advanced to the defendant Rs. 1160/- . The plaintiff's suit was, therefore, dismissed by the learned District Judge. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff. 3. Having heard Learned Counsel for the parties, I have arrived at the conclusion that this appeal must be dismissed. The learned District Judge was no doubt in error in thinking that the document in question is a promissory note. The document Ex. P/1 is in Urdu, and when translated into English it runs as follows:-- That an amount of Rs. 1160/- (one thousand and one hundred and sixty), the half of which is Rs. 580/- has been taken by me in cash on parole (Bator dast garda) from Munshi Nisarali Saheb. The document Ex. P/1 is in Urdu, and when translated into English it runs as follows:-- That an amount of Rs. 1160/- (one thousand and one hundred and sixty), the half of which is Rs. 580/- has been taken by me in cash on parole (Bator dast garda) from Munshi Nisarali Saheb. The same amount shall be returned by 21-1-1949, therefore, this document as a receipt on demand has been executed so that it may be used as the occasion may arise Dated 15-1-1949. Sd./ (by the defendant). The text of the document is plain enough to show that it is not a promissory note as defined in S. 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. It is not necessary to consider whether the document is a bond or an acknowledgement. Even if it is treated as a bond and held to be admissible in evidence on payment of penalty and requisite stamp duty by the plaintiff, it does not carry the plaintiff's case any further The reason is that the evidence on record shows that no consideration ever passed from the plaintiff to the defendant Now, in a suit on a bond, the primary burden is on the plaintiff. He must prove execution as well as consideration (see Udebhan vs. Vithoba A.I.R. 1939 Nag 78). Here the defendant no doubt admitted the execution of the document but pleaded that it was without consideration. The onus was, therefore no doubt upon him to show that the recital of the receipt of consideration in the document was not true. The defendant did not lead any evidence to support his allegation that the document was executed for payment of a bribe. If the matter had stood there, then it would have been legitimately held that the document was executed with consideration. But the plaintiff himself led evidence to show that he paid Rs. 1160/- to the defendant on 15th January 1949. That evidence is so inherently difficult of acceptance that it destroys altogether the presumption arising about the passing of consideration on the defendant's admission of the execution of the document. It is in evidence that on 15th January 1949 and for some ten years before the plaintiff was in straitened circumstances and did not possess sufficient amount to enable him to advance Rs. 1160/- to the defendant. It is in evidence that on 15th January 1949 and for some ten years before the plaintiff was in straitened circumstances and did not possess sufficient amount to enable him to advance Rs. 1160/- to the defendant. According to the plaintiff he pledged his wife's and daughter's ornaments with one Dhannalal and advanced a loan of Rs. 1160/- to the defendant out of the amount borrowed by him from Dhannalal. Dhannalal gave evidence to the effect that the plaintiff had pawned the ornaments after representing to him that they belonged to his daughter and that he was pledging them because his son-in-law required some amount. Dhannalal also made the statement that the entry in his account book about the pledge was in the name of the plaintiff's son-in-law. The plaintiff admitted that on 15th January 1949 the defendant owned a house of the value of Rs. 2000/- to Rs. 2500/- . This evidence does not at all prove the probability of the plaintiff having advanced any amount to the defendant. It is difficult to believe that a person who has been in straitened circumstances for some years would advance money to another by pledging the ornaments of his wife and daughter without there being an impelling necessity for it. No such necessity has been shown in the present case. The fact that the defendant himself possessed property and could easily raise money on the security of his property altogether reduces the likelihood of the plaintiff going to the length of pawning ornaments of his wife and daughter just to oblige the defendant. If the evidence of Dhannalal is accepted, the pledge of the ornaments said to have been effected was not by the plaintiff but by his son-in-law and the money was needed not by the defendant but by the plaintiffs son-in-law. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant urged that as the burden of proving want of consideration was on the defendant, who had admitted the execution of the document, and as the defendant led no evidence to negative the presumption arising under S. 114 Evidence Act about passing of consideration, the defendant must fail even though the plaintiff's evidence about payment of consideration was not satisfactory. I do not agree. No doubt on the admission of execution of the bond by the defendant a presumption under S. 114 Evidence Act about passing of consideration would arise. I do not agree. No doubt on the admission of execution of the bond by the defendant a presumption under S. 114 Evidence Act about passing of consideration would arise. But this is a rebuttable presumption. The burden is no doubt on the defendant to prove circumstances rebutting the presumption Bui if the evidence on record, no matter whether led by the plaintiff or by the defendant, itself rebuts the presumption, then the presumption cannot be allowed to stand merely because the evidence rebutting the presumption was led by the plaintiff and not by the defendant. 5. In my judgment, on the evidence on record the learned District Judge of Bhopal was right in coming to the conclusion that no amount was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant and in dismissing the plaintiff's suit. This appeal is, therefore, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.