The facts leading to this application in revision against an order of confirmation made by the learned Additional Collector, Ajmer dated 10.6.59 may in brief be stated as below:— 2. Shri Chhoga and others who are non-applicants before us filed an application in the court of S.D.O. Ajmer u/s. 104 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act with the averment that they had been cultivating the land in dispute as Khudkasht since long and that the applicants on 5.7.1953 had unlawfully taken and retained possession of the said land and forcibly ploughed it without any authority. It was prayed that the applicants be ejected from the. said land and the opposite party be put in possession thereof and damages to the extent of Rs. 500/- be awarded. The above allegations were denied by the applicants who in their written statement urged that they had been cultivating the said land since long as tenants of the Jagirdar Sayed Abdul Vasid and paid rent to him for the same and that the non-applicants were neither the tenants of the land nor ever held possession thereof. The trial court framed issues and after some of the witnesses of the opposite party had already been examined an application was moved by the opposite party evidently under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. in which it was stated that the land in dispute was mortgaged by Lata and Mala Ballais of village Gagel in favour of Shri Imam Ali Jagirdar in year 1885, that the opposite party were the heirs and successors of the said mortgagor and got the land redeemed from the present Jagirdar who put them in possession of the said land. In this application it was prayed that the alleged mortgage deed being an important piece of evidence in the case should be allowed to be produced now as it was not traceable at the time of filing the other documents and could not therefore be produced earlier. This application was contested by the applicants on the ground that if the said document be allowed to be placed on record and admitted in evidence it would set up a case entirely different from what was originally pleaded in the plaint and that it should therefore be disallowed. The trial court, however, allowed the application of the opposite party and admitted the document in question in evidence. The trial court, however, allowed the application of the opposite party and admitted the document in question in evidence. Thereafter it appears that further evidence was produced by the opposite party to prove that the said land had been redeemed by the opposite party and on its redemption the Jagirdar induced the applicants who had been admittedly in cultivatory possession thereof upto 4.5.1960 to surrender it to the Jagirdar who out of pity put the non-applicants in possession of the land. The applicants also examined their witnesses. After having recorded the evidence of the parties on the issues which had been earlier framed the trial court held that the land in dispute which had been in cultivatory possession of the applicants upto 1950 as tenants of the Jagirdar, had on redemption of the alleged mortgage been surrendered by the applicants to the Jagirdar, who thereafter put the opposite party in possession as his tenants. It was also found that on the crucial date i.e. 5.7.1953 the opposite party were in lawful possession of this land and that they were forcibly and unlawfully [dispossessed by the applicants. On the basis of these findings the trial court allowed the application of the opposite party and ordered that the applicant* be ejected from the land in dispute and damages to the extent of Rs. 160/-, being four timer of the rental value of the land, be also awarded to the opposite party. The case was then submitted to the learned Collector who passed it on to the Addl. Collector for confirmation of the proceedings under sec. 182 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950. The learned Addl. Collector after hearing the counsel for both the parties confirmed the order of the trial court. Hence this revision petition has been filed by the applicants challenging the correctness of the impugned decisions of the lower courts on several grounds. * The learned counsel for the applicants urged that the manner in which the trial court conducted itself in the disposal of the case was wholly unwarranted by law and full of such procedural irregularities and illegalities as to call for an interference by this court in the exercise of their revisionary powers. * The learned counsel for the applicants urged that the manner in which the trial court conducted itself in the disposal of the case was wholly unwarranted by law and full of such procedural irregularities and illegalities as to call for an interference by this court in the exercise of their revisionary powers. It was pointed out that the application as originally instituted did not at all disclose how and when the opposite party redeemed the alleged mortgage said to have been made by Lala and Mala whom they claimed to be their ancestors in favour of the father of the present Jagirdar. Further it was no where stated in the plaint that the applicants voluntarily surrendered this land to the present Jagirdar after the redemption of the alleged mortgage and how and in what capacity the opposite party were put in possession of the disputed land. It was vehemently urged that the story of the alleged mortgage, its redemption, and surrender by the applicants in favour of the Jagirdar was a myth and a creation of the machinations of the Jagirdar and his Kamdar who colluded with the opposite party to oust the applicant who had ever since admittedly remained accredited tenants duly admitted by the Jagirdar somewhere in 1934. The oral evidence of some of the witnesses examined by the applicants was also referred to by the learned counsel for the applicants in order to show that there was no evidence worth the name to support the findings of the lower courts about the alleged voluntary surrender said to have been made by the applicants in favour of the Jagirdar. A reference was made to some of the documents produced by the opposite party in order to establish that they were either inadmissible in evidence, or illegally relied upon by the lower courts. The learned counsel for the opposite party, however, tried to meet all these contentions in his own way. 3. A plain reading of the plaint as it was put before the trial court clearly shows that the opposite party did not at all state any thing about the alleged mortgage of the land, its redemption and voluntary surrender by the applicants. No issues could therefore be framed on these controversial points. 3. A plain reading of the plaint as it was put before the trial court clearly shows that the opposite party did not at all state any thing about the alleged mortgage of the land, its redemption and voluntary surrender by the applicants. No issues could therefore be framed on these controversial points. If, however, the opposite party had thought it necessary to introduce these facts the correct procedure for the court was to have asked the opposite party to amend its pleadings in order to give an adequate opportunity to the applicants to contest the same in their amended written statement. This would have further facilitated the framing of additional issues and recording the evidence of the parties in the manner as contemplated by law. No such procedure was, however, followed by the trial court and yet the opposite party was allowed to produce evidence on these matters which did not form a part of the pleadings or subject matter of an issue. This, in our opinion, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicants, is a material irregularity and illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction in as much as that it militates against the well known maxim "Secundum allegata et probata" Nevertheless as the whole mass of evidence was recorded at the instance of the parties and no objection was seriously taken in the lower courts, we have gone into it ourselves. The statement of Abdul Vasid AW2 the present Jagirdar and his Kamdar Shri Laxmi Narain AW3 through whom the opposite party claims tenancy are very significant on the point whether the said land was ever voluntarily surrendered by the applicants who had been cultivating it since long up to 1950. Abdul Vasid stated that this land had been in cultivatory possession of Shah Mohamad and the other applicants upto 1950 as his tenants and that on his request they surrendered this land and put the opposite party in possession thereof, and the Ex.A.l, purporting to admit the opposite party as tenants was got executed and possession made over to them. This Ex.Al as stated by Laxmi Narayan (AW3) its scribe and Kamdar of the Thikana was written by him "at the instance and under dictation of the Jagirdar". This Ex.Al as stated by Laxmi Narayan (AW3) its scribe and Kamdar of the Thikana was written by him "at the instance and under dictation of the Jagirdar". It has been strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that from the statements of these two witnesses it is impossible to hold that the applicants voluntarily surrendered the land which they had been admittedly cultivating for the last sixteen or seventeen years. It was urged that in order to constitute a valid surrender there ought to emanate from the tenant himself, a proposal to give up his tenancy rights in the land to the landlord out of free will and volition; if however on the contrary the land holder puts up a proposal to the. tenant in possession to give up the land and compels the tenant to do so it would be impossible and absurd to call such a relinquishment as a voluntary surrender. We have no doubt in our mind that from the evidence of the Jagirdar as well as the Kamdar on whose evidence the trial court has so much relied in giving a finding on surrender against the applicants clearly shows that the entire thing was done at the behest and dictates of the Jagirdar who by virtue of his dominating position may have succeeded in prevailing upon the applicants to agree for a moment to relinquish the land. It is inconceivable indeed that but for duress and compulsion of the Jagirdar, an old tenant of about sixteen years standing could have agreed voluntarily to part with his means of livelihood. Again the rent receipts o/l and o/2 dated 24-12-52 and o/3 dated 1-5-1953 admittedly issued by the Jagirdar and his Kamdar to the applicants for the land clearly show that in spite of the alleged surrender, the applicants did not actually give up possession, but continued to cultivate the land and the Jagirdar accepted rent for the same. A surrender of a holding whatever may be its nature remains incomplete if possession is not gi\en up and rent accepted by the landholder. It would be in our opinion therefore absurd to come to a finding on the basis of this evidence that the applicants had voluntarily surrendered the land to the Jagirdar and that the opposite party were actually put in lawful possession of the land. It would be in our opinion therefore absurd to come to a finding on the basis of this evidence that the applicants had voluntarily surrendered the land to the Jagirdar and that the opposite party were actually put in lawful possession of the land. This being so the entire fabric of the opposite partys case which was built up on the story of surrender falls to the ground, and the findings of the lower courts on this point even if they are concurrent can not be accepted by us. The learned counsel for the opposite party however drew our attention to certain rent receipts said to have been given by the Jagirdar to the non-applicants for the year 1950 onwards as well as a purcha lagan said to have been issued in their favour in proof of the fact that they were actually put in possession of the land. The parcha lagan is admittedly still under dispute and proceedings are pending in the Settlement Department about correction of entries therein. It has thus no evidentiary value of any weight at this stage. The rent receipts even if they be genuine do not help the opposite party for the simple reason that in the circumstances as stated above it was quite easy for the Jagirdar and the opposite party who had a unity of purpose to create this piece of evidence to dislodge the applicant. In view of all these facts we are of the opinion that the findings arrived at by the lower courts can not be supported. In the result the application is allowed, the decisions of the lower courts are set aside and the application filed by the opposite party is hereby dismissed. Shri R.N. Hawa: 1. This is a revision preferred by unsuccessful defendant against the order of the Addl. Collector Ajmer dated 10-6-59 whereby he confirmed the order and decree of ejectment passed against the applicants by the S.D.O. III Ajmer u/s. 104 of the Ajmer Tenancy & Land Records, Act, 1915 on 30-4-58. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. Collector Ajmer dated 10-6-59 whereby he confirmed the order and decree of ejectment passed against the applicants by the S.D.O. III Ajmer u/s. 104 of the Ajmer Tenancy & Land Records, Act, 1915 on 30-4-58. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. Briefly put, circumstances leading to this revision are that on 3-11-55 the opposite party filed an application u/Sec. 104 of the Ajmer Tenancy & Land Records Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the court of the S.D.O., Ajmer with the allegation that field No. 1084 situated in village Gegal Tehsil Ajmer was in his cultivatory possession as Khudkast, that the applicants on 5.7.53 have taken and retained possession of the said land in contravention of the provisions of the Act by forcibly ploughing it and growing bazra and jowar crops thereon, and that therefore they be ejected therefrom and the opposite party be put in possession thereof. This was denied by the applicants and it was averred that the opposite party had no connection whatsoever with the land under dispute, that the applicants had been in possession thereof from a long time and paying rent thereof to the Jagirdar, that they had never dispossessed the opposite party and so there did not arise any question of their being ejected and the opposite party being re-instated into possession. Additional pleas were taken to the effect that the application was time-barred and suffered from the defect of non-joinder of the Jagirdar as the necessary party and that the same was not maintainable in law. Following issues were framed by the trial court— (1) Were the applicants (opposite party in this revision) "tenants" (subsequently amended to "landlord") in cultivatory possession of the land in dispute ? (2) Were the applicants (opposite party in this revision) dispossessed of the land in dispute as alleged in para 2 of the application ? (3) Did the applicants (opposite party in this revision) suffer damages as alleged in para 5 of the application ? (4) Is the application not maintainable as alleged in para 1 and 3 of the additional pleas ? | (5) Is the application barred by time? (6) To what relief the applicants (opposite party in this revision) are entitled. 3. These issues were framed on 7.1.58 after a number of adjournments sought by the parties for one reason or the other. | (5) Is the application barred by time? (6) To what relief the applicants (opposite party in this revision) are entitled. 3. These issues were framed on 7.1.58 after a number of adjournments sought by the parties for one reason or the other. Date 4.2.54 was fixed for taking the evidence and the parties were ordered to produce their documentary evidence in the meanwhile. On 4.2.54 the opposite party produced two witnesses and the case was further adjourned to 4.3.54. On 4.3.54 one more witness was produced by the applicants whose statement also remained incomplete. Documents Ex.A1 to A5 were also produced. Next date was adjourned at the request of the parties, on the next date and 28.5.54 before any proceedings were taken, an application was presented by the opposite party under O. 13 R. 2 and sec. 151 of C.P.C. stating that the land in dispute had been mortgaged by Lala and Mala sons of Shimbhu Ballai of village Gegal in favour of Shri Imam Ali Jagirdar of Gegal in year 1885, that the opposite party were the heirs and successors of the said Lala and Mala and therefore entitled to the land in dispute, that they had got it redeemed from the present Jagirdar who were in possession of the same and obtained the mortgage deed from them, that the same mortgage deed was very important piece of evidence in this case and would help the court in arriving at a just decision of the case besides being 30 years old the genuineness whereof was beyond doubt, that the said mortgage deed was not traceable at the time of filing of the documents in this case and as such it could not be produced earlier and that therefore permission may be granted to produce the document in evidence. It may be remarked in this connection that the previous documents Ex.A-1 to A-5 produced by the opposite party had been produced on 4.2.54 and 4.3.58. After a number of adjournments at the request of the parties and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties it was decided on 14.12.54 by the learned trial court that the opposite party could produce the mortgage deed applied for after paying costs awarded, date 1.2.55 was fixed for production of further evidence by the opposite party. After a number of adjournments at the request of the parties and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties it was decided on 14.12.54 by the learned trial court that the opposite party could produce the mortgage deed applied for after paying costs awarded, date 1.2.55 was fixed for production of further evidence by the opposite party. The mortgage deed under reference was produced on this very D/14.12.54.After a number of adjourn ments again either at the request on the part of the parties or for want of time on the part of court, further evidence was recorded in the matter on 5.8.S5;when the incomplete statement of the opposite party witness No. 3 were completed and one more witness was examined. The remaining witnesses were left to be examined later on for want of time. In this way after adjournments from time to time and examination of the evidence of the parties the case was decided by the learned trial court on 30.4.58. The learned S.D.O. found issues No. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the opposite party. The issues Nos. 4 and 5 were left undecided as having not been pressed by the applicants, and in result the applicants were ordered to be ejected from the land in dispute and further ordered to pay Rs. 160/- by way of damages. The proceedings were submitted to the learned Addl. Collector, Ajmer for confirmation under sec. 182 of the Act. The contention raised before the Addl. Collector on behalf of the applicants was that the opposite party were Biswedars and the applicants were in cultivatory possession of the land since long as tenants and so could not be ejected except under the provisions of sec. 96 of the Act and that as the case did not fall under the provisions of sec. 96 of Act, they could not be ejected from the land. It was admitted before the learned Addl. Collector by the parties that the opposite party were the Biswedars of the land in dispute and the rent was being paid to the Jagirdar of the village. The main point determined by the learned Addl. Collector was therefore as to who was in possession of the land and whether any dispossession had taken place or not. Collector by the parties that the opposite party were the Biswedars of the land in dispute and the rent was being paid to the Jagirdar of the village. The main point determined by the learned Addl. Collector was therefore as to who was in possession of the land and whether any dispossession had taken place or not. After considering the evidence produced on behalf of the parties and discussing the same in the same elaborate manner as bad been done by the learned S.D.O., the learned Addl. Collector came to the conclusion that the opposite party were in possession of the land in dispute from 4.5.50, from before the date of coming into force on 12.5.50 of the Act, and that they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the applicants on 5.7.53. The orders of the learned S.D.O. were therefore confirmed. 4. It is against these concurrent findings of both the learned counsel below that this revision has been preferred by the applicant. 5. The orders and decrees of the lower courts have been assailed by the learned counsel for the applicants on the grounds that— (1) The learned trial court bad allowed evidence to be recorded and decided the case after considering the same, which was not at all in consonance with the application of the opposite party and being thus at variance from the pleadings could not be considered for the decision of the case and that therefore both the learned courts below had acted illegally and with material irregularity affecting the decision of the case on merits. (2) Statements Ex.A 16 had been wrongly admitted into evidence without there having been submitted a proper proof of the deposition [thereof by the applicant Shah Mohamad and therefore again the decision of the learned courts below suffered from an illegality affecting decision of the case on merits. (3) Plea of surrender by the applicants taken by opposite party had not at all been proved and therefore the learned courts below had again acted illegally in basing their decision thereon. 6. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the opposite party a proforma had been prescribed for the application to be presented u/Sec. 104 of the Act by rule 47 of the Rules framed under the Act. 6. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the opposite party a proforma had been prescribed for the application to be presented u/Sec. 104 of the Act by rule 47 of the Rules framed under the Act. Chapter VIII contained Rule 47 and specifically stated that an application u/Sec. 104 of the Act shall substantially state the particulars mentioned in form 24. The form consisted of 6 paras and the para second thereof contained that the taking or retaining possession of the disputed land in contravention of the provisions of the. Act had to be stated and what was required was only "the manner of wrongful entry or retention of possession to be specifically stated". The form prescribed for the application did not as such contain any where that it was necessary to be stated as to how the person making the application had come into possession of the land under dispute. What was needed was only the manner in which wrongful entry had been done and the possession wrongfully retained by the person applied against. It could not therefore be said that the opposite party had by not stating as to how they had come into possession of the land, when they were bound by the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder to present the application in a prescribed form alone, they had intentionally kept those particulars back from the applicants and had taken them by surprise by starting to produce evidence about the mortgage, the redemption thereof and the surrender of the land. Even O. 6, R. 3 of the C.P.C. required that the form and appendix thereof when applicable shall be used for all pleadings and that when they we not so applicable forms of the like character as nearly as may be were to be used for writing out the pleadings. R. 4 of this order only required that in all cases in which particulars beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid were required to be stated shall be stated in the pleadings. Now this application filed by the opposite party related only to a wrongful dispossession from the disputed land and wrongfully retaining possession thereof. It did not therefore require any particulars more than that the opposite party were in possession and had been wrongfully dispossessed therefrom on 5.7.53 in the manner stated in the application. Now this application filed by the opposite party related only to a wrongful dispossession from the disputed land and wrongfully retaining possession thereof. It did not therefore require any particulars more than that the opposite party were in possession and had been wrongfully dispossessed therefrom on 5.7.53 in the manner stated in the application. Even if, however, for the sake of argument (with which I do not agree) it be taken that the application (plaint) had not been properly framed, this in itself could not be a ground sufficient to throw away the case on principle law that the pleadings in India and specially in the Mofussil were not to be construed strictly but that only it was to be seen whether particular matters had been stated in the forms required or not. In AIR 1956 Rajasthan 171 it has been held that "pleadings in India and specially those in the Mofussil should not be construed very strictly, and the court must look to the essentiality of justice of the case without considering whether matters of form have been strictly adhered to", This was an application against wrongful dispossession from land and the wrongfully retaining of the same. What was required to be stated in such a case was only that the opposite party who were in possession of the land had been wrongly dispossessed therefrom. The issues framed contained what was to be proved by the opposite party and the applicants, as the onus of proof was not on them, could not be called to have been taken by surprise by the evidence produced by the opposite party to show how and from when they were in possession and how and when they had been dispossessed. If a party knows from the evidence produced by the other side in advance the case he has to meet, he cannot be called to have been taken by surprise. Nor can a court throw out a claim on mere technicality of pleadings where t)he substance of thing is there and no prejudice caused to the other side. A.I.R. 1952 Supreme Court 47 may be perused in this connection. This brings us to the Rule of "Secundum allegatta et probata." The test when, objection of this kind is taken, is to see whether the party aggrieved has really been taken by surprise or is prejudiced by the action of the opposite party. A.I.R. 1952 Supreme Court 47 may be perused in this connection. This brings us to the Rule of "Secundum allegatta et probata." The test when, objection of this kind is taken, is to see whether the party aggrieved has really been taken by surprise or is prejudiced by the action of the opposite party. In applying this test the whole circumstances are required to be taken into account and carefully scrutinised to find out whether there has really been such a surprise or prejudice as would disentitle a party to relief. Every variance between pleadings and proof is not necessarily fatal to the suit or defence. In this case the applicants knew clearly that the opposite party were required to prove that they were in possession of the land and they had been dispossessed therefrom ; the parties were at issue on these points and they have led their evidence thereon. The application put up under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. referred to above was al$o not seriously contested by the applicants before their coming into this revision. The very first witness examined by the opposite party was Jagirdar and he disclosed in his evidence that the land in dispute had been mortgaged by the opposite party, that it had since been redeemed and that the applicants who had been cultivating the same during the period of mortgage had given up possession thereof in favour of the opposite party. This theory had not therefore been introduced in the middle of the evidence all of a sudden or surprisingly and to the prejudice of the applicants at the fag-end of the case. But from the very beginning, and the applicants have had a sufficient chance of cross-examining the witnesses produced by the opposite party and have been producing their evidence in rebuttal thereof. It has been held in AIR 1915 P.C. 2 that points on which parties have been allowed to go to proof can be decided by the courts. Thus where a ground though not raised in the pleadings is expressly put in issue or where the new claim set up is not inconsistent with the allegations made in the pleadings there cannot be called to be a question of surprise to the other party. Thus where a ground though not raised in the pleadings is expressly put in issue or where the new claim set up is not inconsistent with the allegations made in the pleadings there cannot be called to be a question of surprise to the other party. So also where there was no specific plea or specific issue on a particular question but where the parties have gone to trial with the full knowledge that the question was in issue and adduce evidence, there cannot be called to have occurred any prejudice to the other party. This question was examined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1956 Supreme Court 593 and it was held that "True scope of this rule (O. 6, R. 2) is that evidence let in on issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue which is not present to the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to cases where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduced evidence relating thereto." In that case the plea of lis pendens was not taken in the pleadings and the question was whether the evidence bearing on that question could be properly looked into or not for it was an established principle of law that "No amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward". But it was found that the question of lis pendens was raised by the plaintiff at the very commencement of the trial when he went to the witness-box and no objection was raised by the deft. to its reception. In the appellate court also far from objecting to this plea the defendants argued the question on merit and sought a decision on that evidence. Their Lordships therefore observed that "we are satisfied that the defts. went to trial with full knowledge that the question of lis pendens was in issue, had ample opportunity to adduce their evidence, thereon, and fully availed themselves of the same, and that, in the circumstances the absence of a specific pleadings on the question was a mere irregularity, which resulted in no prejudice to them". went to trial with full knowledge that the question of lis pendens was in issue, had ample opportunity to adduce their evidence, thereon, and fully availed themselves of the same, and that, in the circumstances the absence of a specific pleadings on the question was a mere irregularity, which resulted in no prejudice to them". In the present case also the very first witness produced on behalf of the opposite party disclosed the plea that the land in dispute had been mortgaged had been got redeemed on 4.5.50 and that the applicants who were sub-tenants thereof had voluntarily given up the possession thereof in favour of the opposite party and the applicants had full opportunity of cross-examining not only this witness but also subsequent evidence produced in this behalf. They thus went to trial knowing the case of the opposite party fully well and met it in their own way. Not only this but they also argued and sought decision thereon in both the lower courts. The principles of Secundum allegata et probata does not therefore operate in this case, and it will not be strictly applied when there could be no surprise and the applicants were not prejudiced thereby. As held in AIR 1951 Orissa 11, if a court sees that a plaintiff is entitled to the relief which is claimed by him although on grounds other than those put forward in his claim it should grant that relief it the defts. were not thereby taken by surprise. So also, as held in AIR 1948 Avadh, 307 when the issues in this case were already enough to cover up the case put up by the opposite party, all record was there before court and evidence had been led on all the points, the applicants could not be called to have been taken by surprise, nor prejudiced in their case. As stated above this was a case only for wrongful dispossession and what was required to be proved by the opposite party was only their possession and wrongful dispossession therefrom. The issues had been framed to cover this and the parties went to evidence fully knowing these issues, the opposite party disclosed their case with the introduction of very first witness, the applicants could not therefore be at all called to have been taken by surprise. The issues had been framed to cover this and the parties went to evidence fully knowing these issues, the opposite party disclosed their case with the introduction of very first witness, the applicants could not therefore be at all called to have been taken by surprise. And therefore it can not be said that the learned courts below had taken into consideration, and decided the case, on an evidence which was not at all in consonance with the application of the opposite party but was at variance with the pleadings and so could not be considered for the decision of the case. There is thus no illegality and material irregularity by the learned courts in this respect. 6. Now regarding the contention that the statement Ex.A.16 has been wrongly admitted into evidence without a proper proof of the deposition thereof by the applicants Shri Shah Mohamad himself; there appears to be some truth in this contention. When the applicant Shri Shah Mohamad had denied having made such statements the fact that they had been given by himself should have been proved specifically. No such proof appears to have been brought on record in this case. Basing a decision on such a statement therefore could be called to be an illegality affecting decision of the case on merits. In this respect, however, it can not be overlooked whether even if this piece of evidence is left out of consideration, the case of the opposite party was proved or not. This evidence has been considered by the trial court in connection with decision of issue No. 2 regarding dispossession from the disputed land. This has got nothing to do with the coming into possession over the disputed land of the opposite party. And, there is a huge volume of evidence regarding this dispossession from the disputed land. The testimony of AWs. Abdul Rahaman, Abdul Basis, Laxmi Narain, Dharam Chand, Vali Mohamad, Ali Mohamad (AWs. 1 to 6) clearly corroborate the testimony of the opposite party Nathu and Kalu themselves that they were forcibly dispossessed of the disputed land on 5.7.1953. Even by leaving the Ex. A16 out of consideration, the case of opposite party is not in any way affected. 7. The learned Addl. Collector has also referred to the statement Ex.A.16 in connection with the possession of the opposite party over the disputed land. Even by leaving the Ex. A16 out of consideration, the case of opposite party is not in any way affected. 7. The learned Addl. Collector has also referred to the statement Ex.A.16 in connection with the possession of the opposite party over the disputed land. Here also it should not have been used for the self-same grounds as given above. But here again the leaving out of consideration of these statements Ex A. 16 does not at all affect the case of the opposite party. The testimony of the witnesses produced on behalf of the opposite party goes to prove beyond doubt that the land had passed into possession of the opposite party on 4.5.1950. This is corroborated by the documentary evidence Ex.A2, A3 and A4-the rent-receipts of the disputed land for the years St. 2007, 2008, and 2009 which correspond to years 1950, 1951 and 1952. A. D. These receipts) have been duly proved by the Kamdar of the Jagirdar AW 3 Laxmi Narayan. As against these receipts, the receipts produced by the applicants Ex. 01, 02 and 03 are not free from suspicion. Ex. 01 even though purporting to be the rent receipt upto the period ending with St. 2006 (i.e. year 1949 A.D.) has been given in St. 2009 (on 24.12.1952), three years after, and does not say specifically, when the rent receipts produced by the opposite party state khasra numbers of the disputed land specifically, as to which land the amount related. Nor has it been explained as to why the receipt was not in the hands of the Kamdar as it should normally have been as it was for the year St. 2010, and why the rent was paid after three years of its becoming due even for the year St. 2006 but also for the period earlier than that as well and why there was a necessity of giving a remission of Rs. 50/- as alleged therein. Similarly rent receipt Ex.02 is for two years St. 2008 and 2009 and is for one fourth Banta when according to the statement of the applicant Shri Shah Mohamad himself the Banta should have been one-fifth. 50/- as alleged therein. Similarly rent receipt Ex.02 is for two years St. 2008 and 2009 and is for one fourth Banta when according to the statement of the applicant Shri Shah Mohamad himself the Banta should have been one-fifth. No explanation has been offered for this; nor has it been explained why it was again in the hands of the Jagirdar himself when the other receipts were in the hands of the Kamdar as it should have been and why the receipt was for two years of rent at a time and that also not on the date it was due but much after that. Rent receipt Ex. 03 for St. 2010 was in the hand of the Kamdar but it also contained one-fourth Banta when it should have been one-fifth in accordance with the statement of the applicant Shri Shah Mohamad himself. As against this rent receipt Ex.A.2, A. 3 and A. 4 produced by the opposite party were such as should have been issued regularly in the normal course of the business in the hands of the Kamdar of the Jagirdar. They have been corroborated by the Kamdar Laxmi Narayan A.W.3 to be genuine for the disputed land and there cannot be any reason for disbelieving them. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicants during the course of arguments that the deposition of this witness AW3 that for his convenience he had made the khata of the opposite party a separate number 19/2 without there being such division in the record of rights themselves went to show that he was a witness interested in the opposite party against the interest of the applicants and so should be disbelieved cannot be taken very seriously. If Khata No. 19 consists of so many Khasra numbers in possession of so many different parties there could not be any thing unnatural in sub-dividing the same by the person actually responsible for the recovery of rents in different Bata numbers for the sake of convenience. Apart from this, when no explanation has come forward for the unusual manner of the issuing of the rent-receipts to the opposite party, and there is no such receipt even put forward for the years Smt. 2007 (1950 AD) and whatever have been produced do not even state specifically that they were for the land under dispute and that during the year Svt. 2007 i.e. year 1950 AD (crucial year in this case) the land under dispute was in the possession of the applicants and not that of the opposite party. Apart from the question of propriety or impropriety of the coming into possession in the year Smt. 2007 i.e. 1950 AD of the opposite party over the dispute land, which is not at all in dispute in this case, it being not a case brought forward by the applicants for their having been wrongfully dispossessed by the opposite party on such a dispossession, but it being a case brought forward by the opposite party for their having been wrongfully dispossessed by the applicants after the opposite party having been put into possession about three years before that what is to be seen in this case is whether the opposite party were in possession of the land from Smt. 2007 (year 1950 AD) or not. It is what the learned lower courts have decided after recording full evidence of the parties after letting them have a full opportunity for adducing the same. Both the learned lower courts have found this concurrently in favour of the opposite party. This finding stands even if the statement A-16 is taken out of consideration; and is independent of it too. And as held in AIR 1926 Patna 29, even if a court erroneously holds any document to be admissible but arrives at its finding even independent of it its finding cannot be vitiated by such an admission alone. To come to a decision on the basis of evidence rightly recorded was absolutely within the competency of the learned courts below and they could not be called to have committed any illegality or material irregularity in their doing so. 8. Let us examine the third point raised by the learned counsel for the applicants that the plea of surrender had not at all been proved. As has been stated above also, it could not be lost sight of that this is not a case of dispossession in which an opposite party alleged to have wrongfully dispossessed an applicant has raised a plea of surrender, but it is a case in which an applicant comes forward to raise this plea only to show how he had come into possession of the land three years earlier and had since been dispossessed by the opposite party. In 1958 RRD 114 quoted by the learned counsel for the applicants it was the case of the former type that was under examination of the Board. It was quite alright for not taking the surrender to be a voluntary one in view of the facts of that particular case. Really the surrender or relinquishment cannot be the same as duress or compulsion. To constitute surrender or relinquishment there ought to emanate from the tenant a proposal for giving up his tenancy rights in the land to the landlord who should accept the same. A proposal by the landlord on the contrary to dislodge the tenant and compelling to accept the same cannot be taken as a voluntary surrender. But as referred to above also, this can be considered when there is a complaint against such a surrender. On the other hand when no such complaint is made, nor in any other way also it is opposed, and on the other hand it is very clearly proved by the evidence of the subsequent events including rent receipts that the land had so actually changed hand and the parties remained in possession accordingly for a sufficient period after that, there cannot certainly be an occasion to examine whether surrender had been voluntary or not. That stage no longer remains there and the fact accomplished has to be taken as it is. Admittedly in this case the opposite party are Biswedars of the land under dispute. They have been so recorded even in the record of rights as back as 1349 fasli. about 1942 AD. During that year in Khavat they had also been entered as mortgager and Abdul Rasis, Abdul Ahman and Abdul Kayum (one of the AWs) as mortgagee. The applicants were entered in Khatoni during that year only as tenants-at-will. There has been produced a copy of mutation register also opened before the starting of the present proceedings stating that the land had been redeemed from mortgage. There is no entry in favour of the applicants anywhere in the record of rights over disputed land after the year 1950. These facts coupled with the payment of rent as is proved by the rent receipts already discussed above by the opposite party from the year 1950 onwards go sufficiently to prove that the disputed land had passed into the hands of the opposite party in the year 1950 as alleged. These facts coupled with the payment of rent as is proved by the rent receipts already discussed above by the opposite party from the year 1950 onwards go sufficiently to prove that the disputed land had passed into the hands of the opposite party in the year 1950 as alleged. In a case of this type when possession and dispossession are alleged, what is required to be proved is only a possession and dispossession within the statutory period of limitation. No particular mode of possession or dispossession is required to be proved as has been held by the Board in a number of cases. When on the basis of evidence produced by the parties the learned courts below have come to a conclusion that the opposite party were in possession as alleged by them and had been similarly dispossessed as alleged by them, I do not think there is any occasion for the court of revision to examine the illegality or otherwise of the surrender. That could be examined in separate proceedings as discussed above certainly not in the proceedings of the instant type. A court of revision can interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower (courts only when (a) they have exercised jurisdiction not vested in them by law (b) or they have failed to exercise their jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Points (a) and (b) have not at all been raised in this case. It is only the point (c) that has been raised. The grounds on which it was raised have been already discussed above and found to be without force. Even in a case as in AIR 1926 Patna 29 when there is one piece of inadmissible evidence but the findings have been arrived at on the rest of the evidence there has not been found to be a sufficient reason to interfere with the findings of fact by the lower courts. Nor can the powers of revision be exercised to attack findings of the fact by the subordinate courts and substitute the appreciation of evidence by the revising court itself for that of the subordinate courts as held in AIR 1953 Travancore 535. Nor can the powers of revision be exercised to attack findings of the fact by the subordinate courts and substitute the appreciation of evidence by the revising court itself for that of the subordinate courts as held in AIR 1953 Travancore 535. The main point in this case for decision was whether the disputed land had been in possession of the opposite party from the year 1950 and they had been dispossessed therefrom in the year 1953 or not. Both the lower courts have found this in favour of the opposite party. The Board can not reopen these concurrent findings of facts by them. Only acting in breach of some provision or law or committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision of the case can be looked into in revision and not a finding of fact upon the appreciation of evidence. 9. This point as to when the powers of revision could be exercised by a revising court came into detailed examination of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in AIR 1953 Supreme Court 23 where Mahajan, C.J. after examining the leading cases decided by the Privy Council in its behalf held that even if the lower court had decided a case wrongly but within their jurisdiction there could not be called to have exercised their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and that these words did not cover either errors of facts or law but only the manner in which a decision had been reached. The errors contemplated, it was held, related to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact if the formalities which the law prescribed had been complied with. 10. As has been discussed in details above no such defect in procedure has been made out and the learned courts below have not been found to have acted in any way illegally or with material irregularity. 11. There is therefore no force in this revision and it is hereby rejected.