JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This is an appeal by the decree-holder whose application in execution has been dismissed on two grounds, namely, that it was filed during the operation of the Madhya Bharat Famine (Suspension of Proceedings) Act, 1953, and the order staying the proceedings and subsequent entertainment by the Court were illegal. The second ground is that at the first instance the decree-holder had mentioned in his application the original judgment-debtor, but on the next date he brought on record the representatives. The relevant facts are common ground. In 1953, there was an Act in force in certain parts of the Madhya Bharat, entitled "Famine (Suspension of Proceedings) Act", Section 7 of which runs thus: (1) No suit for money and no suit for foreclosure or sale in enforcement of a mortgage against an agriculturist, nor any appeal from any decree or order passed in any such suit shall be instituted during the prescribed period in any Court. (2) No application for execution of any decree referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 5 or for making final any preliminary decree for foreclosure or sale referred to therein shall be entertained by any Court during the prescribed period. It is to be noted that in regard to suits the principle was that it should not be instituted during the prescribed period, and in regard to application for execution, the principle was that no application should be entertained. The former, it may be noted, is similar to the wording in Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. It is common ground that the decree-holder's application for execution was filed during the prohibited period in an area in which the said Act was in force. The judgment-debtor prayed for stay, because of the operation of the Act and it was accordingly stayed and action on the application was taken after the end of the operation of the Act and took its usual course. The judgment-debtor prayed for stay, because of the operation of the Act and it was accordingly stayed and action on the application was taken after the end of the operation of the Act and took its usual course. Later on the judgment-debtor took another objection, namely, that the application having been filed during the operation of the said Act, it should be thrown out in accordance with the ruling, Mangtya v. Mangilal MLR 1934 Civil 386 which was one relating to the institution of the suits under the first Sub-section The executing Court as well as the first appellate Court felt that the same principles would be applicable to execution cases also and accordingly dismissed the application. In the present appeal, it was urged that the said ruling calls for reconsideration; but I rind that I am not called upon to do this, and I need restrict my attention to Sub-section (2). The distinction can, on occasions, be fundamental. Sub-section (i) (as indeed are Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure and Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act) puts a ban on the litigant from going to the Court, and may, literally interpreted, mean that the institution, in other words, the handing in of the plaint or memorandum is itself illegal. Whether or not that this interpretation is reasonable, it is certainly different from a ban on the Court from entertaining an application, that is to say, taking appropriate judicial action under the law, after the application is handed in by the party. The question, therefore, resolves to this: Whether by staying the execution applied for by the party till the termination of the Act, the Court had entertained it or had put off the entertaining to the proper time? The mere statement of the facts shows that by doing this the Court was just refusing to entertain it, calling upon the decree-holder to wait till entertaining it, that is to say, taking the steps for the collection of the dues from the judgment-debtor, was legally permitted. Far from breaking the mandatory ban imposed by Section 7(2), the Court was accepting it and was waiting for the ban to lift. In the other case, which is the subject-matter of the reported ruling, the Plaintiff had already broken the ban imposed by Sub-section (1) by handing in the memorandum. Far from breaking the mandatory ban imposed by Section 7(2), the Court was accepting it and was waiting for the ban to lift. In the other case, which is the subject-matter of the reported ruling, the Plaintiff had already broken the ban imposed by Sub-section (1) by handing in the memorandum. Whether the effect of this breach should lead to the dismissal of the suit, as laid down in the ruling, is a question which has been posed in arguments before me; however important in other cases, it does not call for consideration here. Thus, I am unable to find anything in Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act, or as for that matter, even in that ruling from which I can uphold the finding that the execution proceedings were ab initio void. Certainly, the decree-holder had handed in his application while the Act was in force. But I find no ban against handing in the application, in other words, instituting an execution case. This disposes of the first ground. The second ground is that in the application as handed in, the original judgment debtor, namely, Nihala Bhilala was mentioned. Later on, but well before the application became entertainable after the termination of the Act, the decree-holder petitioned that in his application he had mentioned the original judgment-debtor who, he had then learnt, was dead five months before it, and whose legal representatives he was naming. Accordingly, the names of the sons and who are admittedly the only legal representatives, were entered. On the date on which the application became entertainable, the names were of the present judgment-debtors; this is by the simple operation of Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment-debtors urged (and repeat here) that originally the dead judgment-debtor was named, and on the analogy of some rulings reported under Order 1, Rule 10, a suit against one dead man alone is a nullity and therefore an execution case against a dead man is also a nullity and the application should be thrown out. As there is some confusion in this regard, it will be convenient to set out the position briefly. As there is some confusion in this regard, it will be convenient to set out the position briefly. In view of Order 22, Rule 12, which expressly provides that the law of abatement on death of party, does not apply to execution proceedings, we should be on guard against applying to execution proceedings, principles such as have been quoted by the first appellate Court, which are in terms applicable only to suits. An execution application against a dead person is certainly of no effect, for the very simple reason that a dead person does not own property, and any property seized, attached or sold, would be belonging to somebody else, that is, a living person. Therefore, sooner or later, the living person liable to discharge the decretal debt under Section 50, should be on record and pursued in execution. But in regard to execution proceedings, the procedure is simpler because there is no abatement, and unless there is bad faith or fraud or any such thing, the decree-holder can bring the legal representatives of the dead judgment-debtor at any time; nor is limitation governed by Articles 176 and 177 of the Limitation Act, Certainly, an execution against legal representatives is governed by the general law of limitation in regard to execution but we are not concerned with it here. The Code of Civil Procedure also has no express provision for the substitution of the legal representatives of a deceased judgment debtor. This does not mean that we should straightway apply the principles contained in Order 1, Rule 10 or as for that matter anything in Order 22. The question is not whether execution application can proceed against the person originally named; certainly, it could not. It is, whether it was illegal for the decree-holder to bring on record even after five months after the death, or as for that matter even after a longer term provided he acts in good faith and diligence, the legal representatives answerable for the decreed debt under Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure Code. Thus I find nothing illegal in the execution application being filed with the name of the original judgment-debtor, and a prayer being made and rightly accepted to substitute and levy execution against his legal representatives. In the result, I find that both the grounds upon which the execution case was dismissed by the lower Courts are not sustainable. Thus I find nothing illegal in the execution application being filed with the name of the original judgment-debtor, and a prayer being made and rightly accepted to substitute and levy execution against his legal representatives. In the result, I find that both the grounds upon which the execution case was dismissed by the lower Courts are not sustainable. I would, accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order and direct that the execution case be restored. Costs and pleader's fee according to rules payable to the decree-holder-Appellant. Appeal allowed