JUDGMENT V.D. Bhargava, J. - This is a defendant's appeal in a suit filed by the plaintiff for ejectment and recovery of Rs. 1141|8/- as damages for use and occupation from 15th May, 1949 to 10th April, 1951, at the rate of Rs. 50/- per mensem. Pendentelite and future damages were also claimed at the same rate. 2. According to the plaint the plaintiff had let out the entire shop to Mitter San, who was the defendant in the suit. He died during the pendency of the suit and his widow, Smt. Asha Devi, the present appellant, had been brought on the record. The shop was given on an annual rental of Rs. 5001- on the 26th of January, 1944, for a fixed period of five years, but that was to be effective from the 15th of May, 1944. According to the plaintiff the tenancy came to an end on the 15th of May, 1949, that is, after the expiry of five years and the defendant became liable to ejectment. Another ground was that the defendant had sublet the shop to defendants nos. 2 to 4 without the consent of the plaintiff and hence he was liable to ejectment. 3. As I have already mentioned Mitter Sen was alive when the suit had been filed. He in his written statement had said that the shop was given to him for five years and he had actually paid Rs. 2500/- as rent in advance for five years. Later on the plaintiff colluded with Sumat Pershad and others, who were tenants in the shop and prevented him from taking possession of the same. The defendant, therefore, had to bring a suit and incur an expenditure of about Rs. 2500/- and was then able to get possession only on 7th May, 1947. Therefore, the period of five years should begin from the 7th of May, 1947. He also contended that he had got the shop partitioned at a cost of Rs. 2000/- and it was with the con-sent of the plaintiff that he had let it out to defendants Nos. 2 to 4; that the period of five years had not expired for which rent had already been paid and, therefore, the suit was premature. Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 did not contest the suit. 4. The trial court framed the following issues : "1. Has the period of tenancy expired ? 2. 2 to 4; that the period of five years had not expired for which rent had already been paid and, therefore, the suit was premature. Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 did not contest the suit. 4. The trial court framed the following issues : "1. Has the period of tenancy expired ? 2. Has the defendant sublet the shop? If so is the defendant liable to ejectment ? 3. Has the plaintiff not filed the suit? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to damages? If so to what amount ? 5. To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled ? 5. The trial court came to the conclusion that in the light of the provisions of Act 111 of 1947 the tenancy of defendant no. 1 continued even after the expiry of the period of five years unless terminated in the manner prescribed in the said Act. It was held that the subletting was done with the permission of the plaintiff; that defendant No. 1 was tenant of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of Rs. 916|10|8 as rent upto the 15th of March, 1951, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to eject the defendant. With these findings the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 6. The plaintiff went up in appeal against the dismissal of her suit for ejectment and also prayed for a further recovery. 7. The lower appellate court has concurred with the findings of the trial court to the effect that Mitter Sen continued to be a tenant even after the expiry of the period of five years and that he had sublet the shop with the consent of the plaintiff. But it came to the conclusion that after the death of Mitter Sen his widow was not entitled to continue as a tenant and was liable to ejectment. It thus modified the decree of the trial court. Aggrieved by the decision the defendant has come in this Court. 8. It has been argued on behalf of the defendant-appellant that the word 'tenant' in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, includes his heirs also. The object of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was that on account of dearth of accommodation tenants may not be put to inconvenience. 8. It has been argued on behalf of the defendant-appellant that the word 'tenant' in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, includes his heirs also. The object of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was that on account of dearth of accommodation tenants may not be put to inconvenience. As the preamble of the Act shows the Act was to provide for continuance during a limited period of powers to control the letting and the rent of such accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom. It further provided that due to the shortage of accommodation in the Uttar Pradesh it is expedient to provide for the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the letting and the rent of such accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom it was enacted. A tenant has been defined in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act in Sec. 2 (g) as a person by whom rent is, or but for a contract, express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation. After the death of Mitter Sen if the widow was occupying the premises rent would be payable to the landlord, the plaintiff. Therefore, for the purpose of this Act she would be still a tenant. If we are to take that the heirs of the original tenant are not allowed to continue, the object of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act would be frustrated. It is clear from the general explanation of the Act that it wanted to give relief to all those who were occupying the premises. Sec. 14 provided that:- "No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 3." 8. Therefore, according to this Act even if a decree had been obtained against the tenant on any of the grounds under the Transfer of Property Act he could not be ejected. Similarly Sec. 15 applied to all the pending suits. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that in the case of Raman Lal v. Bhagwan Das, A.I.R. 1950 Alld. Therefore, according to this Act even if a decree had been obtained against the tenant on any of the grounds under the Transfer of Property Act he could not be ejected. Similarly Sec. 15 applied to all the pending suits. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that in the case of Raman Lal v. Bhagwan Das, A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 583 it had been held that the right conferred under Sec. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act was not heritable and this tenancy was not inherited. 10. In the present case we are not concerned with the interpretation of the words used in the Transfer of property Act. As a matter of fact the Transfer of Property Act does not use the word 'tenant' at all. In Sec. 105 it has used the words 'Lessee' and 'Lessor.' It may be that after the lease had expired the defendant may not be a 'Lessee' but he would still be a 'ten-ant' under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Under the Transfer of Property Act a lease comes into existence after there is a privity of contract between the lessor and the lessee, but under the Rent Control and Eviction Act, a landlord may never have seen the face of the tenant, but one can become a tenant by allotment. Under the Rent Control and Eviction Act it is the possession, which has been recognised, not the agreement between the parties. Under the circumstances, I am of opinion that a tenant includes his heirs also if they continue in possession after the death of the tenant. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the case of Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Satya Niranjan Shaw, A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 227 That was a case under the Calcutta Rent Act. There the question was where after the expiry of the tenancy if the tenant continued in possession as ex-tenant whether he was entitled to certain relief under that Act and it was held that Sec. 14 intended to give relief to any person who, having been a tenant, comes within the period of limitation to assert his claim to recover excessive rent paid, whether at the time he claims it, he is actually a tenant or not. That case really does not very much help the appellant but personally I have no doubt that the object of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was to include the heirs of a tenant in the word 'tenant.' 12. So far as the question of subletting is concerned, the finding of the lower appellate court is a finding of fact binding upon me and cannot be challenged and the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly not contested it. But the learned counsel for the respondent has challenged the other finding of the court that after the expiry of the lease he could not be deemed to be a tenant under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is clear on this point. It has forbidden all kinds of suits against a tenant except on any of the grounds mentioned therein. There cannot be any doubt, that even after the expiry of the period of lease he would be a tenant at will and liable to payment of the rent to the landlord. Therefore, he would be a tenant under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act if immediately thereafter he was liable to pay rent and he would not be liable to ejectment under Sec. 3 except on any of the grounds mentioned therein. In the present case no notice for demand of arrears of rent, was served, on the tenant and, therefore, the plaintiff could not claim ejectment under Sec. 3 (e). She has failed to substantiate any of the grounds under Sec. 3. Therefore, the defendant would not be liable to ejectment. The U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act would have applied even if the suit was pending at the date when the Act came into force or even if a decree had been passed for ejectment but actually ejectment had not taken place before the Act came into force. I am accordingly of the opinion that the finding of the court below to the effect that he was a tenant within the meaning of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act even after the expiry of the term of lease is correct. 13. I am accordingly of the opinion that the finding of the court below to the effect that he was a tenant within the meaning of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act even after the expiry of the term of lease is correct. 13. I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court regarding the ejectment and restore the decree of the trial court with costs. Learned counsel for the respondents asked for leave to the special appeal. Since the question involved is an important question of law, I grant the leave asked for.