JUDGMENT 1. THIS is the defendant's appeal, arising out of a suit which was filed for ejectment and mesne profits. The suit was eventually decreed by the learned trial Court for joint khas possession only, the prayer for mesne profits being refused. There was an appeal from this decree of the trial court by the contesting defendant and the learned Subordinate Judge who heard this appeal maintained, in substance, the decree for joint possession omitting only the word 'khas' in the facts and circumstances of this case. There was also, in the lower appellate court, a cross-objection by the plaintiffs against the trial court's finding that the decree for joint possession would be subject to payment of compensation by the plaintiffs to the defendant under Section 9 (1) (iii) of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and also against the trial Court's refusal of the plaintiffs' claim for mesne profits. This cross-objection, however, does not appear to have been dealt with by the learned Subordinate Judge, possibly through oversight or inadvertence, and it remained on the record of the lower appellate court, strictly un-disposed of, although the learned Judge, in the ordering portion of his judgment, affirmed the decree of the trial Court by dismissing the defendant's appeal, omitting only the word 'khas' from the decree for 'joint khas possession', as passed by the said trial court. From this appellate decree, the present appeal has been taken to this court by the defendant and, on the plaintiffs' behalf, a cross-objection has been filed similar in terms of the cross-objection before the lower Appellate Court. This appeal and the cross-objection are now before us for disposal. 2. THE relevant facts are, practically speaking, not in dispute and the points that arise are really points of law, both in the appeal and in the cross-objection. These relevant facts, which lie within a short compass, may now be briefly stated for purposes of our judgment. Those facts stand as follows: The plaintiffs were the holders of an eight annas interest in the land in suit under a permanent ijara from certain deities, to whom the superior interest in the said eight annas share belonged, the plaintiffs being the holders of the superior interest with regard to the remaining eight annas share and the pro forma defendants, the patnidars under the plaintiffs in respect thereof. Of the above ijara interest of the plaintiffs, the contesting defendant came to take a settlement, first, in the year 1933, under a registered lease, which is Ext. 8 in the case, dated 4th Agrahayan 1340 B. S. corresponding to 20th November 1933. This lease was for a period of five years, from 18th October, 1933 to 17th October, 1938 and the stipulated rental was Rs. 500/-per annum. On the expiry of the aforesaid lease, the defendant continued to hold the demised land and a fresh registered lease was executed between the parties on 20th October, 1938, corresponding to 3rd Kartik 1345 B. S. for a period of four years, terminating with the end of Aswin 1349 B. S. According to the English calendar, this lease, which was marked as Ext. 8 (a) in the trial court was up to 17th October, 1942, and the stipulated rental under this lease [ext. 8 (a)] also was Rs. 500/- per annum. Thereafter, also the defendant continued to hold the disputed land and, on 7th July, 1943, corresponding to 22nd Ashar 1350 B. S., the defendant executed and registered a Kabuliyat, which is Ext. 1 in the case, at a rental of Rs. 550/- per annum for a period of four years, purporting to run from 18th October, 1942 to 17th October, 1946. This was followed by the defendant's holding over, again, from the 18th October, 1946 to 17th October, 1950, that is, for another period of four years, (Kartick 1353 B. S. to Aswin 1357 B. S.) upon an oral settlement, taken by the defendant, that is, a fresh settlement, according to the plaintiffs, and simply by holding over, according to the defendant, the plaintiffs' case being that, during this period, the stipulated rental was increased to Rs. 1,000/- per annum and there was also a payment of a lump sum premium of Rs. 1500/- for the brick-kiln in the disputed land. The application, which, according to the plaintiffs, was filed by the defendant in the plaintiffs' sherista for the purpose of taking or getting this oral settlement, has been marked as Ext. 11 in the case. 1,000/- per annum and there was also a payment of a lump sum premium of Rs. 1500/- for the brick-kiln in the disputed land. The application, which, according to the plaintiffs, was filed by the defendant in the plaintiffs' sherista for the purpose of taking or getting this oral settlement, has been marked as Ext. 11 in the case. With the expiry of this so-called oral settlement, the defendant's tenancy was terminated or purported to be terminated by the plaintiffs by a six months' notice to quit, ending with the expiry of the above month of Aswin 1357 B. S., and, upon, the defendant's refusal to act in terms of the said notice, the present suit was instituted by the plaintiffs on 10th September, 1951, for ejectment and mesne profits, as stated hereinbefore. 3. TO this suit, the defendant's defense, inter alia, was that, under the terms or provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, which had come into force in the meantime, he was entitled to protection from ejectment and the plaintiffs were not entitled to get back possession from the defendant. The defendant also disputed the plaintiffs' claim to mesne profits, his contention being that his tenancy was continued and protected by virtue of the provisions of the above Act. 4. THERE is no dispute that the disputed tenancy would be a tenancy, coming under and governed by the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, referred to hereinbefore. The dispute relates in the main, to the question of the claim of protection, asserted or put forward by the defendant under the said statute. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant could not come, in the circumstances of this case, under the terms of any of the sub-sections of section 7, but, his case would, at the most, come under section 9 of the Act and, accordingly, in view of the six months' notice which has, admittedly, been served upon the defendant by the plaintiffs, terminating or purporting to terminate the defendant's tenancy, the defendant would be entitled to no protection under the aforesaid statute. Both the courts below have accepted the plaintiffs' contention in this behalf and refused relief or protection to the defendant. Both the courts below have accepted the plaintiffs' contention in this behalf and refused relief or protection to the defendant. The trial court also, practically speaking, refused the plaintiffs' claim for mesne profits, as, in its opinion, although the defendant was not entitled to any protection from eviction under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, he would, at least, be entitled to compensation under section 9, sub-section (1) clause (iii) of the said Act, until and unless that compensation has been determined and paid by the plaintiffs, the defendant's status could not be, regarded as that of a trespasser and the plaintiffs' claim for mesne profits could not, accordingly, be maintained or given effect to. As we have already said above, before the lower appellate court, this finding of the trial court about the defendant's right or eligibility to claim compensation under the aforesaid section and the refusal of the plaintiffs' claim for mesne profits were included in the cross-objection, filed by the plaintiffs in the said court of appeal below, within its subject-matter but that cross-objection apparently through oversight or inadvertence, was not dealt with by that court. There is however, no difficulty in this matter from the plaintiffs' point of view as, in this court also, the plaintiffs have filed a similar cross objection and, accordingly, those points are open to argument here on the plaintiffs' behalf. Admittedly, in this case, the six months' notice to quit has been served in accordance with the terms of section 9 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and, if the defendant could come only under section 9 of the said Act, his tenancy must be deemed to have been validly determined by the said notice. If, however, the defendant's claim for protection under section 7. that is, either under subsection (4) or sub-section (5) of that section, which only are the two relevant provisions in that behalf, be found to be acceptable, the plaintiffs' claim for ejectment or for joint possession, as decreed by the lower appellate court, must be held to be not maintainable. 5. THE first point, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the defendant is entitled to claim protection under any of the two sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 7. 5. THE first point, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the defendant is entitled to claim protection under any of the two sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 7. Now, sub-section (4) of section 7, in its relevant part, runs as follows: "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract if any non-agricultural land held under a lease in writing for a period specified therein continues to be held with the express or implied consent of the landlord after the expiration of the time limited by such lease and the total period for which such land is so held is not less than twelve years, then the tenant holding the non-agricultural land comprised in such tenancy shall not be ejected by his landlord from such land except on the ground that he has used such land in a manner which renders it unfit for use for the purposes of the tenancy." And sub-section (5) of the said section 7,-to quote again, only the relevant portion,-is in these terms: "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, if the landlord has allowed pucca structures to be erected on any non-agricultural land held under a lease in writing for a period specified therein, whether such structures have been erected, (a) before the expiration of the said period, or (b) where such non-agricultural land continues to be held with the express or implied consent of the landlord after the expiration of the said period, during the period such non-agricultural land so continues to be held, then- (i) the tenant holding the non- agricultural land comprised in such tenancy shall not be ejected by his landlord from such land except on the ground that he has used such land in a manner which renders it unfit for use for the purposes of the tenancy." It is not necessary to refer to or to quote any other portion of section 7 for our present purpose. 6. TURNING now, to the facts of this case, it will at once be clear that the defendant was holding the demised land, which has been accepted as admittedly non-agricultural land within the meaning of this Act, from about the year 1933 until October, 1950, roughly making up a period of about 17 years. 6. TURNING now, to the facts of this case, it will at once be clear that the defendant was holding the demised land, which has been accepted as admittedly non-agricultural land within the meaning of this Act, from about the year 1933 until October, 1950, roughly making up a period of about 17 years. It is not necessary for our purpose to consider whether the first five years under the lease (Ext. 8) should be reckoned as period, relevant for purposes of Section 7. We will assume for our present purpose that the period also would be so relevant and, accordingly, the defendant's period of occupation would be roughly a period of 17 years. If now, under Section 7, sub-section (4), the defendant be entitled to the whole of this period of 17 years for purposes of that sub-section, he will clearly be entitled to the protection, given thereunder, as the requisite period, necessary for such protection, is 12 years of occupation. Reading Section 7, sub-section (4) by itself and without reference to any other section, the defendant's case would, prima facie, be a good case for protection under that section but section 7, sub-section (4) cannot be read alone or only by itself for the purpose of computation of the period, relevant thereunder. For such computation, inter alia, the statute itself lays down a particular mode and that mode is prescribed in the connected section 90 of the Act. For such computation, inter alia, the statute itself lays down a particular mode and that mode is prescribed in the connected section 90 of the Act. This Section (Section 90) runs as follows:- "if any non-agricultural land has been held by a tenant from before the commencement of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940- (a) Under a lease in writing and the time limited by such lease has expired either before such commencement or at any time during the period the said Act has been in force and the tenant has continued to hold such land during such period, or (b) under a lease in writing but no term is specified in such lease, or (c) Without a lease in writing, then in calculating for the purposes of sections 7 and 9, the period for which such land has been held by such tenant,- (i) in the case where the land has been held under a lease in writing and the time limited by such lease has expired at any time during the continuance in force of the said Act, the period for which such land has been held during such continuance after the expiration of the time limited by such lease, and (ii) in other cases the period for which the said Act has been in force, shall be excluded. " 7. THE above-quoted section (Section 90) was obviously dictated by reasons of justice to the landlords on account of the curtailment or restriction or suspension of their power of ejectment during the continuance of the allied previous temporary Act, namely, the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940. As the permanent Act (The West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949) was making a provision in section 7 that occupation for a period of twelve years would practically give immunity to tenants from ejectment and as it was making that provision at a time when, for the several years, prior thereto, the landlord, even if he had so wished, could not put into effect his desire for evicting a particular tenant, howsoever otherwise that desire might have been legitimate or lawful, the permanent Act was making a provision in Section 90 for appropriate exclusion of such period from the tenants' period of occupation for purposes of relevant computation as that was deemed necessary,-and obviously so,-for ends of justice. This appears to the underlying policy of Section 90 and, by that section, the Legislature wanted to regulate the mode of calculation of the period, both under section 7 and section 9, under which protection of one type or the other was given to the tenants from ejectment. It will be impossible to accept the argument that Section 90, inspite of its clear, express, specific and mandatory provision that it would apply in the matter of calculation of the period for purposes of section 7 and section 9, would not apply to the present case. Section 90 plainly contemplates all cases, where the tenant was actually holding (non-agricultural land-Ed.) either under a lease in writing for a specified period or for an unspecified period or without a lease in writing at the date of commencement of the temporary Act, the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940, and makes suitable and express provision for each of them, and the mode of calculation or exclusion, that it prescribes is that, if, at that time, the tenant was holding under a lease in writing and if such lease in writing expired during the continuance of the above temporary Act and the tenant continued to hold the land during the rest of the period, for which the aforesaid temporary Act lasted or continued in force. in the calculation of the period of twelve years under section 7 or of the relevant period under section 9, the occupation of the tenant for the period after the expiration of the lease in writing and before or up till the expiry of the above temporary Act, that is, between the expiry of the said lease and the expiry of the said Act, would not be relevant or taken into account. This, in our opinion, is the simple scheme and intention of section. 90 of the Act and it is simply and fully expressed by and in the actual words used in that Section. Indeed, no other meaning can possibly be given to these words and no other inference can reasonably or legitimately be drawn from them. This, in our opinion, is the simple scheme and intention of section. 90 of the Act and it is simply and fully expressed by and in the actual words used in that Section. Indeed, no other meaning can possibly be given to these words and no other inference can reasonably or legitimately be drawn from them. The words are plain enough and they are so plain as hardly to require or raise any question of construction and if this section (Section 90) has to be given effect-and that certainly has to be done-it must be applied, if the particular case comes within its terms, in making the necessary calculations under sections 7 and 9 of the Act. In the light of the above, the position becomes at once clear that the defendant who was holding, at the date of the temporary Act, under his second registered lease, running from October, 1938 to October, 1942, would come clearly under section 90, clause (a), sub-clause (i) and, on the application of the said provision, the period from after 17th October, 1942 till May 15, 1949 (exclusive), when the temporary Act came to an end and was replaced by the permanent Act, would have to be excluded. That would mean and justify the exclusion of about six and a half years from the defendant's total occupation of seventeen years for purposes of section 7 (4) and would thus reduce the effective period for purposes of that section to less than twelve years. In this view, the defendant would not be entitled to any protection, in the present case, under section 7 (4)-and he would have no protection also-under section 7 (5) either, as we shall presently see, of the above permanent Act, namely, the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 and his case would clearly come under the other section, that is, Section 9 of the said Act, and as, admittedly, the requisite six months' notice for terminating his tenancy has been given under the said section 9. sub-section (1), clause (iii), of the Act. the view taken on the question of ejectment by the lower appellate court must be held to be perfectly correct and its decree in that behalf ought to be maintained, unless its finding on the other sub-section of section 7, namely, sub-section (5), referred to above, be reversed in the defendant's favour. sub-section (1), clause (iii), of the Act. the view taken on the question of ejectment by the lower appellate court must be held to be perfectly correct and its decree in that behalf ought to be maintained, unless its finding on the other sub-section of section 7, namely, sub-section (5), referred to above, be reversed in the defendant's favour. So far, however, as this latter provision is concerned, namely, sub-section (5) of section 7, the defendant can claim, protection only if he is able to establish that, during the period of his occupation, as aforesaid, the landlord has allowed pucca structures to be erected on the demised land. This the defendant has attempted to show by adducing evidence to the effect that the erection and existence of such structures were known to the landlords and, inspite of that, they made no protests but allowed the same to be erected and to remain on the land. He has also attempted to adduce evidence of something like express permission from the landlords for the erection or building and continuance of those pucca structures. Neither of the above two branches of evidence, however, has been accepted either by the trial court or by the lower appellate court and, in this second appeal, we find no justification for taking a different view of the matter. We also agree with the lower appellate court that, for the application of sub-section (5) of section 7, the erection or the existence and continuance of the pucca structures must, at least, be shown to have been with the knowledge of the Landlord even though it was or might have been against the landlord's will. No such evidence, however, is forthcoming in the present case on this particular aspect of the matter which can be accepted as reliable. In this view we hold that the defendant would not also be entitled to any protection under sub-section (5) of section 7. 8. IT is necessary to notice here that, in connection with section 7 (4), Mr. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the defendant appellant, also raised a contention that the kabuliyat (Ext. 1) dated 7th July, 1943, should, by itself, be regarded as a lease in writing and the occupation or the possession of the tenant under this kabuliyat should not, in the circumstances, be liable to be excluded even under section 90. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the defendant appellant, also raised a contention that the kabuliyat (Ext. 1) dated 7th July, 1943, should, by itself, be regarded as a lease in writing and the occupation or the possession of the tenant under this kabuliyat should not, in the circumstances, be liable to be excluded even under section 90. We do not find any such restriction or exception in the words of Section 90, as would support or justify Mr. Gupta's claim or argument of application for his client, even if this kabuliyat be regarded, by itself, as a lease in writing, but apart from that, we also think that this kabuliyat (Ext. 1) cannot really be accepted as a lease or a lease in writing for purposes of the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. It is true that, under the Transfer of Property Act, a kabuliyat, when accepted by the landlord, which acceptance need not be in writing, would give the tenant the status of a lease under section 105 of the said Act but it is true also that under that Act (Vide Section 107), whenever a lease purports to be for a period, exceeding one year, it must be made or created by or under a registered instrument, signed or executed by both the parties, that is, by both the lessor and the lessee. A kabuliyat, by itself, would not certainly satisfy this test-and the position is not altered or improved by its acceptance by the landlord, at least where such acceptance is oral or in writing unregistered, as in the case here,- and. therefore, a lease for a period, exceeding one year, cannot be created by a unilateral kabuliyat even though it be a registered one and even though it be accepted by the landlord as aforesaid, that is orally or by writing unregistered, under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The kabuliyat in the present case, Ext. 1, dated 7th July, 1943, purported to create a tenancy for four years. If, therefore, the matter had to be considered under the Transfer of Property Act, this kabuliyat (Ext. 1) would have been invalid as a lease and could not, therefore, for obvious reasons, be regarded or accepted as a lease in writing either. 1, dated 7th July, 1943, purported to create a tenancy for four years. If, therefore, the matter had to be considered under the Transfer of Property Act, this kabuliyat (Ext. 1) would have been invalid as a lease and could not, therefore, for obvious reasons, be regarded or accepted as a lease in writing either. The tenancy, however, may arise and may continue by reason of payment and acceptance of rent but that will not be a tenancy of four years as was attempted to be created by this kabuliyat (Ext. 1) or, in other words,-and that is really more precise and to the point,- would not, strictly speaking, be a tenancy under this kabuliyat or referable to at all. Under the West Ben gal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act also the position appears to be similar. Mr. Gupta argued that the Kabuliyat (Ext. 1) on acceptance by the landlords, became a lease,- and, being in. writing, it would be a lease in writing,-and the bar of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act would not apply in cases of tenancies under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act to invalidate the said Kabuliyat as a lease or as a lease in writing, even though it be for a period, exceeding one year. We are unable to accept this argument. In Section 71 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. express provision has been made to this effect:- "the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and of any other law for the time being in force, in so far as they may be applicable and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to all tenancies to which the provisions of this Act apply. " 9. IT is clear, therefore, that Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act [which, we may just state here, in passing, is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the above Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act nor, at least or in particular with Section 7, which alone is relevant for our present purpose, and to which our special attention was drawn in this behalf by Mr. Gupta because of its opening words,- or the 'non-obstinate' clause, with which the section opens, - namely. Gupta because of its opening words,- or the 'non-obstinate' clause, with which the section opens, - namely. "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force"] would apply to the present case and, accordingly, the kabuliyat (Ext. 1) cannot be regarded either as a lease or a lease in writing even for purposes at the said Act (West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act ). We must just add that the opening words, "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force'' in Section 7 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. really refer to the new rights of protection which are given under the said section to non-Agricultural tenants, and protect and preserve those rights against and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force but those words have nothing to do with the validity or invalidity of a lease or with the requirements of a lease or a valid lease in writing for purposes of the said Act which, in view of Section 71, referred to above, will be the same as under the Transfer of Property Act. In the above view, we hold that the defendant in the present case would not be entitled to any protection either under section 7 (4) or section 7 (5) of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, and that claim of protection has been rightly refused by the court of appeal below and its decree, granting joint possession to the plaintiffs with the defendant, who, by the way, has acquired lease in respect of the remaining 8 annas share from the proforma defendants (who are the plaintiffs' patnidars in respect thereof) as his (defendant's) superior interest holder, must be maintained subject to payment of compensation as desired by that Court. The defendant's appeal would, therefore, fail and must be dismissed. 10. The defendant's appeal would, therefore, fail and must be dismissed. 10. COMING now to the plaintiffs' cross-objection we do not find any substance in the contention that the finding of the two courts below that the defendant would be entitled to compensation and can be evicted from the disputed eight annas share or joint possession taken with him (the defendant) by the plaintiffs of the suit property in respect of, that is, to the extent of, the said disputed 8 annas share, the defendant retaining possession of his (the defendant's) remaining 8 annas share, only upon payment of the said compensation, is incorrect. Section 9, sub-section (1), clause (iii) admittedly applies to this case and the terms of its express provision (Vide the proviso, which, as an integral part of the section, goes on to enact,-"provided that a tenant shall not be liable to ejectment on the ground specified in clause (iii) except on payment of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant or if they do not agree, as may be determined by the court on the application of the landlord or such tenant") makes it imperative upon the court to pass a decree for ejectment or for joint possession, as in the present case, only on payment of such reasonable compensation as aforesaid. Clearly, therefore, this part of the decree of the court of appeal below, affirming the similar direction of the trial court, must also be maintained and the plaintiffs' cross-objection to that extent must be dismissed. On the other matter, however, namely, on the question of mesne profits, the plaintiffs, in our opinion, notwithstanding the nature of the case, made by them, in the plaint and notwithstanding the remarks, made by the learned trial court on this part of the case, would be entitled to some relief. It is true that, technically speaking, until the payment of compensation as aforesaid, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to take advantage of their decree for ejectment, that is, for joint possession in the present case, and, until that time, the defendant cannot be regarded strictly as a trespasser and, from that strict technical point of view, the plaintiffs' claim for 'mesne profits' in the strict sense of that term may not be sustainable. But, after the purported determination of the defendant's tenancy by the six months' notice to quit under section 9, subsection (1), clause (iii) until the payment of the compensation, as mentioned in the above proviso, the defendant's position, if not of a trespasser, would be either of a tenant, possibly statutory, or of some one in the permissive or suffered occupation of the disputed land. In this state of things, the plaintiffs would, in our opinion, be entitled, at least, to damages or compensation for the use and occupation (of the disputed land by the defendant-Ed.) during this period and, obviously, from the point of view of justice and equity, which is certainly not contrary to any law in this behalf, the plaintiffs would be entitled to such compensation or damages, at least, at the rate of rent, which was prevailing just before the termination or purported termination or determination of the defendant's tenancy by the aforesaid notice to quit. The plaintiffs, therefore, upon payment of proper court-fees, would be entitled to a decree for such damages or compensation also from the defendant at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per annum from Kartick 1357 B. S. until the end of 1351 B. S. or until delivery of joint possession to the plaintiffs in terms of this judgment, if the plaintiffs' superior ijara interest in the disputed land has not vested in the State, under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954, but has been retained by them under and inspite of the said Act, as claimed before us on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents. On this disputed question of vesting we are expressing no opinion and the trial court will decide if according to law in the presence of all parties concerned, including the State of West Bengal, after taking all necessary and appropriate steps in that behalf. If possible and if no difficulty intervenes, the trial court will also, after making assessment of the reasonable compensation, payable by the plaintiffs to the defendant in terms of title decree of the lower appellate court, mow affirmed by us, try to make an adjustment of any amount, due and owing from the defendant on account of compensation or damages, as afore, said, against the defendant's said claim for compensation from the plaintiffs under the Statute [west Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. Section 9 (1) (iii) proviso] and, after making all necessary adjustment, the trial court will pass a proper decree in this case on the plaintiffs' claim for ejectment and mesne profits, that is, a decree for joint possession in favour of the plaintiffs on payment of such compensation, if any, under the above statutory provision [section 9 (1) (iii) proviso] as may still be outstanding after adjustment as aforesaid and for mesne profits,-strictly compensation or damages for use and occupation,- also, if any remain payable to the plaintiffs after the aforesaid adjustment upon payment, of course, of additional or deficit court fee, if any, in accordance with law. The plaintiffs' cross-objection will he allowed only to the above extent and the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge will be modified accordingly. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. 11. THE cross-objection is allowed in part, as indicated hereinbefore. The trial court will follow the directions in this judgment in passing the final order (decree) in the present case and disposing of the same. In the circumstances of this case and having regard to the nature of the claims of the above respective parties, and the extent and manner, to which and in which they have been accepted and rejected by us, we would direct them to bear their own costs in this court and also in the court of appeal below. The plaintiffs, however, will be entitled to proportionate costs in the trial court.