Judgment :- 1. The present second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff for a declaration that the proceedings connected with O.S. No. 999 of 1112, District Munsiff's Court, Sherthalai, and the other delivery proceedings which resulted in consequence of that decree, are not valid and binding as against the plaintiff. In consequence, the plaintiff prayed for recovery of possession of the properties and also claimed mesne profits. 2. The suit was contested on the ground that the decree obtained in O.S. 999 of 1112 was really against the tarwad of the defendants and also proceedings were properly taken as against the plaint properties which were admittedly tarwad properties and, therefore, the decree and other proceedings are valid and binding as against the present plaintiff. The trial court accepted the contentions of the first defendant that the relief asked for in O. S.999 of 1112 was in substance against the tarwad properties and the persons competent to represent the tarwad, namely, the karanavan and the senior anandiravan, as required under S.31 of the Nair Act, were on the party array. The trial court also considered the various recitals in the plaint and came to the conclusion that the suit itself as framed was in substance only as against the tarwad of the defendants and its properties. In this view, the trial court dismissed the suit holding that the proceedings challenged by the plaintiff are binding on him. 3. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Subordinate Judge of Alleppey has taken a different view about the proceedings connected with O. S.999 of 1112. The learned judge was prepared to hold that it was not necessary, under S.31 of the Nair Act of 1100, that in the party array the karanavan must be described as such. That is clear from the following statement in the judgment of the learned judge: "The law is now well settled that the karanavan need not be impleaded as such for the decree to be binding on the tarwad. It is enough if the decree discloses that it is against the tarwad with necessary parties on record. That is clear from the following statement in the judgment of the learned judge: "The law is now well settled that the karanavan need not be impleaded as such for the decree to be binding on the tarwad. It is enough if the decree discloses that it is against the tarwad with necessary parties on record. There must be sufficient indication to show that the decree claimed is against the tarwad." These statements in the judgment of the learned judge clearly show that he was proceeding on a correct basis to find out whether the suit and the proceedings in O S.999 of 1112 were really directed as against the tarwad as such. 4. But unfortunately when the learned judge was considering the proceedings connected with the litigation as such, he came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the plaintiff in these proceedings was directing his attack as against the tarwad or seeking any relief as against tarwad properties. In this view, the learned judge reversed the decree of the trial court, and decreed the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. 5. The first defendant has filed this appeal and on his behalf Mr. M. Madhavan Nair, learned counsel, has contended that though the learned Subordinate Judge has correctly set out the position under S.31 of the Nair Act of 1100, he has really misconstrued the plaint. The learned counsel has taken me through the various statements contained in the plaint, Ext. A. Mr. Madhavan Nair has fairly and frankly stated that the word 'tarwad' is not mentioned in the plaint. The plaint could have been more scientifically or more clearly drafted. But, according to the learned counsel, the whole tenor of the plaint will clearly show that the relief asked for is against the tarwad and the properties of the tarwad. On the other hand, Mr. Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, contended that the first defendant, as plaintiff in O.S. 999 of 1112, has only proceeded on the basis that defendants 1, 2 and 3 in that litigation, who are defendants 3 to 5 in the present proceedings are solely entitled to the properties and therefore there was never a tarwad in the contemplation of the plaintiff therein nor did he ask for any relief against the tarwad as such. This assumes importance, according to the learned counsel, because the plaintiff is also a member of the tarwad and if the decree is not passed against the tarwad as such it could not be executed against the properties of the tarwad in which he is interested as a member of the tarwad. 6. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, I am of the opinion that the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be sustained. The learned judge has no doubt stated correctly the principles applicable under S.31 of the Nair Act. In Pappi Amma v. Rama Iyer (A.I.R.1937 Madras 438) Varadacharier, J. has observed: "In determining whether a decree was obtained against a karanavan as representative of the tarwad, courts have attached more importance to the nature of the debt and the substance of the claim and have not insisted upon any particular form of words in the frame of the suit." This observation of the learned judge of the Madras High Court, has been quoted with approval by a Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Subramania Iyer and Mr. Justice Joseph reported in Kesava Pillai v. Govindan Nair (1954 K.L.T. 620). 7. In this case there is no controversy that the person who was the karnavan at that time was on the party array as the first defendant, and the second defendant who was on the party array was also the senior anandiravan. The third defendant in that litigation was no other than the mother of the present plaintiff and it appears from the plaint that she was the only other adult member at that time. No doubt, the plaintiff's case appears to be that he was also a major at the time but it is not necessary for me for the purpose of this case to go into that point. He has also raised another contention that he had another brother who was also in existence at that time. This aspect also need not be considered by me because the requirement of S.31 is satisfied if the tarwad is represented by the karnavan and the senior anandiravan. He has also raised another contention that he had another brother who was also in existence at that time. This aspect also need not be considered by me because the requirement of S.31 is satisfied if the tarwad is represented by the karnavan and the senior anandiravan. Therefore the question is as to whether the plaint in O. S.999 of 1112 can be in substance said to be one against defendants 1 and 2 therein as karanavan representing the tarwad and also the senior anandiravan on the party array. The nature of the transaction, as observed by the learned judges in the Full Bench decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court, has to be primarily looked into. In this case the plaint in O. S.999 of 1112 clearly refers to the lease back by Padmanabhan Nair, namely, the father of the present defendants 3 to 5. The plaint also proceeds on the basis that defendants 1 to 3 in that suit were in possession of the properties by virtue of a gift deed executed by the father on 30-11-1091 which is Ext. E in the present proceedings. The suit itself was for arrears of rent in respect of the lease taken by Padmanabhan Nair and also for recovery of possession of the suit properties. The title of the parties herein has been mentioned to be the gift deed of the father, namely, Ex. E. Though Mr. Varghese is right in saying that there is no whisper of the word 'tarwad' I cannot comprehend what else the plaintiff in that litigation could have contemplated when he asked for recovery of possession of properties from defendants 1, 2 and 3 therein which they had obtained as gift from their father. There is no controversy that the properties comprised are the tarwad properties in which case, the position becomes absolutely clear that when against the karnavan and the senior anandiravan and the only other adult member of the tarwad a suit is instituted for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of properties taken on lease and gifted by Padmanabhan Nair, the relief is claimed against the tarwad. In my view the interpretation placed upon the plaint in O. S.999 of 1112 and the subsequent proceedings by the lower appellate court, cannot be accepted. In my view the interpretation placed upon the plaint in O. S.999 of 1112 and the subsequent proceedings by the lower appellate court, cannot be accepted. It follows that the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court have to be reversed and those of the trial court have to be restored. 8. The second appeal is allowed with costs throughout. No leave. Allowed.