Judgment :- The petitioner in this revision petition was convicted of offences under S.451 and 323, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. The conviction and sentence were confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge of Kottayam and the accused has preferred this revision petition. 2. The two points urged in revision are (1) that though the case was tried as a summons case, the trial Magistrate transferred it to the register of summary cases and disposed of the case under Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure and (2) that the sentence is too harsh and should be reduced. 3. As regards the first point, it is true that the trial commenced as a summons case and that at the stage of pronouncing judgment, the learned Magistrate adopted the procedure for summary trials. It is seen that the procedure for summary trials was adopted only in delivering the judgment. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to do so and that the decision should be vacated on this ground. In support of this argument, it is urged that, though S.260 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables a Magistrate trying a case summarily to adopt a different form of trial, if the same is found desirable, there is no provision to cover a case of this nature. Certain decisions were cited in support of this argument. The petitioner relied on the decisions in Ratanlal v. Halku (A.I.R.1954 M. B. 2) and Khurshid v. Emperor (A. I. R.1943 Peshawar 89); but on the facts those are not applicable to this case. So far as this case is concerned, it was open to the Magistrate to try the case summarily and that is not disputed. The only question is whether after having tried the case according to the procedure prescribed for the trial of summons cases, the Magistrate was competent to write a judgment as provided for in S.367 of the Code. I may here refer to S.262 of the Code which provides that, in summons cases tried under Chapter XXII, the court is to follow the procedure prescribed for summons cases, and, in warrant cases, the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases with this distinction, that, instead of recording the whole evidence, the substance of the evidence alone need be recorded. In this case, the whole evidence has been recorded and the accused has not suffered any prejudice on that account. This case must be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in W. Slaney v. State, of M. P. (A. I. R.1956 S. C. 116), the only question being whether the accused has been prejudiced by what was done by the trial Magistrate. The petitioner cannot successfully contend that any prejudice has been caused to him by the form of judgment, as the trial up to that point was conducted according to Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes the procedure for trial of of summons cases. I am not satisfied that interference is called for on this ground. 4. Coming to the second point regarding sentence, I may observe that, in the circumstances of the case, there is scope for some modification. Only simple hurt was caused by beating on the cheek of the complainant and the beating was with the hand. A sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month should meet the ends of justice, and I order accordingly. 5. In the result, I confirm the conviction, . but reduce the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for one month. The criminal revision petition is allowed to the extent indicated above and is dismsised in other respects.