ORDER P.R. Sharma, J. This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the order dated the 13th of March, 1958 passed by a single Judge of this Court in M. P. No. 250 of 1957. Dr. Miss J.D. Sharma owns house No. 22 situate on the Residency Road at Jabalpur. Shri K.P. Sharma, Respondent No. 2 looks after the said property and recovers rent from the tenants living therein. A portion of this house fell vacant on 19-9-1957 on account of the tenaut(sic) residing therein having left the premises. On the same day the present Respondent No. 1 gave intimation through Respondent No. 2 to the Collector as required by Clause 22 of the Rent Control Order, stating that she required the entire house for her personal use and that the portion which had fallen vacant should not, therefore, be allotted to anyone. The Additional Collector, exercising the powers of a Deputy Commissioner under the Rent Control Order, however, passed an order on 21-10-1957 whereby he allotted the bouse to the present Appellant without holding any inquiry as contemplated by the proviso to Clause 23 (i) of the Rent Control Order. The Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 thereupon filed an application on 28-10-1957 seeking a review of the order of allotment. This application also was dismissed by the Respondent No. 3 on 6-11-1957. A petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was filed in this Court by the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for the issue of writs certiorari and mandamus. This petition was allowed by a single Judge of this Court as already stated above. In allowing the said petition it was held by the learned Judge that the power of the Deputy Commissioner under Clause 23 of the Rent Control Order to allot a house which has fallen vacant must be exercised within the period specified therein, viz., 14 days. The order of allotment in the present case having been passed long after this period was, therefore, quashed. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant urged before us the following grounds in support of his appeal: (i) that the delay in the order of allotment was attributable to the conduct of Respondents Nos. The order of allotment in the present case having been passed long after this period was, therefore, quashed. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant urged before us the following grounds in support of his appeal: (i) that the delay in the order of allotment was attributable to the conduct of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 themselves and that they were, therefore, not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; and (ii) that even if the Deputy Commissioner fails to make an allotment within the specified period in respect of the portion of the house which has fallen vacant all that the landlady could do was to select a tenant of her own choice to occupy the same, and till she did so she had no right to seek the eviction of the present Appellant from the premises allotted to him. We find that neither of these grounds was urged before the learned single Judge against whose order this Letters Patent appeal has been preferred. It was held in the case of Kanhaiyalal v. Jerame D'Costa,1065 NLJ 710 by a Full Bench of this Court that if a particular topic was not considered fit for being urged before the learned single Judge or if a point was abandoned before him it is not proper for the Division Bench in a Letters Patent Appeal to allow it to be urged. Although in that case the Letters Patent Appeal was directed against a decision in second appeal by a single Judge, we are of the opinion that the principle applies also to a Letters Patent Appeal against an original decision by a single Judge in a miscellaneous petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, we must hold that this appeal cannot be maintained on grounds which were not urged before the learned single Judge. Even on merits, the Appellant has no case. It was contended that the delay in passing the allotment order was due to Respondent No. 1's action in requesting the Deputy Commissioner to allow the house for her personal occupation. Merely because such a request was made, the allotment of the premises could not be delayed. As has been observed by the learned single Judge, the allotment must be made within the time allowed by Clause 23 of the Rent Control Order even though an application for personal occupation is pending. Merely because such a request was made, the allotment of the premises could not be delayed. As has been observed by the learned single Judge, the allotment must be made within the time allowed by Clause 23 of the Rent Control Order even though an application for personal occupation is pending. This has been held on the authority of Sangidas v. S.G. Suradkar, 1954 NLJ. We respectfully agree with the interpretation of Clause 23 accepted by the learned single Judge for reconciling the provision relating to limitation and the right of the landlord to have an enquiry made into his personal need. The second contention is that as the need of the landlady to occupy the house has not been established, it is not open to her to occupy the house personally and all that she can do is to let it out to some tenant as provided in Clause 23 of the Rent Control Order. There is a third alternative that if she does not get a tenant of her choice, she may keep it vacant for some time. Shri Dabir contends that this would defeat the provisions of the Rent Control Order. This is not necessarily so; as under Clause 24 of the Order the Deputy Commissioner has power to allot it to any person if the bouse remains vacant for some time. In any case, as the order under Clause 23 was not passed in time, the landlady became entitled to have a tenant of her choice, and no tenant could be forced upon her except by passing a proper and valid order under the provisions of law. Clause 24 has not been resorted to by the Deputy Commissioner in this case. The order under Clause 23 is not legally valid. The decision of the learned single Judge is not, therefore, liable to be set aside in this Letters Patent Appeal. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs.50. Appeal dismissed