JUDGMENT A.H. Khan, J. The grievance of the Petitioner Piyare before us is that according to Section 38 of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act, he filed an application before the Tahsildar for the conferment of Pakka tenancy rights and also for the mutation of his name. This application was resisted by the non-Petitioner before the Tahsildar on the ground that the opposite party was entitled to the benefit of Section 74 of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The Tahsildar rejected the application. On appeal the Collector confirmed the order and dismissed the appeal. In second appeal before the Revenue Commissioner it was held that no appeal or revision lay against the order passed under Section 38 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act. In revision, the Revenue Board also held that no appeal or revision lay against the order passed under Section 38, and dismissed the revision. Against the order of the Board of Revenue, the Petitioner has preferred a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to this Court. Precisely this question was considered by this Court in Sujan Singh v. Dwarka Prasad 1959 MPLJ 738 . in which it was held that where an application before the Tahsildar was both under Section 38 and Section 86 of the M.B. Tenancy Act (for mutation of names), then the order of the Tahsildar, either ordering mutation or refusing mutation should be treated under Section 86 of the Tenancy Act and as such not only would an appeal lie, but in proper cases a revision would also be competent. The Board has treated the order as one under Section 38 of the Zamindari Abolition Act only. This is not the correct approach and the matter is already explained in the case referred to above. For reasons stated above the application is allowed and the case is sent back to the Revenue Commissioner with the direction to consider the Tahsildar's order under Section 86 of the Tenancy Act and decide the appeal on merits. Parties to bear their own costs. Shiv Dayal, J. Where an applicant claims to have become a Pakka tenant and to be recorded as such in the revenue papers, such an application is a composite one and must be dealt with under both, Section 38, M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 and Section 86 of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. Shiv Dayal, J. Where an applicant claims to have become a Pakka tenant and to be recorded as such in the revenue papers, such an application is a composite one and must be dealt with under both, Section 38, M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 and Section 86 of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. The said Section 38 speaks of conferral of pakka tenancy rights on tenants and sub-tenants. A sub-tenant can, on depositing the requisite compensation, claim that revenue papers be corrected and his name may be entered. The last prayer falls within the purview of the said Section 86. In my opinion, it is not correct to argue that Section 86 is not applicable to such a case, as that section must be restricted to cases of succession and transfer. The section is comprehensive enough to include every possibility where mutation of names is to be effected consequent upon legal right vesting or devolving upon a person whose name is not entered and the cessation of interest of another person whose name appears in the revenue papers. Clause (1) of Section 88 runs thus: When a holder of land, other than an assignee of proprietary rights, loses his rights is any land in a village by death or by surrender or abandonment of the land or by transfer of his rights to any other person, or by dispossession or otherwise, the Patwari of the village in which the land is situated shall forthwith report the fact to the Tahsildar intimating the name of the new holder and the grounds on which the latter claims to succeed to the title of the former holder may also apply to the Tahsildar for the mutation of his name within a period of two years from the date the last holder loses his rights. The import of the words 'or otherwise' makes the provision comprehensive in its scope. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the true implication of the words 'or otherwise' in Smt. Lilavati Bai v. Slate of Bombay AIR 1957 SC 521 . Those words are not words of limitation but of extension...... The Legislature apparently intended to cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of the preceding clauses........ Hence, far from using those words ejusdem(sic) generis with the preceding clauses, the Legislature used those words in all inclusive sense. Those words are not words of limitation but of extension...... The Legislature apparently intended to cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of the preceding clauses........ Hence, far from using those words ejusdem(sic) generis with the preceding clauses, the Legislature used those words in all inclusive sense. The expression "claims to succeed to the title of the former holder" is in my judgment, not restrictive of privies in estate and privies in blood. The word 'succeed' means "to come after; to follow up; to take place previously filled by another". It is used in this section in its widest connotation, that is, where one person comes on the land in place of another. This is clear from the section itself because it includes in terms eases where a holder of land is dispossessed by another or where he surrenders or abandons the land and the same is allotted to a new tenant- cases which do not fall within the narrow construction of the word 'succeed'. It is an argument that whereas Section 86 of the Land Revenue and Tenancy Act envisages two persons, Section 38 does not contemplate a transfer of the rights of the original holder (e. g., the outgoing proprietor). In the first place, I have my own doubts whether the Zamindari Abolition Act in any way affects the rights of the tenants except for the change of the masters. But it is wholly unnecessary for me to dilate on that question for the purposes of the problem in hand. Suffice to proceed on the assumption that the rights conferred on the tenants under Section 38 of the Zamindari Abolition Act are altogether new rights created for the first time by that law and every tenant on the commencement of the Act, became a tenant of the Government. Even so, the question of mutation still arises. The name of the outgoing proprietor or any one else whose name appears in the revenue papers is to be removed and the name of tenant in whom vest or devolve tenancy rights under Section 38 (as a tenant of the Government) is to be entered in his stead. This is 'mutation' and is to be effected under section 86 of the Tenancy Act alone; there is no other provision in the Act. This is 'mutation' and is to be effected under section 86 of the Tenancy Act alone; there is no other provision in the Act. To construe the section otherwise would be not in consonance of the scheme of the Tenancy Act itself or of the Zamindari Abolition Act. It is the obvious policy of the law that revenue papers must be uptodate and must be corrected whenever a correction is required to make them so. In Uttar Pradesh v. C. Tobit AIR 1958 S.C. 414 ., their Lordships have laid down: It is well settled that the words of a statute, when there is doubt in their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In order, therefore, to come to a decision as to the true meaning of a word used in a statute one has to enquire as to the subject-matter of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. In the above view, the Petitioner's appeal to the Revenue Commissioner was competent. I agree that this petition must be allowed and the case must go back to the Commissioner for deciding the Petitioner's appeal on merits and that in the circumstances of the case, there should be no order for costs. Petition allowed