ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. The only question involved in this revision is whether the civil suit is competent. Respondent Bansilal instituted a suit under Section 326, Qanoon Mal on June 9, 1951 in the Court of the Tehsildar, Susneer, on the allegation that he was in possession of 36 survey numbers in village Paili as his khud-kasht land; that on June 1, 1951 the Defendants Bapulal, Kanhaiyalal and Ram Prasad unlawfully took possession of the lands and that he was, therefore, entitled to restoration of possession. The defence was that the Plaintiff's father had led them into possession and that their possession was not unlawful. That suit was dismissed by the Tehsildar on June 9, 1952. Stage by stage the Plaintiff went up to the Board of Revenue but remained unsuccessful everywhere. Thereafter, the Plaintiff instituted the present suit against the very same Defendants. Bapulal Defendant No. 1 is his step-brother and Kanhaiyalal and Ram Prasad Defendants are sons of Bapulal. The Defendants raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the present suit. The trial Judge has held that the suit is competent. It is against this preliminary finding that the present revision has been filed. Shri Khandekar relies on two decisions of this Court: One of them is reported in 1953 M.L.R. 138. That was in a case for partition. The other decision relied on is in C.S.A. No. 168 of 1956 where I have held that the civil suit was barred under Section 377 of the Qanoon Mal. Shri Patankar, Learned Counsel for the Respondent, urges that his present suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that previously a suit was instituted under Section 326 of the Qanoon Mal. The argument of the Learned Counsel is that there is no provision in the Qanoon Mal for entertaining a suit for declaration of title. Section 326 of the Qanoon Mal contemplated a suit for restoration of possession on the basis of wrongful dispossession only and in other words, it corresponds to a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Section 326 of the Qanoon Mal contemplated a suit for restoration of possession on the basis of wrongful dispossession only and in other words, it corresponds to a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. My attention is invited to the observation of the Board of Revenue in this very case namely "Madakhlat he mamle men istahqaq ke adhar par decree nahin dija sakti hai." I find considerable force in the argument of Shri Patankar that if a person seeks redress in the revenue Court on the basis of his title, he is not heard because Section 326 does not envisage a title suit; and if he comes to the civil Court, he is again denied a hearing saying that such a suit is barred by Section 377 of the Qanoon Mal and the only remedy is before the revenue Court. This amounts to a refusal to give redress to that person if he claims possession on the basis of his title. Where is he to go ? Can it be said that a person who has title to the land, but no possession, cannot get possession under the law ? But I find that it is unnecessary to decide that point in this revision. When I advert to the plaint I find that the Plaintiff's present suit is not based on title. Shri Patankar developed his argument on the assumption that the Plaintiff was a minor on June 9, 1951 when the cause of action arose and his father, the natural guardian, was not competent to hand over the possession to the Defendants. But this is not the Plaintiff's suit. If the grievance in the plaint was that he had an exclusive title to the land and that his father allowed the Defendants to enter into possession thereof without any authority or without any legal justification, the matter would have been different. The allegations in the plaint are these: (1) That the Plaintiff was a Zamindar of 2 annas and the Defendants lived separately from him. (2) That the disputed field numbers listed in paragraph 2 of the plaint (in all 36) were in the personal cultivation (khudkashi) of the Plaintiff. (3) That the Defendants had no concern with the disputed field numbers of which on 1-6-1951, they took wrongful possession without any authority. (2) That the disputed field numbers listed in paragraph 2 of the plaint (in all 36) were in the personal cultivation (khudkashi) of the Plaintiff. (3) That the Defendants had no concern with the disputed field numbers of which on 1-6-1951, they took wrongful possession without any authority. In the paragraphs which follow a history of the revenue litigation is given and then it is alleged that on the abolition of the Zamindari the Plaintiff became a pucca tenant and he is entitled to a declaration of that right as also of restoration of possession. It must be made clear that in every case where one person is the Zamindar and another person is in possession of his land, it cannot be said that he is a trespasser and a suit cannot be decreed merely of these two allegations. The Plaintiff has further to allege how the other party was not entitled to possession. Then alone it will be called a title suit. But if the Zamindar merely alleges that he was in actual possession of the land, but the other person wrongfully occupied it and the possession should be restored to him, that is a suit on the basis of possession. Shri Patankar does not dispute the proposition that if a suit under Section 326 of the Qanoon Mal is based on possession and is decided by the revenue Court, a subsequent suit on the basis of possession in the civil Court will be barred by Section 377(1) of the Qanoon Mal. In the present case that is so. It was held by the Tehsildar that the Plaintiff's father, and his natural guardian, allowed the Defendants to take possession of the disputed land. In the present suit the Plaintiff says nothing about that; he just reiterates what he had said in the revenue suit namely, that the Defendants wrongfully occupied the property on 9-6-1951. In this view of the matter the present suit cannot be said one on the basis of title, and the argument developed by Shri Patankar need not be considered in this revision. The result is that the present suit on the basis of possession being barred under Section 377(1) of the Qanoon Mal, it must be dismissed. This revision is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the trial Judge dated June 17, 1957 is set aside and the suit is dismissed. The result is that the present suit on the basis of possession being barred under Section 377(1) of the Qanoon Mal, it must be dismissed. This revision is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the trial Judge dated June 17, 1957 is set aside and the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Petition allowed