ORDER A.H. Khan J 1. This is a petition under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. 2. Petitioner Sampurnanand has stated that Police Pohri effected his arrest on 4-2-59 under Section 411 I.P.C. On an application being moved and allowed for bail, but before security for bail could be furnished in order to set at naught the order of the Court granting bail, the Collector, Shivpuri, clamped upon him an order under Preventive Detention Act on 4-2-59. The petitioner was supplied grounds of detention on 5-2-59. The submission of the petitioner with regard to his detention are three fold. First, that the grounds of detention supplied to him are vague and that in consequence, he could not make an effective representation against them. Two, that the grounds No. 6 and 7 are extraneous to the purpose of Preventive Detention Act. Three, that the order of detention passed against him is malafide, 3. With regard to the first submission, it is said that the grounds furnished to the petitioner arc vague and indefinite, and that in the circumstances, he has been prevented for making a representation entitling him to be released. Reliance is placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 318 (Dr. Ram Krishna Bharadwaj vs. the Stale of Delhi and others) and it is contended that the petitioner has a right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to be furnished with particulars of grounds of detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to the detenue, It is urged that the grounds lack this constitutional requirements. In deciding this point, we must first study the grounds and determine whether they are indefinite or not. 4. The grounds furnished to the detenue are seven in number. The first ground sums up the substance of accusation which in the main is that the detenue has an association with Amritlal dacoit who has been declared as Public Enemy No. 3 by the Madhya Pradesh Government. 5. Grounds No. 2, 3, 4, 3, 6 and 7 give instances of the association together with dates, when the detune came in contact with the dacoit named above. 5. Grounds No. 2, 3, 4, 3, 6 and 7 give instances of the association together with dates, when the detune came in contact with the dacoit named above. In the circumstances, it can not be held that the grounds are not sufficiently clear and that because of them, the detenue was prevented from making an effective representation. The Supreme Court case cited by the learned counsel, is, therefore, not to the point, 6. With regard to the second submission, namely, that grounds Nos. 6 and 7 are beyond the purview of the Act and as such the detention is bad, reliance is placed on A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 179 (Shibbanlal Saxena vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others). It is submitted that the two grounds being extraneous to the purpose of the Act, they can be challenged in a court of law and that the detenue must be released in consequence. But before applying the decision of the Supreme Court to the present case, let us examine the argument that the two grounds are beyond the scope of the Act. The grounds run thus.- Ground No. 6:- Ground No. 7:- It is argued that the allegation of trying to influence the witnesses through Amritlal (Ground No. 6) and the accusation of taking Rs. 2000/- from Amrit Lal to concoct evidence in a case (Ground No. 7) are purposes unconnected with the maintenance of public order and hence are beyond the scope of the Act. But in advancing this argument the learned counsel has referred to the tale-end of the ground only. The two grounds read as a whole (from top to bottom) show the association of the Detenue with the dacoit and incidents related therein are only instances of intimacy and friendship. Now no one would deny that association with dacoits is not an act affecting public order. I am, therefore, unable to hold that grounds No. 6 and 7 are extraneous to the scope of the Act. 7. There is no force in the third submission. The first impression which one gained on reading the petition of the detenue was that because the Magistrate released the detenue on bail in a case pending against him under Sec. 411 I.P.C, the Collector, being displeased with the grant of bail, put him under the Preventive Detention Act. The order of granting bail synchronizes with the order of detention. The first impression which one gained on reading the petition of the detenue was that because the Magistrate released the detenue on bail in a case pending against him under Sec. 411 I.P.C, the Collector, being displeased with the grant of bail, put him under the Preventive Detention Act. The order of granting bail synchronizes with the order of detention. But from the record of the Collector, we find that much before the arrest or bail of the accused the question of detention under the Preventive Detention Act was under consideration of the Collector from December 1958. He was all the while thinking whether to order detention or not. In the circumstances no question of defying the order of bail arises and no mate fide is established. 8. For reasons stated above, the petition is rejected. Shivdayal J 9. The contention of Shri Gupta that the grounds furnished to him are vague is an after-thought. Admittedly this was not a grievance before the Advisory Board. Secondly, that the detenue did not apply to the detaining authority to be supplied with particulars of the grounds furnished to him has been regarded by the Supreme Court as a circumstance against the allegation of vagueness of grounds (Lawrence D'Souza vs. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1956 SC. 531). 10. It is also held in the above decision that the question whether the grounds furnished are vague or not, is ultimately a question that has to be determined on a consideration of the circumstances of each case. 11. Here, the District Magistrate first set out the conclusion reached by him. Then a detailed statement of the instances followed it. On a perusal of the communication as a whole I find that it is not vague and is sufficiently definite to apprise the petitioner of the grounds for which he was being detained. In a similar situation their Lordships dismissed the petition of Shamrao Parlulekar (See A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 23) and maintained the detention order. 12. In his argument as to the second contention that grounds No. 6 and 7 (quoted verbatim in the judgment of my learned brother) are extraneous to the Act, the learned counsel endeavors not only to dissociate these two grounds from the rest, but also to dissect them. He urges that the latter parts of each of these two grounds do not fall within the ambit of the Preventive Detention Act. He urges that the latter parts of each of these two grounds do not fall within the ambit of the Preventive Detention Act. This process of approach is not permissible. In order to find out whether any particular ground is or is not relevant, regard must be had to all the grounds as a whole. Thus a dictum in Shamrao Parulekar vs. The District Magistrate Thana (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 324). When it is applied to the case in hand the relevance of these two grounds (No. 6 and 7) becomes quite plain 13. Regarding the third ground, I confess that while issuing rule nisi the learned counsel created in my mind an impression that the detention was aimed at frustrating the order of bail passed by the judicial Magistrate in the case under S. 411 I.P. C. before him. Now it is transparent that the impression was not correct. The District Magistrate has stated in the Return, supported by his affidavit and further supported by the record which was placed before us by the Additional Government Advocate that the question whether the petitioner should be taken in preventive detention had been pending before the District Magistrate for quite a long time before he was arrested in connection with the criminal offence. He had already been inquiring into matter for his satisfaction. And it was just a coincidence that the actual order for detention was passed by the District Magistrate on the same day as the bail order by the trial Magistrate. It is significant that the District Magistrate has filed an affidavit here in which he has stated that the order granting bail was not even in his knowledge when he passed the detention order. These facts, which stand uncontroverted, completely destroy the allegation of malafides. 14. I am quite unable to see any material for which it can be said that the order of detention was made for ulterior purposes or purposes other than those mentioned in the detention order. And this is the only relevant consideration, as pronounced by the Supreme Court in Puranlal Lakhanpal vs. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 163). Their Lord-ships have clearly laid down that it is not a relevant consideration whether the activities of the appellant were liked or disliked by the authorities concerned. 15. And this is the only relevant consideration, as pronounced by the Supreme Court in Puranlal Lakhanpal vs. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 163). Their Lord-ships have clearly laid down that it is not a relevant consideration whether the activities of the appellant were liked or disliked by the authorities concerned. 15. It is the argument advanced for the petitioner that the malafide lay at the door of the Police officials. I am afraid, this argument deserves no consideration. This Court is not at all concerned with the malafides or otherwise of any one except the detaining authority. This view is also based on the decision of the Supreme Court in D'Souza's case cited above (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 531):- Where an order of detention is challenged on the ground of malafides, what has got to be made out is not the want of bona fides on the part of the police, but want of bona fides as well as the non-application of mind, on the part of the detaining authority, which for this purpose must be taken to be different from the police. 16. For these reasons, I agree that the petition is entirely misconceived and must be dismissed as such. Petition dismissed.