ORDER This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Officer on Special Duty, Manipur State Transport dated 7-2-56, removing the petitioner from service and the order dated 7-11-57 of the Chief Commissioner of Manipur, dismissing the appeal against the said Older of removal. 2. The writ petitioner was appointed as a temporary conductor in the Manipur State Transport by order of the Chief Commissioner of Manipur dated 13-3-54 (document No. 1) for the period from 15-3-54 to 28-2-55. By the same order six other persons were appointed as temporary conductors. The Manipur State Transport (hereinafter called the M.S.T.) is a Government undertaking. The power of appointment of conductors in the M.S.T. was vested in the Development Commissioner and Ex-Officio Secretary of the Government of Manipur at the time of this appointment, according to the rules framed by the Chief Commissioner under Rules 44 and 54 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules on 25-9-1951. But the Chief Commissioner appears to have withdrawn the power to himself and made the above appointment. It would appear that in September 1954, the power of appointment of conductors was transferred to the Home Secretary to the Government of Manipur and that by a further notification dated 19-3-56, it was again transferred to the Officer on Special Duty, Manipur State Transport with retrospective effect from 29-7-55. 3. Though the period of temporary service of the petitioner ended on 28-2-55, he continued in service as temporary conductor even beyond that period and until his removal from service on 7-2-56 by order of the Officer on Special Duty in the M.S.T. While the petitioner was thus continuing in service as a conductor, there was a complaint against him that on 28-12-55 he allowed a passenger to travel in the bus without collecting the fare from him. His explanation was taken (document No. 4). The result of this complaint was that while some of the other temporary conductors recruited along with him were confirmed as conductors, the petitioner was allowed to continue only in a temporary capacity. 4. Then, there was a second complaint against him, that on 26-1-56, he collected a sum of Rs. 4/8/- from a passenger by name K.R. Sen Gupta, but that he did not issue a ticket to him even though the passenger demanded one. 4. Then, there was a second complaint against him, that on 26-1-56, he collected a sum of Rs. 4/8/- from a passenger by name K.R. Sen Gupta, but that he did not issue a ticket to him even though the passenger demanded one. The passenger submitted a written report to that effect. 5. On these two complaints, charges were drawn up against the petitioner on 30-1-56 (document No. 6). He was also placed under suspension on the same day by the Officer on Special Duty. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the charges on 3-2-56 (document No. 8). He stated in his explanation that as far as the first complaint was concerned he was guilty of violating the Standing Order No. 6 dated 27-8-55, stating that no M.S.T. Vehicle should be allowed to move till tickets to all the passengers have been issued and money realised, but that he did so with a good motive to help the passenger simply from a humanitarian point of view when he was quite helpless and he requested to be pardoned. With regard to the second charge, he denied it as false and he referred to his own report dated 27-1-56 (document No. 5) in that connection. 6. While the enquiry under the two charges were pending against the petitioner, an incident took place in the Office of the M.S.T. As to what actually happened on that date is not known from the records of the M.S.T. But the petitioner has given his version of it in his petition (document No. 11) which he submitted to the Chief Commissioner. The petitioners version is that he had gone to the Office at the M.S.T. on 7-2-56 and was asking the Accountant why his allowances for four months and pay for one month were withheld, when Mr. S. Palit, the Officer on Special Duty happened to pass that way and seeing the petitioner arguing with the Accountant, asked rum to clear out of the Office, that then, the petitioner asked the Officer why he should be so unsympathetic, that thereupon the Officer asked the attender to take the petitioner out of the Office and phoned to the Police and the petitioner was taken into Police custody on the ground that he was mentally insane. The version given by the respondents as to what happened on that day is seen from the affidavit filed by the present Officer on Special Duty in the M.S.T. who is the successor of the Officer who was in-charge on 7-2-56. According to this affidavit, the petitioner went to the Office at 2-30 p.m. on 7-2-56 and behaved in a violent manner and the Officer on Special Duty took him to be either insane or bent upon doing some mischief and so a report was sent to the Police and he was put in the lock-up. 7. Any way, the result of the incident on 7-2-1956 was that without any further enquiry into the charges pending against the petitioner, Mr. S. Palit, the Officer then on Special Duty passed the order (document No. 9) on 7-2-56 itself discharging the petitioner from service with effect from that very day for insubordination and misconduct towards his, superior. Then proceedings were started against the petitioner by the Police under S. 13 of the Lunacy Act before the Additional District Magistrate, Manipur. But the A.D.M. was satisfied that the petitioner was quite sane and sound and he was released on 9-2-56 on furnishing a bail bond for Rs. 500/- for his future conduct. The petitioner then sent up the petition (document No. 11) to the Chief Commissioner on 15-2-56, complaining against Mr. Palit that the petitioner was unjustly treated as mentally unwell and ordered to be put behind the bars and also stating that he was not very eager to have his job back under such a man, but requesting the Chief Commissioner to render justice to him. 8. In the meantime, Mr. S. Palit, the Officer on Special Duty seems to have realised that his own conduct in summarily discharging the petitioner from service without holding any enquiry may not have been quite proper. So on 14-2-56 he issued a notice (document No. 10) stating that the explanation submitted by the petitioner for the charge sheet against him dated 30-1-56 was not satisfactory, that the was found guilty under both the two heads of charges, that it was proposed to dismiss him from service with effect from the date of suspension, namely, 30-1-56 and so he was called upon to show cause within 7 days from the date of receipt of the notice why lie should not be dismissed from service. This notice was served on the petitioner on 22-2-1956 (vide page 18 of the Government file). Still the petitioner did not submit any reply to the show cause notice. The explanation of the petitioner for not replying was that lie had already been discharged from service on 7-2-56 and so he did not think it necessary to send any reply. But instead of doing so he sent the appeal (document No. 11) to the Chief Commissioner on 15-2-56 to which lie did not receive any reply for a long time. 9. On 6-3-56, Mr. S. Palit, Officer on Special Duty, M.S.T., passed a second order dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from 26-1-56, the date on which he was placed on suspension on the charge sheet dated 30-1-56 (document No. 6) already referred to by me. In this order (vide page 18 of the Government file) it was stated that the petitioner at first refused to receive a copy of the show cause notice when he went to the Office on 14-2-56, but that on 22-2-56 he received a copy, but did not submit any explanation and so it was to be presumed that he had no explanation to offer and that on the material, available the said order was passed. It will be seen from what I have stated already that the petitioner had really no reply to make as far as charge I was concerned except to say that he allowed the passenger to travel in the bus without a ticket on humanitarian grounds. 10. Against this order dated 6-3-56, the petitioner did not file any appeal and the said order has not been referred to at all in the present writ petition. The order challenged in this petition is only the order dated 7-2-56 discharging the petitioner from service for insubordination and misconduct towards his superior. I wish to make it dear here itself that the order which I shall pass in this writ will have nothing to do with the validity or otherwise of the order of the Special Officer, dated 6-3-56 dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from 26-1-56. 11. The petitioner next filed another petition to the Chief Commissioner on 25-9-57. No reference is made to this petition in the present writ. It is seen at page 33 of the Government file. 11. The petitioner next filed another petition to the Chief Commissioner on 25-9-57. No reference is made to this petition in the present writ. It is seen at page 33 of the Government file. In that petition he stalled that he was dismissed from service by the order dated 7-2-56, that he appealed against the order on 15-2-56, that since the happening of the event which led to his dismissal, the petitioner has learnt much and he hoped to conduct himself better in future and therefore he requested that he may be reinstated in his post of conductor. Even this petition makes no reference to the order of dismissal passed on 6-3-56. The petition is also not an appeal against the order of discharge dated 7-2-1956, but only a prayer for reinstatement. The application was forwarded to the Chief Commissioner with a covering Memo by the Officer on Special Duty No. 2999/ST/FS/57 dated 7-10-57 (seen at page 34 of the Government file) for favour of consideration. It was on this Memo that the order (document No. 13) dated 7-11-57 was passed by the Administration stating that there was no reason to set aside the dismissal order, but that the dismissal order will not debar him from future appointment. It will be seen that the order shows that the subject dealt with was the reinstatement of the dismissed conductor, as requested in the application of the petitioner dated 25-9-57 and that it was not an order passed in any appeal against the order of dismissal dated 6-3-56. 12. It is under the above circumstances that the petitioner has come with this writ petition on 4-3-58. The contentions raised by the petitioner are that he was appointed as a temporary conductor by order of the Chief Commissioner on 13-3-54, that his service had ripened into a quasi-permanent one at the time when he was discharged from service by way of punishment on 7-2-56, that the Officer on Special Duty being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of Manipur, who appointed the petitioner, the order dated 7-2-56 passed by the said Officer which in effect amounted to the removal of the petitioner from service was in violation of the mandatory provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution, and that the Chief Commissioner acted illegally in dismissing the petitioners appeal on 7-11-57. 13. 13. The reply of the respondent to these contentions is that the petitioner was only a temporary servant and not a quasi-permanent servant, that though he was appointed as a temporary servant by the Chief Commissioner for the period upto 28-2-55, his continuance in service beyond 28-2-55, must be deemed to have been effected on the authority of the Home Secretary, who then had the power to appoint persons in the class of post held by the petitioner under the authority delegated to him by Government Notification No. FA/53-A/51/40 dated 25-9-51 read with Notification No. FA/53-A/51/69 dated 22nd September, 1954, that his continuance in service beyond 28-7-55 had to be treated as under the authority of the Officer on Special Duty, who was empowered under Government Notification No. MFA/53-A/51-56 dated 19-3-56, which was given retrospective effect from 29-7-55, that his continuance in service on the date of his discharge on 7-2-1956 was on the authority of the Special Officer on Duty, that the latter Officer was competent to remove the petitioner from service, that the said order does not therefore violate the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution, that, in any case, the order dated 7-2-56 was not given effect to, but only the order dated 6-3-1956, that as the petitioners explanation to the two charges levelled against him was not found satisfactory, he was called upon the show cause on 14-2-56, why he should not be dismissed from service, that the petitioner did not give any reply to the said notice and hence the said order dated 6-3-56 was passed and that as it was the said order which was given effect to and as the order has not been impugned in this writ the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 14. I have already made it clear that in this writ I shall not be dealing with the order dated 6-3-56, as it has not been questioned. It will be time enough to do so if the petitioner conies forward with a writ questioning the validity of the said order. I am only dealing with the order dated 7-2-56 discharging the petitioner from service for insubordination and misconduct towards his superior. It will be time enough to do so if the petitioner conies forward with a writ questioning the validity of the said order. I am only dealing with the order dated 7-2-56 discharging the petitioner from service for insubordination and misconduct towards his superior. The respondent cannot say that the said order has not been given effect to as the said order was referred to in the subsequent petition given by the petitioner on 25-9-57 requesting reinstatement and as the Chief Commissioner passed the order dated 7-11-57 rejecting the said request for reinstatement. 15. The petitioner was appointed as Stated already by the Chief Commissioner for a fixed period, namely, 15-3-54 to 28-2-55. At the time of the appointment the appointing authority under the Government Notification No. FA/53-A/51/40 dated 25-9-51 was the Development and Revenue Commissioner to whom the said power had been delegated by the Chief Commissioner under Rules 44 and 54 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In making the appointment himself, the Chief Commissioner appears to have withdrawn the said power to himself. But the petitioner continued in service beyond 28-2-55. On 28-2-55, the Home Secretary to the Government of Manipur was vested with the power of appointment of Class III and IV servants by Notification No.FA/53-A/51/69 dated 22-9-54. It is contended for the respondents, that the petitioner must be deemed to have continued in service beyond 28-2-55 on the authority of the Home Secretary. But it is admitted that there was no specific order of the Home Secretary allowing the petitioner to continue in service beyond the fixed period for which he was appointed by the Chief Commissioner. The Government file shows that a conductor was promoted as a Driver temporarily and in his place the petitioner was appointed as a conductor and because the drivers appointment was extended from time to time, the petitioner also continued in service in his place as conductor. In the absence of any specific order by the Home Secretary appointing the petitioner as conductor after 28-2-55 or at least allowing him to continue as conductor, it cannot be stated that the petitioner continued in service on the authority of the Home Secretary. He must be deemed to have continued on the strength of his original appointment made by the Chief Commissioner. He must be deemed to have continued on the strength of his original appointment made by the Chief Commissioner. In the same connection it may be stated that by another Notification No. MFA/53-A/51-56 dated 19-3-56, the Officer on Special Duty, M.S.T. was made the appointing authority with effect from 29-7-55. But no separate orders were passed by that Officer allowing the petitioner to continue as conductor. So it is clear beyond doubt that the petitioner continued in service till 7-2-1956 on the original order of appointment passed by the Chief Commissioner. It follows therefore that the authority which appointed the petitioner in service was the Chief Commissioner within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution. 16. Now the first question which I shall have to consider, before I deal with the validity or otherwise of the order dated 7-2-1956, is whether the petitioner as a temporary Government servant is entitled to the protection under Art. 311 of the Constitution. Now the petitioner states in his petition that his services were of a quasi-permanent character and that he would therefore be entitled to the protection under Art. 311. Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules. 1949, which, have been made applicable to Manipur by notification dated 26-9-1951, defines a quasi-permanent Government servant as a person, who has been in continuous Government service for more than 5 years and in connection with whose service the appointing authority has issued a declaration to the effect that he was suitable by age, qualification, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity. In the present case, the petitioner had not put in 3 years of service by 7-2-56, the date of his discharge from service and admittedly no such declaration as stated above had been issued by the appointing authority. So, it is clear that he was not a quasi-permanent Government servant. He can at best be treated only as a temporary servant within the meaning of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, whose service was liable to termination at any time by notice in writing by the appointing authority. 17. The question now is whether such a temporary servant is entitled to the protection under Art. 311. This matter has been dealt with in the decision of the Supreme Court, Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 . 17. The question now is whether such a temporary servant is entitled to the protection under Art. 311. This matter has been dealt with in the decision of the Supreme Court, Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 . It has no doubt been laid down in that decision, while dealing with, the question as to who are entitled to the protection, that Art. 311 makes no distinction between a permanent servant and a temporary servant and that both of them are within its protection. But in further dealing with the question of the ambit and the scope of that protection, it has further been laid down that only if the termination of service was sought to be brought about by way of punishment can a Government servant claim the protection of Art. 311(2). In further dealing with the question as to when an order of termination of service can be said to have been inflicted as and by way of punishment their Lordships hold that when a servant has a right to a post under the terms of the contract of employment express or implied or under the Rules governing the conditions of service, the termination of service of such a servant is by itself and prima facie a punishment as it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post, but that if the servant has no right to the post as in the case of a temporary servant, whose service had not ripened into Appellant quasi-permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, the termination of his employment does not deprive him of any right and cannot therefore by itself be a punishment. They have made it clear by stating that if the Government have the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the manner provided in the Rules is prima facie and per se not a punishment and does not attract the provision of Art. 311. They have made it clear by stating that if the Government have the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the manner provided in the Rules is prima facie and per se not a punishment and does not attract the provision of Art. 311. Their Lordships go further and say that if however the Government instead of taking action under the Rules relating to the conditions of service take the view that a simple termination of service was not enough and that the conduct of the servant has been such that he deserves a punishment entailing penal consequences, the Government may choose to proceed against the Government servant on the basis of his misconduct, negligence or inefficiency and inflict on him the punishment of dismissal or removal carrying with it penal consequences. In such a case the servant will be entitled to the protection under Art. 311(2). Thus if the Government choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 811 must be complied with. The test laid down by their Lordships for determining whether the dismissal or removal was by way of punishment was to find out (1) whether the servant had a right to the post in which case the termination of service has to be treated as by way of punishment or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences as a result of the termination of the services in which case again the termination of service had to be treated as a punishment. In those two cases the requirements of Art. 311 have to be complied with before the termination of service. 18. The question in this case is whether applying the above tests the termination of the service of the petitioner by the order dated 7-2-56, must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant. The first test does not apply to the petitioner as he was only a temporary servant, who had not attained the character of a quasi-permanent servant and as such entitled as of right to the post he was holding. So the question will be whether by the order dated 7-2-56 he has been visited with evil consequences. The first test does not apply to the petitioner as he was only a temporary servant, who had not attained the character of a quasi-permanent servant and as such entitled as of right to the post he was holding. So the question will be whether by the order dated 7-2-56 he has been visited with evil consequences. The order no doubt states that the petitioner was discharged from service for his insubordination and misconduct towards his superior and that he was found to be quite unsuitable for further continuance in service. The question will be whether this would amount to a termination o£ service by way of punishment visiting the petitioner with penal consequences. No doubt the worker; of the order would amount to a stigma on the petitioner affecting his future career as a Government servant, but that would give a right for action under Art. 311 only in the case of a servant who has got a right to continue in the post. Such a right the petitioner did not have as he was not even a quasi-permanent Government servant. So, it cannot be stated that the removal of the petitioner has operated as a forfeiture of his right and that he was visited with evil consequences by the same. 19. The decision in AIR 1958 SC 36 cited above dealt with a case of a Government servant, who was officiating in a Class II post in the Railway Service and was reverted to a Class III post. His case was that the reduction in rank was done as a punishment and that he was not given the protection under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India to defend himself. It is seen from the report that his superior officers found him suffering from an inflated idea of self-importance, that his office work was scrappy, that his relations with the staff and officers were not happy and that he displayed a tendency to resort freely to transfer and punishment of staff as a means of correcting their faults. The General Manager of the Railway in reverting him, as a class III servant said that he should revert as a subordinate till he made good his shortcomings as an officer. The Railway Board in appeal said that his reversion for unsatisfactory work will stand, but that it will not be a bar to his being considered again for promotion. The General Manager of the Railway in reverting him, as a class III servant said that he should revert as a subordinate till he made good his shortcomings as an officer. The Railway Board in appeal said that his reversion for unsatisfactory work will stand, but that it will not be a bar to his being considered again for promotion. Thus though the reduction in rank was effected on the ground of misconduct and inefficiency, as an Officer, their Lordships did not consider that in the case of a Government servant who was only officiating in a particular post and. did not have a right to continue in the post, he would be entitled to the protection under Art. 311(2). I find from the judgments of the dissenting Judge Mr. Bose, J. that he treated Appellant reduction in rank, under such circumstances as an evil consequence-visited on the Officer which made him entitled to the protection under Art. 311, but the majority opinion of four Judges of the Supreme Court did not agree with that view. 20. In the same way, in the present case, even though the petitioner was discharged from service for insubordination and misconduct towards his superior Officer, which made him unsuitable to continue in service, it cannot be said in the light of the Supreme Court decision quoted above that such a discharge even if treated as amounting to removal from service has visited the petitioner with any evil consequences as he was only a temporary Government servant within the meaning of R. 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Services) Rules, 1949. In the case of a Government servant, who has a right to continue in the post under the contract of employment or under the Rules, such words as used in the order dated 7-2-56 would, no doubt, amount to a stigma on his future career and as such would be treated as a punishment entailing penal consequences. Nay, in such a case, even if the Government in terminating the employment so worded the order of removal or dismissal as to make it appear that it was not a punishment, the Court will have to apply the test laid down in the decision, to decide whether it amounted to a punishment visiting the Officer with evil consequences. Nay, in such a case, even if the Government in terminating the employment so worded the order of removal or dismissal as to make it appear that it was not a punishment, the Court will have to apply the test laid down in the decision, to decide whether it amounted to a punishment visiting the Officer with evil consequences. But in the case of a temporary, servant, who does not possess the character of a quasi-permanent servant, it seems to me that the converse proposition would apply, namely, that even if the Government in its order of discharge uses such words as to make it appear that it was a punishment, the Court would not give such a servant the right to apply under Art. 311, as no evil consequences would really follow from such an order of dismissal or removal. In other words, the discharge of a temporary Government servant who has not attained the status of quasi-permanency even if it is done for misconduct will not amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning of Art. 311. 21. The petitioner had no right to his post as conductor under the contract of service and the Government could terminate his services at any time under R. 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Services) Rules 1949. The termination of his post either under the Rules or as a punishment would not visit him with any evil consequences, as it would not operate as a forfeiture of his rights and would not affect his future career as he had no future career at all in Government service. Again, in the order dated 7-11-57, passed by the Manipur Administration, it has been made clear that the petitioner will not be debarred by his removal from service from future appointment. Thus I am unable to see any evil consequences or penalty inflicted on the petitioner as a result of the order dated 7-2-56. It follows that the petitioner cannot invoke the aid of Art. 311 against the said order. 22. Thus I am unable to see any evil consequences or penalty inflicted on the petitioner as a result of the order dated 7-2-56. It follows that the petitioner cannot invoke the aid of Art. 311 against the said order. 22. In the view that I have taken, namely, that the petitioner is not entitled to the protection under Art. 311 it becomes unnecessary for me to consider the further questions raised by him that he was dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and that he has not been given any reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his removal. Even if he got any relief regarding the order passed on 7-2-56, he has still got another hurdle to cross, namely, the order dated 6-3-56, dismissing him from service after giving an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and after he had failed to show such cause. That order has not been questioned at all in this writ. 23. From what I have said above, it follows that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this application and it is dismissed with the costs of the respondents. Counsels fee Rs. 100/-. Petition dismissed.