Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to revise an order of the District Munsiff of Crangannore, passed under O.XXV, R.1, Code of Civil Procedure, calling upon the plaintiff to furnish security for costs of the defendants. Plaintiff has admittedly no property and he has also filed an insolvency petition. The defendant application under 0. XXV R.1 C. P. C. to order the plaintiff to furnish security for costs was opposed by the plaintiff on the grounds that the mere fact of his poverty was not sufficient for calling upon him to furnish security for costs and that as the suit was filed by him on behalf of the Samajam and the Samajam was possessed of properties O. XXV R.1 could have no application to this case at all. 2. Or. XXV R.1, Code of Civil Procedure, reads as follows: "I. (1) At any stage of a suit, the court may either of its own motion or on the application of any defendant, order the plaintiff, for reasons to be recorded, to give within the time fix d by it security for the payment of all costs incurred and likely to be incurred by any defendant: Provided that such an order shall be made in all cases in which it appears to the court that a sole plaintiff is, or (when there are more plaintiff's than one) that all the plaintiffs are, residing out of India and that such plaintiff does not possess or that no one of such plaintiffs possesses any sufficient immovable property within India other than the property in suit. (2) Whoever leaves India under such circumstances as to afford reasonable probability that he will not be forthcoming whenever he may be called upon to pay costs shall be deemed to be residing out of India within the meaning of the proviso to sub-rule (1)". It is common ground that neither clause (2) nor the proviso to clause (1), both of which make it obligatory on the part of the court to call upon the plaintiff to furnish security applies to this case. Under the first paragraph of sub-clause (1) the court has a discretion to decide whether the plaintiff should be called upon to furnish security or not, and the only question for decision is whether that discretion has been properly exercised in this case. 3. Under the first paragraph of sub-clause (1) the court has a discretion to decide whether the plaintiff should be called upon to furnish security or not, and the only question for decision is whether that discretion has been properly exercised in this case. 3. It was contended on behalf of the revision petitioner that the real plaintiff in this case is the Samajam and not the person who has filed the plaint and the Samajam being possessed of properties there is no ground for calling upon the plaintiff to furnish security, and that even if it is considered that the real plaintiff is not the Samajam but the person who has filed the plaint his poverty is not a ground for calling upon him to furnish security as he has filed the suit merely to protect the interests of the Samajam. 4. The Samajam is not eo nomini the plaintiff in this suit. The plaintiff eo nomini is the revision petitioner and what he has asked in the plaint is for a decree to be given to him for recovering, on behalf of the Samajam, the amounts said to be due to it. He is not the person entitled under the bye-laws of the Samajam to bring the suit on its behalf. It is only by virtue of his right as a mere member of the Samajam that the suit has been brought. Admittedly the Samajam possesses properties, and there are many members in it some of whom also admittedly possess properties. And yet, the suit, which it is alleged has been filed on behalf of the Samajam, has been brought by an insolvent. In these circumstances, if the suit has been brought with the authority or the consent of the Samajam or of the majority of its members, there is every reason to suspect that the insolvent has been made to file the suit in order to enable the Samajam to escape the liability for costs if the suit is dismissed. 5. Bowen, L. J., has observed in Cowell v. Taylor (1886) XXXI Ch, D. 34: "The general rule is that poverty is no bar to a litigant that, from time immemorial has been the rule at common law, and also, I believe, in equity. 5. Bowen, L. J., has observed in Cowell v. Taylor (1886) XXXI Ch, D. 34: "The general rule is that poverty is no bar to a litigant that, from time immemorial has been the rule at common law, and also, I believe, in equity. There is an exception in the case of appeals but there the appellant has had the benefit of a decision by one of Her Majesty's Courts, and so an insolvent arty is not excluded from the courts but only prevented, if he cannot find security, from dragging his opponent from one court to another. There is also an exception introduced in order to prevent abuse that if an insolvent sues as nominal plaintiff for the benefit of somebody else, be must give security." The principles enunciated in this passage can, in my opinion if I may say so with respect, be adopted as a safe guide for the exercise of the discretion vested in the court by the first paragraph of Or. XXV, rule (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. In the present case, the revision petitioner is only a nominal plaintiff, the real plaintiff i. e. the Samajam is possessed of properties and neither the Samajam as such nor any member thereof who is possessed of properties has come forward to file the suit. In the circumstances, this is a case in which to prevent abuse, it is necessary to call upon the insolvent, suing as nominal plaintiff for the benefit of the Samajam, to give security. The exercise of the discretion by the lower court therefore, cannot be said to be improper. The order of the lower court is, therefore, confirmed, and the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.